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MANNAMARAKKALA GE JOSEPH ANTHONY COORAY
THE JUDICIAL ROLE UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONS OE CEYLON/SRI 
LANKA: AN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY.
In this thesis the attention is mainly focussed on ' 
the 1 judicial power cases* of the 1948-1972 period, which 
laid down that separation of powers and independence of 
the judiciary were fundamental features of the Soulbury 
Constitution of Ceylon, In Part I an attempt is made to 
find out the extent to which these principles found 
expression in the colonial constitutional structure from 
1796 to 1948, It will be shown how during this period the 
courts of Ceylon gradually strengthened their independent 
position.
How the courts of Ceylon * assumed* the power of 
judicial review of legislation and creatively interpreted 
the Constitution and so made lav; is discussed in Part II.
The adoption of the *autochtho nous constitution* of 
1972, its objects, and the role of the Constitutional Court 
which was given the power to review Bills, instead of the 
more familiar judicial review of legislation form the 
subject matter of Part III, It will be shown how that 
court interpreted the Constitution in such a manner so as 
to defeat the very purpose for which it had been adopted.
Chapters 3 and 9 deal with the judicial role 
during colonial rule and in independent Ceylon, 
respectively. The role of the Constitutional Court is 
assessed in Chapter 11.
The epilogue reviev/s the development of the judiciary 
and its role with hindsight, outlines the changes brought 
about by the 1978 Constitution and examines how far the 
independence of the judges is respected in Sri Lanka.
An attempt is also made to study briefly the causes for 
rivalry or disharmony between the judiciary and the 
administration.
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PREFACE
Arthur C. Clarke, the man who forecast the space
exploration programme with precision aid set out the
basic mathematics of communications satellites twenty
1
years before they became a reality, chooses in his latest
2
work of science fiction, The Fountain of Paradise,
Adam!s Peak, a holy mountain for Buddhists, Muslims and
Christians, as the earth terminal for a bridge linking
the earth with a man-made moon in space. Imaginary
inter-planetary relations based in fthe Resplendent Island*
apart, Sri Lanka has had maintained close trade and
cultural links with a multitude of nations, some of whom
have left behind distinctly identifiable traces. The
recent past records the advent of the Portuguese (1505—
1658), who left behind Catholicism, of the Dutch (1658-
1796), who introduced the Roman-Dutch Law, the starting
3
point of Sri Lanka*s common law, and of the British 
(1796-1948), who transplanted an administrative and 
judicial system known to them.
In our survey of the judicial role in Ceylon/Sri 
Lanka it is not necessary to travel beyond the time of 
British colonial rule since the present constitutional and
1. Telegranh, Sunday Magazine. No. 122 of 1979,
*How the Man Found His Way to the Stars* (pp. 33-9).
2. Published by Victor Gollanz Ltd., (1979).
3. See Kodeeswaran v. The Attorney-General of Ceylon 
(1969) 72 N. 1. R. 337, at p. 342 (P. C.).
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judicial structure begins with their governance of Ceylon. 
Therefore, we have left out from the scope of this thesis 
the native judicial system, which was in force at the time 
of British occupation of Ceylon, nor have we delved into 
the developments that took place during the Portuguese 
and the Dutch periods.
One third of my time in London on my research was 
spent in the Official Archives. This, however, is 
barely adequate to do justice to the voluminous material 
that awaits to be analysed and put to proper use.
Therefore, if there are imperfections the reader is kindly 
asked to forgive me. I earnestly believe that I have 
succeeded in selecting what is necessary for a proper 
1 understanding of the development of the judiciary with 
special reference to its relationship with the administration. 
God willing, I hope to engage in further research into 
the historical aspect in the near future.
It is inevitable that certain aspects of my thesis 
receive more detailed treatment than others. Similarly 
certain aspects which may be thought to be important are 
merely outlined. This is because I had to highlight some 
issues which I thought deserved detailed examination 
either because they have not previously been discussed in 
detail or because I had a contribution to make to v/hat 
has already been said by others. I hope that the thesis 
nevertheless maintains a balanced flow.
It was Professor James S. Read, my thesis supervisor, 
who encouraged me to undertake historical research. The 
one full year that I spent in the Public Records Offic'e 
has been the most challlenging and rewarding period of my 
research in London for just over three years. Por his 
masterly guidance, unfailing assistance and friendly 
persuasion and encouragement I am greatly indebted 
to Professor Read.
Professor M. L. Marasinghe (Windsor, Canada) and 
Dr. Peter Slinn (SOAS, London) read and made valuable 
comments on some of the chapters. Mr Y. R. Vyas (Vikram 
University, India) kindly went through some of the 
original drafts. Professor Marasinghe also made certain 
documents and books available. To them I am sincerely 
thankful.
Professor G-. L. Peiris (University of Colombo',..
Sri Lanka) has been a constant source of inspiration. To 
him and to Professor T. Nadaraja (Dean/Law, University of 
Colombo), who are genuinely interested in my welfare,
I am more than thankful.
I wish to thank the Commonwealth Scholarships 
Commission in the U. K. for awarding me a scholarship.
My thanks are especially due to Miss. Olivia Saldanha 
(British Council) and to Mr. L. C. C. Reynolds 
(Association of Commonwealth Universities).
XMrs. Farida Marasinghe typed the first two parts of 
my thesis with great dedication. It is due to certain 
mechanical problems of typewriters that the thesis is 
not as neat as I would have wished it to be. I must in 
any case thank Mrs. Marasinghe for her wonderful 
contribution.
Last but not least I must thank my wife for all 
her assistance especially at the last stages of my 
thesis. Many others have helped me in many ways.
I thank them all.
Anton Cooray,
May 1979,
London,
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PART I
BRITISH COLONIAL RULE 1796-1948
C H A P T E R  O N E
1796 to 1832 - PRELUDE TO THE BEGINNING OF THE 
MODERN SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
This, the formative period of the modern system of 
courts, provides an interesting episode in the history of 
the judicial role in Sri Lanka. Through a series of clashes 
that occurred during this period between judicial and 
administrative officers, one discerns certain ideals which 
were cherished by the judges. These clashes and a number of 
other events will be discussed in this chapter in order to 
understand the attitude of both judicial and administrative 
officers towards an independent judiciary. The structural 
developments in the civil and judicial administration will 
be discussed only in . outline and only to an extent strictly 
necessary for our purpose.^
Ceylon experienced three distinct systems of 
administration during the period under review. From the 
conquest of Ceylon in 1796 to 1798, the administration of 
Ceylon was in the hands of the British East India Company, 
whose forces were responsible for the conquest of Ceylon.
The Commander of their forces in Ceylon headed the administra 
tion. In 1798 the administrative responsibility for Ceylon 
was transferred to the Crown, with certain powers over
1. For a detailed account see Nadaraja, Leoal System 
Chapter II.
administration still left to the Madras-based British East 
India Company. This *dual system of administration1 came to 
an end when, in 1801, Ceylon became a Crown colony.
(1) 1796 to 1801
A period of uncertainty prevailed in Ceylon from 
1796 to 1798. The root-cause of the uncertainty may be 
attributed to the then prevailing.likelihood of restoring the 
British possessions in Ceylon to the Dutch. This uncertainty 
contributed in no small measure to the unwillingness or 
inability of the East India Company to introduce a well- 
organised administrative system together with a satisfactory 
system of courts and to the refusal of the Dutch inhabitants 
to co-operate with the British to establish and maintain 
Dutch courts of law.^ Moreover, it appears that the primary, 
if not exclusive, concern of the British East India Company
was to collect as much revenue as possible while it held the
. . 2maritime provinces of Ceylon. As a result, whatever judicial
arrangements made during this period were inevitably temporary
3
and not the result of serious deliberation. It is, therefore, 
safe to conclude that they made little contribution to the 
development of the judiciary. In fact, when, in 1798, North
1. In the opinion of the British East India Company:
1 the precariousness of our position, the short period the whole
of the Dutch settlements have been in our hands, the difficulty 
of obtaining information, the distrust of the natives, the 
indisposition of the Dutch were obstacles to a successful 
management1. Robert Hobart’s minute of June 9, 1797.
C. 0. 55/2.
2. See generally, Colvin R. de Silva, Ceylon Under 
the British Occupation, (1953), chapter VII.
3. See Jackson to Stuart, April 28, 1796.
C. 0. 55/1; and, Colvin R. de Silva, op.cit., pp. 310-11.
came to Ceylon as the first civil Governor of Ceylon who uas 
ever to be appointed by the Crown, he noticed a ’total 
suspension of every kind of criminal justice and indeed of 
civilT
The Royal Instructions issued to North emphasised the
need to administer justice fairly:
It being of the greatest importance that 
justice be everywhere speedily and duly 
administered, and that all disorders, 
delays and other undue practices in the 
Administration thereof be effectually 
prevented, we do particularly require you 
to take especial care, that in all courts 
• • • Justice be impartially administered, 
and that all Judges and other persons therein 
concerned do likewise perform their several 
Duties without delay or partiality.
In order to realise such objectives he was instructed to 
'establish the Dutch system of courts and to set up a court 
of appeal in civil cases of above a certain monetary value.
An appeal lay from the appeal court to the Privy Council 
subject to a still higher monetary value requirement.^
In the beginning North failed to secure the 
co-operation of the Dutch inhabitants to set in motion the 
Dutch courts which were in abeyance. Moreover, he believed 
that the Dutch system of courts should not be adopted without 
major modifications. Negligence, uncertainty and corruption,
4. North to Dundas, June 28, 1798. Wellesley Mss.,
B. M. Add. Mss. 13866 p. 37 a; North to Court of Directors, 
February 25, 1799. C. 0. 54/1.
5. G. C. Mendis (ed, ), The Colebrooke-Cameron Papers 
Documents on British Colonial Policy in Ceylon 1796-1833, ~ 
Vol. 2 pp. 70-79, at p. 76.
6* Ibid., at p. 72, 74-75.
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he found, had been regular features of Dutch Courts,
Fiscaals (court-officials uith wide powers in civil and
criminal cases), whose powers were extensive and dangerous,
were not necessarily lawyers, nor was there legal
representation before Dutch Courts,
(\lo viva voce evidence was insisted upon 
by the Court, and the Court itself was 
composed of two military and six civil 
servants of the /Dutch East India7 
Company presided by the Chief Administrator, 
or Head of the Revenue and Commerce, A 
Court composed of men entirely unlearned 
in the law without salary as judges, or 
even the obligation of hearing cases in 
open court, is not an establishment to 
which one can look for great attention.^,
North was in favour of appointing lawyers as judges, legal 
representation, the separation of the judicial function from 
the collection of revenue and of the need to amply remunerate 
judges in order to secure an impartial system of administration 
of justice.®
Uhatever his personal views, his reactions to them 
were ultimately conditioned by various considerations, mainly 
economic. Thus, after expressing those views and stating 
the refusal of the Dutch judges to cooperate, he goes on to 
say:
It therefore became my duty to make such 
arrangements as with the smallest charge 
to your revenue would obtain most effectually 
under existing circumstances the substantial 
ends of justice.g
7. North to Court of Directors, Dune 10, 1799. 
C. 0. 54/1.
8. Also see North to Camden, March 1, 1805.
C. 0. 54/17.
9. North to Court of Directors, Dune 10, 1799. 
C. 0. 54/1.
North was able to resuscitate the Dutch system of courts 
when the Dutch judicial officers changed their minds and 
extended their cooperation to the new rulers. Replacing the 
three Raden van Justitie, North introduced a Supreme Court 
of Criminal Justice consisting of the Governor as president, 
Commander in Chief, Chief Secretary, Commandant of 
Trincomalee, Commercial Resident and Dames Dunkin, a 
Barrister. (This court had an exclusive jurisdiction in 
criminal matters except the jurisdiction given to fiscals 
in respect of minor offences). In fact, North had requested 
in the above quoted despatch that a lawyer be sent from 
India 'till it may please His Majesty to make such appointments 
on the island, as may either alleviate my judicial labours,
.or relieve me from them altogether'.^®
North re-established the Dutch civil courts 
(Landraden and Civiele Raden) providinq an appeal to the 
greater or the lesser court of appeal depending on the value 
of the subject matter and a further appeal to the Privy 
Council. Realising that fiscals' courts had functioned 
satisfactorily, their criminal jurisdiction was enhanced by 
North twice before the introduction of the Charter of Justice, 
1801. A member of one such fiscal's court was found to be 
'a gentleman bred to the law'.^"^
1°. • Ibid.
11. North to Court of Directors, January 30, 1800. 
C. 0. 54/2.
The attitude shown by North during this period 
(1797-1801) towards the judiciary is noteworthy. In a state­
ment of the administration of Ceylon, while referring to the 
Supreme Criminal Court he says:
Though subject to the disadvantages a court 
not consisting of lawyers and without legal 
representation would labour, the court seems 
to have won confidence.^
He had earlier hoped that time was not far 'when the state 
of this colony will allow of the establishment of a more
13
regular system for the administration of criminal justice*. 
North, who continued in the office of Governor until 1804, 
did not change his views favourable to a properly constituted 
judiciary,.even faced with intense enmity betueen the judiciary 
and the military officers which will be discussed shortly in 
this chapter.
(2) 1801-1832: Structural Developments
The close of the 'dual system of administration* saw 
the beginning of a new era in the British administration of 
Ceylon, when in 1801 Ceylon became a Crown Colony and thus 
directly under the control of the Imperial Government.
As before 1801, the Governor was, under the new 
Commission and Instructions issued to him in 1801, the sole 
repository of all powers of government 'as well Civil as 
Military*. He was, however, instructed to form a Council 
which he could consult with on 'all great and important
1 12. Ibid.
13. North to Court of Directors, October 5, 1799.
C. 0. 54/1.
occasions*, but uhich uas not to have any share of the 
legislative or executive authority. In fact it uas intended 
for the sake of *more solemnity1.^ The formation of this 
advisory council is significant, however, to the extent that 
it recognised, at least in theory, the need to provide some 
check on the Governor in uhom uas vested a uide variety of 
powers, NorthjUho uas instructed to appoint to the Council 
the Chief Justice, the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief Secretary, 
and tuo others in the Governor* s discretion, chose to appoint 
the three named officials only.
The Charter of Justice of 1801, uhich drew freely
2on the measures that had provisionally been adopted by North, 
established a Supreme Court of Judicature, composed of a 
Chief Justice and a Puisne Justice uho were to be Barristers, 
in England or Ireland, of not less than five years standing, 
and uho were to be nominated and appointed by His Majesty.
Thus, just under five years of the British occupation of 
Ceylon, a court consisting of professional lauyers uho did 
not oue the tenure of their office to the local executive came 
into being.
The Supreme Court uas given a criminal jurisdiction 
extending throughout the British possessions in Ceylon and a 
civil jurisdiction limited to the toun and fort of Colombo 
and over all Europeans. Criminal jurisdiction in respect of 
lesser offences continued to be exercised by Magistrates, 
Justices of the Peace and Fiscals* Courts (renamed courts of 
the Justices of the Peace in 1802) appointed, and acting
1. Instructions from Dundas, President of the Board
of Control, to Governor North, March 13, 1801. Mendis, op.cit., 
Vol. II, pp. 107-137, at p. 108.
2. Ibid., at p. 110.
according to the regulations issued, by the Governor, but 
over uhom the Supreme Court exercised a general supervision.
(As ue shall see later, this general supervision by the
3
Supreme Court uas resented by succeeding Governors).
Outside the Colombo fort and toun limits civil jurisdiction, 
uas to be exercised by Landraden and Civiele Raden.
A High Court of Appeal uas introduced by the Charter, 
replacing the Greater and Lesser Courts of Appeal then in 
existence, to hear appeals from Landraden and Civiele Raden.
Its members uere the Governor, the Chief Secretary and the tuo 
judges of the Supreme Court. One of the tuo judges of the 
Supreme Court uas required to be present uhenever the High 
Court of Appeal assembled. Any tuo members of the Court 
"constituted a competent court. These provisions ensured that 
much of the actual uork could be carried out by the tuo judges, 
'uhile the attention of the natives /uas/ still preserved to 
the Governor, as the President of these salutary tribunals; 
as the immediate representative of His Majesty and the source 
of redress in civil as of mercy in criminal cases' /
The provisions relating to the High Court of Appeal, 
thus, enabled a uilling executive to leave judicial functions 
in appeal cases exclusively to the tuo judicial officers. In 
the Supreme Court of Judicature, the only pouer the Governor 
had uas to decide finally a criminal case uhere the tuo judges 
could not reach consensus.
3. See, infra , p. 23-26.
4. Instructions from Henry Dundas, President of the 
Board of Control, to Governor North, 13 March 1801. Mendis, 
op.cit., Vol. II, p. 111.
No major changes were made in the judicial structure 
introduced in 1801 until 1810. Maitland, North's successor, 
sent the Puisne Justice, Alexander Johnstone to England, in 
1809, to present a case for judicial reforms. Uhat Maitland 
wanted most uas the introduction of a jury system in order to 
ensure that the Supreme Court judges, uho uere aliens to the 
native society, had the indispensable assistance of local 
inhabitants as jurors. By this time Maitland had come to 
resent certain acts of the Chief Justice calculated to 
demonstrate the independence and the authority of the Supreme 
Court. These events uhich uill be discussed in the next 
part of this chapter prompted Maitland to seek reforms in the 
judicial system tending to avert such unpleasant incidents. 
Unfortunately for him, Johnstone proved to be an ardent 
supporter of an independent and authoritative judiciary.
5
The Charter of Justice of 9th August, 1810, based 
on the recommendations of Johnston, P. J., extended the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court so that nou it had both 
civil and criminal jurisdiction over the uhole of the British 
possessions in Ceylon and over persons of every nationality 
residing uithin that territory. The Provincial Courts, uhich 
had taken the place of Landraden^were abolished in vieu of the 
extended civil jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Landraden 
uere to be restored instead, in such districts and under such 
modifications as the Chief Justice might deem expedient. The 
Chief Justice uas given the further powers, with the 
concurrence of the Governor, of making rules of proceeding
5. Mendis, op.cit., Vol II, pp. 170-199.
and tables of fees, and of appointing secretaries and other 
necessary officers of Landraden. The appointment of the 
members of such courts uas, however, left to the sole 
discretion of the Governor as before.
It uas provided that the Supreme Court should usually 
sit in tuo divisions: the Chief Justice holding the first of
such tuo divisions of the Supreme Court in Colombo and making 
circuits in the western and southern provinces and the Puisne 
Justice holding the second division in Jaffna and going on 
circuits in the northern and eastern provinces. The Chief 
Justice uas authorised, however,vto convene a full court in 
his discretion.
Introducing trial by jury, the Charter left it to the
Chief Justice to specify the qualifications of jurors. Further,
both judges sitting together or either of them sitting in
division could direct that the jury be made up of members of
a particular community alone, in order to ensure impartiality.
The Charter increased the salaries payable to the 
tuo judges of the Supreme Court and directed that they be 
made payable in Madras and not as previously in Ceylon.
The Governor uas empowered to make provision or 
regulation in order to give effect to the Charter but only at 
the instance of the Chief Justice stating the need for such 
arrangement.
The instructions accompanying the Charter of Justice 
of 1810^ placed the judicial department directly under the 
'Controul and Management1 of the Chief Justice, and directed
6. Mendis, op.c it., Vol. II, pp. 208-213.
that all orders for this department and all correspondence 
uith it should pass through him. The Chief Justice uas 
directed to submit half-yearly reports on the state of his 
department to the Governor in Council, uhich in turn uere to 
be forwarded to the Secretary of State.
In the Council, too, the powers of the Chief Justice 
were enhanced. He uas designated as the President of the 
Council, and to him uas entrusted the Great Seal of the 
British Settlements of Ceylon, uhich had previously been 
placed in the custody of the Governor. Now, the Governor uas 
to be considered as the Representative of the Crown, in an 
attempt to equate the Council to the Privy Council in England. 
All legislative Acts of the Governor and Council uere to be 
sealed uith the Great Seal, and all grants of lands, uhich 
were required to be made by the Governor in Council under the 
Great Seal, had also to be signed by the President and one 
other member of the Council. The Governor uas given the power 
to appoint members of all the inferior courts under that Seal.
The Charter of Justice, 1810, uhich uas proclaimed
in Ceylon on November 7, 1811, had the effect of elevating
the office of the Chief Justice to a position of considerable
importance and power. In fact, Maitland, uho had to abruptly
leave his office and Ceylon due to ill-health, on July 18, 1811,
protested that Alexander Johnston, uho became the Chief Justice
n
in early 1810, had acted through greed for more power.
Maitland maintained that Johnston uas sent to England to 
request for trial by jury, but not the conferment on the
7. Maitland to Peal, August 30., 1811, C. 0. 54/41.
Chief Justice of powers *of a novel and extended nature*.
The abolition of the provincial courts, he observed, would 
handicap the collection of revenue, andfspeaking from his 
previous experience, the Governor was the best judge of the 
need to establish courts in any particular area, as he was 
well familiar with the state of revenue collection. The 
authority of the Chief Justice over the judicial department 
was objected to on the ground that it constituted a rival to 
the authority of the Governor over the Civil Service. The 
provisions affecting the authority of the Governor in Council 
with diminished pouers in respect of the judicial department, 
Maitland concluded, tended to lower the position of the
0
Governor before the natives.
A new Charter was issued, as a result of the 
representations made by Maitland, on 30th October 1811,
correcting the objectionable provisions of the Charter of
9 101810, which virtually restored the status quo, except for
allowing the continuation of trial by jury which Maitland
himself supported. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts
was confined to its original limits, and the Governor was
empowered to put an end to the division of that court. The
power of regulating the qualifications of jurors was to be
shared by the Chief Justice with the Puisne Justice, In the
event of a disagreement among them, the Governor had the
final decision.
8. Ibid.
9. See Instructions accompanying the Charter of 
Justice, 1811. Mendis, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 219.
10. IMadaraja, Legal System., p. 63.
Provincial Courts which existed prior to the Charter 
of 1810 were revived, with the sole discretion given to the 
Governor of establishing any L andraden. The control over 
the proceedings in the minor courts reverted to the Governor.
The Governor was no longer required to act on the 
advice of the Chief Justice in making arrangements to over­
come doubts or difficulties arising from the operation of 
the Charter, nor was the Chief Justice to continue as the 
President of the Council, having the custody of the Great 
Seal and the authority to sign grants of land. Although 
the increase in the salary of the two judges of the Supreme 
Court was unaffected, it was directed that the salaries be 
paid in Colombo as it had previously been.
In effect, the only change brought about by the 
short-lived Charter of Justice of 1811 was to introduce trial 
by jury, and the judicial system introduced by the Charter 
of Justice, 1801, remained in force in the maritime provinces 
of Ceylon for all practical purposes, with the improvements 
made on it, until 1832.
(3 )____ 1801-1832: The Judiciary v. The Administration
The above outline of the major structural developments 
in the judicial system provides the appropriate setting to 
examine the all too frequent disputes the judiciary had, 
during this period, with either civil or military authorities.
The first series of such disputes took place during 
the Governorship of North between the Supreme Court end the 
Military.'*’ Its origin may be traced to. a strong protest made
1. North to Hobart, October 5, 1804. C. 0. 54/14.
by Colonel Baillie, Commandant of Colombo, against the
imposition of disproportionately severe punishments on two
2soldiers by the Sitting Magistrate in the Pettah. Uhen 
Lushington, P. J •, came to know of this, he not only shared 
the view of the Sitting Magistrate that Baillie!s conduct 
was nothing less than a threat to the safety of the Magistrate 
and thus tantamount to a breach of the peace, but went a step 
■fuHJher placing the matter before the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, 
the matter was taken up by North who thought that BaillieTs 
action was not subversive. Baillie^who was summoned before 
the Supreme Court*was acquitted.
The close proximity in which judicial and military 
authorities were stationed in the Fort of Colombo should 
•.mainly account for the occurrence of the early disputes between 
the two authorities. Uithin a few weeks after the above 
incident, the Supreme Court ordered corporal punishment to be 
inflicted on an offender, on the military parade ground 
situated in front of the court-house. Although the sentry 
stood by while the sentence was carried out, a strong protest 
was made to the Fiscal by the Town Major. The Supreme Court, 
after its own inquiries, came to the conclusion that although 
the parade ground had been exclusively given to the military, 
no ’regular grant’ had been made and that the military had, in 
fact, ’illegally monopolized* the particular piece of land. 
Baillie was summoned before the Supreme Court and asked to 
revoke the standing garrison order made three years previously 
which authorised the use of the particular area as a parade 
ground. Upon his refusal to do so without the approval of
the Governor or General Uemyss, the Commander, he was ordered
to enter into a bond to keep the peace. The Governor, on
hearing this, made a proclamation in Council prohibiting the
infliction of any punishment not of a military nature on the
parade ground. To appease the judges the sentries were
withdrawn. However, the judges were not too happy about the 
3
settlement.
General Uemyss at Chilaw, provoked by the attitude 
of the judges, ordered Baillie to close the gates of the Fort 
of Colombo from 8 a.m. till mid-day, on the pretext that spies 
entered the Fort in the morning and stayed in till noon. On 
the 24th of September, the judges of the Supreme Court,who 
could not enter the Fort as Uemyss’s order, which had clearly 
been intended to prevent the functioning of the Supreme Court 
in the Fort, had been given effect to, sought the intervention 
of the Governor. North annulled the order and permitted the 
gates to be open, but only till the following day when 
Uemyss’s notification of the order reached North. In order to 
safeguard the interests of Baillie, North authorised the 
closure of the gates as ordered by Uemyss• The Supreme Court 
Judges were, therefore, left with Hobson’s choice; to enter 
the Fort before 8 a.m. and leave after 12 nooa. They, in 
return, compelled Uemyss-to appear before the Supreme Court, 
notwithstanding his urgent commitments in the operations 
against the Kandyans, and to enter into a bond for 100,000 
rix-dollars to keep the peace for a year.
3. Ibid.
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North moved the Supreme Court from the Fort of 
Colombo on the ground that the court-house, which North had 
always intended to hand over to the military as an armoury, 
was needed for expected reinforcements.
Humiliated as they were by this turn of events, the 
Supreme Court Judges took strong objection to a letter 
addressed to North by Uemyss abusing judicial officers. The 
Advocate-Fiscal allegedly challenged Uemyss to a duel as a 
result of what contained in that letter. The Supreme Court 
decided that no challenge had been intended, reprimanded the 
Advocate-Fiscal and ordered him to apologise to Uemyss. Later 
judicial proceedings were instituted against Uemyss, though 
unsuccessfully, for allegedly ordering his servants to collect 
.firewood from private lands without permission.
The enmity between the judges of the Supreme Court 
* and General Uemyss reached such proportions that they no 
longer recognised each other on private occasions. Of this 
series of disputes North remarked thus: ’A storm hasjjust
blown over which I feared might have nearly shipwrecked our 
small colony'.^
North attributed the cause for these unpleasant 
incidents to the lack of clear demarcation between political, 
military and judicial functions. Further, it was incompatible 
to have two ’commanding officers’, namely the Commandant and 
the Chief Justice, within the Fort of Colombo. Although 
he found the course of events unsatisfactory, North appreciated
4. Ibid.
the need to ’repel in an open and unqualified manner the 
implied disrespect’ to the Court caused by the closure of 
the fort-entrances. In these events is discernible a strong
commitment by the Supreme Court to assert its independence, 
in spite of the fact that a clash of personalities is also 
detected.
A feu months after the arrival, on Duly 18, 1807, of 
North’s successor, Maitland, Lushington, P.O., uas appointed 
the Chief Oustice uith Alexander Oohnston, till then the 
Advocate-Fiscal, as the Puisne Oustice. The attempt by 
Oohnston to secure a high degree of independence and authority 
for the Supreme Court and more, particularly to the Chief 
Oustice leading to the Charters of 1810 and 1811 ha^ already 
been referred to. Certain disputes betueen Lushington, C.O., 
and Maitland remain to be mentioned.
Immediately after his return from England, uith his 
neu appointment as the Chief Oustice, Lushington tried 
unsuccessfully to rule that courts-martial could not exercise 
a criminal jurisdiction in minor offences concurrently uith 
the courts of lau.^ His next attempt to negate the legality
7
of the table of fees in the High Court, too, failed. Another 
example of the peculiarity of the decisions given by 
Lushington, much to the annoyance of Maitland, may be mentioned. 
Maitland granted a pardon to a prisoner, on Lushington’s 
recommendation, countersigned by the Deputy Secretary in'the
5• Ibid.
6. Maitland to Castlereagh, September 30 and 
December 1, 1807. C. 0. 54/26.
7. See the papers in C. 0. 54/32.
absence of the Chief Secretary, uho, according, to the Royal 
Instructions, had the authority to do so. In spite of his 
own advice to the Governor that the Deputy . Secretary’s 
signature uas sufficient, Lushington declared from the Bench 
that the pardon had not validly been issued. Maitland 
legislated validating pardons issued uith the Deputy Secretary’s 
signature. Lushington refused to reply ^ aitland’s correspon­
dence on this matter on the ground that it related to a 
judicial decision.^
Maitland reacted by removing Lushington from the
Council, bringing in the Puisne Justice instead, and shortly
afteruards, follouing the decision of the Governor in Council
g
to suspend him, Lushington resigned.
In 1818, the Puisne Justice, in a case dealing uith 
the legality of pressing coolies for the army, declared from 
the Bench that such action could be valid only if the officer 
concerned had been issued a commission, and that in the case 
of a fugitive coolie only if a uarrant of arrest had been 
issued by a Magistrate. He suggested to Brounrigg, the 
Governor, that his ruling should be given effect to by a 
regulation. Brounrigg uas, houever, inclined to accept the 
advice of the Collectors that in vieu of the service land 
tenures prevalent in the country and the scarcity of 
Magistrates, no restrictions ought to be placed on adminis­
trative officers in respect of pressing for labour. Accordingly, 
he passed a regulation to declare valid the existing practices, 
thereby nullifying the ruling of the Supreme Court.
8. Maitland to Castlereagh., August 18, 1808. C. 0.
54/28.
9. See papers in C. 0. 54/32..
10. Brounrigg to Bathurst, July 17, 1818, C. 0. 54/71.
Soon afteruards, the Supreme Court decided that a 
person of lou caste had been urongly convicted by a Collector 
for using a palanquin. There uas no regulation uhich autho­
rised such punishment (flogging) and it uas improper to foster 
caste distinctions, the Supreme Court held. Although Barnes, 
uho had by nou succeeded Brounrigg as Governor, sau the evil 
in perpetuating caste distinction, he thought it imprudent to 
offend the higher classes of natives for the time being. A
regulation uas then enacted sanctioning the punishment of
those of a lou caste for such offences.^
One of the most important disputes betueen the 
Judiciary and the Governor arose in early 1824 regarding the 
pouer of the Supreme Court to issue the urit of Habeas Corpus. 
Sir James Campbell, uho acted temporarily as the Governor 
until Barnes uas reappointed later that year, had directed 
the Sitting Magistrate in Colombo to arrest a certain 
deserter and to hold him in custody. Shortly after his 
arrest, an application for a urit of habeas corpus uas made
before the Supreme Court, uhich directed the prisoner to be
brought before it uith the authority on uhich he uas detained. 
Meanuhile the Governor passed a regulation legalising the 
arrest and detention of any person under the authority of the
Governor. According to that regulation the production of the
12order of the Governor barred any further legal proceedings.
Bound by the neu regulation, the Supreme Court had no option
but to dismiss the case observing that ’this Court is reduced
to the heart-breaking necessity of saying that His Majesty’s
13u n t  of habeas corpus is of no effect’.
11. Barnes to Bathurst, March 11, 1821. C. 0. 54/79.
12. Regulation 11, February 5, 1821. C. 0. 54/79.
13. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. XXIV/, p. 1158.
The Governor thought that in the interest of the 
State he should posses certain powers of arrest and detention 
not subject to judicial scrutiny."^ On the other hand, the 
Chief Justice recorded that the vesting of such wide powers 
in the Governor eroded the freedom of the subject. The 
Secretary of State responded by ordering the substitution of 
the regulation with another which gave limited powers to the 
Governor in respect of political prisoners.
An examination of the incidents outlined above indicates 
a distinct difference in the attitudes held by the judges of 
the Supreme Court, and the administration. The Judges of the 
Supreme Court, who did not owe their tenure of office to the 
Governor, "were able to take an independent stand in matters 
•where the interests of the state and the individual or those 
of the state and the courts were in conflict. In each of the 
above incidents the Supreme Court seems to have acted in 
defence of the freedom of the individual or the independence 
of the judiciary. The Governor, and his subordinate civil 
servants, on the other hand, were committed to upholding the 
security of the state, maintaining a steady revenue and 
ensuring an efficient civil and military administration.
The assertion by the Supreme Court of its independence 
and authority was resented by the Governor to the extent that 
it undermined his own authority. For instance, Brounrigg 
felt that the insistence of the Supreme Court on the need for 
the continuation of it being escorted by musicians and 
lascoreens uas explicable only on the ground that judges wanted
14. Campbell to Bathurst, January 14, 1824. 
C. 0. 54/86.
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to publicly demonstrate its high position. In recommending
that all unnecessary expenses incurred in respect of such
ceremonies ought to be brought to an end, Brounrigg indicated
hou the elevation of the Supreme Court to a position equal
to that held by the Governor, at least in outuard appearancs,
15tended to diminish his authority before the natives. Dn the
other hand, the Budges of the Supreme Court contended that it
uould detract from the respect uhich uas paid to the Court, 
if such an escort did not attend to i t . ^  This struggle for 
pouer and dignity is clearly brought out by the rival claims 
of the Supreme Court and the Governor over the control and 
supervision of the members of the inferior courts.
(4) 1801-1832: Inferior Courts
Tuo conflicting vieus competed for recognition during
this period. The first highlighted the advantages of a
separate and independent judiciary. As North recorded;
The uise and humane establishment of Adaulats 
in Bengal has sufficiently declared to the 
uorld your /Court of Directors^/ opinion of 
the necessity of separating the judicial 
pouers from the collection of the revenue.
I need not therefore, I presume, state at 
length the inconvenience uhich naturally 
results from their union in the Collectors 
Cutchery or the advantage uhich of course 
uould arise from the re-establishment of 
distinct and independent Courts of Lau.^
Such salutary vieus, houever, had to give u.ay to vieus that 
resulted from considerations of practical government.
15. Brounrigg to Bathurst, March 13, 1817. C. 0. 54/65.
16. See the note by judges in the above dispatch.
1. North to Court of Directors, June 10, 1799.
C. 0. 54/1.
Emphasising the need to entrust revenue collectors uith
judicial powers Maitland pointed out that it uas not the
name of the collector and not the instructions of Government
that enabled him to collect the revenue, !but the conviction
in the minds of the natives that he has pouer to enforce
such collection’.
/"~A_7nd whenever they are persuaded that he 
has either no pouer or that they can go to 
any quarter uhere the effects of such pouer 
may be counteracted, from that moment there 
is an end of all hopes of the Collector being 
able to execute the functions of his office.2
Maitland, however, clearly indicated that the exercise
of judicial function uas not to be considered a primary
function of collectors, and that judicial function ought to
.be exercised only uhen necessity demanded it, for instance,
3
uhen a judge uas not easily available.
The members of Dutch Courts, uhich uere later abolished, 
and of the neu courts established in their place, oued their 
tenure of office to the Governor. This ensured that they 
acted in a manner consistent uith the policies and the needs 
of the government.
An acute disagreement occurred betueen the Supreme 
Court and the Governor in respect of the manner in uhich the 
inferior judges uere directed and controlled. Ue have already 
noted the short lived attempt by Oohnston to secure to the 
Supreme Court a tighter control over inferior judicial officers
2. Memorandum, August 30, 1811. C. 0. 54/41.
3. Instructions to Collectors of Oaffna and Matara, 
n. d. 1806. C. 0. 54/25.
and hou Maitland vehemently objected to such a scheme 
resulting in the proclamation of the Charter of Justice,
1811* Here, it is proposed to deal uith difficulties arising 
from the supervisory control the Supreme Court assumed over 
the inferior courts.
The Charter of Justice, 1801 granted to the Supreme 
Court !a general Superintendence and Controul over all and 
every the Advocates Fiscal, Justices of the Peace, Fiscals, 
and Peace Officers1, and such officers uere declared to be 
’subject to the Order and Controul* of the Supreme Court 
’in the exercise of their Functions’.^ On the other hand it- 
uas left to the Governor to lay doun rules of procedure and 
issue a uide variety of instructions either as legislative 
enactments or executive directions in order to regulate 
proceedings before inferior courts. The Supreme Court, in 
the exercise of its pouers, used . uhile on circuit, to 
examine the diaries and records of magistrates and Justices 
of the Peace and instruct them, and to inquire into the 
conduct of headmen as peace officers. A common practice greu 
after 1812 for the Supreme Court Judges to send in reports, 
usually after making circuits, to the Governor on the state 
of the lau together uith their recommendations and stating
their opinion on the inferior judges and peace officers.
5 6
Both Brounrigg and Maitland resented the extent to uhich
the Supreme Court uent in the exercise of such control.
4. Charter of Justice, 1801, Mendis, op.cit., 
Vol. II, p. 193-94.
5. Brounrigg to Liverpool, January 21, 1813. 
C. 0. 54/46.
6. Memorandum of Maitland, August 30, 1811.
C. 0. 54/41.
Brounrigg particularly opposed the attempts by the
Supreme Court to issue instructions regarding the procedure
in the louer courts. He pointed out rather strongly that the
’province of the Court is certainly to control the pouer
exercised by all inferior magistrates to correct illegal or
erroneous proceedings and to furnish all uilful violations of
their official duties. Those duties are not formed or measured
7
by the orders of the Court but by the lau of the country’.
Such encroachments by the Supreme Court on the legislative and 
executive functions adversely affected the manner in uhich
g
administration uas carried out through Headmen and Collectors.
In 1825, the Colonial Office finally decided, after 
years of hesitation, in favour of the Governors by laying 
•doun that the Supreme Court had exceeded its pouers uhen it 
tried to frame rules for the regulation of the police in the 
* Colony.^
To illustrate the difficulties resulting from this 
dual control, one of many incidents may be cited. In 1818, 
a Nudalyar (a native officer) took auay forcibly a servant of 
a Burgher"^ family. The magistrate, upon complaint, committed 
the accused before the Supreme Court for trial, and the 
Advocate-Fiscal approved his order. An objection uas raised 
by the Collector of Colombo on the ground that the Nudalyar 
had acted on his orders. The Commissioner of Revenue vieued
7. Brounrigg to Bathurst, July 9, 1817. C. 0. 54/66.
8. Ibid.
9. Bathurst to Barnes, September 12, 1825. C. 0.
55/69.
10. ’A person descended from an European by a Native*. 
Proclamation of January 22, 1801, art. 33.
the action of the Magistrate as an attempt to set up his 
authority against that of the Collector. In his opinion, the 
Magistrate should have referred the matter to him instead of 
committing the Mudalyar before the Supreme Court for trial.
The Deputy Secretary held that by acting in disregard of the 
convenience and the interests of the Government, the 
Magistrate had committed a contempt of authority of the 
Collector. He uas dismissed. ^
The above instance amply demonstrates the rivalry 
betueen the Supreme Court and the administration to control 
the inferior judicial officers. Due to its authoritative 
position the administration seems to have had the last word 
nearly aluays in such disputes.
(5 ) Concluding Remarks
The major features of the judicial system of the 
period under review are the existence of a relatively independent 
Supreme Court, inferior courts largely under the control of 
the administration and a rivalry betueen the Supreme Court 
and the administration for both pouer and prestige.
The judicial arrangements made for the Kandyan 
provinces uhich came under British occupation in 1815, too, 
gave rise to an acute disagreement betueen the Supreme Court 
and the administration. First, the judicial arrangements
made in the Kandyan provinces may be outlined.
The fall of the Kandyan Kingdom uas occasioned in the
main by the defection from the Kandyan king of a faction of his
chiefs. Therefore, uhatever arrangements the British introduced
i
11. See Deane to Boyd, April 14, 1818; Boyd to Rodney, 
April 16, 1818; and Lusignam to Tranchell, April 18, 1818.
C. 0. 54/71.
in the Kandyan Kingdom, administrative or judicial, uere
fashioned to accord uith the uishes of the Kandyan chiefs
and people. Thus the executive and judicial system introduced
in 1815 uas a mere super-imposition, on the ancient organs of
administration, of a means of directive European control.^
The Governor, as the representative of the Sovereign of the
British Empire, replaced the former Kandyan king, and exercised
his authority through the Resident of Kandy, the Chief European
officer in the Kandyan provinces. The repository of all
administrative and judicial pouers, the Resident exercised
an exclusive criminal jurisdiction in capital offences.
Otheruise, criminal and civil jurisdiction in respect of
Kandyans uas permitted to be uhere it had lain during the time
2of the Sinhalese Kings.
The unsuccessful rebellion of 1817-1818 afforded a 
good opportunity for Brounrigg to drastically diminish the 
pouers of the native chiefs on the grounds that since they had 
rebelled and violated the Convention of 1815 made betueen them 
and the British, the Convention uas not completely binding on 
him. In addition to the exercise of judicial pouers by the 
Sudicial Commissioner, one of the three members of the neuly
3
created Board of Commissioners, the accredited agents of 
government uere also vested uith judicial pouers. The 
Proclamation of November 21, 1818 took auay the judicial pouers 
exercised by native chiefs almost entirely, leaving only a 
limited criminal jurisdiction in respect of petty offences.
1. Colvin R. de Silva, Ceylon under the British 
Occupation, 1795-1833, p. 299.
2. See for the system of administration of justice 
during the time of the Kandyan Kings, Colvin R. de Silva, 
op.cit., pp. 292-96.
3. It uas set up uith effect from October 1, 1816.
See, Ceylon Government Gazette, September 11, 1816.
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The space does not permit an exhaustive examination 
of the pouers and functions of the Agents and the Judicial 
Commissioner. It may,houever,be noted that in actual 
practice they functioned nearly in the manner the courts did 
in the maritime provinces.
A serious claim uas made, meanuhile, by the judges 
of the Supreme Court and the Advocate-Fiscal, that the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court should extend to the 
Kandyan provinces. The Advocate-Fiscal maintained that the 
judicial arrangements made for those provinces uere contrary 
to the Charter of Justice, 1801, and that every person residing 
in those provinces should be subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court,^ Slightly modest in his claim, the Chief 
Justice argued that all non-Kandyans, according to the
5
Charter, came uithin the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Brounrigg uas of the opinion that the introduction of a
judicial system, uhich till then had been competing uith the
executive for pouer and prestige, uas inadvisable.^ Further,
until more information could be obtained no major changes
7
ought to be made.
It uas not until the proclamation of the Charter of 
Justice, 1833 that the judicial arrangements made by the 
local executive and much objected to by the Supreme Court 
uere suept auay,bringing the uhole island under the jurisdiction 
of a uniform system of judicial administration.
4. H. Giffard to Brounrigg, March 11, 1815.
C. 0. 54/55.
5. See Brounrigg to Bathurst, November 17, 1815.
C. 0. 54/57.
6. Brounrigg to Bathurst, March 15, 1818. C. 0.
54/55.
7. Ibid.
29
C H A P T E R  2
THE CHARTER OF JUSTICE 1833 AND THE 
MODERN JUDICIAL SYSTEM
The Charter of Justice, 1833 has rightly been 
considered to be the foundation of our judicial system and 
the parent of the Administration of Justice Ordinance 1868 
and of the present Courts Ordinance, 1889’.  ^ It is proposed 
in this chapter to examine the recommendations of the 
Colebrooko-Cameron Commission uhich provided the ’general 
basis and design’ as uell as ’all /the/ valuable details’  ^
of the Charter of Justice, 1833, folloued by an outline of 
the judicial system introduced by it. The major developments 
in that judicial system culminating in the Courts Ordinance, 
1889 uill then be examined in,order to provide the necessary 
background to the discussion, in the next chapter, of the 
relationship betueen the judiciary and the administration 
during the period 1833-1948.
1* Per De Sampayo, A.J. in Application for a Urit 
of Prohibition directed to the members of a Field General 
MaiTtiaT (1915 ) 18 N . L • R • 334, at p . 338. The Courts Ordinance 
of 1889, uas repealed by the Administration of Justice Lau of 
1973.
2. Instructions accompanying the Charter from Viscount 
Goderich, Secretary of State to Governor Horton, March 23, 1833. 
Mendis, The Colebrooke-Cameron Papers, Vol. I, p. 350-373, 
at 350. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
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The extent to uhich the defects of the judicial system 
in operation prior to 1833 uere sought to be remedied by 
improving upon the provisions relating to the constitution 
and the uorking of the judiciary forms the essential theme 
of this chapter. Uhat in fact happened in practice uill 
further be discussed in the next chapter.
(l) Judicial Reforms Recommended by the Colebrooke-Cameron 
Commission*
Colebrooke made four reports on the administration of 
Government, on revenue, on compulsory services to uhich the 
native Ceylonese uere subject and on the establishments and 
expenditure in Ceylon, uhile Cameron contributed one lengthy 
report on the judicial establishments and procedure. It is 
this last report that ue uill discuss here. For the present, 
it is sufficient to note that Colebrooke recommended the 
introduction of a uniform system of government, uith a 
Legislative Council and an Executive Council intended to 
operate as a check on the ui'de pouers of the Governor. (The 
cons/tj.tutional developments during the period under revieu
are outlined in Chapter 3).
Cameron started from the pr'emise that the duty of the
government touards the natives uas the provision of cheap and 
accessible courts and, at the same time, the prevention of 
the use of vexatious litigation as a means of oppression. In 
the absence of adequate moral restraints, an efficient system 
of courts alone could, in Ceylon, protect the rights of the 
individual. Moreover, the protection of lau should be
*For a thorough account of the background to the 
appointment of, and a scholarly assessment of the contribution 
made by, the Commission, see Samaraueera, V. K. The Commission 
of Eastern Inquiry in Ceylon. 1822-1837 (Oxford, D.Phil, 1969).
gratuitous so that justice uas not denied to the natives uho 
uere generally poor. Thus, he recommended the establishment 
of a sufficient number of courts--courts so constituted as 
to deliver correct judgments--uithin the easy reach of 
people.^-
The members of the then existing courts of original
jurisdiction, Cameron found, had no legal qualifications.
They oued their tenure of office to the Governor, and
depended on the medium of government to apply to the Advocate-
Fiscal for advice in case of any doubts relating to their
2
pouers and functions and the procedure to be adopted m  
their courts. As -ue have already seen in Chapter 1, the 
Governor and high ranking government officials exercised a 
high degree of control over the louer courts. In the 
Kandyan provinces the administration of justice uas virtually 
in the hands of the executive. Cameron recommended that the 
control over inferior judges should be transferred to the 
judges of the superior court.
That the local civil courts had no jurisdiction in 
any case involving a subject matter of above a certain 
monetary value and uhere the defendant uas a European appeared 
to Cameron to be a serious defect. Since both the Supreme 
Court and the provincial courts applied the same substantive 
lau, he thought, there uas no justification for d r a u i n a  
distinction betueen Europeans and natives in deciding the 
jurisdiction of a court. He successfully advocated the 
elimination of such distinction.
1. Mendis, The Colebrooke Cameron Papers, Vol. I,
p. 121-22.
2. Ibid♦, p. 125. 3. Ibid., p. 135.
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' In spite of the fact that Cameron advocated the 
abolition of the judicial arrangements that had been made 
in the Kandyan provinces, he recommended that the system of 
assessors employed there should be adopted along uith the 
existing jury system.^
Since the only legally qualified persons in the then 
existing appeal courts (Minor Courts of Appeal and the High 
Court of Appeal) uere the tuo judges of the Supreme Court 
in the High Court of Appeal, the same objections raised 
against the poor quality of the judgments delivered by local 
courts could be levelled against those of the appeal courts 
too.^ Cameron recommended the introduction of a Supreme 
Court of appellate jurisdiction, uith a limited original 
jurisdiction in respect of serious offences, centrally 
located in Colombo, but expected to make circuits in different 
parts of the country. Such a court uould preserve the 
uniformity of judicial decision particularly through a 
thorough supervision of the local courts uhile on circuit, 
thereby also making the appellate court easily accessible to 
residents of places far off from. Colombo.^
To summarize Cameron’s recommendations, he advocated 
a uniform system of administration of justice abandoning the 
tuo different systems prevailing in the maritime provinces 
and the Kandyan provinces, a simple system of a set of original 
courts and a central appeal-court, ensuring cheap and acces­
sible courts protected from undue interferences from the 
administration. It is interesting to note that the Charter
4. Ibid., pp. 126, 167 and 184.
5. Ibid., 139-44. 6. Ibid., pp. 183-84.
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of Justice, 1810, the brain-child of Alexander Johnston, P.J., 
(as he uas then), unsuccessfully attempted to introduce many 
of the features that Cameron recommended. Most of the 
recommendations contained in Cameron’s report uere adopted 
in drafting the Charter of Justice, 1833, uhich uill be 
discussed nou.
(2) The Salient Features of the Charter of Justice, 1833
The Charter of Justice, 1833 uhich marks the beginning 
of fa neu and important era in the history of the administra­
tion of justice’ in Ceylon^ is undoubtedly the most important
constitutional document in . ■ Nineteenth-Century Ceylon.
2It repealed all the previous Charters and introduced
*
a system of courts consisting of District Courts and a 
Supreme Court, and prohibited the introduction of any other
courts by the Governor uith the advice of the Legislative
3 /[
Council. The jurisdiction of admiralty courts and Gansabes
(VilTage Councils) uas, houever, left unaffected.
For the purposes of judicial administration Ceylon
uas divided into the district of Colombo and three circuits
uhose boundaries uere specified in the Charter.® Any changes
in such divisions could be effected by the Governor, but only
7at the request of the Supreme Court. The Governor uas 
authorised to sub-divide each of the three circuits into 
districts, uith the concurrence of the Judges of the Supreme 
Court.®
1. Chief Justice Sir Charles Marshall in Colombo 
Journal 1833, p. 558.
2. Ibid., p. 321. 3. Ibid., p. 323. 4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. 6. Ibid., p. 327.
7. Ibid., p. 328. 8. Ibid.
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Uithin each district uas directed to be a District
Court to be held before a District Judge and three assessors.
District Judges uere to be appointed by letters patent issued
by the Governor in pursuance of uarrants addressed to him by
g
the Croun and to hold office during His Majesty^ pleasure.
The selection of assessors uas to be according to the
qualifications laid doun by rules of court in addition to
the criteria laid doun by the Charter itself.'*'0 District
Courts uere given an unlimited civil jurisdiction together
uith a criminal jurisdiction exclusive except for the denial
of jurisdiction in respect of graver offences.'*''*' District
Courts uere given .the care and custody of the person and
property of those of unsound mind, and the authority to
administer testate or intestate properties.^
Every sentence or judgment of the District Court uas
to be pronounced by the judge in open court, after consulting
the assessors. The judge uas bound to state before the
assessors all the questions of lau and fact in issue together
uith" his opinion on each such question. Every assessor then
declared his opinion on each issue. In the event of a
difference of opinion betueen the judge and the assessors on
any issue before the court the opinion of the judge prevailed.
In such event, a record had to be kept in the court of the
vote of the judge and of every assessor in respect of each
13of the issues decided by the court. This method ensured 
that the judge uhile having the assistance of local inhabitants
9. Ibid., p. 328-29. 10. Ibid., p. 329.
11. Ibid., p. 331. 12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 333.
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in arriving at a correct decision, could ultimately uphold 
his oun opinion: a safeguard against any unfounded decision
of a District Judge existed in that such a decision could 
lacer be challenged before the Supreme Court, uhich had 
the advantage of examining the detailed account of the 
disagreement betueen the judge and the assessors as recorded 
by the District Court.
The Supreme Court uas to consist of a Chief Justice 
and tuo Puisne Justices appointed by Letters Patent issued by 
the Governor in pursuance of uarrants addressed to him by
14the Croun and holding office during His Majesty’s pleasure.
The Governor could provisionally suspend a Judge of the
Supreme Court from the exercise of his functions uith ’the
advice and consent’ of the Executive Council ’upon proof of
misconduct or incapacity’ and ’upon the most evident necessity
and after the most mature deliberation’, provided that (i)
the Secretary of State uas immediately informed of the grounds
and causes of such suspension and (ii) the suspended' judge
uas 'supplied uith a full copy of the minutes of the Council
15meeting and of evidence on uhich it acted. Such a
suspension uas subject to confirmation or disallouance by
the C r o u n . A  Judge of the Supreme Court vacated his seat
ipso facto if he accepted any other office or place of profit
17uithin the island.
14* Ibid., p. 323. 
Ibid., p. 325.
15. Ibid., pp. 324-25.
17. Ibid., p. 326.
An exclusive criminal jurisdiction uas vested in the
Supreme Court in respect of offences punishable uith death,
or transportation, or banishment, or imprisonment for more
than tuelve calender months, or by uhipping exceeding 100
18lashes, or by fine exceeding ten pounds. The Supreme Court
uas also given a criminal jurisdiction concurrent uith that
of the District Court, thereby qualifying the recommendations 
19of Cameron, so that cases, though of a trifling nature,
involving questions *of great difficulty or of peculiar
importance1 could be transferred from a District Court to the 
20Supreme Court. Its original criminal jurisdiction uas
required to be exercised be fore a Judge of the Supreme Court
21and a jury of thirteen men.
It uas essentially as a court of appeal that the
Supreme Court uas intended. All appeals from the decisions
of the District Courts in both civil and criminal cases uere
to be determined by it. In civil appeals it uas assisted by
three *assessors• In the event of a difference of opinion
betueen the assessors and the Judge, the Judge!s opinion
22prevailed, as in the case of District Courts. The Supreme 
Court could affirm, reverse, correct, alter or vary any 
judgment, sentence decree or order appealed from and admit 
neu evidence or in the case of a civil appeal remand bn the 
District Court for a further hearing, or for the admission of 
any further'evidence. It could also transfer a civil or
18. Ibid., p. 331.
19. Instructions Accompanying the Charter, ibid. ,
p. 352. 2Q> jbid.
Ibid., p. 335.
22. Ibid., p. 336.
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criminal case to be decided by another District Court uithin
the same circuit. Full pouer and authority uas granted to
the Supreme Court so that it could issue mandates, in the
nature of urits of mandamus, procedendo and prohibition against
23any District Court,
The sessions of the Supreme Court uere to be held in
Colombo and on circuit, Ceylon uas divided into the District
of Colombo and three circuits, A number of District Courts
uere established uithin each such circuit and the District
of Colombo, (in a practical sense the District of Colombo
24constituted a fourth circuit). Sessions of the Supreme
Court held by one judge of the Supreme Court uere required to
be conducted in each of the three circuits tuice a year,
arranged in such a manner that all the judges of the Supreme
Court uould not at the same time be absent from Colombo and
that all such judges uould be resident in Colombo not less
25than one month tuice a year,
* At criminal sessions held on circuit, the Judge uho
had the authority to decide any questions of lau arising for
determination, could nevertheless reserve such question for
the decision of the three Judges of the Supreme Court
2 6
collectively assembled. In the sam^ manner, any questions 
of lau, pleading, evidence or practice arising for adjudication
23. Ibid.
24. See the suggestion made by Carr. 3., that the 
Charter ought to be amended to specify four circuits, instead 
of the three circuits it mentioned, the fourth being the 
Home (Colombo) Circuit, Draft Ordinance for better and more 
effectual administration of Oustice uith comments by the 
Supreme Court Judges. C. 0. 54/202.
25. flendis, op. ci t., Vol. I, p. 334-35.
26. Ibid. , p • 339.
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at any civil or criminal session on circuit could be referred
27
for decision to a collective session of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court Judge holding a session on circuit was
required to * inspect and examine the records of the different
District Courts1 in search of contradictory or inconsistent
decisions on matters of lau, evidence, pleading or practice .
and to report any such contradictions or inconsistencies at
a general session. It then became the duty of the Supreme
Court to draft a declaratory lau to be transmitted to the
Governor to be laid before the Legislative Council for its 
28consideration. The Supreme Court could also make general
rules and orders of court for the removal of doubts respecting
any questions or inconsistent decisions referred to it in the
29manner above mentioned. Provision uas also made for any 
appeal to be heard in a summary manner at the instance of and 
by the Collective Court in Colombo (instead of by a single
rz n
judge on circuit) uith the consent of the litigant parties.
0
Admitting that regulations respecting 1 the course and 
manner of proceeding1 to be observed by the Supreme Court and 
the District Courts uhich uere needed for carrying into effect 
the various provisions of the Charter and for 1 the more prompt 
and effectual administration of justicp1 cannot properly be 
made except by the Judges of the Supreme Court, the Charter 
of Justice, 1833 authorised the Supreme Court at any general 
session to make general rules and orders relating to a variety 
of matters connected uith court proceedings. Any such
27. Ibid.s p. 340. 28. Ibid., p. 340-1.
29* Ibid., p. 341. 30. Ibid., p. 342.
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regulations uere required not to be repugnant to the Charter, 
and the pouers of approbation and disallowance were reserved 
to the Crown to whom such regulations had to be transmitted 
forthwith.^
An appeal was allowed from any final decision of the
32Supreme Court to the Privy Council, which had been recognized
as the ultimate appeal court since the Charter of Justice,
331801. As before, the Chief Justice was authorised with
the approval of the Governor to appoint any additional
ministerial" officers needed for the Supreme Court.^ Deviating
from the power previously enjoyed by the Supreme Court to
admit persons qualified according to the rules of court to
35act *both as advocates and proctors*, it could now enrol
'as advocates or proctors* persons of good repute and of
*3 6 *competent knowledge."
With this outline of the Charter of Justice, 1833
in mind, we may now proceed to examine the changes which
were tnade in the judicial structure upto 1889.
31* Ibid., p. 343-44. ^
32. Ibid., p. 344".
33. Mendis, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 197-98.
34. Ibid., p. 326. cf. The Charter of Justice, 1801, 
sec. xxii.
35. The Charter of Justice, 1801, sec. xxiv.
36. Mendis, op.cit., Vol. I ,  p .  327.
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(3) Developments in the Judicial Structure during 1833-1889
In spite of ’the solidity and comprehensiveness of
the general principles’ forming the foundation of the
Cameron reforms,'*' the Charter, in its practical application, .
evinced serious defects. Perhaps, the major cause of such
defects in the Charter, the general scheme of uhich had found
support in 'an almost unbroken current of judicial and legal
testimony at Ceylon', might have been the 'Asiatic character
and customs of Ceylon' uhich neither the Commissioners nor
2the draftsmen adequately understood.
Governor Campbell complained that the administration 
of justice in Ceylon uas not by any means 'in a credible,
3
useful or economical condition*. 'The delays and practical
denial of justice' both in civil and criminal matters, he
said, uere unparalleled in any country.^ Even in the Supreme
Court and the District Court the prevailing vj.eu appears to
5
have been that the judicial system needed improving, although 
the general consensus uas against a repeal of the Charter; 
in Pact, the Supreme Court Judges strongly believed that 
they could bring about necessary changes by uay of judicial 
interpretation alone.^
1. The Instructions accompanying the Charter of 
Justice, 1833, flendis, op.c11., Vol. I, p. 370.
2. Secretary of State Stanley to Governor Campbell, 
February 26, 1842. C. 0. 54/191.
3. Governor Campbell to Secretary of State Lord 
Stanley, November 11, 1841., C. 0. 54/191.
4. Campbell to Lord Stanley, April 18, 1842.
C. 0. 54/196.
5. See, dispatch No. 91 of flay 30, 1839. C. 0.
54/170; No. 94 of December 13, 1841. C. 0. 54/196; and the
observations of District Judges on the Charter enclosed 
towards the end in C. 0. 54/202.
6. See the observations of the Governor on the
reports of the Judges of the Supreme Court on the Charter.
Dispatch No. 91 of flay 30, 1839. C. 0. 54/170.
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The mass of reports exposing the defects in the
judicial administration in Ceylon, uhich had caused much
7
embarrassment in the Colonial Office, primarily complained 
of the lack of inferior courts uhich could summarily dispose
o
of petty offences. This caused an overburdening of the
District Courts, and opened the uay for proctors to exploit
9
poverty stricken natives uith their excessive fees.
Governor Mackenzie had pointed out in 1838 that under the 
authority of the Supreme Court, District Courts conducted 
preliminary examinations for the information of the QueenTs 
Advocate, 'in cases uhich uere ultimately to be tried before 
the Supreme Court.' It uas his firm vieu that the District 
Courts should be relieved from this rather ministerial 
function, by transfering it to some other authority.^
In 1843 five Ordinances uere passed locally uhich 
uere confirmed by the Croun in order to remedy 1 the evils 
uhich arise under the Charter1. ^  (it must be noted here 
that 'the local legislature had by this time been granted the 
pouer to legislate notuithstanding anything contained in the 
Charter subject to the confirmation or disallouance by the 
Croun in the event such enactment did not receive the unanimous 
approval of the Legislative Council and the Judges of the 
'Supreme Court. As uill be seen in the next chapter, by 1847
7. Governor Campbell to Lord Stanley, dispatch No. 3 
of November 22, 1841. C. 0. 54/191.
8. Governor Campbell to Lord Stanley, dispatch No. 56 
of April 18, 1842. C. 0. 54/196.
9 • Ibid.
10. Governor Mackenzie to Lord Glenely, dispatch 
No. 95 of June 27, 1838. C. 0. 54/163.
11. See Governor Campbell to Lord Stanley, dispatch 
No. 56 of April 18, 1842. C. 0. 54/196.
the local legislature had been given the pouer to pass laws
affecting the administration of justice to operate from the
date of promulgation in Ceylon by the Governor), Ordinance
No, 10 of 1843 established Courts of Requests uhich uere
empouered to ’determine in a summary uay and according to
equity and good conscience1 all civil cases, except those
specified by the Ordinance, uhere the subject matter involved
12did not exceed £5 in value. Inferior courts of criminal
jurisdiction called Police Courts uere introduced by
Ordinance No, 11 of 1843, They uere authorised to determine
in a summary uay all charges of crimes except those punishable
by imprisonment for a period of more than three months, or by
13fine exceeding £5 or by uhipping exceeding tuenty lashes.
No legal representation uas alloued either in the
Courts of Requests or Police Courts, except in certain stated 
14circumstances. Although there uas no right of appeal from
the decision of either of these courts, an aggrieved party
coulcf petition the Supreme Court to revieu the proceedings
on any of the stated grounds such as ’gross irregularity in
the proceedings’ or ’the admission of illegal or incompetent 
15evidence’. The creation of these inferior courts had the
12. See section 5 of Ordinance No. 10 of 1843.
13. See section 5 of Ordinance No. 11 of 1843.
14. Ordinance No. 10 of 1843, sec. 13 (Courts of
Requests) and Ordinance No. 11 of 1843, sec. 15.
15. Ordinance No. 10 of 1843, sec. 22; Ordinance
No. 11 of 1843, sec. 14.
effect of relieving the District Courts of their overload, 
.securing at the same time speedy and inexpensive judicial
process in respect of trivial matters both civil and
. . , 15acriminal•
Ordinance No. 15 of 1843,intended to provide ’in
certain respects for more efficient Administration of Justice
in Criminal Cases’,had the effect of relieving the District
Court of its duty to conduct preliminary examinations into
charges of offences uhich uere ultimately to be tried before
the Supreme Court. Ordinance No. 6 and Ordinance No. 13 of
the same year made provision for the maintenance of public
peace and the apprehension of persons suspected of having
committed criminal offences.
A serious criticism had been made regarding the
manner in uhich the Supreme Court exercised its appellate
jurisdiction.^ (As has been noted above appeals uere heard
by a single judge on circuit). 0. de Livera, District Judge
of Wa’tara, complained of ’inconsistent and contradictory
expositions of lau and practice’ arising from appeal cases.
The only procedure that existed of eliminating such
inconsistencies, namely reference of any question of lau for
the collective court at the sole discretion of the Supreme
1 7Court Judge, did not prove very effective. This uas
15a. That the creation of inferior courts uas primarily 
intended to ease the uork-load of the District Court is clearly 
brought out by the fact that in certain thinly popu1ated out­
posts one person uas appointed to act as District Judge, 
Commissioner of Requests and Police Magistrate. See Governor 
MacCarthy to Neucastle, April 23, 1862. C. 0. 54/369.
16. Observations of District Judges on the Charter of 
Justice, 1833, enclosed in the latter part of C. 0. 54/202.
17. Ibid.
particularly because a decision of the collective court did
not, in strict lau, bind the individual judges. Livera, D.3.,
pointed out that the diversity of laws prevalent in Ceylon
left ’sufficient latitude’ to each judge to ’act upon his
favourite system uncontrouled by the opinion of his
colleagues’. To remedy this situation and to achieve
uniformity of lau as declared by the Supreme Court, Livera, 3.,
suggested that an appeal should be alloued to the collective
18court from the decision of a single judge.
Not long after did these suggestions find legislative 
recognition. Ordinance No. 11 of 1845 provided that appeals 
could be heard, uith the consent of the parties, by a single 
judge in Colombo instead of on circuit (sec.l). It also 
provided a further appeal from the decision of a single 
judge to the collective court on points of lau (sec.3).
Except in cases appealable to the Privy Council, the judgment 
of the collective court uas final (sec.5). On the recommen­
dations of the Finance Committee of the Executive Council of
19Ceylbn submitted in 1849, it uas enacted in 1852 that the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court should be
exercised in Colombo by tuo judges sitting together, except
uhen, in the opinion of the court, it uas necessary for a
20single judge to go on circuit to take neu evidence.
18. Ibid.
19. Report on the Fixed Establishments, submitted 
on December 13, 1849. British Parliamentary Papers, House 
of Commons, 1852 (568) xxxvi pp. 36-40.
20. Ordinance No. 20 of 1852, sec. 9.
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Ordinance No, 20 of 1852 too uas, undoubtedly, devised in 
furtherance of the object of preserving a central appeal 
court capable of maintaining uniformity of lau, taking, at 
the same time, full advantage accruing from the circuit 
system.’
Another defect in the judicial system established
by the Charter of Justice, 1833 uas in respect of execution
of sentences. According to the Charter no appeal from a
judgment given by a District Court had the effect of staying
the execution of any such sentence or judgment pronounced by
such District Court, except uhen the District Judge made an
order, in his discretion, for the stay of such execution
21pending such appeal. Instances where the Supreme Court
A
reversed a District Court decision imposing corporal punish­
ment uhich had already been executed, such as that mentioned
22in 'Kaloo Appu’s compensation petition1, may not have been
hard to find. In fact, a member of the Legislative Council 
♦
pointed out in 1843 that corporal punishment should be
23deferred until the decision of the appeal. Even the report
21. Mendis, Colebrooke-Cameron Papers, Vol. I,
p . 337.
22. See Governor Campbell to Lord Stanley, April 19,
1844. C. 0. 54/211. Kaloo Appu had been sentenced to tuelve
months imprisonment and fifty lashes, uhich uere immediately 
inflicted on him, inspite of the appeal to the Supreme Court, 
uhich reversed the decision of the District Court. Kaloo Appu's 
petition claiming compensation for the infliction of corporal 
punishment uhich had been proved to be untenable in lau did
not succeed. The dismissal of the petition by the Governor 
uas approved by the Secretary of State. See Lord Stanley 
to Campbell, June 20, 1844. C. 0. 54/211.
23. See C. 0. 54/202. Entry made on January 19, 1843.
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of Empson, uho uas appointed by the Secretary of State to
inquire into the reports emanating from Ceylon on the Charter
of Justice, 1833,2/4 held the same vieu.25 The Draft
Ordinance of 1843 providing for better administration of
justice ,uhich could not be enacted due to lack of unan:ijni.t’y,'
of Judges of the Supreme Court and the Legislative Council ,
2 6
made provision to give effect to this vieu.
Later, Ordinance No. 7 of 1854 provided that the
execution of corporal punishment imposed by a Police Court
should be stayed pending appeal (sec.10). Ordinance No. 13
of 1861 uhich consolidated the lau relating to Police Courts
retained that provision (sec.24). The Criminal Procedure
Code, Ordinance No. 15 of 1898 brought forth the final
solution in section 316(1).
316(1) When the accused is sentenced to 
uhipping /by any cour_t7> the sentence shall 
not be carried out until after the expiration 
of ten days from the date of the pronounce­
ment thereof, or (if an appeal is presented 
uithin that time) until, the order of the - 
Supreme Court shall have been notified to the 
accused, and the execution of the sentence
shall be subject to the terms of that orderly
In 1852 it uas enacted that the Supreme Court should
7 8
hear appeals sitting uithout assessors, and that District 
Courts should sit uithout assessors except uhen the Judge
24. Lord Stanley to Governor Campbell, dispatch 
No. 66 of February 26, 1842. C. 0. 54/191.
25. See the entry cited in note 23 above.
26. See sec. 38 of the Draft Ordinance enclosed 
in C. 0. 54/202.
27. Administration of Justice Lau, No. 44 of 1973 
uhich replaced the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, makes similar 
provision (sec.271). The Criminal Courts Commission 
(Sessional Paper XIII-1953) recommended the abolition of 
uhipping except by the Supreme Court. (para. 126).
28. Ordinance No. 20 of 1852.
29
thought it necessary to require their presence. Attempts 
uere made to consolidate the lau relating to the Courts of 
Requests in 1859 (Ordinance No. 8), to the Police Courts in 
1861 (Ordinance No. 13) and to the Justices of the Peace in 
1864 (Ordinance No. l) culminating in Ordinance No. 11 of 
1868.
The uay uas prepared for the Courts Ordinance of
30
1889, by the enactment of the Penal Code, Criminal
31 32Procedure Code and the Civil Procedure Code.
(4) The Courts Ordinance of 1889
Consolidating the various past enactments, subject 
to many amendments, the Courts Ordinance of 1889 set forth 
the major provisions relating to the judicial system of 
Ceylon, uhich survived a number of amendments in essentials 
until the enactment of the Administration of Justice Lau in 
1973.
The judicial strueture established by the Courts 
Ordinance consisted of one superior court, the Supreme Court, 
and three sets of inferior courts, namely District Courts, 
Courts of Requests and Police Courts.^ The Ordinance, houever, 
permitted the continuance of admiralty courts and of 1 the 
jurisdiction of village tribunals, committees or'councils,
29. Ordinance No. 21 of 1852.
30. Ordinance No. 2 of 1883.
31. Ordinance No.. 3 of 1883.
32. Ordinance No. 2 of 1889.
1. The Courts Ordinance No. 1 of 1889, L .E .C ., i 
cap. 6, sec. 3. (Hereinafter reference uill be made to the 
sections of the Courts Ordinance as appears in the Legislative 
Enactments of Ceylon, 1956 except uhen it is necessary to refer 
to any section of the original enactment).
or of any municipal magistrate, or of any special officer or
tribunal legally constituted for any special purpose or to
2
try any special case or class of cases', It may be mentioned
here that in the course of time certain additions were made
to the judicial system established by the Courts Ordinance
of 1889. For instance Juvenile Courts uere created by
Ordinance No. 48 of 1939, Rural Courts replacing village
councils or committees, by Ordinances Nos. 12 and 13 of 1945,
and a Court of Criminal Appeal, by Ordinance No. 23 of 1938.
It is useful to outline the powers and functions of these
courts, particularly of the Supreme Court.
Before ue proceed to examine the powers and functions
of the courts of law, reference must be made, though briefly,
to how the country was divided for the purposes of the
administration of justice. Ceylon was divided into five
circuits each of which was divided into districts and 
3
divisions. In each district was to be established at least 
one District Court and in each division, at least one Court 
of Requests and one Magistrate's Court.^ The original 
criminal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was to be 
exercised at criminal sessions held for each of the circuits.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., sec. 4.
4. Ibid., sec. 52.
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The Supreme Court consisted of four judges, one of
5
uhom uas designated the Chief Justice, No such judge
uas permitted to accept any other office or place of profit.^
!An original jurisdiction for the inquiry into all crimes
7
and offences committed throughout Ceylon1 and 'an appellate
jurisdiction for the correction of all errors • , • committed
8by any original court1 uere vested in the Supreme Court.
These and the various other pouers of the Supreme Court could
be exercised !in different matters at the same time by the
_ _ g
several Judges of the /Supreme/ Court sitting apart1.
The unlimited original criminal jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court uas,' houever, in practice exercised only in 
respect of serious offences uhich uere beyond the competence 
of any other court.^ Generally, a trial before the Supreme 
Court uas preceded by a non-summary proceeding or preliminary
inquiry in a Magistrates Court^ and the accused uas tried
12 13on indictment before a single judge and a jury on circuit.
5. Ibid., sec. 7 of the original Ordinance. In 1921 
the number uas increased to five (sec. 4 of Ordinance No. 36 
of 1921) and in 1937 to nine (sec. 5 of Ordinance No. 18 of 
1937). In 1962 the number uas increased to one Chief Justice 
and ten Puisne Justices (Act No. 1 of 1962, sec. 17) and in 
1973 the neuly constituted Supreme Court uas to consist of the 
Chief Justice and not less than ten and not more than tuenty 
Puisne Justices. (See Administration of Justice Lau, No. 44 
of 1973, sec. 8).
6. Ibid., sec. 12. 7. Ibid., sec. 19(a).
8. Ibid., sec. 19(b). 9. Ibid., sec. 21.
10. Nadaraja, Legal System, at p. 125.
11. Criminal Procedure Code, L .E .C ., cap. 20, sec. 155.
^2* Ibid., sec. 218.
13. Courts Ordinance, L .E .C ., cap. 6, sec. 29; and
Criminal Procedure Code, L .E .C ., cap. 20, sec. 216.
The exceptions to this general rule uere: (i) the Chief
Justice could order a Trial-at-Bar held at Colombo before 3
Judges and a jury;^ (ii) the Minister of Justice could in
certain circumstances order such a Trial-at-Bar, but uithout 
15a jury; and (iii) the requirement of a preliminary inquiry 
uas dispensed uith in cases uhere the accused had been 
committed for trial before the Supreme Court at Bar uithout 
a jury on information exhibited to the Court by the Attorney- 
General • ^
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court uas
17to be 'ordinarily exercised only at Colombo'. An appeal
from the decision of any District Court either in a civil
or a criminal case uas to be heard by tuo Judges at least,
uhereas an appeal from the decision of any other inferior
18court could be heard by a single Judge. It may be noted 
here that there uas no appeal from a decision of the Supreme 
Court in criminal cases (eithpr by a single Judge or three
Judges) except by special leave to the Privy Council^ until
/ 20 the creation of the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1940 to
fill this lacuna. (The Court of Criminal Appeal consisted.of
all the Judges of the Supreme Court, and appeals uere heard by
an uneven number. An appeal lay from the decision of the
21Court to the Privy Council).
14. Ibid. 15. Ibid., sec. 440 A.
16. Ibid., sec. 440 A(2); and Act No. 31 of 1962, 
sec. 3(3). See infra p* .276.
17. Courts Ordinance, sec. 36.
18. Ibid., sec. 38.
19. Privy Council Appeals, L .E .C ., cap. 100,
Schedule, Rule 1(b).
20. Court of Criminal Appeal Ordinance, L .E .C . , cap. 7
21. Ibid., sec. 2.
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In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court could correct all errors in lau or in fact
committed by any inferior court in 1 any order having the
22effect^of a final judgment*. It could *affirm, reverse,
correct or modify* any such order or judgment, or ' give
23
directions to the court belou, or . order a neu trial.
In the event the Supreme Court decided that it ought to
receive and admit further evidence, it could order that it
should be done by a single Judge on circuit,^ and the
decision of such Judge uas declared to be final. If such
an order had been made in an appeal from the decision of a
District Court, a further appeal lay to a Bench of tuo or
25more Judges of the Supreme Court. This provision ensured
that the full benefit of the circuit system uas taken uithout
infringing upon the provisions of the Ordinance uhich
required the presence on appeal of at least tuo Judges in
certain circumstances.
»
Provision uas made in the Courts Ordinance for the 
reference of a matter before one or more Judges of the Supreme 
Court to a larger Bench. For instance section 38 provided 
that a single Judge sitting alone in appeal could reserve the 
matter for the decision of more than one Judge of that Court.
22. Courts Ordinance, sec. 36. Appeals uere alloued
to the Supreme Court from a number of statutory bodies, such 
as, Bribery Tribunals, Quazis and Co-operative arbitrators, 
all of uhich uill be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.
23* Ibid., sec. 37.
24. Ibid., Proviso to sec. 37.
25. Ibid.
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It uas the duty of the Chief Justice, then, to appoint such
o ez
a Divisional Bench. Section 51 provided that the Chief
Justice could order that any case before the Supreme Court
by uay-of appeal, revieu or revision should be heard by
and before all the Judges of the Supreme Court or at least
five such Judges including the Chief Justice.
In the exercise of its revisionary as distinguished
from appellate pouers, the Supreme Court or any Judge thereof
could, ’at Colombo or elseuhere’, ’inspect and examine the
records of any court1 and ’grant and issue, according to
lau, mandates in the nature of urits of mandamus, quo
uarranto, certiorari, procedendo, and prohibition, against
any District Judge, Commissioner, Magistrate or any other
27
person or tribunal’. Although there uas generally a
reluctance on the part of the Supreme Court to exercise its
revisionary pouers, particularly uhen some other remedy such
2 8as a right of appeal uas available, even an instance uhere 
$
it intervened to correct a decision it had given on appeal
29has been reported. The Supreme Court could also transfer
30a case from one court to another.
26. Sec. 48 a.
27* Ibid., sec. 42.
28. See for instance Attorney-General v. Pod 1sinoho 
(1950) 51 N.L.R. 385, at p. 390 per Dias, S.P.J., affirming
the opinion of Akbar, J., in I. P. Auissauella v. Fernando
(1929) 30 N.L.R. 482 -at p. 483.
29. See Potman v• I. P. Dodanqoda (1971) 74 N.L.R. 115.
30. Courts O r d i n a n c e , s e c . 42.
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Among its general pouers uere the pouer to punish
for contempt of its authority or the authority of any other
court, uhich lacked jurisdiction to try offences of contempt
31committed against its authority, pouer to frame rules for
regulating a variety of matters relating particularly to
court proceedings, subject to the disapproval of the 
32Le.gislature, and the authority to issue urits of Habeas 
33Corpus. It also could admit as Advocates or Proctors 
’persons of good repute and of competent knouledge and 
ability’ . ^
The inferior courts may nou briefly be looked at.
Rural Courts uhicK could be regarded as the louest courts
of lau had both a civil and a criminal jurisdiction of a
35very limited character. No legal representation uas
3 6permitted before these courts, uhich uere required to
3 7’endeavour to bring the parties to an amicable settlement'.
From the final order of a Rur^l Court an appeal lay to the
* 7 R
District Court.
31. Ibid., sec. 47.
32* Ibid., sec. 49.
33* Ibid., sec. 45.’
3.4* Ibid., sec• 16.
35. See Rural Courts Ordinance, No. 12 of 1945, 
L .E .C ., cap. 8, specially sec. 9.
36. Ibid., sec. 21.
37. Ibid., sec. 23.
38* Ibid., secs. 41 and 42.
\
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Courts of Requests were given an original civil
39
jurisdiction subject to certain monetary limits, and 
certain matters such as certain matrimonial matters, uhich
uere uithin the exclusive jurisdiction of the District
.................. 40
Courts, uere specifically excluded from their jurisdiction.
It had been endowed uith certain types of original juris­
diction and uith an appellate jurisdiction in respect of
41decisions of certain statutory bodies. An appeal from
the decision of a Court of Requests could be taken to the 
42Supreme Court.
Magistrate’s Courts uere intended primarily as
inferior courts of criminal jurisdiction, although they also
came to be vested uith pouers under the- Maintenance Ordinance
No. 19 of 1889--pouers uhich are partially civil. In
addition to its criminal proceedings conducted in a summary
uay, Magistrate’s Court conducted non-summary proceedings in
respect of offences, uhich uere ultimately to be tried by 
$
either the District Court or the Supreme Court. Uhat offences
could summarily be tried before a Magistrate’s Court uas
43determined by the Criminal Procedure CCocjft. An appeal lay 
from the decision of a Magistrate’s Court to the Supreme Court, 
except in certain specified circumstances.^
39. See Courts of Requests (Special Provisions)
Act No. 5 of 1964. Sec. 3, the latest relegant enactment.
40. Courts Ordinance, sec. 75.
41. See Nadaraja, Legal System, p. 122.
42. Courts Ordinance, secs. 36 and 78.
43. See Nadaraja, Legal System, note 131 at p. 156.
44. See Courts Ordinance, sec. 39; and Criminal 
Procedure Code, secs. 335-337.
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District Courts uhich ranked immediately belou the
Supreme Court enjoyed an original jurisdiction, both civil
and criminal, and an appellate jurisdiction in respect of
the decisions of the Rural Courts and certain statutory
bodies. The criminal proceedings in a District Court
uere usually preceded by a preliminary inquiry held by a
Magistrate^ Court, Uhat uere specified by the Criminal
Procedure Court to be indictable offences^ uere uithin
the jurisdiction only of the District Court and the Supreme
Court except the graver offences uhich had been placed ex-
47elusive]y uithin the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
The District Courts had also been granted an unlimited
original jurisdiction in civil matters. It uas also given
testamentary, matrimonial and insolvency jurisdiction.^ A
jurisdiction in respect of persons and property of persons
of unsound mind and minors uas enjoyed by the District Courts, 
49among others,
In both civil cases and, subject to certain
/
restrictions, in criminal cases there uas a right of appeal
50to the Supreme Court.
45. See Nadaraja, Legal System, note 131 at p, 156.
46. Criminal Procedure Code, sec. 2.
47. Such as murder and offences against the State.
48. See Courts Ordinance, secs. 67 and 62.
49* Ibid., sec. 69; see also sec. 62.
50. Courts Ordinance secs. 36 and 73, read uith
Criminal Procedure Code secs. 335 and 336.
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The primary purpose of this chapter has been to 
outline the changes introduced by the Charter of Justice,
1833 folloued by subsequent amendments in order to understand 
the extent to uhich the recommendations of Cameron remained 
acceptable in a country uhich uas gradually moving touards 
self-government. Only the structural developments have 
been noted here uhich demonstrate that the basic principles 
on uhich the Charter had been founded uere not abandoned 
at any stage. It is, houever, safe to conclude that the 
later changes made in the judicial structure of 1833 tended 
to detract from its simplicity. In the next chapter it 
is proposed to outline the constitutional changes paying 
special attention to evidence of the assertion of judicial 
independence.
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C H A P T E R  3
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CEYLON UITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETUEEN
THE JUDICIARY AND THE ADMINISTRATION: 1833-1948
In this chapter is told the story of the struggles 
through uhich the judiciary emerged as an independent and 
pouerful institution of government destined to contribute 
in no small measure to the direction of constitutional 
development in the- post-independence period. Part One of 
this chapter uhich outlines the constitgtional developments 
in Ceylon during the period under revieu provides, together 
uith the contents of the previous chapter, the institutional 
background to Part Tuo of this chapter on the relationship 
betueen the judiciary and the administration. An attempt 
is macje in Part Three of this chapter to evaluate the major 
trends in the relationship betueen the judiciary and the 
administration and to arrive at some conclusions regarding 
the judicial role during the period under revieu.
Constitutional Developments: 1833-1948
The Colebrooke-Cameron reforms not only introduced a 
scheme of administering justice uhich at least Contained a 
great amount of practical good sense as uell as profound 
and subtle speculation*,"^ but also laid the foundation stone
1* The Minute prepared by 3. Stephen (Under Secretary • 
of State) appended to dispatch No. 66 of February 26, 1842 
from Lord Stanley (Secretary of State) to Governor Campbell.
C. 0. 54/191.
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for uhat later became .parliamentary: government— an
institution Sri Lanka has proudly retained, the unfortunate
2
events of April 1971 notuithstanding• Lie may begin our
discussion uith a brief account of the constitutional reforms 
based on the recommendations of Colebrooke.
(i) Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms
Colebrooke,in his report on the administration,
advocated a uniform system of government for the uhole of
Ceylon, uith the institution of an Executive Council and a
Legislative Council in order to provide a check on any
arbitrary exercise of authority by the Governor. The
Executive Council uas proposed primarily as an advisory
body to the Governor.'*' In order to protect the rights of
the people by means of providing a forum to freely express
their opinions, a Legislative Council, in uhose deliberations
the Governor uas not to have any part, uas recommended. The
Council uas to consist of a .f;air number of principal civil
and military officers and of respectable inhabitants,
2
European or native.
2. The insurrection of April 1971. See the 
bibliography compiled by H. A. I. Goonetilleke on the 
• insurrection, which is given in the bibliography, infra.
The J. V. P.,(People*s liberation Pront) which was 
responsible for the insurrection has now changed its 
attitude and believes in parliamentary democracy. See 
Ceylon Daily News of March 27, 1979 for an account of the 
J. V. P.*s interest in contesting local government elections.
1. Report of Colebrooke upon the Administration of 
Government of Ceylon, Mendis, The Colebrooke-Cameron Papers, 
Vol. I, pp. 9-76, at p. 53.
2. Ibid., p* 56.
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Legislative measures might either be proposed for
consideration by any member of the Legislative Council or
3
recommended for consideration by the Governor* Uhen any
such measure had been approved, lau-officers uould draft a
4
Bill based on it to be printed for general information.
The Council uas to inquire into any petitions and information 
reaching it as a result of such publication. Any Bill passed 
by the Legislative Council had to be submitted to the Budges 
of the Supreme Court. No Bill could be confirmed by the 
Governor unless the judges certified that it did not contain 
any provision inconsistent uith any Act of Parliament or
5
any Order of His Majesty in Council. Laus uere generally 
to take effect uhen passed by the Governor subject to the 
right of disallouance reserved to the Sovereign.
If the Governor and the Legislative Council disagreed 
on the propriety of a Bill, such Bill uas to be submitted to 
the Sovereign for His approval or disallouance. Likeuise, 
any Bill-uhich the Budges of the Supreme Court refused to 
certify had to be transmitted to the Sovereign for His 
pleasure to be knoun.^
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., pp. 56-57.
5. Ibid♦, p. 57. This proposal, uhich uas not found 
acceptable, did in fact devise uhat could have been the first 
1 Constitutional Court' in the history of Sri Lanka, in the 
sense in uhich that term is used in the Republican Constitution 
of Sri Lanka of 1972.
6* Ibid., pp. 57-58.
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c
The proposal of such a Council, which,as Colebrooke
conceded, would prove inadequate fat a more advanced
stage of /the country1s/ progress1, but which would ftend,
however, to remove some of the obstacles which have
retarded the improvement of a settlement possessed of
great natural resourses* was far ahead of its time. When
7
the Royal Instructions to Governor Horton, by which the 
reforms were introduced, came to be drawn, therefore, 
Colebrooke’s recommendations were watered down so as to 
leave the authority of the Governor largely intact. As we 
shall see, any control over the authority of the Governor 
that the Legislative Council would have been granted 
was more illusory than real.
The Royal Instructions directed Governor Horton to 
constitute an Executive Council consisting of (i) the 
senior officer in command of the British forces in Ceylon,
Q
(ii) the Colonial Secretary, (iii) the Kingfs Advocate,
(iv) the Government Agent for the Central Province and 
/ v  9(v; the Colonial Treasurer. Generally, the Governor was
required to consult with the Executive Council in the
execution of his powers and authorities. In unimportant
or urgent matters he could act on his own discretion,
provided that as soon as practicable he informed the
Executive Council of the measures that he so adopted with
10
the reasons thereof. In 1865, the Governor was 
authorised to act on his own discretion in circumstances
7. The King's Additional Instructions to Governor 
Horton, March 20, 1833. Mendis, op. cit.. Vol. 1, 305-19.
8. The lineal ancestor of the Attorney-General.
9. Mondis, op. cit.. Vol. 1, p. 316.
10. Ibid.
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where in his opinion it would be materially prejudicial to
the interest of the government to have consulted the
11
Executive Council. The Governor was authorised, moreover, 
to act in opposition to the advice which might have been 
given by the Council, provided that at the first convenient 
opportunity he made a full report to the Secretary of State.
The Legislative Council was to consist of nine official 
members and six unofficial members. The official members 
were to be (i) the Chief Justice, (ii) the Senior Officer 
in command of the British forces in Ceylon, (iii) the 
Colonial Secretary, (iv) the Auditor-General, (v) the 
Colonial Treasurer, (vi) the Government-Agent for the 
Western Province, (vii) the Government-Agent for the 
Central Province, (viii) the Surveyor-General, and (ix) the 
Collector of Customs at the Port of Colombo, Six persons
were to be appointed by the Governor out of * the Chief
landed proprietors and principal merchants of /Ceylon/>
• -
who have been actually resident for a period of not less
than two years in /Ceylo&7* as the first unofficial members
13of the Legislative Council,
Contrary to Colebrooke*s recommendation, the Governor
was to preside at the meetings and in his absence the most.
senior member present presided. (Official members took
precedence over unofficial members, and among themselves
the official members took precedence in the- order in
\ 14v/hich their offices have been enumerated above).
■ i . i . ...... ....... —...... j
11. See Mills, Ceylon under British Rule; 1793-1932, 
1933, at p. 105; and 0 . 0. 381/28 despatch of March 4, T865.
12. Mendis, op. cit.. Vol. 1, 316-7.
13. Ibid.. p. 308. 14. Ibid.. p. 309.
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Only the Governor uas authorized to propose the
enactment of laus and to initiate debate on any question
at the Legislative Council. It uas, houever, open for any
member to inform the Governor in uriting of the need to pass
any lau or to debate any question and enter a copy of such
communication on the minutes of the Council. A full and
exact copy of the minutes of the Council had to be transmitted
15
to the Secretary of State tuice in each year.
The authority that had been bestoued on the Governor
previously by the King*s Commission^ to enact laus 1for the
peace, order and good government1 of Ceylon nou became subject
to the provisions -relating to the tuo Councils. The Governor
uas not authorized to propose or assent to certain specified
categories of laus such as a lau (i) uhich violated his
Commission, an Act of Parliament or an Order of His Majesty
in Council, (ii) uhich related to certain revenue and
monetary matters or (iii) uhich ' imposed restrictions on non-
Europeans to uhich Europeans uere not subjected.
All laus enacted by the Legislative Council uere to
be styled Ordinances enacted by the Governor of Ceylon, uith
the advice and consent of the Legislative Council thereof1.
Every enactment had to be submitted to the Sovereign for
17’assent, disallouance or other direction thereupon*. A
copy of every lau passed by the Governor had to be transmitted
1 Rto the Supreme Court to be enrolled in that court.
Ibid., pp. 310-311.
16. See Letters Patent commissioning Governor Horton 
and setting up Council of Government for Ceylon (April 23, 
1831), Mendis, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 138, specially at 139.
17. Mendis, op.cit., Vol. I, p.
18. Ibid.
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Between 1834 and 1910 no significant changes took
place in the constitutional structure. In 1889 the number
of unofficial members was increased to eight, and their
appointments were prescribed to be for a term of five 
19years. In 1859 an unofficial member was allowed for the
20
first time to introduce a Bill in the Legislative Council.
A certain degree of control over financial matters was ceded
21
to the Legislative Council in 1867 after a long struggle.
In 1910 was introduced the principle of elective 
22representation, whereas previously all the unofficial
members had been nominated by the Governor' representing
various racial corrrmunities and commercial interests. The
Legislative Council as constituted in 1910 consisted of
eleven official and ten unofficial members. Out of the ten
unofficial members four were to be elected representing the
European Urban, the European Rural, the Ceylonese and the
Burgher communities. The rest were to be nominated by the
Governor.
/
The unofficial members were given a majority in the
23Legislative Council in 1920, in response to the nationalist 
demands. The Legislative Council now consisted of fourteen
19. Ceylon; Report of the Special Commission on 
the Constitution (1928), Cmd. 3131. pp. 12-13.
20. Governor Word to the Duke of Newcastle, October 
24, 1859. C. 0. 54/346.
21. See A. 0. Uilson, The Manninq Constitution of
Ceylon 1924-1931 (Ph.D. 1956), p. 103.
22. The Royal Instructions of November 24, 1910.
See the report cited in fn. 19 above, at p. 13.
23. Ibid., citing the Order in Council of August 
13, 1920.
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official and twenty-three unofficial members. Of the
unofficial members eleven were to be elected on a territorial
basis of communal representation and the rest nominated by
the Governor. In order to overcome situations where the
unofficial members opposed any legislative measure, the
Governor was empowered to pass any Ordinance with the votes
of the official members alone if, in his opinion, the passing
of that legislative measure was of paramount importance to
the public interest. He could also stop the proceedings in
the Council which in his opinion affected the safety or
24tranquillity in Ceylon. In addition to the two most 
outstanding changes made in 1920 namely, the unofficial 
majority in the Legislative Council and the introduction 
of territorially based elections, the addition of three 
unofficial members for the first time into the Executive 
Council is noteworthy. Agitation for reform continued 
notwithstanding these changes which were thought by the
I
Ceylonese to be totally inadequate.
The Ceylon (Legislative Council) Order in Council,
1923 enlarged the membership of the Legislative Council to 
consist of twelve official members and thirty seven unofficial 
members. Of the unofficial members twenty-three were to 
represent territorial constituencies, eleven to be communally 
elected and three to be nominated by the Governor. The 
Governor continued to be the President of the Council, but
24. Ibid., p. 14.
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in his absence the Vice-President, elected by the Council,
presided in the Council. In matters of paramount importance
to the public interest, the Governor could pass any
Ordinance uith the votes only of the official members. But, ■
whenever he invoked this power he had to make a report to
the Secretary of State. The Executive Council continued to
25
be constituted of both official and unofficial members.
The Donoughmore Commission, appointed in 1927, 
found that under the then existing constitutional system 
the principle of representative government had been conceded, 
without at the same time making the elected members
7  6responsible in any degree, for the conduct of the Government."
In order to ’transfer to the elected representatives of the
people complete control over the internal affairs of the
Island, subject only to provisions which will ensure that
they are helped by the advice of experienced officials and
to the exercise by the Governor of certain safeguarding 
* 27powers’, the Commissioners suggested the establishment of 
a State Council replacing the two Councils then in existence.
The State Council, as recommended by the Commission, 
consisted of sixty-five members elected territorially, three 
executive members and nominated members not exceeding twelve 
in number. Communal representation and franchise qualifi­
cations based on income, property and literacy were to be 
abandoned completely. In the marked absence of political
25. I b r d., p • 16.
26. Ibid., p. 18-19.
27. Ibid., p. 149.
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parties in Ceylon, the Commission thought that a device 
of seven Executive Committees should be introduced in order 
that all members of the State Council uould gain some . 
experience of and some share in administration. The State 
Council uas to be divided into seven executive committees, 
each selecting its oun chairman. These seven chairmen uould 
form a Board of Ministers, together uith the Chief Secretary, 
the Treasurer and the Attorney-General. Ouing to the 
expansion of the pouer granted to the elected and nominated 
representatives in the State Council the Governor uas given 
enlarged pouers. The Governor uas, houever, not to preside 
at the meetings any longer.
LJhen the recommendations of the Commissioners uere 
given effect to under the Ceylon (State Council) Order in 
Council, 1931, the total membership of the State Council 
uas reduced to sixty one (fifty elected, eight nominated 
and three Officers of State), The system of government 
introduced by the Donoughmore Commission uas subjected to 
constant and vigorous criticism, and the popular objective of 
self government uas ultimately realized uhen the Ceylon 
(Constitution) Order in Council, 1946,as amended in 1947* 
began the era of parliamentary democracy in Ceylon.
67
(2) The Relationship betueen the Judiciary and the 
Adm ini s tration
In Chapter 1 ue noted that the upper most 
consideration in the minds of the administration during 
the period 1796-1833 uas the collection of revenue and 
preservation of the British authority in Ceylon--a position 
uhich did not materially change during the entire period of 
the British occupation.^ As a result a stable government 
directed to achieving such object inevitably gained top 
priority. Within such a plan an independent judiciary, 
uhich uould uphold the rights and freedoms of the individual 
even in blatant disregard of governmental policy, uould not 
readily be accepted. But, the fact remains that the Budges 
of the Supreme Court, starting from 1801 up Id the close of 
the colonial era in Ceylon, consistently acted, upon the rules 
and principles that had been evolved by judges ' through the 
centuries in England as suited to the conditions of Ceylon, 
not infrequently asserting their independent position to 
the manifest disadvantage of the Government. Houever, as 
ue shall see later in this Chapter, the Governors of Ceylon 
often resorted to legislative measures, as they did before 
1835,. in response to unacceptable decisions of the Budges of the 
Supreme Court. In any event, as uill be demonstrated in the 
second half of this Part, the major development in respect
1. For instance, one of the significant factors 
that moved the colonial rulers to transfer judicial posts 
from the civil service to members of the local Bar uas that 
the salaries attached to such posts could be significantly 
reduced.
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of the judicial officers uas that directed touards the 
establishment of a Judicial Service protected to a remarkable 
extent from any undue interferences on the part of either the 
Legislature or the Executive.
(i) Some Aspects of the Relationship betueen the Judiciary 
and the Government
One of the earliest developments during t'he period
under revieu is the transfer to the local legislature of the
pouer to amend or repeal the Charter of Justice, 1833, uhich
until then resided exclusively in the Sovereign. Uhen, as
ue have already seen, defects began to shou in the judicial
system established by the Charter of Justice, 1833, another
crucial question surfaced: should the local legislature
have the pouer to pass laus affecting the administration of
justice, as on any ordinary subject?
Governor McKenzie urote in 1838 that he uas
handicapped by his inability .to decide conclusively many
9
important questions touching the interpretation of the
Charter: certain interpretations that the Supreme Court had
placed on the provisions of the Chapter, he contented, uere
Tat variance equally uith the spirit and letter of that 
2
document'. Pour years later, Governor Campbell drauing the 
attention of the Secretary of State to the inability of the 
local government to 'remedy evils uhich arise under the 
Charter', suggested that 'a simple and general' Charter should 
be issued 'leaving all details and the pouer of making uhat- 
ever enactments required to ensure the prompt and impartial
2. McKenzie to Glenely, June 27, 1838. C. 0. 54/163.
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administration of justice to the Legislative Council,
subject of course, to the confirmation by Her MajestyA 
3
Government1.
The Secretary of State unhesitatingly approved the 
views expressed by the Governors.^ Laws relating to the 
administration of justice had been kept outside the province 
of the legislative competence of the local government in 
order 1 to protect the tribunals of Ceylon from the encroach­
ments of the executive authorities of the Island1. However, 
as Lord Stanley remarked, the Charters of Justice had failed 
to ensure that the administrative and the judicial bodies 
maintained their independence on each other and cooperated 
harmoniously in the public service. Moreover, in none of 
the colonies where the courts existed by virtue of local 
enactments discords as to the relative powers of the 
government and the judges /were/, of frequent recurrence1.
The Secretary of State concluded that the Spirit of
I
competition and jealousy1 which was kindled by Charters of
Justice of English origin would be allayed in proportion as
the local government was enabled to regard the courts as
established fby their own deliberate choice and unconstrained 
5
will1. Granting of such power, it was pointed out, uould 
not bring in calamity:
3. Campbell .to Lord Stanley, April 18, 1842.
C. 0. 54/196.
4. Secretary of State, Lord Stanley to Governor 
Campbell, February 26, 1842. C. 0. 54/191.
5. An interesting analogy may be made here to the 
arguments raised on similar lines in favour of Autochthonous1 
cons ti tulions.
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Uith a large body of unofficial members in 
the Legislative Council,--a rapidly increasing 
population--and a press enjoying the utmost 
latitude of free discussion, no Governor of 
Ceylon could accomplish or would seriously 
contemplate the subjugation of the courts to 
his oun authority or influence.^
In any event, the Sovereign could always disallow any
enactment which either improperly undermined the authority
of the court or involved such expenditure as would far
7
exceed the normally acceptable limits.
It was, however, not until a year later, in 1843, that 
any step was taken to give effect to the views of the
R
Secretary of State, Letters Patent of January 28, 1843 
empowered the Governor to enact any Ordinance 1 to make 
provision for the better administration of justice1, notwith­
standing any inconsistency with the Charter of Justice, 1833, 
and to become effective immediately upon promulgation by the 
Governor, provided (a) that the vote was passed unanimously 
by the Legislative Council and. (b) that the Judges of the
t
Supreme Court unanimously certified that the Ordinance should
/
take immediate effect. Five Ordinances were then passed by
the Legislative Council, on the lines of a previous draft 
9
Ordinance which had received the unanimous approval of the 
Supreme Court, but the Judges of the Supreme Court changed 
their minds and raised objections to some of the provisions 
contained in the five Ordinances. Complaining that the 
Judges of the Supreme Court had availed themselves of the
6. Lord Stanley to Governor Campbell, cited in 
note 4 above.
7• Ibid.
8 ‘ L.A.C., Vol. II (1854), p. 142.
9. Enclosed in C. 0. 54/202 (end of the Volume).
71
Letters Patent to obstruct legislation, the Governor submitted
the Ordinances for the approval of the Sovereign. These
were duly confirmed by the Sovereign."^ The Letters Patent
12of July 2, .1844 revoked the Letters Patent of January 28,
1843 and laid down that the Governor could uith the advice
and consent of the Legislative Council enact laus repealing
the Charter of Justice, 1833, in uhole or in part, to become
13effective uhen confirmed by the Sovereign. Finally, in 
1847 the pouer uas granted to the Governor to pass Ordinances 
on all subjects uith the advice and consent of the Legislative 
Council to become effective from the date of promulgation."^
It may be noted parenthetically that the Judges of the Supreme 
Court do not seem to have raised any objection to the transfer 
of such pouers to the local government.
10. Governor Campbell to Lord Stanley, November 23, 
1843. C. 0. 54/206.
11. Lord Stanley to Governor Campbell, April 2 and 
July 4, 1844. C. 0. 55/85.
12* L.A.C., Vol. II (1854)', p. 164.
13. Tuo Ordinances uhich uere not confirmed by
the Sovereign may be given as examples: Ordinance No. 2 of
1845 for removing certain doubts respecting the jurisdiction 
of criminal courts and of Justices of Peace and Ordinance 4 
of 1846 for determining and declaring the rank and nr,?r:.?dence 
of the Bishop of Colombo on the Chief Justice. See L.
Vol. II (1854), pp. 225-226 and 282-283.
14. Governor Torrington’s address to the Legislative 
Council, August 30, 1847. Addresses delivered in the 
Legislative Council of Ceylon by the Governors of the Colony, 
Vol. I (1876) pp. 205-206. ~
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The authority possessed by the Judges of the Supreme 
Court under the Charter of Justice, 1833 to make rules and 
Orders for court proceedings and related matters uas an 
issue on uhich the judiciary and the administration could 
not see eye to eye. In 1825, Governor Barnes had suggested 
the inclusion in any future Charter of Justice of a provision 
to the effect that rules and orders drafted by the Supreme
15
Court uould take effect only uhen approved by the Governor 
a suggestion uhich passed unheaded. Immediately after the 
Charter of Justice, 1833 came into operation, the Judges of 
the Supreme Court drafted rules and orders regulating the 
practice of District Courts. The Chief Justice and the 
second Puisne Justice uere of the opinion that since certain 
parts of such rules and orders seemed to lie beyond their 
competence, the rules and orders must be presented in their 
entirety before the Legislative Council so that they could be 
incorporated in an Ordinance thereby curing any technical 
defect. Rough, S.P.J., houever, thought that the judiciary 
could enact rules of a legislative nature uithout invoking 
the assistance of the Legislature. These rules uere laid 
before the Legislative Council by the Governor and incorporated 
in an Ordinance, fas a measure of prudent caution if not 
absolute necessity1•^
Disallouing Ordinance No. 1 of 1833, which had been passed 
in the manner described above, the Secretary of State thought 
that the judges had attempted to make an incursion into the 
province of the Legislature.17 He feared that fthe Ordinance
15. Barnes to Bathurst, July 20, 1825. C. 0. 54/89.
16. Horton to Col. Stanley, C. 0. 54/134 (1834) p. 8.
17. Col. Stanley to Horton, ibid.
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uhich has nou been suggested and passed in so conciliatory
a spirit uill hereinafter be quoted as a precedent for acts
18
conceived in a very different temper*.
In .1846 an Ordinance uas passed requiring any rules
and orders made by the Supreme Court to be submitted to the
Governor uhich uould take effect only uhen enacted by him
19as an Ordinance. Houever, in 1889 this Ordinance uas 
repealed by the Courts Ordinance uhich provided that rules 
and orders made by the Supreme Court should be laid before
v
the Legislative Council. If uithin forty days they had not 
been annulled by it, the rules uould be published in the 
Gazette subject to any alterations that had been made by 
the Legislature. The rules uere to take effect upon such 
publication (sec. 53).
The main argument against the conferment, in 1855, on the 
Supreme Court of *uncontrolled pouer* to make rules and 
orders seems to have been that it uould use such pouer to
render nugatory important policy decisions of the government.
/
For instance Governor Campbell pointed out in 1842, that
uhile the Legislature had the pouer to regulate the
qualifications of jurors, the Supreme Court uas vested uith
the pouer of making rules as to the summoning and empanelling 
20
of jurors. A rule made by the Supreme Court that no caste
18. Ibid. Ordinance No. 1 of 1833 is found in 
L.A.C., Vol. Tl (*1854), p. 1.
19. Ordinance No. 8 of 1846. L .A .C ., Vol. II (1854), 
p. 290. Tuo such Ordinances may__be mentioned: (i) Ordinance 
No. 9 of 1859 (Ibid., Vol. Ill /1859 Section/ p. 25) giving 
effect to certain rules and orders for the^Courts of Requests, 
and (ii) Ordinance No. 8 of 1860 (Ibid. , /1860 Sectior^/ p. 17) 
to give effect to certain rules and orders made under 
Ordinance No. 13 of 1859.
20. Campbell to Stanley, April 18, 1842.
C. 0. 54/196.
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distinctions should be taken into consideration in empanelling
jurors had led the natives to regard it as an act on the part
21
of the Government calculated to abolish caste distinctions.
Similarly, in 1887, Governor Gordon complained that
Clarence, 3., had interpreted section 288 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, uhich gave the presiding Judge a discretion
in choosing a jury uhen parties could not agree as to the
composition of the jury, to mean that natives had a right to
22demand a native Sinhalese speaking jury.
It is safe to conclude that the Supreme Court did
not use its rule making pouer arbitrarily to annoy the
administration. Uhenever it departed from any government
policy it uas for the commendable object of protecting the
rights of the individual. The repeal of Ordinance No. 8 of
1846 in 1889 amply demonstrates that by that time the
Legislature had conceded that the Supreme Court uould generally
use its rule making pouer in a responsible manner.
0
The third issue relevant here related to the removal
of the Chief Justice from the membership of the Legislative
Council uhich apparently had its antecedent in the follouing
incident. During a meeting of the Legislative Council uhich
uas not attended by the Chief Justice it uas decided that
the K i n g ^  Advocate,.the Chief Government Lau Officer, uho
uas a member of the Executive Council and uas responsible for
drafting Ordinances, would be requested to attend the next
meeting in order that he could explain fully the effect of an
t
2i• Ibid.
22. Gordon to Stanley, December 23, 1886. C. 0. 54/567.
Ordinance that was before the Legislative Council. At the
next meeting, when the King’s Advocate entered the Council
room, the Chief Justice moved that strangers be directed
to withdraw. He withdrew, but was allowed by the Council
23
to take part in the meeting later. (The Chief Justice 
then was Mr. Rough who had earlier entertained the view 
that the Supreme Court had the authority to pass rules of 
court even if they partook of a legislative character). 
Agreeing with Governor McKenzie that the King’s Advocate 
should take the place of the Chief Justice in the 
legislative Council, the Secretary of State insisted that 
this was not calculated as a personal victimisation at all. 
As Governor McKenzie wrote, the exclusion of the Chief 
Justice from a seat in the Council was merely an act of * 
extending a principle that had widely gained currency in 
many other colonies. He further explained that it was 
essential that the King’s Advocate, who was a member of the 
Executive Council, should b‘e present in the Legislative 
Council to clarify any doubts arising from discussions 
on Ordinances.^
A common feature of the perio'd under review is the 
denial by Governors of any intention on their part to 
interfere with the duties and functions of judges. As 
Governor Gregory wrote in 1877:
23. See Glenely to McKenzie, 7. 2. 1838. C. 0. 54/161.
24. Ibid.
25. See the Governor’s dispatch appearing before the 
Secretary of State’s dispatch; and the address of McKenzie, 
Addresses Delivered in the Legislative Council of Ceylon 
by the Governors, Vol^ 1, p. 69.
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Direct interference on the part of the 
Executive Government uith a judge in the 
discharge of his judicial functions and 
in the discretion uhich he must of necessity 
be alloued uhere the course uhich he should 
follou is not positively and definitely laid 
doun by lau is obviously to be avoided and 
should only be resorted to in extreme cases.
There may be grave reasons to be dissatisfied 
uith the action of a judge, but in the absence 
of absolute impropriety of motive or conduct 
on his part, it may be the duty of Government 
to abstain from direct censure until their 
interference is imperatively called for in 
the interests of the public and the adminis­
tration of justice.
These remarks uere occa sioned by the 1 capriciousness
and perversity’ of Hr. Beruick, District Judge of Colombo,
uhich had brought the administration of justice in his
27court to a deadlock. The enactment of Ordinance No. 7 
28of 18 74 authorising uith retrospective effect the entertain­
ment by a District Court of prosecutions filed in by the 
Queen’s Advocate,uhich uas specially intended to stop the 
incessant refusal of Beruick, D.J., to try cases committed 
befctre him by the Queen’s AdVocate* had not succeeded in 
realising that object. The Governor uas, thereto re, nou 
bringing the case up before the Secretary of State for his 
decision. He submitted that although he valued ’the 
importance of upholding the judicial independence of the 
Bench*, there uas another and equally important consideration:
26. Governor Gregory to Earl of Carnarvon, 
January 4, 1877. C. 0. 54/506.
27. Ibid.
28. L.E.C. , 1874-1875 (1875), p. 216-8.
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ZT_7he Government being responsible for the 
due conduct of public affairs and the proper 
administration of justice in the Colony uould 
be neglecting their duty and abdicating the 
function entrusted to them, if they uere to 
allou the vagaries of a judge to pass uithout 
comment uhen they had become matters of public 
notoriety and threatened to affect prejudicially 
the administration of criminal justice in the 
Island, And further it is evident that a judge 
should be scrupulously careful to conform to the 
lau, and that if he fails to do so the government 
should require his compliance uith it. In 
extreme cases the Government have the pouer of 
dismissal and are bound to exercise it, and it 
must therefore not only be proper but incumbent 
on them to exert a control in cases of grave 
necessity uhich may yet fall short of calling 
for the dismissal of the judge.
In 1886, Governor Gordon vehemently denied any
intention on his part to have interfered uith judicial 
30
proceedings. The facts leading to the Governor’s statement
may be briefly stated. In Dombe Budharakkita Terunnanse , v.
Hahapitiqama Dharmnati 1 aka Terunnanse, a case instituted
31before the District Court, the plaintiff had sought an
injunction against the defendant to restrain him from 
*
proceeding uith the building of a library which interfered with 
the plaintiff’s right of uay. The counsel for the defendant 
stated in court that in response to'his petition to the Governor 
the latter had inspected the site and replied in writing 
that he sau no objection to building the proposed library 
as long as it did not interfere uith the right of uay. It 
uas furtheralleged that the Governor expressed his opinion 
being fully auare of the pending action. The District ludge 
uas reported to have said:
29. Dispatch cited in fn. 26.
30. Gordon to Earl of Granville, Dune 4, 1886. 
C. 0. 54/565.
31. The Ceylon Observer, April 24, 1886.
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I do not believe that the Governor has 
given you any authority whatever. I 
don’t care if he did, but I think he 
knows his duty better than to interfere 
with me in the discharge of my duties,
The defendant was jailed for failing to give an
32undertaking not to proceed with the building. The Ceylon 
Observer of April 24, 1886, carried an article under the 
heading ’Authorities at Issue1 which having referred to 
previous clashes between the Executive and the Judiciary, 
stated that the Governor had apparently encouraged and incited 
the priest ’to set a judicial tribunal at defiance’; for, the 
Governor should have known that the defendant would rely on 
his decision. On the Seventh of Hay, 1886 the District 
Judge wrote to the Ceylon Observer stating that the refusal 
by the Governor to release the defendant as prayed for by him 
negatived any allegation that the Governor intended to commit 
a contempt of court.
One last incident may* be mentioned to illustrate
the need the executive authorities felt to avoid any inter-
/
ference with judicial authorities. A sentence of imprison-
ment imposed on an accused person by the Hagistrate’s Court
and affirmed by the Supreme Court, was remitted by the
Governor, who had,.upon being petitioned by the accused’s
wife, conducted an extra-judicial inquiry through a native
officer and come to the conclusion that the charge had been 
33
a false one.. In response to a query made by the Secretary
31a. The Ceylon Observer, April 24, 1886.
32. Ibid.
33. Ualker to Chamberlain, September 30, 1899. 
C. 0. 54/657.
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of State respecting an article appearing in the Ceylon 
Standard of September 1, 1899 entitled ’the Executive and 
the Judiciary’, the Governor informed the Secretary of 
State that he never intended to interfere uith the judicial 
decision. The Governor was able to satisfy the authorities, 
in London that he had acted in good faith and that the failure to 
refer the matter to the Magistrate for his advice uas not 
significant since the allegation had related to the falsity 
of the charge. One Under-Secretary urote, houever: 'I
think ue should be most scrupulous to avoid the appearance 
of conflict betueen Executive and Judiciary in Ceylon1.
Above discuss ion indicates hou the government
exercised its pouer and authority in respect of the
judicial authorities. The attitude of the administration
seems to have been to allou judicial officers to carry out
their functions uithout hind ranee, ensuring, houever, at the
same time that government activities uere not unduly 
*
hampered by judicial behaviour. Ue may nou proceed to look 
at hou the judicial authorities escaped gradually from 
dependence on the government to independence.
34. See the minute appended to the above dispatch 
dated 24.10.1899 and .initialed A. F.
s o
(ii) From Dependence to Independence
That the Judges of the Supreme Court should be
professional lawyers who did not oue their tenure of office
to the Governor had been officially recognized since the
enactment of the Charter of Justice, 1801. But, as ue have
already seen, all inferior judicial officers, at the time
of the proclamation of the Charter of Justice, 1833, belonged
to the Civil Service. Cameron had rightly pointed out hou
the judicial task to 
unsatisfactory it uas to have entrusted^persons having no
legal qualifications and judicial experience. The Secretary
of State, Viscount Godrich, too appreciated the value of
’the general rule 'of confiding the administration of justice
only to persons uho have been trained to the study and
practice of the lau as a profession’. Houever, he
reluctantly chose to depart, in some degree, from the general
rule, in that he instructed the Governor to appoint as
District Judges persons uho had prior to 1833 held judicial 
»
office, thereby avoiding any claims for compensation uhich 
uould result from their removal from office. Any future 
vacancies uere to be filled uith professional lawyers.^
But this instruction uas not strictly adhered to: 
in 1835 the Colombo Observer protested against the appoint­
ment of an inexperienced civil servant as District juc'cc? uhen
there uere more qualified and senior civil.servants and 
2
proctors. In 1837, the Governor informed the Secretary
1. Instructions accompanying the Charter of Justice' 
of 1833, March 23, 1833. Mendis, The Colebrooke-Cameron 
Papers, Vol. I, p. 350-373, at pp. 371-2.
2. See (1835) C. 0. 54/140, pp. 515-6.
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of State that he had appointed tuo Ceylonese lawyers as District
Judges and insisted that he expected 'no reclamation
from any quarter uorthy of the slightest attention (if at
all) against these late appointments founded either upon
the incompetency moral or intellectual of the parties 
3appointed1. Having referred to an article appearing in'
Bengal Hurkaru stating that native judges in Bengal uere
unacquainted uith English and that it uas inadvisable to
grant them extensive pouers until native men could be found
duly qualified, by knouledge and integrity to administer
justice in important cases, the Governor uent on to say that
4those comments Could not be made of the Ceylonese.
Houever, barely tuo years later Governor McKenzie reported 
that natives ’so much distrust each other’ and that 
’some considerable time must elapse’ before natives could 
be appointed--for the Ceylon Bar uas ’entirely uneducated’,
nor had the practitioners in general had any opportunity
* 5to obtain a legal education. He urged, therefore, that
District Judges should be sent from England, even if they 
uere not professionally educated. Governor Campbell shared 
this vieu uhen he urote in 1842 that the.general selection of
3.. Horton to Lord Stanley, September 2, 1837.
C. 0. 54/156.
4. Ibid.
5. Observations of the Governor on the reports of 
the Judges of the Supreme Court on the Charter of Justice, 
1833. May 30, 1839. C. 0. 54/170.
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District Judges from the Ceylon Bar uas.for the time being
g
entirely out of the question. Houever, he uas glad to be
able to appoint Hr. Staples, a Ceylonese lauyer, as the 
District Judge of Kandy. And he indicated that he uas uilling 
to consider able and qualified lauyers for any future 
appointments.
Throughout the period under revieu there uas vigo’Tous
and continuous agitation from lauyers, merchants, planters and
leading inhabitants of Ceylon for the appointment of members
of the local Bar as judicial officers. These demands uere
not readily granted, it is submitted, mainly because European
civil servants enjoying judicial pouers contributed in large
measure to the preservation of British authority in Ceylon.
Before ue continue uith our discussion on the gradual
evolution of a separate judicial service in Ceylon, it is
useful to examine hou the revenue and judicial functions came
to be separated--a step uhich necessarily had to precede the 
*
separation of judicial service from the civil service.
As Governors of Ceylon expressed their uish to 
refrain from undue interferences uith the judiciary so did 
they disapprove the combination of revenue and judicial 
functions in the same person. Governor Campbell urate in 
1845 that the separation of judicial function from revenue 
uas a matter that he had aluays tried to put into practice.
A judicial officer, he pointed out, had to be stationed in 
one place uhile revenue officers had to go to all the parts 
of the area for the proper carrying out of their duties.
6. Campbell to Lord Stanley, January 20, 1842. 
C. 0. 54/196.
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There uere only four stations at that time uhere all
7
different appointments had been concentrated in one person, 
Later in 1856 the Legislative Council decided that in 
Batticoloa judicial functions must be taken auay from the 
revenue and administrative officer as too much uork had been
g
thrusted on him. This move uas immediately folloued by a
memorandum from the inhabitants of Matara requesting inter
alia that ’judicial functions should be separated from
revenue function in the Hatara area. The Governor replied
that this request could be granted if there uas financial
provision by uay of increasing taxes. In another dispatch
Governor Uard observed that corruption and neglect had
crept into administration due to the combining of judicial
g
and revenue duties in the same person. For these reasons 
he effected a separation of functions in Galle and Badulla
4- 10too#
The gradual process of the separation of judicial 
functions from administrative and revenue functions uas 
necessitated by the rapid grouth and1success of the plantation 
industry. Therefore, although the appointment of separate 
judicial officers resulted in extra expenses to the government 
the increased revenue more than adequately compensated the 
adoption of the neu arrangement. The natural follou up from
7. Campbell to Lord Stanley, October 13, 1845.
C. 0. 54/219.
8. Uard to Labouchere, April 12, 1856. C. 0. 54/321.
9. Uard to Labouchere, November 10, 1356.
C. 0. 54/324.
10. Uard to Labouchere, December 8, 1856.
C. 0. 54/321.
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this uas the claim that justice could be properly
administered, particularly in important cases — occa-sioned
by the rapid economic grouth, only by judges draun from
professional lauyers.
By the middle of the century it had become a common
practice to appoint as District Budge Colombo, ’a lauyer of
some eminence1 Governor Uard, uho made that observation
in 1855 recommended, houever, in 1856 the appointment of a
12civil servant as the District Budge of Colombo. The
Secretary of State informed the Governor that in appointing
District Budges, the most suitable person in the interests
of the community should be selected."^ Governor Uard uho
uas instructed to appoint a lauyer as District Budge of 
•^ 4 scvecte^V
Colombo R. F. Morgan, a Burgher lapyer.t—
A major concession uas made in 1872. In that year
the local Bar represented to the Secretary of State strongly
against the appointment of a .civil servant as District Budge, 
* 15
Kandy. w The Secretary of State urote to the Governor that
members of the local Bar should be appointed to the tuo
Principal Budgeships of Colombo and Kandy.*^ The memorial
of the lauyers uas folloued immediately by one from the
17
members of the Civil Service. Uithdraual of the District
11. Uard to Labouchere, May 2, 1855. C. 0. 54/315.
12. See Uard to Labouchere, dispatch No. 24 of 1856.
C. 0. 54/321.
13. Ibid.
14. Labouchere to Uard, May 14, 1856. C. 0. 55/98.
15. Memorial appended to Gregory^ dispatch to Earl of 
Kimberley, May 28, 1872. C. □. 54/476.
16. Ibid.
17. Memorial enclosed uith Gregory!s dispatch to Earl 
of Kimberley, September 2, 1872. C. 0. 54/478.
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Judgeship of Kandy from the Civil Service, they submitted, 
uas prejudicial to the administration of justice, since 
civil servants uho functioned as inferior judicial officers 
uould have no incentive of promotion to higher posts. They 
strongly urged that District Judgeship of Kandy should not be 
given to the local Bar exclusively. Governor Gregory thought 
that it uas beneficial to gradually transfer the judicial
uork from the Civil Service to professional hands, and that
' ■ 18 the savings thereby effected uould not be inconsiderable.
The Secretary of State replied saying that as a general rule
practicing lauyers should be selected for higher judicial
offices. Houever,. in 1880 Lord Kimberley urote that he '
uould be prepared to consider from time to time uhether
’an exception to this requirement might not be made in favour
of an officer of proved ability and experience in a judicial 
19appointment1. This vieu uas accepted later by his
20successors in 1884 and in 1891.
In 1922, the Retrenchment Commission recommended the
gradual removal of the judicial posts from the Civil Service
mainly in order to achieve considerable savings. The
Commission did not recommend the establishment of a !judicial
service uith classes and automatic promotion'. Instead it
recommended that each post should have a definite salary
21attached to it in accordance uith its importance.
18. Ibid.
19. Quoted in the Secretary of State's draft reply 
to Governor Harelock's dispatch No. 31 of January 25, 1891. 
C. 0. 54/592.
2°. Ibid.
21. Sessional Paper III of 1923, pp. 10-11.
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In 1926, it uas moved in the Legislative Council
22
that the judiciary be separated from the Civil Service.
After a lengthy discussion, houever, the motion uas amended
to the effect that a select committee be appointed to consider
the proposal for establishing a separate judicial service
for Ceylon uith a vieu to the appointment of trained lauyers
23in judicial posts. The Select Committee of the Legislative
Council recommended in the main that all judicial posts should
in due course be filled by professional lauyers uith at least
six yearsf practice; that the number of civil servants holding
judicial posts should be reduced to ten; and that all matters
relating to the District Judges and Police Hagistrates
including appointment, transfer and promotions should be
24referred to the Attorney-General for* his advice. The last 
recommendation uas adopted by the Government uithout reserve. 
As regards the first recommendation it uas uilling to 
gradually increase the number* of judicial posts available
I
to professional lauyers.so that only fourteen posts uould be
25reserved to the members of the Civil Service. Houever, 
uithin uhat time the transfers could be made, the government 
uas not uilling to say, although it expected a rapid transfer.
Uith the introduction of the Donoughmore Constitution 
administration of justice uas placed under the Attorney- 
General and a Judicial Appointments Board (consisting of the 
Attorney-General and tuo Judges of the Supreme Court) created
22. Ceylon Hansard, November 11, 1926, p. 1381. 
23« Ibid., p. 1425.
24. See Ceylon Sessional Paper Will of 1930 on 
!Judicial Appointments*.
25. Ibid.
i
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to recommend suitable practising lauyers to be appointed
2 6as inferior judicial officers. The Judicial Service
Commission recommended in 1936 that the Judicial Appointment
Board should consist of the Chief Justice and tuo Puisne
Justices. This uould ’give to judges and magistrates that
sense of independence uhich all judges and magistrates must
have and uhich the present judges and magistrates do not 
27
feel’.
This process was completed in 1939 uhen the Governor 
established a Judicial Service consisting of 46 judicial
9Q
officers excluding the Judges of the Supreme Court.“ It 
uas declared that only proctors and advocates of the Supreme 
Court of Ceylon uith at least six years practice uould be 
eligible for judicial appointments; that appointments and 
promotions uould be done by the Governor uith the advice 
of the Judicial Appointments Board subject to the approval 
of the Secretary of State; that merit and not seniority
uould be the criterion for promotion; and that for the
/
purposes of leave, discipline and administration, judicial
officers uould be under the general- control of the legal 
29secretary. Thus at the time the Ceylon (Constitution)
Order in Council, 1946 uas drafted adequate spade-uork had 
already been done for the introduction of a judicial service, 
in the true sense of the term, regulated by the Judicial 
Service Commission.
26. Sessional Paper VI, 1936. The Report of the 
Judicial Commission, p. 104.
27* Ibid. , p. 107-12.
28. See Ceylon Government Gazette, June 30, 1939,
484.
29* Ibid., paragraphs 2-8.
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The agitation for the appointment of the members
of the local Bar as judicial officers uas undoubtedly a
demand of the educated Ceylonese for responsible gov/ernment
jobs: the local Bar consisted nearly exclusively of
30Ceylonese. The desirability of appointing lawyers
practising in Ceylon as judicial officers uas supported on
the ground that they uere better acquainted uith the local
31
laus and practices than a lawyer brought from overseas.
Aside from providing an avenue for the expression of the 
growing nationalism, the agitation for judicial reforms . 
sought to realize the salutary object of liberating .judicial • 
officers from the shackles of executive control and inter­
ference. A member of the Legislative Council pointed out 
in 1926, during the discussion relating to judicial reforms, 
that a judicial service was urgently called for at least to 
eliminate ’the power that the executive invariably exercises
over the judiciary, specially when the judges happen to be
» 32
civil servants’.
There uas firstly a direct control over inferior
judicial officers in the sense that until the reforms
introduced towards the close of the British Colonial Rule in
Ceylon, the power of appointment, transfer, promotion and
discipline was, for .all practical purposes, in the hands
of the Governor.
30. P. T. H. Fernando, The Legal Profession in 
Ceylon in the Early Twentieth Century: Official Attitudes 
to Ceylonese Aspirations. 19 Ceylon Historical Journal, 
pp. 1-15 (1970).
31. See the memorial from the legal profession 
enclosed in dispatch No. 83 of March 2, 1893. C. 0. 54/607.
32. See Ceylon Hansard, November 11, 1926, p. 1387.
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As regards the appointment of Judges of the Supreme
Court, District Judges and the law officers of the Crown
the Secretary of State generally acted on the advice of
the Governor. In turn, lawyers and judicial officers made
formal requests to the governor for judicial appointments
and promotions respectively. For instance, in 1854 the
Acting District Judge of Kurunegala submitted a memorial
to the Governor requesting to be appointed as District Judge
of Colombo (which in effect was a promotion). The Governor,
however, had recommended the appointment of another civil
33servant which the Secretary of State disapproved of. Even
the Judges of the -Supreme Court had made representations
regarding promotions.^  It was common practice for judicial
officers to apply to the Governor for a variety of benefits
35such as the increase of their salaries, a higher rate of 
3 6
pension and reduction of the rate of contribution to the 
37pension fund.
The power of suspension exercised by the Governor 
and the power of removal exercised by the Crown generally on 
the advice of the Governor also threatened the independence 
of judicial officers. However it is to the credit of the
33. See, Dispatch No. 123 of 1854 from Governor 
Anderson to Secretary of State, Duke of Newcastle. C. 0. 
54/308. The District Judge of Kandy too submitted his claim. 
See Anderson to Newcastle, April 22, 1854. C. 0. 54/307.
34. See Dispatch No. 201 of November 3, 1856.
C. 0. 54/324.
35. Campbell to Lord Stanley, February 15, 1847.
C. 0. 54/233.
36. See dispatch No. 102 of April 14, 1873. C. 0.
54/484.
37. See the memorial of Oliphant, C.J., to the 
Secretary of State, in dispatch No. 40 of February 14, 1850. 
C. 0. 54/268.
so
authorities in London that extensive inquiries preceded any 
38such removal. On the other hand the manner in uhich the
authorities in Ceylon exercised their powers came under
attack. For instance the Chief Justice complained in 1893
that civil servants uho held judicial office uere liable to
be transferred from one office to another at the uill of the 
39Executive. It uas alleged by a Member of the Legislative 
Council in 1926 that if a Police Magistrate adopted a lenient 
attitude touards convicted persons, the police authorities 
used to report such judicial officer to the administrative 
authorities.^
As . British Colonial Rule drew to its end, then, 
ue uitness the emergence of a judicial service greatly 
protected from executive control and interference, and 
consisting of professional lawyers, deviating from the 
firmly held vieu that only civil servants uho had been 
regularly trained in Ceylon made good judges due to their 
’knowledge of native language, familiarity uith the habits, 
mann'ers and prejudices of the people, /and theij:/ capability 
of giving the amount of credibility to the evidence of the 
native uitnesses 1 • ^
38. For instance the paper relative to the dismissal 
of R. Langslou, a District Judge in Ceylon, runs to 1C? sages 
in British Parliamentary Papers (Accounts and Papers) :1, XL I 
(184771 : ' ' ‘
39. See the letter of the Chief Justice enclosed in 
dispatch No. 38 of January 20, 1893. C. 0. 54/606.
40. Ceylon Hansard, November 11, 1926, p. 1387.
41. See dispatch No. 106 of July 4, 1854 from Governor 
Anderson to the Duke of Neucastle. C. 0. 54/308. Similar 
vieus had prevailed in the other parts of the British Empire 
too. See, for instance, James S. Read, ’The Search for Justice1 
in H. F. Morris and James S. Read, Indirect Rule and the Search 
for Justice; Essays in East African Legal History (19 72),
pp. 287-331, particularly pp. 295-308.
(3) Judicial Role: 1833-1948
The gradual evolution of a system of courts manned 
by professional lawyers belonging to a separate judicial 
service has been already witnessed. It must be noted here 
that the Judges of the Supreme Court stood in alliance with 
the lawyers and other leading citizens of Ceylon in defending 
the principle of entrusting judicial functions to trained 
lawyers. For instance Sir John Budd Phear, C.J., complained 
of the evils arising from the employment, as inferior 
judicial officers, of persons who ’manifest as a rule want 
of knowledge of the practice of courts, of the business of 
their office, and of the law which they have to conform to 
and carry out’.^
Aside from insisting on the need for the appointment 
of lawyer-judges, the Judges of the Supreme Court took the 
opportunity to make recommendations for the better adminis­
tration of justice. For ins.t;ance, Phear, C.J.* pointed out 
in his above quoted representation the ill effects of the 
concentration in one person of ’the entire multiform machinery 
for the administration of civil and- criminal justice’. The 
learned Chief Justice went on to propose the adoption of a 
complete civil and criminal Procedure Code based upon the 
Indian model. As ’feu persons would be so bold as to assert 
that they knew what exactly is the existing criminal law of 
the Colony or where it is to be found’, he strongly 
recommended the enactment of a Penal Code.
1. Governor Longdon's dispatch No. 243 to Secretary 
of State, July 24, 1878. C. 0. 54/514. See also dispatch 
No. 33 of January 1, 1893. C. 0. 54/606.
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During the early years of the period under review
the Judges of the Supreme Court made a substantial
contribution to the development of the law of Ceylon by way
of drafting Ordinances. In 1833 Governor Horton acknowledged
the assistance he had received from the Chief Justice in
drafting a number of Ordinances including the Evidence 
2
Ordinance. Governor Campbell informed the Secretary of 
State, in 1842, that the Judges of the Supreme Court were 
preparing, at his request, an Ordinance for the appointment
3
of Police Magistrates. The Judges of the Supreme Court
continued to make their contribution to the codification of
law, even after th'e law officers of the Crown were entrusted
with the duty of drafting Ordinances. For instance, the
Judges of the Supreme Court submitted their observations on
a draft bill to introduce the English law of contract and
4
tort into Ceylon. There was general consensus that much
doubt and con fusion had resulted from the application of 
*
the Roman Dutch law in those two branches of the law,
/
nevertheless, it was thought to be inadvisable to sweep away 
in one enactment the applicable law and to introduce the 
English law instead. That was a matter which needed careful 
consideration.^
2. Blue Book for 1833, enclosed in. C. 0. 54/145.
3. Campbell to Lord Stanley, January 19, 1842,
C. □. 54/196. See for the proposals of Marshall, C.J., 
on the Prescription Ordinance, C. 0. 54/136, at p. 313.
4. Governor Longdon to Secretary of State, March 10, 
1882. C. 0. 54/538.
5. See the report of the Senior Puisne Justice and 
that of the Chief Justice and the two Junior Puisne Justices 
enclosed in the dispatch cited in fn. 4 above.
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Hou much the Governors appreciated the cooperation
of the Judges of the Supreme Court in codifying laus appears
from the invitation by Governor Longdon of Clarence, C.J.,
to attend the Executive Council meetings to explain the
Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code that he had
drafted.^ The significance of this invitation, uhich the
Chief Justice accepted, lies in that in 1838 the Governor
had caused the Chief Justice to be removed from his member-
7
ship of the Legislative Council,
The contribution made by the Judges of the'Supreme 
Court to the development of lau uas not limited to their 
cooperation in codification. They did evolve the lau of 
Ceylon, in the main, through judicial .interpretation. In 
fact, the manner in uhich they modified and altered the 
application of the Roman Dutch lau and thereby introduced 
or superimposed the English lau provides a very rich area 
for an extensive research. Professor Nadaraja has, in his
9 ’ '
book, succinctly summarized the methods by uhich the Supreme 
Court brought about the metamorphosis in the Roman Dutch 
lau as it uould have prevailed at the time of the British
g
occupation of Ceylon. As B. L. Burnside, the Queen's 
Advocate, uho later became the Chief Justice of Ceylon urote:
6. Longdon to Earl of Derby, June 12, 1883.
C. 0. 54/547.
7. This is discussed in Part.(2)(i) of this Chapter.
8. See Nadaraja, Legal System, Chapter 6.
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The Courts, usurping the function of 
the Legislature, whenever difficulties 
have arisen, have had no hesitation in 
rejecting the Roman Dutch Lau and 
deciding as if the English lau uere 
actually in force.g
As the Supreme Court uas instrumental in evolving 
the judicial system of Ceylon, so did it continue to be the 
guardian of the freedoms of the subject. The celebrated 
decision of the Supreme Court in Bracegirdle^ Case^  alone 
■ provides ample evidence of the firm stand taken by the 
,Supreme Court in defence of personal liberty. This case 
arose out of a deportation order made by the Governor 
against Bracegirdle uhich came under severe attack in the 
State Council.
On April 20, 1937 the Governor, purporting to act 
in pursuance of the pouer vested in him by clause 3 of 
Article III of an Order of Her Majesty in Council of 1096, 
ordered Bracegirdle to leave the country uithin four days. 
Upon*his refusal to comply uith that order, the Governor, 
on the Seventh of Hay, authorised the Police to arrest him 
and to place him aboard any ship proceeding to Australia,
9. The QueenTs Advocate!s report on the draft 
Bill to introduce .English Lau of Contract and Tort.
Enclosed in dispatch No. 108 of Harch 10, 1882. C. 0. 54/538.
10• In the Hatter of an Application for a Urit of 
Habeas Corpus upon the Deputy Inspector-General of Police:
In re Hark Anthony Lyster Bracegirdle (1937) 39 N.L.R. 193.
11. Ceylon Hansard, Hay 4, 1937 p. 903-944;
Hay 5, 1937 p. 947-982.
Bracegirdle’s last place of residence. Although the reasons
uhich prompted the Governor had not been placed before the
Court in detail, it assumed that the Governor uas of opinion
that Bracegirdle’s actions and utterances reflecting on the
current political and social situation in Ceylon justified
12his removal from Ceylon. Immediately upon his arrest an 
application for a urit of - Habeas Corpus uas made on his 
behalf alleging that the Governor had acted ultra vires in 
issuing the order of arrest and deportation.
Briefly, the argument uas that the Governor uas 
authorised to make such an order only in an emergency 
situation: such an emergency, it uas contended, did not
then exist. The relevant Order in Council may first be 
outlined.
The Order of Her Majesty in Council of October 26,
1896 uas enacted to be operative in certain places of
13strategic importance such as Hong Kong, Malta and Ceylon,
(specified in the Schedule), uhen proclaimed in any such
Colony by its Governor, Uhen proclaimed the Order uould be
in operation until the Governor issued another proclamation
declaring its operation to have ceased.^ Article III (3)
of the Order in Council uas as follous:
The Governor may order any person to quit the
Colony, or any part of or place in the Colony,
to be specified in such order, and if any person
shall refuse to obey any such order the Governor
may cause him to be arrested and- removed from the
Colony, or from such part thereof, or place therein,
and for that purpose to be placed on board any ship
or boat.ir 15
12. In re Bracegirdle (1937) 39 N.L.R. 193 at p. 206 
13* Ibid., p. 211. 14. Ibid., p. 206.
Ibid., p. 207.
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The rest of the articles in this Order in Council authorized
the Governor, among others, to requisition food and fuel;
to seize, use or destroy public buildings; and' to control
railways, light houses and uater supply.^
The preamble to the Order in Council of March 21,
1916 which amended the previous Order in Council, in order
to expand the scope of Article III (l), stated that the
original Order in Council had been enacted 1 to make provision
for the security of the Colonies mentioned in the schedule
to that Order in times of emergency’.
The Order in Council, 1896 was brought'into operation
in Ceylon, on August 5, 1914 by a proclamation issued by the
Governor, who on the same day proclaimed a state of war
between Great Britain and the German Empire. No steps had
been taken by the Governor, after the war, to terminate the
operation of the Order in Council in Ceylon.
It was argued on behalf of the applicant that the
provisions contained in the Order in Council, 1896 were
suitably meant for exigencies of a war, a civil strife or a
similar type of emergency. Moreover, the preamble to the
amending Order in Council, 1916 made it abundantly clear
that these extensive powers were meant to be invoked by the
Governor in an emergency alone. The mere fact that the
Proclamation had not been repealed did not justify ’the
exercise of powers uhich could properly be exercised only at
17a time of great public danger’. As Professor Keith uas 
quoted to have uritten:
16. Ibid ♦
17. Ibid., p. 217, per Soertsz, 3.
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/T_7he courts of the empire recognized 
the validity of such powers under war 
conditions, but it is clear that a 
complete change would be effected in the 
security of personal rights if executive 
officers in time of peace were permitted 
the discretion they exercised during the a 
war, and which in foreign countries they 
often exercise even in time of peace.^
Rejecting the argument raised by the Attorney- 
General that Article III, 3 must be read alone without any 
reference to the rest of the Order in Council or the 
preamble, the Court relied on the well established rule of 
construction that the whole of an enactment must be
1 9considered in the construction of any of its parts."
Moreover there was ’strong authority to the effect that the
Legislature does not intend to interfere with existing law
and that it would require clear and unmistakable language to
20dislodge that presumption’.
The Supreme Court did not agree with the submissions 
made by the Attorney-General..that ’the elementary principle
of Government is that the safety of the State is a matter/
of paramount concern and every other principle must give 
way to the safety of the State’ and- that ’if there was any 
infringement of any private right or private liberty, which 
is seldom likely to occur, there is always an appeal to the
Ibid., p. 210, citing B. Keith, The Government 
of the British Empire ( ) Part I, Chapter \/II, at p. 234.
19. Ibid., p. 210.
20. Ibid., p. 209.
Crown through the Secretary of State, and ultimately to 
Parliament. As to whether an emergency has arisen or not
21
is a matter which cannot he canvassed in a Court of Law1.
The three judges were unanimous in their decision 
that Bracegirdle had been illegally detained on the basis 
that the G-overnor could exercise the powers granted to 
him by the Order in Council only in an emergency and that 
at the time of Bracegirdle’s arrest there was no such 
emergency.
V/ith Bracegirdle’s case may be contrasted Dias v.
22The Attorney-General. In that case, military authorities 
had, during a time when martial lav; was in force, impressed 
two cars belonging to the plaintiff and later returned them 
with a small sum as compensation. The Supreme Court 
held that the Governor was empowered by the Order in 
Council we have seen above to order the requisition of the 
cars. According to that Order in Council the amount of 
compensation payable could be decided only by a compensa­
tion board if one is appointed by the Governor. It was
23not a matter that could be determined by a court of law.
23• Ibid.. p. 195.
22. (1918) 20 N. L. R. 193.
23. Ibid., at p. 203. This decision was overruled 
by the Privy Council i (1920) 22 N. L. R. 16iy following 
A. G . V. De Key.serV Royal Hotel Ltd.. which had held that 
the Crown was not entitled to take possession of property 
of a subject in connection with the defence of the realm 
without paying compensation for their use and occupation.
The Privy Council ordered that the amount which the District 
Judge thought was appropriate, had he recognised the right , 
of the plaintiff to sue the Crown, should be paid as 
compensation.
99
Thus according to the Supreme Court decision, later 
overruled by the Privy Council, if the Governor decided 
not to pay compensation courts could not upset that 
decision. This decision indicates that in circumstances 
where the courts upheld the legality of governmental 
action they did not obstruct executive functions.
In the light of the above discussion it is safe to 
conclude that the Supreme Court duly appreciated the 
need to permit the government, in times of emergency, to 
assume certain powers, which if exercised during normal 
times would be regarded as obnoxious to fundamental 
principles of constitutional lav/.
Instances where a decision of the Supreme Court 
proved unacceptable to the government are not rare 
during the period under review. Two examples may be given. 
In 1834, the Supreme Court decided that a person had 
acted legally when he removed more than two bottles of
24. It was not infrequently that colonial government 
sought the protection of Indemnity Acts to exclude 
liability during the subsistence of an emergency. For 
instance the Ceylon Indemnity Order in Council of 1915 
provided thus:
No action, prosecution, or legal proceeding 
whatever shall be brought, instituted, or 
maintained against the Governor of Ceylon, 
or the person for the time being or at any 
time commanding the troops in Ceylon, or 
against any person or persons acting under 
them . . . for or on account of or in respect 
of any acts, matters, or things whatsoever 
in good faith advised, commanded, ordered, 
directed, or done for the maintenance of good 
order and government or for the public safety 
of the Colony between the date of commencement 
of martial law and the date of the taking effect 
of this order Ij- .e., when martial law was 
terminated.y.
ioo
s'
25
arrack with a permit issued by the renter.• It was
brought to the notice of the Governor by the Queen*s
Advocate that the Supreme Court decision had been given
in the inadvertent absence of Crown representation and
that the decision was wrong. A regulation was, then,
made by the Governor to prevent the occurence of such
events by prohibiting the renters to issue permits of the
26
type in question. In 1836, the Supreme Court set aside 
the conviction entered by the District Court on a person 
who had been charged for having unlawful possession of 
an article of clothing belonging to a soldier, on the 
ground that a particular local regulation was applicable 
to the case, but without any prejudice to fresh procee­
dings being instituted. An Ordinance was then passed
repealing that regulation so that fresh proceedings
27
could be instituted.
There is no doubt that the role of the judiciary 
in its relationship with the administration was a very 
delicate one. On the one hand, the Judges of the 
Supreme Court, who cherished the great judicial 
traditions upholding the freedoms of the subject, were 
ever vigilant against any violation of such freedoms.
On the other hand, they could not altogether ignore the 
safety of State and public safety.
25. A locally distilled spirituous liquor.
26. See C. 0. 54/136 (1834) pp. 259-81.
27. See C. 0. 54/147 (1836).
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PART II
PROM INDEPENDENCE TO AUTOCHTHONY
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C H A P T E R  4
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS
The Independence Constitution of Ceylon uhich uas
contained in the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946,
js amended by the Ceylon Independence Order in Council, 1947,^
is a fine nx«ample of what is commonly knoun as the Westminster
Model'. The Soulbury Commission report may be quoted at
length to demonstrate the inclination on the part of the
Commissioners to recommend, and the desire of the representatives
of the Ceylonese people to favour, a constitution modelled on
3
the British system of government:
The Constitution ue recommend for Ceylon 
produces in large measure the form of the 
British Constitution, its usages and 
conventions, and may on that account invite 
the criticism so often and so legitimately 
levelled against attempts to frame a govern­
ment for an Eastern people on the pattern of 
Uestern democracy. * • . At all events, in 
recommending for Ceylon a Constitution on the 
British pattern, ue are recommending a method 
of government ue knou something about, a 
method uhich is the result of very long 
experience, uhich has been tested by trial 
and error and uhich uorks, and, on the 
uhole, uorks uell. . , • But be that as it 
may, the majority— the politically conscious 
majority of the people of Ceylon— favour a 
Constitution on British lines. ue
think that Ceylon is uell qualified for a 
Constitution framed on the British model.
1. The Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe /l964_7,
2 U.L.R. 130.1, at 1304; 66 N.L.R. 73, at 74 (Tper Lord Pearce).
2. See generally S. A. de Smith, The Neu Commonuealth 
and Its Constitutions (1964), Chapter 3.
3. Ceylon. Report of the Commission on Constitutional
Reform. 1945, Cmd. 6677. Epilogue p. 109.
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'The Soulbury Constitution’ , uhich had a commendable 
life span of nearLy a quarter of a century, proved to be a* 
successful system in spite of its abolition in 1972. The 
Republican Constitution promulgated in that year did in 
fact take over some of the basic features and institutions 
of the ’Soulbury Constitution’ , bearing evidence to the fact 
that the traditions and institutions uhich uere rooted in the 
past uere not altogether deracinated uith the proclamation of 
the 'Autochthonous Constitution'.
(l) An Outline of the Soulbury Constitution
The legislative pouer, under this Constitution, uas 
vested in the Parliament uhich consisted of the King, the 
House of Representatives and the Senate.^ The executive 
pouer uhich uas vested in the King uas to be exercised by
the Governor-General in accordance uith the provisions of the
2
Constitution." Since the Governor-General representing the
King uas only the nominal Head of State, the executive pouer
3uas in fact exercised by the Cabinet of Ministers. The
Constitution did not create a neu system of courts, nor did
it make any express mention of the existence of judicial
pouer. Certain matters relating to the appointment, tenure
and remuneration ^ u ere, houever, ret. out in a separate part of the 
4Constitution.
1. The Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946, 
secs., 29 (l) and 7.
2 . Ibid., sec. 45*
3 . Ibid., sec. 46.
4 . Part V I.
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The Louer House, the House of Representatives,
5consisted of elected members as uell as nominated members.
The Upper House, the Senate, on the other hand, uas not a
representative body. Its members uere either elected by the
House of Representatives or nominated by the Governor-General,
and the Senate uas intended as a permanent body in the sense
that its life uas unaffected by any dissolution of the House
7
of Representatives.
As regards the procedure for enacting laus, it uas
g
provided that a Bill had to be passed by both the Houses
except in specified circumstances where a Bill uhich had not
been approved by the Senate could nevertheless be passed by
g
the House of Representatives alone. A Bill passed either by 
both Houses or, uhere permitted, by the House of Representatives 
alone became a lau uhen the Governor-General on behalf of the 
King assented to i t.
In order to sustain a continuous link betueen the tuo 
Houses it uas provided that not less than tuo Ministers, 
including the Minister of Justice, and not less than tuo of 
the Parliamentary Secretaries should be appointed from the 
Senate. ^  ^
5. Ihi d . , sec . 11.
6. See generally Sir Ivor Jennings, The Constitution 
of Ceylon (2nd ed. 1951), pp. 78-86.
7. Ibid. , sec. 8(1) and (2).
8♦ Sec. 32 .
9. Secs , 33 and 34.
10. Sec. 36.
11. Sec. 48.
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The Governor-General uho uas appointed by His Majesty 
uas required to exercise all pouers, authorities and functions 
vested in him 'as far as may be in accordance uith the con­
stitutional conventions applicable to the exercise of similar
12pouers, authorities and functions vested in His Majesty’.
This provision enabled the Governor-General to act at variance 
uith the conventions uhich are rooted in the British consti­
tutional structure and thereby meet novel situations uhich
13hnd no parallel in England. No act or omission on the part
of the Governor-General uas justiciable on the ground that
/ \ 14he had not complied uith the provisions of section 4(2).
As indicated above, the executive pouer uas in fact exercised 
by the Cabinet of Ministers collectively responsible to the 
Parliament. Section 49(2) ensured that only a member of
either House could become a Minister.
12. Sec. 4(2).
13. See 5. A. de Smith, The New Commonuealth and 
Its Constitutions (196 4), pp. 83-84; A. 3. Wilson, 'The 
Governor-General and the Tuo Dissolutions of Parliament,
S December 1959 and 23 April I960' , 3 Ceylon Journal of 
Historical and Social Studies 187 (i960); L. J* M. Cooray, 
'Operation of Conventions in the Constitutional History of 
Ceylon', 1 Modern Ceylon Studies 1-42 (1970).
14. Proviso to sec. 4(2).
15. Sec. 46(1).
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A separate part of the Constitution, Part III uas 
devoted to the mode of delimitation of electoral districts
based on the strict territorial principle modified, however,
16 17in favour of the minorities* The election lau of Ceylon
uhich uas founded on adult universal suffrage did not form
1 g
part of the Constitution.
Being a 'Uestminster Model Constitution', it estab-
19lished a Judicial Service Commission and a Public Service
20
Commission. I he modelling of the constitutional structure
on the British pattern uas completed uhen the Parliament uas
empouered to make provision for pouers and privileges of the
tuo Houses of Parliament provided that they did not exceed
those enjoyed or held by the Commons House of Parliament
21of the United Kingdom or of its members. An Act uas, in
fact, passed soon afteruards, based to a great extent on the
22English practice." The Standing Orders of the House of 
Representatives faithfully reproduced their counterpart in
England.
16. Sir Ivor Jennings, The Constitution of Ceylon 
(2nd. ed. 1951), p. 209.
17. The Ceylon (Parliamentary Elections) Amendment 
Act, No. 19 of 1948, as amended by Act No. 48 of 1949.
18. Tambiah v. Kulasinqham (1949) 50 N.L.R. 25, at
p . 33.
.19. Sec. 53. A detailed discussion follous shortly.
20. Part VI I .
21. Sec . 27 .
22. Parliamentary Pouers and Privileges Act No. 21 of
1953, L.E.C. cap. 383.
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Having outlined the structure of the Constitution it 
remains to examine the sovereignty or the legislative supremacy 
of the Parliament and then the position of the judiciary under 
the Constitution, leading to a discussion on hou the Judiciary 
assumed the pouer of judicial revieu of legislation.
(2) The Sovereignty of Parliament
The starting point for this discussion is section 29 
of the Constitution:
29. - (l) Subject to the provisions of this Order, 
Parliament shall have pouer to make laws for 
the peace, order and good government of the Island.
(2) No such lau shall-
(a) prohibit or restrict the free exercise 
of any religion; or
(b) make persons of any community or religion 
liable to disabilities or restrictions
to uhich persons of other communities or 
religions are not made liable; or
(c) confer on persons of any community or 
religion any privilege or advantage 
uhich is not conferred on persons of 
other communities or religions; or
(d) alter the constitution of any religious 
body except uith the consent of the 
governing authority of that body:
Provided that, in any case uhere 
a religious body is incorporated by 
lau, no such alteration shall be made 
except at the request of the governing 
authority of that body.
(3) Any lau made in contravention of subsection (2) 
of this section shall, to the extent of such contra­
vention, be void.
(4 ) In the exercise of its pouers under this section, 
Parliament may amend or repeal any of the provisions
of this Order, or of any other Order of His Majesty in 
Council in its application to the Island:
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Provided that no Bill for the amendment 
or repeal of any of the provisions of this 
Order shall be presented for the Royal Assent 
unless it has endorsed on it a certificate 
under the hand of the Speaker that the 
number of votes cast in favour thereof in 
the House of Representatives amounted to 
not less than tuo thirds of the uhole 
number of members of the House (including 
those not present).
Every certificate of the Speaker under 
this subsection shall be conclusive for 
all purposes and shall not be questioned 
in any court of lau.
The phrase 'peace, order and good government' used
in section 29(1), far from being a description of the purposes
for uhich legislation may be enacted,^ connotes authority
'as plenary and as ample as the Imperial Parliament in the
2
plenitude of its pouer can bestou'. ' It has been judicially 
recognised that this phrase conferred unlimited pouer on the 
Parliament in Ceylon, and that any limitations on that uere
to be found in any constitutional provision other than section
q
29(1) itself.' It has rightly been pointed out that the 
pouer conferred by this subsection on the Parliament uas not 
mere legislative pouer in a technical sense.
Subsection (2) uhich sought to protect the interests
of minority communities, but uhich failed to protect
5
individuals against discrimination, has been regarded as an
1. See L. J. I*!. Cooray, Ref lections, p. 62.
2. Hodge v. The Queen (1833) 9 Appeal Cases 117.
3. Ibbralebbe v. The Queen (1963) 65 N.L.R. 433 at
p. 443; /1964_/ 1 All E. R. 251, at p . z e o .
4. C. P. Amerasinghe, 'Sovereignty of Parliament
Revisited', 1 The Colombo Lau Revieu 91 (1969).
5. See flu dan a yak e v. S.? vngnanasundaram (1951) 53 M.L.R.
25, at pp. 30 and 44.
1G9
entrenched provision by C. P. Amerasinghe in his pioneering
uork.n The obiter dictum of Lord Pearce in The Bribery
7
Commiss ionor v. H o n a s i n g h e that the entrenched religious 
and racial matters, uhich shall not be the subject of legis­
lation . . . represent the solemn balance of rights between
the citizens of Ceylon, the fundamental conditions on uhich 
inter se they accepted the Constitution; and /that/ these 
are therefore unalterable under the Constitution', and the
obiter dictum of Viscount Radcliffe in Ibbralebbe v. The
0
Queen that the pouer conferred on the Parliament by section 
29 (1) uas "subject to certain protective reservations for the 
exercise of religion and the freedom of religious bodies",
seem to support the contention that section 29(2) uas un-
9 10alterable. However, Jennings and Marshall held a con­
trary view. The uncertainty uhich prevailed regarding the 
nature of the prohibition couched in section 29(2) undoubted­
ly contributed to the inclination touards the replacement of
the Constitution completely.^
6. C. P. Amerasinghe, The Doctrines of Sovereignty and 
Separation of Pouers in the Lau of Ceylon (Colombo, 1 9 7 0 ) , pp.
53-56.
7. (1964) 66 N.L.R. 73 at p. 7B.
8. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 385 at p. 387.
9. Sir Ivor Jennings, op. cit., at pp. 23 and 64.
10. Geoffrey Marshall, Parliamentary Sovereignty
in the Commonuealth (1957), pp. 127, 128.
11. See the Ceylon Hansard August 16, 1969, col., 108;
M . L. Marasinghe, Ceylon - A Conflict of Constitutions’,
20 I.C.L.Q. (1971), pp. 645-74.
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No statute has heon do clarod invalid on the ground
1 2that it uas inconsistent uith section 29(2). In Kodoosuaran 
v* The Attorney General^ ' the Privy Council reversed the 
decision of the Suprerne Court that a public servant could not 
sue the Crown for arrears of payment, and sent the case back
to the Supremo Court to decide whether the (")fficia 1 Lanquage
I 4 / \
Act uas inconsistent uith section 29(2). The Supreme
Court uas relieved from the task of pronouncing upon the
validity nf this Act uith the enactment of the Republican
Constitution uhich declared that the courts did not have the
pouer to question the validity of any lews in existence at
15the time of adoptint thi Republican Constitution.'
Subsection ( 3 ) d o c I a r r rl that any lau inconsistent 
uith subsection (?) uas void; there uas the absence of any 
provision uhich declared that laus uhich uere inconsistent 
uith any other Constitutional provision uere void.' Courts, 
hounver, assumed that this uas the position. The procedure 
for amending or repealing the provisions of the Constitution 
uas prescribed in subsection (4).
A reading of section 29 indicates that the Parliament 
of Ceylon had the pouer to pass any Act uith a simple majority 
in the House of Representatives provided in section 18,
1 See for unsuccessful attempts; Kodak.an Pillol 
flu dan a yake (1953) 54 N.L.R. 433 and Sundaral 
1. P. Kankosanthu.ru i (1971 ) 74 N.L.R. 457; 7l971_/ A.C. 370.
13. (1969) 72 N.L.R. 337.
14. Act No. 33 of .1956, (L.E.C., Supplement, Vol. 2,
1967).
1; . The Constitution of Sri Lanka, secs. 12(1)
48 ( 2) and: spedaily 13(3).
1 * R e e 1 fifr a  p.n*7
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except uhen an Act amounted to an amendment of any Consti­
tutional provision; there uas the likelihood of section 
29(2) being held to be a substantial limitation and thus 
beyond alteration by the Parliament even acting under 
section 29(4).
The pouers possessed by the Ceylon Parliament, then, 
are not comparable to those attributed to the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom. Jennings remarked that the Ceylon 
Parliament uas not a sovereign legislature in the commonly
used sense of having 'complete and unlimited legislative 
17pouer'. That the Ceylon Parliament uas not sovereign in
the sense in uhich the British Parliament is sovereign has
been recognised.^
Sinnatamby, J., in P. S. Bus Company v. C . T. B . rightly 
19observed that:
unlike the British Parliament the legislative 
bodies in the various dominions are creatures 
of statute. They are bound by the provisions 
of the Acts or Orders-in-Council by uhich they 
uere created and they cannot act in contraven­
tion of those provisions.
These opinions suggest that the Ceylon Parliament uas
not sovereign because it could not make or unmake any lau by
a bare majority unlike the British Parliament. On the other
20hand, Lord Pearce in L i yanaqe v. The Queen noted that the 
Parliament of Ceylon had 'the full legislative pouer of
17. Jennings, op. cit., pp. 64-65.
18. P. S. Bus Co., v. C . T. B . (1958) 61 N.L.R.
491, at p. 494~^  (p e r Sinna tamb y~, J. ) , and The Queen v.
L.i yanaqe (1962) 6 4 N.L.R. 313, at p. 350, (per T. S.
Fernando, J.).
1.9. (1953) 61 N.L.R. 491 at p. 493.
20. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 265 at p. 280; /I966/ 1 All E. R.
250, at p. 657.
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a sovereign independent state’. It has been pointed out
that this merely meant that Ceylon uas a Sovereign State
21before International lau. It uas said in Kodakkan Pillai
22v. Nudanayake*" that the case before the Privy Council 
involved ’a construction of a constitutional limitation 
upon the general sovereign pouer of the Ceylon legislature 
to legislate for peace, order and good government'. This 
seems to suggest that the Parliament of Ceylon enjoyed legis­
lative supremacy in the sense that it had no rival legislative 
authority.
It is apparent that although the Parliament of Ceylon
uas not sovereign in the sense that it did not enjoy all the
pouers attributed to the British Parliament, it uas not a
23subordinate legislature in any sense. On the other hand,
it has been suggested that the concept of 'sovereignty of
Parliament1, uhich is peculiar to English Constitutional lau,
uas irrelevant in Ceylon, especially because the Ceylon
Constitution did not refer to the concept. The proper
question to ask uas, uhat uere the pouers of Parliament
24under the Ceylon Constitution ?
At all events the primary distinction betueen the 
respective pouers of the Parliaments of Britain and Ceylon 
seems to be the existence of the pouer of judicial revieu of
21. Bee Amerasinghe, Separation., p. 12.
22. (1953) 54 N.L.R. 433 at p. 439.
23. Bee Amerasinghe, Separation., p. 16.
24. l . J. M . Cooray, Reflections., p . 72.
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legislation in Ceylon. It has been alleged that in the 
United States of America there exists a ’judicial supremacy’ 
as opposed to the ’supremacy of the legislature’. Hou the 
judiciary assumed the power of judicial review of legislation 
uill be discussed shortly.
(3) The Judiciary
Separate provision relating to the Supreme Court and 
other judicial officers was made in Part \] I.
The judges of the Supreme Court were to be appointed 
by the Governor-General to hold judicial office during good 
behaviour, and to be removable only by the Governor-General 
on an address of the Senate and the House of Representatives.^
The age of retirement of judges of the Supreme Court was
2
sixty two years, but the Governor-General could permit a judge
who had reached the age of retirement to continue in office
3
for a period not exceeding twelve months. The salary of a 
Supreme Court judge could not be diminished during his term 
of office.C
The appointment, transfer, dismissal and disciplinary
control of judicial officers other than judges of the Supreme
5
Court was vested in the Judicial Service Commission, which 
was to consist of the Chief Justice, a judge of the Supreme 
Court, and one other person who was or who had been a judge
1. The Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council,
1946, sec. 52(1) and (2).
2 . Sec. 5 2(3).
3. Proviso to section 52(3).
4. Sec. 52(6).
5. Sec. 55(1).
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□f the Supreme Court/ Every member of the Commission,
except the Chief Justice uho uas ex-officio the Chairman, uas
appointed for a period of five years and uas eligible for 
7
reappointment. The Governor-General had the pouer to
0
remove any member of the Commission for cause assigned." Any
salary or allouance paid to a member could not be diminished
g
during his term of office.
The integrity and impartiality of the Judicial 
Service Commission uas sought to be safeguarded uhen the 
Constitution declared it an offence to influence or attempt
to influence any decision of the Commission or of any member
10of the Commission.
It has been judicially held that the foregoing 
provisions cnvinced an intention that judicial functions 
should be discharged by persons uhose independence and im­
partiality had properly been ensured by the Constitution.^
It has been alleged that the constitutional pro­
visions relating to the judiciary uere amenable to abuse by 
12the executive* Houever, it is to the credit of the judges
6. Sec. 53(1).
7. Sec. 53(3).
8. Sec. 54(4).
9. Sec. 5 3(6).
10. Sec. 56.
11. See Ii yanage v. The Queen ^1966/ 1 All E. R. 650 
at p. 658; (1965) 68 N.L.R. 265, at p. 282, per Lord Pearce.
12. See e.g., J. A. L .. Cooray, 'The Supreme Court 
of Ceylon', The Journal of the International Commission of 
Jurists (1968).
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of' Ceylon that it has been recognised that the Supreme Court 
in particular has maintained a proud tradition of judicial
independence.x ^
(4) 'Sovereignty of Parliament1 v. 'Judicial Supremacy’
The sovereignty or the legislative supremacy of the 
United Kingdom parliament is best represented by its immunity 
from judicial inquiry. As recent as in 1974, the House of 
Lords reiterated the cardinal principle of English Consti­
tutional lau that the courts in England have no pouer to
declare enacted lau invalid." Lord Denning had, in the Court
2
of Appeal, expressed the opinion that if the court uas satis­
fied that a private Bill had been impruperly obtained it uas 
the duty of the court to report that finding to the Parliament 
so that the matter could be put right. This, Lord Denning
thought, uas acting in aid of Parliament and, as he uished
3
to add, in aid of justice. The House of Lords disapproved
of this opinion and held that it did not lie in the province
of the judiciary even to express such an opinion as uas in
4the contemplation of Lord Denning.
13. See L. J. M. Cooray, Reflections. , p. 105 and 
The Debates of the House of Representatives, 29 August, .1969,
column 115.
1. British Railuay Board v. pick 1 n /I974/ 1 All E. R.
609, at p. 627, per Lord Simon of Glaisdale.
2* Z1972/  3 A11 R* 923 (C • A.) a t  p .  928.
3. See the House of Lords decision at p. 619 uhere 
Lord Morris of 1"0rth-Y-Gest said: ’Uhen an enactment is 
passed there is finality unless and until it is amended by 
Parliament. In the courts there may be arguments as to the 
correct interpretation of the enactment; there must be none 
as to uhether it should be in the statute book at all' .
4. Ibid.
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In fact, a judicial decision uhich declares an Act 
of Parliament invalid ouing to an inconsistency uith a 
fundamental principle of English Constitutional law is futile 
because, the United Kingdom Parliament may at will reverse 
any unpalatable judicial decision by a simple majority in 
the House of Commons,
The position in a country uhich has a written consti­
tution containing procedural or absolute limitations is differ­
ent, Uheare explains the position quite clearly:
It is the function of the judges to decide uhat 
the law is, in disputed cases. A Constitution 
is part of the lau and it therefore falls uithin 
the purvieu of the judges* Moreover it may happen 
that there appears to be some conflict between the 
Constitution and some other rule of law or some 
action, whether by the legislature or of the executive.
If the judges are to decide uhat the law is in such a 
case, they must determine the meaning not only of the 
rule of ordinary law but also of the lau of the Consti­
tution, And if, in terms, a Constitution imposes res­
trictions upon the powers of the institutions it sets 
up, then the Courts must decide whether their actions 
transgress those restrictions, and in doing so, the 
judges must say what the Constitution means•g
Unlike the U. K. Parliament, the legislature of a 
country uhich has a Controlled Constitution*^ cannot dis­
regard with impunity a judicial decision which declares a 
statute unconstitutional.
From the above discussion it appears that judicial 
review of legislation is effective only in a country which 
has a constitution which is the paramount lau, in the sense
5. K. C. Uheare, Modern Constitutions (1951), p. 146.
6. In the words of Lord Birkenhead in McCauley v.
The King (1920) A. C. 691, at p. 703 a controlled constitu­
tion is one in which the Constitution makers ’have created 
obstacles of varying difficulty in the path of those who 
would lay rash hands upon the ark, the Constitution’•
117
that a lau uhich transgresses a constitutional provision is 
uholly void or can only be passed in a special uay. Some 
Constitutions expressly confer the pouer of judicial revieu 
on the courts.^
That the Ceylon Constitution uas the paramount lau 
uas assumed by the courts in the absence of an express
g
provision. Section 29(2) of the Constitution declared that 
any lau inconsistent uith section 29(2) uas void. Section 
29(4) merely declared, on the other hand, that any consti­
tutional provision can be amended by a tuo thirds majority.
Accordingly it uas argued in Ranasinqhe v. The Bribery 
g
Commissioner that an Act of Parliament could properly be 
regarded as unconstitutional only if it transgresses the 
limitations stated in section 29(2), since there uas no pro­
vision uhich rendered invalid statutes uhich infringed other 
constitutional provisions. The Supreme Court, houever, found 
a solution in the term 'amendment1: amendment may be either 
express or implied, and accordingly a statute uhich does not 
expressly purport to amend the Constitution but is neverthe­
less inconsistent uith a constitutional provision is tanta­
mount to an amendment of that constitutional provision by 
implication.^ The position then is that, assuming that 
section 29(2) did not contain substantive limitations, the
7 .  See e.g., Article 81 of the Constitution of SSpan, 
1946; Title VI "Unconstitutionality and Revieu" in the Consti­
tution of the Republic of Honduras, 1965; Section 131 (a) and 
32(1) of the Constitution of India.
8. See e.g., The Queen v. Liyanaoe (1962) 64 N.L.R. 
313 at p. 355.
9. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 449.
10. Ibid., at p. 453.
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Parliament of Ceylon uas incompetent to pass a lau incon­
sistent uith any constitutional provision or to amend the 
Constitution except uhere it adhered to the procedure pre­
scribed in section 29(4).
Once the courts agreed that the Constitution of 
Ceylon uas the paramount or the fundamental lau uhich took 
precedence over all other laus, judicial revieu of legisla­
tion uhich results from the traditional function of the 
courts, namely the interpretation of statutes, naturally 
folloued. In fact, as Uynes has pointed out, invalidation 
of statutes is a natural incident of litigation:^
In strict legal theory the judgment of the 
court does no more than decide inter partes 
and the statute remains as a subsisting lau; 
in so far as the Court has refused to enforce 
it, because it is in conflict uith the Consti­
tution and it is assumed that the decision 
uill be folloued if subsequent proceedings 
under it are brought, the practical result 
is that the lau becomes a dead letter.
The historical origins of judicial revieu in the
Commonuealth countries seem to reduce to the fact that the
Privy Council originally exercised that pouer in relation to
the overseas empire, just as it did in relation to the thir-
12teen American colonies before 1776, it has been said.
The essential premise on uhich the Privy Council proceeded 
uas, as McUhinney rightly points out, that the colonial 
legislatures uere subordinate legislative bodies vis-a-vis
11. U. A. Uynes, Legislative Executive and Judicial 
Pouers in Australia (5th ed. 1976), pu 30.
12. E. McUhinney, Judicial Revieu in the English 
Speaking Uorld (3rd ed. 1965), pp• 13-14.
119
the United Kingdom Parliament, and that their enactments 
were therefore subject to rev/ieu by the courts on the same 
basis as, for example, regulations passed by local government 
authorities uithin the United Kingdom.
That the Ceylon Constitution took precedence over 
all other laus, that it is the function of the courts to 
decide uhat the lau is in disputed cases, that this function 
included that of determining any conflicts betueen the 
fundamental lau and any other lau, and that there is prece­
dent in the Privy Council itself for invalidating the sub­
ordinate lau in the event of a conflict uith the higher lau, 
amply justify the assumption by the courts of Ceylon of 
pouer of judicial revieu. The courts of Ceylon, houever, 
did not explain the basis for such assumption.
(5) Judicial Revieu of Legislation in Ceylon
It is notable that only those provisions relating to 
the judiciary uere successfully set up against the validity 
of Acts of Parliament of Ceylon, though in a number of cases 
statutes uere unsuccessfully challenged as being inconsistent 
uith some other constitutional provisions.^ It is proposed 
to study the judicial role under the Independence Constitution 
of Ceylon especially in relation to the cases uhere statutes 
uere impugned on the ground that they uere in conflict uith 
the constitutional provisions relating to the judiciary.
1. See for a cross section of such cases H. L. de
Silva, 'Some Reflections on the Interpretation of the
Constitution of Ceylon and its Amendment* , The Journal of
Ceylon Lau Vol. 1 No. 2 (Dec. 1970), fn. 15 p. 236.
12a
The first series of successful cases came to be 
knoun as 'the Tribunal Cases'. These decisions uere centred 
around section 55(1) uhich vested the pouer of appointing 
judicial officers in the Judicial Service Commission, Having 
held that any person uho exercised judicial pouer came uithin 
the definition of 'judicial officer', in each of the ’Tribunal 
Cases’ the task of the court uas to determine uhether the 
tribunal or the officer in question uas vested uith Judicial 
pouer. These cases uill be discussed in the next tuo chapters.
A serious implication arising from the 'Tribunal 
Cases' uas that judicial pouer uas vested exclusively in the 
judiciary, meaning the ordinary courts of lau and any validly 
constituted tribunals or 'special courts'• As a result, the 
principle that neither the legislature nor the executive 
could exercise judicial pouer gained judicial recognition.
Cases uhere the argument uas raised that the legislature or 
the executive exercised judicial pouer are discussed in the 
seventh and eighth chapters respectively.
These cases uhich principally dealt uith the question 
uhether the legislature or the executive usurped the judicial 
pouer of the State uhich uas vested in the judiciary, including 
the !Tribunal Cases1, are commonly knoun as the 'judicial 
pouer cases'. The last chapter briefly surveys the various 
aspects of the role played by the judiciary in the judicial 
pouer cases.
2. Subject, of course, to the second requirement that 
such judicial officer held a *paidf judicial office.
3. The term 'special courts' seems capable of represen­
ting those judicial tribunals uhich do not come uithin the 
definition of 'ordinary courts of lau' as constituted by the 
Courts Ordinance No. 1 of 1889. See Nadaraja, Legal System.,
p. 119.
121
C H A P T E R  5
THE JUDICIARY AND SPECIAL TRIBUNALS - PART I
A common feature of contemporary states has been 
the growth of systems of administrativ/e tribunals, flaking a 
deviation from the traditional theory that the legislative, 
executive and judicial functions of the State ought to be 
allocated to the three main organs of government so as to 
ensure a strict separation of powers, many countries of the 
world have readily accepted that it is inevitable in the 
interest of justice and expediency that specialised agencies 
should be created in various fields of activity, even if it 
means a denial of the jurisdiction that was previously enjoyed 
by ordinary courts of law: in fact many of these tribunals
came to be known as ’special courts’ •
This universal trend has had its impact in Sri Lanka 
too. Many statutes have or had the effect of conferring 
diverse powers such as dispute-settlement, imposition of 
penalties and punishment for committing an offence on 
administrative officers or tribunals. In a remarkably high 
number of Ceylon cases popularly known as the !Tribunal 
Cases1 the argument was raised that administrative tribunals 
could not consistently with the Independence Constitution 
of Ceylon exercise judicial powers.
As has been already mentioned,^ this argument was 
founded on the premise that judicial officers, meaning those
1. See supra Chapter 4, Part (3).
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uho exercised judicial pouer as against purely arbitral 
or administrative functions, uere governed by the provisions 
of the Constitution relating to the judiciary, and that 
accordingly it uas unconstitutional to vest judicial pouers 
in any person not governed by those provisions.
Uhether a particular tribunal uas governed by the 
constitutional provisions relating to the judiciary depended 
on the ansuers given to tuo basic questions:
(i) Uere those provisions applicable to the
judges of the ordinary courts of lau only or to 
a uider category of persons uho, by the 
application of some criteria, could be 
regarded as ’judicial officers* uithin the 
meaning of section 52(l) of the Constitution?
(ii) Did the tribunal in question exercise
’judicial pouer’, so that membership of it 
had to be regarded as a ’judicial office*?
It is proposed to examine first the meaning accorded
to the term ’judicial officer’ by the courts, folloued by an
examination of a number of relevant statutes uith reference
to the case-lau in order to understand the meaning and
content attributed to ’judicial pouer’ by the courts.
The Meaning of the Term ’Judicial Officer’
The Constitution in Part VI made provision in 
respect of the judges of the Supreme Court and other ’judicial 
officers*. Section 55(1) read: ’The appointment, transfer,
dismissal and disciplinary control of judicial officers is 
hereby vested in the Judicial Service Commission’• Section 
55(5) declared that ’judicial officer’ meant ’the holder of 
any judicial office’. Subsection (l) of section 3, the 
interpretation section, stated that ’judicial office means
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any paid judicial office*• Thus the only assistance derived 
from the Constitution in elucidating the meaning of 'judicial 
officer* is that any person uho held a paid judicial office 
uas to be considered a judicial officer uithin the meaning 
of the relevant provisions. It appears from these provisions 
that there are tuo requirements in order to regard any officer 
as a judicial officer; (a) he must hold a judicial office and
(b) that office must be a paid judicial office.
The second, and the less important, requirement may 
be disposed of first. The requirement seems to be that the 
officer should be paid for holding a judicial and not some 
other office. In determining uhether a person is paid for a 
judicial office uhat is decisive is the nature, and not nec­
essarily the designation, of office,
2
In Ranasinohe v. The Bribery Commissioner H, N, G. 
Fernando, 3,, took the case of a hypothetical statute uhich 
provided that in specified circumstances Croun Counsel could 
function as Magistrates. Uhen a Croun Counsel functions as 
a Magistrate under this statute for a period of time, and 
continues to drau the salary he usually receives as a Croun 
Counsel, he is, nevertheless, paid for such period for holding 
the office of a Magistrate. Here, as H. N. G. Fernando, 3., 
pointed out, although his appointment by name is as a Croun 
Counsel, uhenever he performs the functions of a Magistrate 
it is by office that of a judicial officer. The learned 
judge cited this example to controvert the argument raised 
on behalf of the Croun that the office created by the Bribery 
(Amendment) Act uas merely the office of membership of the panel.
2. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 449, at p. 451.
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The argument uas that the Governor-General appointed a panel
uhich as such did not exercise judicial pouer; charges of
bribery uere tried by Bribery Tribunals constituted out of 
3
the panel. In so far as the panel as such did not conduct 
any proceedings, the argument uent, it uas immaterial that a 
Bribery Tribunal uhose members uere draun from the panel 
exercised judicial pouer. Thus, although the membership of 
the panel could be regarded as a paid office it could not be 
regarded as a paid judicial office. The learned judge un­
hesitatingly rejected this line of argument on the basis that 
uhen a member of such panel sat on a Bribery Tribunal he dreu 
his salary for discharging the duties of the Tribunal, uhich 
uas a judicial office; he dreu attention to the cardinal 
principle of Constitutional lau that fyou cannot do indirectly 
uhich you cannot do directly’.^ The vieu held by H, N, G. 
Fernando, 3,, uas approved by the Privy Council on appeal in 
The Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe^ and by the Supreme 
Court in Ualker v. Fry. ^
In Gunaseela v, Uduqama, H. N. G. Fernando, S.P.3.,
came to the conclusion that membership of a Court Martial is
7
not a judicial office:
/i/t is a body consisting of Service Officers 
convened ad hoc for trial of particular cases, 
and the duty to serve as a member of such a
3. See the discussion on the Bribery Tribunals, 
infra pp, - f44 •
4. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 449, at p. 451.
5. (1964) 66 N.L.R. 73; /1964/ 2 All E. R. 785.
6. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 73, at p. 80 per Sansoni, C.3.
7. (1966) 69 N.L.R. 193, at p. 194
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Court is only one of the several kinds of 
duties uhich a Service Officer can under the 
relevant Statutes be called upon to perform.
The office uhich entitles an Army officer to 
pay and other emoluments is his substantive 
office in the Army, and service as a member 
of a Court martial is no more the basis of 
his entitlement to pay and emoluments than 
is his service in any other duty uhich the
Army Act requires him to perform.
The distinction betueen a Bribery Tribunal and a 
Court martial in respect of uhat is a paid judicial office 
seems to be that members of the panel under the Bribery Act 
had only one duty, namely to sit on a Tribunal uhen called 
upon to do so, uhereas it uas merely one of several duties
of Service Officers to serve as a member of a Court martial.
The vieus expressed by H, N. G, Fernando, S.P.3.,
in Gunaseela v, Uduqama are in keeping uith uhat he said in 
8
Ualker v. Fry:
Section 55 of the Constitution • • • failed 
to preclude the possibility of the entrustment 
of judicial pouer to some authority bona fide 
established for administrative purposes. If 
administrative officials, the majority of uhose 
pouers and functions are administrative, are in 
addition entrusted on the grounds of expediency 
uith judicial pouer, there uould not in my 
opinion be conflict uith Section 55, But if, 
under cover of expediency, judicial pouers are 
vested in an office administrative only in name, 
then the principle that you cannot do indirectly 
that uhich you cannot do directly uill apply.
Courts martial and Bribery Tribunals seem to provide 
clear examples of the principles enunciated in the above 
quoted passage.
One other question remains: Could a person hold
judicial office, and not be subject to the provisions relating 
to the judiciary, if that person received no payment at all?
8. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 73, at p. 101.
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H. N. G. Fernando, S.P.J., in Ualker v. Fry thought that if
an Act purported to v/est judicial pouer in a person uho did
not receive any emolument the principle that you cannot do
indirectly uhich you cannot do directly should apply, to
g
render such statute unconstitutional. This conclusion finds 
support in the fact that if the Constitution required judicial 
officers to be appointed and controlled in a particular manner 
such intention could not be negated by making substantially 
different provision in respect of a class of persons uho 
uould perform the functions generally entrusted to judicial 
officers.^
The primary requirement of holding a !judicial 
office1 may nou be examined. In its narrow meaning 1 judicial 
office* refers to ordinary courts of lau uhich uere in exis­
tence at the time of the enactment of the Constitution. In 
fact, the Soulbury Commission Report, on uhich the Constitu­
tion uas largely modelled, recommended that the appointment, 
promotion, transfer and discipline of all District Judges, 
Magistrates, Commissioners of Request and Presidents of
l/illage Tribunals should be dealt uith by a Judicial Service
11 12 Commission. The Ministers1 Draft, uhich uas folloued by
13the Soulbury Commission whenever possible, declared that the
9. Ibid.
10. See C. F. Amerasinghe, Separation., p. 152.
11. Paragraph 397 of the Report, Cmnd. 6677.
12. Sessional Paper XIV/ - 1944. Section 68(3).
13. Paragraph 416 of the Soulbury Commission Report,
Cmnd. 6677.
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appointment to any judicial office (except membership of 
Supreme Court) should be made by the Governor-General on 
the advice of the Judicial Commission*
14In Senadhira v* The Bribery Commissioner Sansom,
J., refused to accept the narrow view that ’judicial officer' 
meant only the judges of ordinary courts of lau. Such a 
meaning uould have been the only acceptable one, if the 
court uas confined to the Soulbury Commission Report alone. 
Sansoni, J., thought that there uere more weighty considera­
tions than the Soulbury Report uhich led him to conclude 
that ’judicial officer* included all persons uho exercised 
judicial power. To hold otherwise, he observed, uould be 
to hold that ’Parliament can establish new courts uith pouers 
as great as, or even greater than, those possessed by ordinary 
courts and devise a new method of appointing the judges uho 
are to preside over them’.^^ He reiterated the principle 
that 'whether persons are judges, uhether tribunals are 
courts, and uhether they exercise uhat is now called judicial 
power depended and depends on substance and not on mere name' 
That the phrase judicial officer uas not limited to 
the judges of the ordinary courts of lau uas reaffirmed by 
the Privy Council in The Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinqhe,
where Lord Pearce, rejecting the restricted interpretation,
17expressed the fear that:
14. (1961) 63 N.L.R. 313.
15. (1961) 63 N.L.R. 313 at 320.
16. Waterside Workers Federation of Australia v.
Alexander (1918) 25 C.L.R . 434 at p. 451.
17. (1964) 66 N.L.R. 73 at p. 76; /T964? 2 All E. R.
785 at p. 789.
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if that argument uere sound it might be open 
to the executive to appoint uhom they chose 
to sit on any number of neuly created tribunals 
uhich might deal uith various aspects of the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and thus, *
by eroding the courts1 jurisdiction, render 
section 55 valueless,
A similar sentiment has been expressed in the
Jamaican Case of Hinds v. The Queen uhen Lord Diplock
delivering the majority decision of the Privy Council made
18the follouing observation:
A breach of a constitutional restriction is 
not excused by the good intentions uith uhich 
the legislative pouer has been exceeded by the 
particular lau. If consistently uith the 
Constitution, it is permissible for Parliament 
to confer the discretion to determine the 
length of custodial sentences for criminal 
offences on a body composed as the Revieu 
Board is, it uould be equally permissible to 
a less uell-intentioned Parliament to confer 
the same discretion on any other person or 
body of persons not qualified to exercise 
judicial pouer, and in this uay, uithout 
any amendment of the Constitution, to open 
the door to the exercise of arbitary pouer 
by the executive in the uhole field of 
criminal lau.
The term 'judicial officer’ uas given a uider 
meaning in the Bribery Tribunal cases for the reasons under­
lined in the foregoing discussion. Thus section 55(1) of 
the Independence Constitution of Ceylon uhich enjoined that 
judicial officers should be appointed by the Judicial 
Service Commission uas construed to be applicable not only 
to judges of the ordinary courts of lau but also to any 
person uho held a paid office involving judicial functions 
in the main.
18. /1976/ 1 All E. R. 353 at p. 370 ad. fin.
Also cf. Liyanaqe v. The Queen /19667 1 All E. R. 650 at p.660; 
(1965) 68 N.L.R. 265 at p. 285 Toer Lord Pearce), cited 
infra p •293
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19Tambiah, 3., in Ualker v. Fry did not agree uith 
the position taken by the courts that any person uho per­
formed any judicial function solely or in addition to his 
executive functions should be appointed by the Judicial 
Service Commission, The learned judge pointed out that at 
the time the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946, 
came into operation, there existed certain statutes uhich 
conferred judicial pouers on particular administrative 
officers or tribunals. Such administrative officers or 
tribunals uere not considered to be judicial bodies, since 
their functions uere overuhelmingly administrative. In order 
to leave out such administrative officers and tribunals from 
the scope of section 55(1) it uas necessary, in the vieu of 
Tambiah, J., to construe that section in a strict manner,
Tambiah, J., uas of the opinion that their Lordships
20did not, in The Bribery Commissioner v, Ranasinqhe, decide 
that the judicial pouer of the State uas vested exclusively 
in the judiciary. This uas a further reason uhy it should 
not be laid doun that any person uho exercised judicial pouer 
came uithin the ambit of section 55(1) uhich regulated the 
manner of appointment, transfer and disciplinary control of 
judicial officers other than judges of the Supreme Court. It
is respectfully submitted that in the light of Liyanaqe v.
21The Queen, uhere the Privy Council authoritatively laid
19. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 73.
20. (1964) 66 N.L.R. 73; /1964/ 2 All E.R. 785.
21. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 265; /1966? 1 All E.R. 650.
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doun that there existed in the Constitution of Ceylon a 
separation of powers and that as a result judicial power 
was vested exclusively in the judiciary, the view of 
Tambiah, 3., is untenable.
In place of the generally accepted construction 
placed on section 55(l), Tambiah, J., suggested that 
judicial office meant the office held by judges of the 
courts of law that were in existence at the time the Consti­
tution came into force, or the offices which might be held by 
^V\o
those presided or heard cases in analogous courts or courts 
performing similar functions.
Whether a tribunal is analogous to a court of law 
is one of the tests applied in determining whether it 
exercises judicial pouer. A tribunal uhich does not resemble 
a court of lau may be regarded as a repository of judicial 
power in certain circumstances. Thus the fact that a tribunal 
is not analogous to a court of law does not by itself make 
it a non-judicial body. On the other hand, if it were 
accepted that section 55(1) applied only to courts of lau 
and analogous bodies, the legislature could confer judicial 
powers on administrative tribunal as long as they did not 
resemble a court of law and thereby defeat the spirit of 
the constitutional provisions relating to the judiciary, 
namely that judicial functions should be performed only by 
persons whose independence and integrity had been secured by 
the special provisions contained in the Constitution. In 
order to prevent such a result the strict construction
131
advocated by Tambiah, 3., had to give uay to the uider
interpretation that gained general acceptance in the Bribery
Tribunal cases. Moreover, the Privy Council decision in
22Liyanaqe v. The Queen uhich uas decided soon after the 
judgment in Ualker v. Fry uas delivered made the vieu 
expressed by Tambiah, 3., all the more untenable,
Uhile there uas general agreement, except for the 
minority vieu of Tambiah, 3,, that section 55(1) applied to 
any officer uho exercised judicial pouer, unanimity uas 
beyond reach as to uhat constituted judicial pouer in given 
circumstances, nor uas there a universally applicable test 
to determine the nature and the content of judicial pouer.
22. Ibid.
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(1) The Bribery Tribunals
In the Bribery Tribunal cases the primary issue uas
uhether a Bribery Tribunal exercised judicial pouer uhen
it inquired into an alleged offence of bribery uith a vieu
to punishing any accused uho in its vieu had committed any
such offence* In Senadhira v* The Bribery Commissioner^
2
and Don Anthony v* The Bribery Commissioner the Supreme 
Court uithout quashing the findings of guilt the Tribunal 
had made against the accused persons merely set aside the 
sentences imposed on them, uhereas in Piyadasa v. The
3
Bribery Commissioner, Ranasinqhe v. The Bribery Commissioner
5
and The Bribery Commissioner v* Ranasinqhe it uas held 
that a Bribery Tribunal exercised judicial pouer even at 
the stage of inquiring into alleged offences and that as a 
result, a Bribery Tribunal could not conduct any proceedings 
consistently uith the constitutional provisions relating to 
the judiciary* A sixth case, Don Anthony v* Gunasekera,^ 
uas brought before the Supreme Court to bring the decision
7
in Don Anthony v. The Bribery Commissioner into line uith 
the Privy Council decision in The Bribery Commissioner v. 
Ranasinqhe»^
1. (1961) 63 N.L.R. 313
2. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 93.
3. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 385
4. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 449
5. (1964) 66 n .L.R. 73.
6. (1964) C.L.U. 84 •
7. Supra note 2.
8. Supra note 5.
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Here it is proposed to study only those parts of the 
relevant judgments uhich dealt uith the meaning of "judicial 
pouer" in the context of Bribery Tribunals. A brief account 
of the Bribery Act is called for before embarking on an ex­
amination of the case lau.
(i) The Bribery Act
The Bribery Act of 1954 uhich uas intended to pro­
vide for the prevention and punishment of bribery^ enabled 
the Attorney-General to indict before a court of lau or 
arraign before one of the Boards of Inquiries created by the 
Act any public servant against uhom, in the opinion of the
2
Attorney-General, there uas a prima facie case of bribery.
A Board of Inquiry u^s- given the pouer to decide uhether an
3
accused person uas guilty at the end of an inquiry; a finding 
of guilt carried uith it certain statutory penalties uhich
i\
automatically intervened.
The legislature uas not unmindful of the fact that 
the Bribery Act might be inconsistent uith the Constitution 
for, the Act uas passed after complying uith the procedure 
prescribed in section 29(4) of the Ceylon (Constitution)
Order in Council for constitutional amendment. Section 2
1. Long Title of Act No. 11 of 1954.
2. Act No. 11 of 1954, sec. 5.
3. Ibid., sec. 47(1) (b).
4. See sec 28* Some such statutory penalties uere
disqualification for seven years from being registered as
a voter and disqualification from being employed as a public 
servant.
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declared that the provisions of that Act uere to be opera­
tive notuithstanding any inconsistency uith the Constitution 
as if they uere contained in an Act properly passed as an 
amendment of the Constitution,
Significant changes uere introduced in 1958 uith 
the enactment of the Bribery (Amendment) Act No, 40 of 1958 
uhich uas passed, unlike the original Act, as an ordinary 
statute. This Act brought into being a neu official knoun 
as the Bribery Commissioner uho uas empouered to conduct
5
investigations into allegations of bribery. If he uas 
satisfied that there uas a prima facie case of the commission 
by any person of a bribery offence as specified in Part II 
of the Act,^ he should prosecute such person before a
7
Bribery Tribunal,
The Act of 1958 made provision for the appointment
by the Governor-General of not less than 15 persons to a
panel from uhich uere constituted Bribery Tribunals uhen-
ever the need arose,^
A Bribery Tribunal had the pouer to impose a sentence
of imprisonment not exceeding 7 years or a fine not exceed-
g
ing Rs. 5000 or both. The sentence of imprisonment uas
5, See section 4 of Act No, 40 of 1958.
6, These offences included offering a bribe to a 
judicial officer, a Member of Parliament or to a public 
servant and soliting or accepting a bribe by such persons,
7, Section 5(1), as amended by sec, 7 of Act No. 
40 of 1958.
8, Sec. 24 of The Bribery Amendment Act No. 40 of
1958.
9, Secs. 14 to 23.
carried out, as by a court, on warrants of commitment signed 
by the President of the Bribery Tribunal addressed to the 
Fiscal of the Province and the Superintendent of Prison.^
A fine imposed by a Bribery Tribunal could be recovered by 
the Attorney-General on an application made to a District 
Court. ^  Section 68 enabled a Bribery Tribunal to punish 
persons uho committed a contempt of its authority as a 
contempt of court. For this purpose it had been given all
the pouers conferred on a court by section 57 of the Courts
12 13Ordinance and chapter 65 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Section 69 A of the Bribery Act as amended gave a 
convicted person a right of appeal to the Supreme Court 
against a conviction for any error in lau or in^ fact. In 
the exercise of this pouer persons uho had been convicted 
by Bribery Tribunals contested the validity of the appoint­
ments made to Bribery Tribunals in order to render such 
convictions null and void.
(ii) The Case Lau
In one or the other of the Bribery Tribunal cases 
the following aspects relating to the validity of the con­
ferment of judicial power on Bribery Tribunals were considered
a. Did ’judicial officer1 mean judges of ordinary 
courts of lau alone?
10. See sec. 17(1) of Act No. 40 of 1958 uhich makes 
sec. 311 of the Criminal Procedure Code applicable. Also see 
Senadhira v. The Bribery Commissioner (1961) 63 N.L.R. 313 
at p. 316.
11. Sec. 28(2) of Act No. 11 of 1954.
12. Ordinance No. 1 of 1889 (L.E.C. cap. 6).
13. Ordinance No. 2 of 1889 (L .E .C . cap. 101).
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b. Even if that term covered a wider category
than judges in the ordinary sense, could a
member of a Bribery Tribunal be regarded as 
the holder of a judicial 'office', in that, 
he received payment as a member of the panel 
and not as a member of a Bribery Tribunal?
c. Uas it open for a person uho attacked the
validity of a statute to exercise the right
of appeal uhich derived solely from that 
statute?
d. Uere the pouers conferred on a Bribery Tribunal 
judicial in nature?
Of these four aspects the first two have been dis­
cussed in the first part of this chapter. The third, uhich 
uas the preliminary objection raised against the appellate 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to pronounce upon the 
validity of the Bribery Act uas upheld in Don Anthony v.
The Bribery Commissioner  ^ but uas dismissed in Piyadasa v.
2
The Bribery Commissioner, In the first relevant case,
3
Senadhira v. The Bribery Commissioner, in order to avoid the 
application of the preliminary objection the accused-appellant 
contended that he uas challenging the validity of only those 
provisions uhich conferred penal pouers on a Bribery Tribunal. 
Accordingly, the actual judgment itself uas limited to a pro­
nouncement that although a Bribery Tribunal might validly 
find a person charged before it guilty of a bribery offence 
any punishment imposed on him by the Tribunal had no legal 
effect. Once the preliminary objection uas overruled in 
Piyadasafs case both the Supreme Court and the Privy Council
1. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 93.
2. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 385.
3. (1961) 63 N.L.R. 313.
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had no hesitation in deciding that unless appointments to a 
Bribery Tribunal uere made by the Judicial Service Commission 
all proceedings before a Bribery Tribunal uould be tainted 
uith illegality*
Here ue are concerned uith the issue uhether 
Bribery Tribunals could be said to have been vested uith 
judicial pouer.
4
In Senadhira v. The Bribery Commissioner Sansoni, J., 
conceded that it uas difficult to define the precise limits 
of 'judicial p o u e r ' T h e r e ,  houever, existed certain 
judicial precedents uhich proved useful in determining uhether 
a Bribery Tribunal uas vested uith Judicial pouers.
Toronto Corporation v. York Corporation^ uas one such
precedent. In that case the Privy Council had held that uhile
the Municipal Board constituted under the particular Act uas
primarily entrusted uith administrative functions, it uas
also entrusted, by certain provisions of the Act, uith the
jurisdiction and pouers of a Superior Court, such as the pouer
to set aside a contract and impose neu terms upon the parties
7
to it. In regard to such pouers the Privy Council observed:
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion 
that, uhatever be the definition given to 
a Court of Justice, or judicial pouer, the 
sections in question do purport to clothe 
the Board uith the functions of a Court, and 
to vest in it judicial pouers.
4• Ibid.
5. Ibid., at p. 318.
6. /T9387 A.C. 415.
7. Ibid., at p. 427.
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It must be noted here that the Privy Council in 
Toronto Corporation v. York Corporation regarded the 
Municipal Board as an administrative body !in pith and
g
substance1. Their Lordships found nothing to suggest that
the Board uould not have been granted its administrative
powers without the addition of the judicial power complained
of. Accordingly, such parts of the Act as purported to vest
in the Board, the functions of a court were severable and
g
such parts alone were invalid.
Sansoni, 3., in Senadhira v. The Bribery Commissioner 
then referred to the second relevant case, Attorney-General 
for Australia v. The Queen and the Boilermakers1 Society of 
Australia. The Privy Council was called upon in that case 
to determine whether the Dominion Parliament of Australia 
could confer on one body of persons--tribunal or court-- 
arbitral and judicial functions together. Their Lordships 
affirmed the order of the High Court of Australia that the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia which is based 
on a separation of functions did not permit such a course. 
Accordingly, it was held that the conferment of judicial 
powers, such as powers to impose penalties for the breach 
of an order or award, and to punish contempts of its 
authority, on the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration--an
8. Ibid., at p. 426.
9. Ibid., at p. 427.
10. /T9577 A.C. 288.
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essentially non-judicial body--uas inconsistent uith the 
Constitution. Such provisions as purported to vest in 
the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration judicial power 
'even to the extent of fining a citizen or depriving him 
of his liberty'"^ were held to be unconstitutional.
The third case relevant to the matter before
Sansoni, 3., in Senadhira's case uas Uaterside Workers'
12
Federation of Australia v. 3. U. Alexander Ltd., uhich had
been cited uith approval in Attorney-General for Australia
13
v. The Queen and Boilermakers' Society of Australia.
Isaacs, 3., and Rich, 3., in Uaterside Uorkers' case explained
the difference betueen judicial and arbitral functions in the
follouing terms:^
Both of them rest for their ultimate validity 
and efficacy on the legislative power. Both 
presuppose a dispute, and a hearing or 
investigation, and a decision. But the es­
sential difference is that the judicial power 
is concerned uith the ascertainment, declara­
tion and enforcement of the rights and liabilities 
of the parties as they exist, or are deemed to 
exist, at the moment proceedings are instituted; 
uhereas the function of the arbitral pouer in 
relation to industrial disputes is to ascertain 
and declare, but not enforce, uhat in the opinion 
of the arbitrator ought to be the respective 
rights and liabilities of the parties in relation 
to each other. . . .  The arbitral function is 
ancillary to the legislative function and provides 
the factum upon uhich the lau operates to create 
the right or duty. The judicial function is an 
entirely separate branch, and first ascertains 
uhether the alleged right or duty exists in lau, 
and proceeds if necessary to enforce the lau.
11. Ibid. , at p. 309.
12. (1918) 25 C.L.R. 434.
13. /T9577 A.C. 288.
14. (1918) 25 C.L.R. 434 at p. 463.
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Isaacs, 3,, and Rich, 3*, clearly emphasised that
a judicial decision enforced rights and duties uhich the
existing lau recognised. Barton, 3,, in the same case
explained that the pouer of enforcement uas an essential
part of judicial pouer, in that laus in themselves uere of
little force uithout bodies uhich uould enforce them. He
added that:^
• .... uhether persons uere judges, uhether 
tribunals uere courts, and uhether they ex­
ercised uhat is nou called judicial pouer, 
depended and depends on substance and not 
on mere name. Enforceable decisions by an 
authority constituted by lau at the suit 
of a party submitting a case to it for 
decision is in character a judicial func­
tion.
Drauing assistance from the three judicial decisions 
referred to above, Sansoni, 3., (uith T. S. Fernando, 3., 
agreeing) concluded that a Bribery Tribunal uas required by 
the Bribery (Amendment) Act to exercise arbitral functions 
in conducting an inquiry into an alleged commission of an 
offence of bribery--an inquiry uhich resulted in a finding 
uhether the accused person had committed such offence. The 
authority of the Tribunal to inflict punishment by uay of 
a fine or a term of imprisonment or both had the character 
of a judicial function. These punitive pouers uere judicial 
for tuo reasons. Firstly, the Tribunal had been given a 
pouer of enforcing its decisions by uay of inflicting 
punishment. Secondly, the pouer of imposing punishment 
appertained exclusively to judicial pouer.
15. Ibid.5 at p. 451 ad. fin.
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The Supreme Court in Senadhira!s case held accordingly 
that the sentences entered by the Tribunal against the accused 
appellants uere inoperative without prejudice to the validity 
of the proceedings of the Tribunal up to the stage of pro­
nouncing upon the guilt of the accused. Sansoni, S., did, 
however, entertain a doubt whether the conferment of judicial 
power on a Bribery Tribunal was proper:"^
It is right that we should preserve as much 
of the will of Parliament as possible: and
so far as that will, as expressed in a Statute, 
is not repugnant to the Constitution, we should 
uphold those provisions which we consider not 
to conflict with the Constitution. I see no 
objection to the conferment of arbitral functions 
which involve the investigation and pronouncement 
of a finding on questions of fact, though I must 
confess that the manner in which arbitral and 
judicial functions have been conferred on 
Tribunals makes this a border-line case.
17In Piyadasa v. The Bribery Commissioner, Tambiah,
3., (with Sri Skanda Rajah, 3., agreeing) held that ’enforce­
ment’ was not an indispensable ingredient of judicial power,
18drawing support from an Australian authority--Dr• Uynes.
19According to Dr. Uynes:
enforcement could not be a necessary attribute 
of a court exercising judicial power--for 
example the power to award execution might not 
belong to a tribunal, yet its determinations 
might clearly amount to an exercise of judicial 
power.
16. (1961) 63 N.L.R. 313, at p. 321.
17. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 385.
18. U. A. Uynes, Legislative, Executive and 3udicial 
Powers in Australia (2nd ed. ), cited at p. 392.
19. op. cit., (5th ed.) at p. 423-4.
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Tambiah, 3., rightly pointed out that the pouer of enforce­
ment tyas not regarded as an essential element of judicial
20
pouer in the United States of America too.
That the definition of the term 'judicial pouer1 had
21
caused much difficulty uas duly appreciated by Tambiah, 3.
In order to elucidate the meaning of ’judicial pouer1, the 
distinction draun in Alexander’s Case betueen arbitral and 
judicial pouers uas referred to. So uas the definition
given by Griffiths, C.3., in Huddart, Parker & Co. v.
22
Moorhead. Griffiths, C.3., said:
I am of opinion that the uords ’’judicial 
pouer . . .  means the pouer uhich every 
sovereign authority must of necessity 
have to decide controversies betueen 
his subjects or betueen itself and its 
subjects, uhether the right relates to 
life, liberty or property. The exercise 
of this pouer does not begin until some
tribunal uhich has pouer to give a
binding and authoritative decision, 
uhether subject to appeal or not, is 
called upon to take action.
The essential elements of judicial pouer as appear 
from the above mentioned authorities seem to be (a) settle­
ment of a dispute (b) uith reference to existing legal rights 
and liabilities and (c) uith a vieu to pronouncing an autho­
ritative or binding decision (d) even uhere the tribunal has 
no pouer to enforce its determination. Guided by these
considerations Tambiah, 3., held that a Bribery Tribunal
uhich uas required to ’hear, try and determine any prosecution
20. See Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railuay v. 
Uallace (1933) 288 U.S. 249; 77 L. ed. 730.
21. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 385, at p. 391.
22. (1908) 8 C.L.R. 330, at p. 357.
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for bribery made against any person before the tribunal* 
(sec. 47(1) as amended by Act No. 40 of 1958) uas conferred 
uith judicial pouer. For, a Bribery Tribunal, it seems,
(a) inquired into a dispute betueen the State (represented 
by the Bribery Commissioner) and the alleged offender (b) 
uith reference to definitions of bribery found in Part II 
of the Bribery Act of offences uhich uere previously triable 
in a court of lau (c) in order to pronounce upon the guilt 
of the accused uhich pronouncement uas final and conclu­
sive subject only to the right of appeal. In vieu of the 
fact that (d) enforcement uas not an essential element of 
judicial pouer, even at the stage of trying persons for 
bribery a Bribery Tribunal exercised judicial pouer.
In Piyadasa v. The Bribery Commissioner not only
the sentence uas set aside as in Senadhira v. The Bribery
Commissioner, but the uhole of the proceedings before the
23
Tribunal uas declared null and void. In arriving at this 
conclusion the Supreme Court paid due regard to the fact 
that the legislature had purported to create a tribunal and 
had conferred upon it the judicial pouer exercised by the 
Supreme Court and the inferior courts uith the result that 
the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts in regard to bribery 
offences uas greatly curtailed.
23. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 385, at p. 395.
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The validity of the decision in Piyadasa v. The 
Bribery Commissioner uas canvassed before another Bench of
2 judges of the Supreme Court in Ranasinqhe v. The Bribery
24 ,
Commissioner. H. N. G. Fernando, 3., (uith L. B. de
Silva, 3., agreeing) had no hesitation in subscribing to
the opinion expressed by Tambiah, 3., in Piyadasa v. The
Bribery Commissioner. The Privy Council on appeal in
25
The Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinqhe, sau no occasion 
to detract from Tambiah, 3.*s decision in any manner. Since 
the arguments before the Supreme Court and the Privy Council 
in Ranasinqhe1s Case uere centred around certain other 
aspects relating to the validity of the Bribery Amendment 
Act, there is no discussion there on the content of judicial 
pouer.
By uay of conclusion it may be said that in decid­
ing that a Bribery Tribunal uas a judicial office the Supreme 
Court took into account the follouing factors: (a) bribery
uas and continued to be an offence triable in a court of 
lau; (b) Bribery Tribunals ousted the jurisdiction of the
courts in respect of bribery offences specified in the Bribery 
26
Act; (c) inflicting a penalty and imposing punishment are 
exclusively judicial pouers; and (d) a Bribery Tribunal uas 
more akin to a court of lau and had little resemblance to a 
fact finding commission.
24. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 449.
25. (1964) 66 N.L.R. 73; /I9647 2 All E.R. 785.
26. See e.g. Senadhira!s case (1961) 63 N.L.R. 313,
at p. 320 ad. fin, uhere Sansoni, 3., said that 'the Bribery 
Tribunals uere Courts set up in substitution for the established 
courts'. See also Piyadasa1s case (1962) 64 N.L.R. 385
at p . 393.
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(2) Quazi Courts
The first case to extend the principle enunciated
in the bribery Tribunal cases1 to other areas of statutory
lau uas Oailabdeen v. Danina Umma  ^ (uhich uas decided
2
after Piyadasa v. The Bribery Commissioner but before 
Ranasinqhe v. The Bribery Commissioner )• It uas success­
fully argued in that case that the appointment of Quazis 
by the Minister uas inconsistent uith the Constitution,
In subscribing to that argument, the Supreme Court traced 
the history of local legislation relating to the creation 
of the office of Quazis and examined the pouers and functions 
of Quazis,
The earliest attempt to reduce into a statute the 
laus relating to Muslim marriage and divorce uas accom­
plished in 1806 uith the promulgation of the Muslim Code 
of that year. It uas not until 1929 that the lau relating
to Muslim marriage and divorce, uhich uas in a *very un-
4
settled and complicated state1, underuent thorough revision. 
The Ordinance No, 27 of 1929, among other changes, 
introduced a system of Quazi courts to deal uith questions 
of Muslim marriages and divorces together uith applications 
for the maintenance of Muslim uives and children and other 
connected matters.
1. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 419 (S.C.)
2. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 385 (S.C.)
3. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 449 (S.C.)
4. N. H. M. Cader moving that a committee of the 
Legislative Council be appointed to consider and report on 
Muslim Lau of marriages. Ceylon Hansard, February 5, 1926, 
p. 140.
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The provisions contained in this Ordinance, uhich
uere re-enacted in the Marriage and Divorce (Muslim) Act
of 1951,^ gives a Quazi the jurisdiction, among other
things, to entertain an application by a Muslim wife for a 
7
divorce and to adjudicate on claims for the recovery of
8 9Mahr as uell as for the maintenance of uives and children*
These pouers had, prior to the Ordinance of 1929,
been exercised by ordinary courts of lau. For instance,
in F3. v. M'iskin Umma^  the Supreme Court had held that a
Muslim uife could obtain a divorce, uithout the consent of
her husband, only from a court of lau. The court uas not
prepared to acquiesce in the submission that a local practice
had groun uhereby a Muslim uife could obtain a divorce from
a Muslim priest in similar circumstances. The Ordinance of
1929 had the effect of transferring such pouers as uere
exercised by the courts relating to Muslim marriage and
divorce to the neuly created Quazis.^
In support of the conclusion that the pouer of a
Quazi to order a husband to pay maintenance to his uife and
children involved the exercise of judicial pouer, H. N. G.
Fernando, 0., observed that prior to the enactment of the
Ordinance of 1929,—
6. Act No. 13 of 1951, (L .E.C. cap. 115).
7. Ibid., s. 28.
8• Ibid.
9. Ibid., s. 47(1) (b) and (c).
10. (1925) 26 N.L.R. 343.
11. Dailabdeen v. Danina Umma, supra n. 1, at p. 423.
147
• . • in exercising it a magistrate uas clearly 
exercising judicial pouer, for he had to ad­
minister the common lau under uhich a person 
had the liability to maintain the uife and 
children; upon claims being made for mainte­
nance, the magistrate had to decide upon the 
validity of alleged marriages and upon 
questions of paternity; to make enforceable 
orders; these are all matters involving the 
exercise of judicial pouer.^
The above passage amply demonstrates that the pouers 
conferred on Quazis, previously enjoyed by courts of lau, 
uere pouers that properly fall uithin the range of "judicial 
functions". It may be noted here that section 48 of the 
Marriage and Divorce (Muslim) Act of 1951 declared the 
jurisdiction exercisable by a quazi under section 47
exclusive. The Act, houever, provided for an appeal from
13the decision of a Quazi to the Board of Quazis and a
14further appeal therefrom to the Supreme Court.
The foliouing judicial observation lends support
to  th e  c o n c l u s i o n  a r r i v e d  a t  i n  J a i l a b d e e n  v .  D an in a  Umma
t h a t  Quaz is  e x e r c i s e  j u d i c i a l  p o u e r :
In Islam all lau uas sacred, and the only person 
who judicially administered it (apart from the 
head of the state itself) uas the Kazi (or 
Kathi) uho uas a judge in the fullest sense of 
the term, and the only judge uhom the lau 
recognised. ^
12. Ibid., at p. 423.
13. Section 60.
14. Section 62.
15. R_. Miskin Umma (1925) 26 N.L.R. 343, at p. 355,
per Bertram, C.3.
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As regards the meaning of !judicial power*, the 
Supreme Court in Jailabdeen v. Danina Umma ^ inclined to 
agree with the judgment of Tambiah, J., in Piyadasa v.
The Bribery Commissioner^  that the definition given in
17
Huddart, Parker and Company Proprietory Ltd., v. Moorhead 
was the most acceptable* That * enforcement1 was not an 
indispensable attribute of judicial power also was approved 
of* H. N* G* Fernando, 3*, however, pointed out that under 
the Marriage and Divorce (Muslim) Act the order of a Quazi 
could be enforced as an order of a magistrate on applica­
tion to him*
Here, as in the case of Bribery Tribunals, the 
Supreme Court uas much influenced by the fact that a jurisdic­
tion previously enjoyed by ordinary courts of lau had been 
conferred on an extra-judicial tribunal whereby the juris­
diction of the courts was ousted* Dn the application of 
this principle Quazis, undoubtedly, exercise judicial power.
16. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 385.
17. (1908) 8 C.L.R. 330, at p. 357. See supra p. |^ 2..
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(3) Arbitration and Adjudication under the 
Industrial Disputes Act
The Industrial Disputes Act No. 43 of 1950 intro­
duced mediation, conciliation and arbitration as methods 
of preventing and expeditiously settling industrial dis­
putes. It is the duty of the Commissioner of Labour, under 
this Act, to endeavour to settle industrial disputes by 
conciliation.'*' He is also empowered to refer an industrial
dispute, with the consent of the parties to the dispute,
2
to an arbitrator or a District Court for arbitration. In 
the event that conciliation fails and the parties to the 
dispute do not consent to arbitration, the Minister has 
the power to refer such dispute to an arbitrator or an
3
Industrial Court for arbitration.
Significant changes in this legislative scheme 
uere effected by the Industrial Disputes (.Amendment) Act 
No. 62 of 1957. This Act created Labour Tribunals to 
which workmen could directly apply in respect of termi­
nation of employment. Labour Tribunals in addition took
over the jurisdiction previously exercised by District
4
Courts as arbitrators under the original Act.
In a series of cases the Industrial Disputes Act, 
as amended in 1957, came under attack on the basis that 
arbitrators, Industrial Courts and Labour Tribunals were in
1. The Industrial Disputes Act No. 43 of 1950, 
sec • 3(1).
2. Ibid. By section 2 of Act No. 62 of 1957, the 
District Court was replaced with a Labour Tribunal.
3. Ibid. , sec. 4.
4. Act No. 62 of 1957, sec. 2.
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fact courts and that accordingly the appointments to those 
bodies made otherwise than by the Judicial Service Commission 
were inconsistent uith the Constitutional provisions uhich
safeguarded the independence of the Judiciary.
5
Ualker v. Fry, uas decided by a Divisional Bench
of five judges of the Supreme Court of Ceylon, and came
\
before the Privy Council as The United Engineering Workers 
Union v. Devanayaqam.^ These tuo decisions provide the 
leading judgments on this question. In the Supreme Court 
it uas held by a majority of three judges that Labour 
Tribunals uere judicial bodies. On appeal, the Privy Council 
laid doun by a majority decision that none of the institu­
tions uhich uere created by the Act uas intended as a 
judicial tribunal.
It is proposed to study the majority decision of 
the Supreme Court in Ualker v. Fry uith the minority vieu 
expressed by the Privy Council on appeal. The dissenting 
judgment in Ualker v. Fry uill then be discussed uith the 
majority judgment in Devanayaqam1s case. This uill provide 
an appropriate setting to evaluate briefly the respective 
merits of the differing vieus. First, the relevant statutory 
provisions uill be outlined.
5. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 73.
6. (1967) 69 N.L.R. 289.
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(i) An Outline of the Industrial Disputes Act
Arbitration proceedings, uhich may be voluntary or
compulsory, are initiated either by the Commissioner of
Labour or the Minister, and not by any party to an industrial
dispute.^ In contrast, the amendments made in 1957 enable
a workman to make an application to a Labour Tribunal in
respect of termination of employment
Provisions relating to arbitration on reference may
be studied first* Uhen an industrial dispute is referred to
an arbitrator it is his duty to make all such inquiries as
he may consider necessary, hear such evidence as may be
tendered by the parties to the dispute, and make such auard
2
as may appear to him just and equitable*
The auard is then transmitted to the Commissioner
3
of Labour to be published in the Gazette* Every auard of 
an arbitrator shall come into force on the date of the auard, 
or any other specified date not being earlier than the date
on uhich the industrial dispute to uhich the auard relates
4
first arose. Such an auard has effect for a period specified
5
in the auard or, uhere no such period is specified, for an 
indefinite period.^
1. See p*149 supra. la. Ibid.
2. The Industrial Disputes Act, sec. 17(1).
3. Ibid., sec. 18(1).
4. Sec. 18(2).
5. Sec. 18(3).
6. Sec. 18(4).
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Provision is made in the Act, houever, for any party
7 . .to the auard to repudiate such auard. Similar provision
0
is made in relation to Industrial Courts except for the 
fact that an auard of an Industrial Court cannot be repu­
diated. Instead, any party to an auard may apply to the
g
Minister to set aside, modify or vary it. Such application,
then, is referred by the Minister to an Industrial C ourt^
uhich may confirm, set aside, vary or modify such auard.^
Every auard made by an arbitrator and an Industrial
Court shall be binding on all the parties to the dispute
(unless repudiated by a party or set aside by an Industrial
Court as the case may be), and the terms of the auard shall
be implied terms in the contract of employment betueen the
12employer(s) and the uorkman(men) bound by the auard.
An arbitrator is either nominated by the parties
13 14to the dispute or appointed by the Minister. An
Industrial Court is constituted by one person or three persons
nominated by the Minister^ out of a panel of five persons
appointed by the Governor-General•^
7. Sec. 27.
8. Secs . 24 to 27.
9. Sec. 27.
10. Ibid •
11. Sec. 28(1).
12. Secs • 19 and 26.
13. Sec. 3(1).
14. Sec • 4.
15. Sec. 22(3).
16. Sec. 22(1).
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The amending Act of 1957 added a neu Part IV/ A 
uhich deals uith matters relating to the pouers and func­
tions of Labour Tribunals uhen inquiring into applications 
made to it by uorkmen.
The Minister is empouered to constitute such number
of Labour Tribunals as he determines, each consisting of
17one person called the President.
A uorkman, or a trade union on behalf of a uorkman 
uho is a member of that union, can make an application to 
a Labour Tribunal for relief or redress in respect of:
(a) the termination of his services by his 
employer;
(b) the question uhether any gratuity or other 
benefits are due to him from his employer 
on termination of his services and the 
amount of such gratuity and the nature and 
extent of such benefits; and,
(c) such other matters relating to the terms of 
employment, or the conditions of labour, of 
uorkman as may be prescribed.^
It is the duty of a Labour Tribunal, uhen an appli­
cation is duly made to it, to make all such inquiries into 
that application and hear all such evidence as the Tribunal
may consider necessary, and make such order as may appear
19
to the Tribunal to be just and equitable.
Any relief or redress may be granted by a Labour
Tribunal to a uorkman upon an application duly made, not-
uithstanding anything to the contrary in any contract of
20service betueen him and his employer. An order of a Labour
17. Sec. 31A (1). IB. Sec. 31B(l).
19. Sec. 31C(1). 20. Sec. 31B(4).
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21 . .Tribunal is conclusive, subject to the condition that
22
an appeal lies to the Supreme Court on a question of lau*
Uhen the Tribunal is satisfied that a matter to 
uhich an application duly made relates is under discussion 
betueen a trade union to uhich the uorkman belongs and the 
employer, the Tribunal is required to suspend its proceedings 
until the conclusion of that discussion, and upon such con­
clusion to resume the proceedings and make an order according
to the terms of any such agreement resulting from such dis- 
23cussion. Again, if the application relates to a matter
uhich has been referred to be settled by arbitration under
24section 4, the Tribunal shall dismiss such application.
If a uorkman has resorted to a Labour Tribunal he
shall not seek any legal remedy and, similarly, if a uorkman
has resorted to any legal remedy he is not entitled to any
25remedy from a Labour Tribunal under Part IV A of the Act.
(ii) The Vieu that Labour Tribunals are Judicial Bodies 
This is the vieu upheld by the majority in 
Ualker v. Fry and by the minority in Devanayaqam1s case.
The basic premise for this vieu seems to be the alleged 
difference betueen the dispute settlement machinery intro­
duced by the original Act and the Labour Tribunals under 
Part IV A, introduced in 1957.
21. Sec. 31D(1). 22. Sec. 31D(2).
23. Sec. 31C(2). 24. Sec. 31B(2) (b).
25. Sec. 31B(5).
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An arbitrator, an Industrial Court or a Labour 
Tribunal uhen acting on a reference exercised arbitral and 
not judicial pouers, said Sansoni, C.3., uho, together uith
H. N. G. Fernando, S.P.3., and T. S. Fernando, 3,, formed 
the majority in Ualker v. Fry* In reaching this conclusion 
he relied on 1 enforcement1 as an essential requirement of 
judicial pouer* Arbitration proceedings result in laying 
doun conditions for the future uhich become terms in the 
contract of employment, uhereas a Labour Tribunal is em- 
pouered to deliver a final and conclusive order in the 
exercise of its pouers "to apply the lau, to interpret the 
agreement, to decide the facts, and by its adjudication to 
create an instant right or liability, on the basis of some 
previously existing legal standard".'*'
Unlike an auard of an arbitrator uhich may be
repudiated or an auard of an Industrial Court uhich may be
set aside or modified on application to the Minister, an
2
order of a Labour Tribunal is final and conclusive*
The fact that a Labour Tribunal ascertains existing 
legal rights and liabilities and declares them conclusively 
prompted the majority of the judges in Ualker v* Fry to
equate a Labour Tribunal to a court of lau, deriving further
strength from the fact that a uorkman has direct access to
a Labour Tribunal, but not to an arbitrator or to an
3
Industrial Court.
1. (1966) 68 N.L.R* 73, at p. 80, (per Sansoni, C.3.)*
2. Ibid., at pp. 85 and 86, (per Sansoni, C.3.).
3. Ibid., at p. 93, per, H. N. G. Fernando, S.P.3.
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An industrial dispute is referred by the Minister 
or the Commissioner of Labour to an arbitrator or to an 
Industrial Court for the ’settlement* of such dispute, uhere- 
as a uorkman directly applies to a Labour Tribunal for ’relief 
or redress’. Redress, uhich means ’reparation for a urong*, 
as H. N. G. Fernando, S.P.3., observed, indicates that a
4
Labour Tribunal is expected to remedy a violation of a lau.
In fact, the redress claimed in an application to a Labour
5
Tribunal can be identical uith that claimed in a civil court. 
Unlike an arbitrator or an Industrial Court uhich strives to 
reach a "settlement" a Labour Tribunal makes an “order", and 
the term "order" is "perfectly appropriate as an alternative 
for "decree"
The word's "just and equitable" uhen appended to an 
order that a Labour Tribunal is expected to make did not 
render such order non-judicial; in fact it is a just and 
equitable order that a court of lau is generally expected to 
make. That a Labour Tribunal can order reinstatement and 
look outside the contract of service in search of justice
7
and equity also did not make a Labour Tribunal non-judicial,
The fact that a uorkman had to choose betueen
g
judicial proceedings and an application to a Labour Tribunal,
uas construed as an indication that Labour Tribunals uere
intended as courts to exist side by side uith the then
g
existing courts of lau. Similar provision did not exist 
in the original Act,
4. Ibid, 5. Ibid, 6, Ibid., at p, 94.
7. Ibid., at p. 95. 8. See above at p. i5 4.
9. Ualker v. Fry, at p. 94.
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Drawing a division line betueen the original Act, 
uhich created institutions to exercise arbitral pouers, 
and the amending Act, uhich created a judicial tribunal, 
namely the Labour Tribunal, the Supreme Court in Ualker v. 
Fry, by a majority decision, thus rendered invalid orders 
made by Labour Tribunals, uhich had been appointed by the 
Public Service Commission*
The dissenting judgment of Lord Guest and Lord 
Devlin, as delivered by Lord Devlin, in The United 
Engineering Uorkers Union v. Devanayagam,^  uhich approves 
the majority judgment in Ualker v* Fry, may nou be discussed* 
The basis for the dissenting opinion uas stated as
follous:
Thus in our opinion the guestion uhether 
a body is exercising judicial pouer is 
not to be determined by looking at its 
functions in conjunction uith those of 
other bodies set up by the Act and 
forming a general impression about 
uhether they are judicial or administra­
tive. Nor is it to be answered by 
totting up and balancing resemblances 
betueen the Labour Tribunal and other 
judicial and administrative bodies*
Judicial pouer is a concept that is 
capable of clear delineation.^
Unlike the majority judgment in Ualker v. Fry, the 
dissenting opinion in Devanayagam1s case refused to be guided 
merely by differences that existed betueen arbitration 
machinery and Labour Tribunals, and inclined in favour of 
applying the concept of judicial pouer, uhich their Lordships 
thought uas clearly identifiable.
10. (1967) 69 N.L.R. 289; /T9677 2 All E.R. 367.
11. United Engineering Uorkers Union v. Devanayagam 
(1967) 69 N.L.R. 289, at p. 306; /1967/ 2 All E.R. 367,
at p. 379, per Lord Devlin.
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The fact that at least a single party to a dispute, 
namely, a uorkman, has access to a Labour Tribunal shous 
that the Tribunal uas endoued uith judicial pouer; for, an 
arbitral body can derive authority only from the consent of 
all the parties to a dispute, their Lordships pointed out,'*' 
It is respectfully submitted that the Industrial Disputes 
Act in its unamended form envisaged compulsory as uell as 
voluntary arbitration, and that accordingly the criterion 
adopted as to the nature of the source of pouer is not con­
clusive as to uhether the pouer ultimately exercised is 
arbitral or judicial.
The pouers enjoyed by a Labour Tribunal, such as 
those to disregard the terms of a contract of employment 
or to order reinstatement, uhich are uider than those 
conferred on a court of lau, did not deter Lord Devlin and 
Lord Guest from the conviction that Labour Tribunals 
exercised judicial pouer, While affirming the proposition
that a court of lau applies lau to facts before it Lord
13Devlin had this to say:
But this does not mean that unless the tribunal 
from the first applies an existing lau it cannot 
be judicial. The distinction is not betueen old 
lau and neu lau but betueen lau and no lau, • • •
Uhat the statute appears to us to be doing is to 
substitute for the rigidity of the old lau a neu 
and more flexible system.
12. Ibid., at p. 307 (N.L.R.); 380 (All E.R.).
13. Ibid., at p. 308 (N.L.R.); 381 (All E.R.).
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On the other hand, a court of lau should exclude
altogether considerations of policy and expediency. A
Labour Tribunal may not shun these consideration altogether,
but the paramount consideration remains the need for a just
14and equitable solution. In other uords it is required 
1 to do justice betueen the parties to the application1, 
uhich is also the criterion that guides a judge.^
Lord Devlin pointed out that:
another and essential characteristic of 
judicial pouer is that it should be 
exercised judicially. Put another uay, 
judicial pouer is pouer limited by the 
obligation to act judicially. Administra- 
tive or executive pouer is not limited in 
that uay.
This criterion, it is submitted, is ill-conceived
since it is uidely recognised that the duty to act judicially
and the exercise of judicial pouer are distinct and not
co-extensive concepts. ^  The attempt made by Lord Devlin
to place all situations uhere a duty to act judicially
exists uithin the exclusive premises of judicial pouer is
comparable to the vieu held by Sansoni, C.3., in Ualker v.
Fry that the uords *just and equitable order* connote the
need to *hold an even hand betueen conflicting interests*
and that a Labour Tribunal *has no pouer to act in a purely
17arbitrary manner*. The true position is that uhenever
i4. Ibid., at p. 310 (N.L.R.); 383 (All E.R.).
i5• Ibid., at p. 311 (N.L.R.); 384 (All E.R.).
16. See Ualker v. Fry (1966)68 N.L.R. 73 at p. 121
per Tambiah, 3., and C .T.B . v. Gunasinqhe (1968) 72 N.L.R. 76 
at p. 81, citing Rola Co., (Aust.) Pty Ltd., v• The 
Commonuealth (194T) 69 C.L.R. at 203.
17. Ibid., at p. 79.
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there exists a duty to act judicially the proceedings 
should conform to the principles of natural justice and 
not be arbitrary; and, that the duty to act judicially can 
apply to a judicial as uell as an arbitral or administrative 
proceeding,
(iii) The vieu that Labour Tribunals are not Judicial 
Tribunals
In Ualker v. Fry, ^  Tambiah, 3., uith Sri Skanda 
Rajah, 3,, agreeing, elected to vieu the Industrial Disputes 
Act as a uhole to determine uhether the Labour Tribunals 
fitted into the primary purpose of the Act, namely the 
prevention and settlement of industrial disputes, or marked 
a deviation so grave as to equate such Tribunals uith courts 
of lau.
Labour Tribunals, Tambiah, 3,, stated, do not perform
the same functions as those of a court of lau. For instance,
a Labour Tribunal is not called upon to decide a 1is betueen
the parties. Only a uorkman, but not his employer, has
2
access to a Labour Tribunal.
3
Adopting the test of enforcement to distinguish 
betueen arbitral and judicial functions, Tambiah, 3,, had 
no hesitation in holding that a Labour Tribunal, uhich in 
the main decides uhat ought to be the rights and duties of 
the parties to the application for the future, is not 
endoued uith judicial pouer.
1. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 73. 2. Ibid., at 108.
3. See supra pp. 139-40.
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To obtain relief from a Labour Tribunal it is not
necessary that the termination of the services uas urongful.^
Thus, a Labour Tribunal may come to the assistance of an
aggrieved uorkman uho is unable to institute an action in
a court of lau in the absence of a cause of action.
The uider considerations that a Labour Tribunal
may take into account, but uhich fall outside the purvieu
of the courts of lau, together uith the unprecedentedly
uide range of remedies uhich can be meted out by a Tribunal,
prompted Tambiah, 3., to assert that Labour Tribunals are
merely arbitral bodies* The only limitation set on the
arbitral pouer of a Labour Tribunal is that its order has
to be Mjust and equitable". Such an order is uider in
5
scope than a judicial decision*
Tambiah, 3*, also dreu attention to the provisions 
uhich require a Labour Tribunal to dismiss an application or 
to suspend its proceedings,^ and held that those provisions 
clearly indicated that Labour Tribunals uere not intended
7
as additions to the existing courts system*
Tambiah, 3., received the unreserved approbation of 
the Privy Council in vieuing the legislative plan in enacting 
the original as uell as the amendment Acts as a uhole in
4. Shell Company of Ceylon Ltd., v* Pathirana 
(1962) 64 N.L.R. 71.
5. Ualker v* Fry, supra, at p* 112*
6. See supra p.154.
7* Ualker v. Fry, supra, at p. 112.
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order to determine uhether a Labour Tribunal uas analogous
0
to a court of lau. This approach of the Privy Council is 
opposed to that adopted by the majority in Ualker v. Fry and 
by the minority in Devanayaqam1s case.
The test of analogy is succinctly stated in 
Labour Relations Board of Saskatcheuan v. John East Iron 
Uorks Ltd:^
It is as good a test as another of Analogy* 
to ask uhether the subject matter of the 
assumed justiciable issue makes it desirable 
that the judges should have the same qualifi­
cations as those uhich distinguish the judges 
of the superior or other courts.
Viscount Dilhcrne, delivering the majority opinion 
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,^ accepted 
the proposition that there are many features uhich are 
essential to the existence of judicial pouer, yet uhich by 
themselves are not conclusive of it, or that any combina­
tion of such features uill fail to establish a judicial 
pouer if, as is a common characteristic of so-called 
administrative tribunals, the ultimate decision may be 
determined not merely by the application of legal principles 
to ascertained facts but by considerations of policy also.^^
8. (1967) 69 N.L.R. 289, at p. 294; (1967) 2 All E.R.
367, at p. 371.
9. /19497 A.C . 134 (P.C.) at p. 151. Cited in
Devanayaqam1s case, supra. at p. 293 (N.L.R.); 370 (All E.R.).
10. The other tuo judges uere, Lord Upjohn and 
Lord Pearson.
11. Labour Relations case at p. 149, cited in 
Devanayaqam1s case at p. 293 (N.L.R.); 370 (All E.R.).
163
Having briefly examined the provisions relating
to arbitrators and Industrial Courts, l/iscount Dilhorne
agreed uith the unanimous vieu of the Supreme Court in
Ualker v. Fry that they were not intended by the legislature
12to exercise judicial power, but mere arbitral functions.
The powers and functions of a Labour Tribunal under the
1957 Act did not differ from those of an arbitrator or an
Industrial Court; therefore, the Privy Council held that it
was proper to infer that arbitrators, Industrial Courts and
Labour Tribunals alike had been endowed with powers of
arbitration.^
The proposition which found favour uith the majority
in Ualker v. Fry, that a workman might apply to a Labour
Tribunal only if he had a cause of action, was rejected on
three counts: firstly, if that was the case one would not
expect access to the Tribunal to be limited to one party to
a dispute arising out of employment; secondly, a Labour
Tribunal was empowered to make an order notwithstanding
anything to the contrary in the contract of service; thirdly,
the words !relief! and 'redress1 occurring in relation to
Labour Tribunals did not limit the scope of the order which
14a Tribunal may make to a strictly legal one.
12. Devanayaqam's case, at p. 297 (N.L.R.); 
372 (All E . R ."J~*
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., at 299 (N.L.R.); 374 (All E.R.).
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The fact that an application made to a Labour 
Tribunal debars legal proceedings, and vice versa, does not, 
in their Lordships1 opinion, make a Labour Tribunal a court.
Tuo alternatives are available to an aggrieved workman. If 
he has a cause of action he may sue in a civil court for 
legal relief; otherwise he may make an application to a 
Labour Tribunal even if he does not have a cause of action 
for a remedy which is wider in scope than a judicial remedy.
(iv) Concluding Remarks
The case law on the Industrial Disputes Act clearly 
indicates the difficulties involved in determining whether 
a particular office is a judicial office. The opinion was 
divided in both the cases discussed above: moreover, in
Hoosajees v. Fernando , ^  which was decided after Ualker v.
Fry but before Devanayaqam1s case, also the judges were 
divided.
1 0In Floosajees v. Fernando a divisional Bench of
five judges of the Supreme Court was convened to reconsider
the decision in Ualker v. Fry, in the light of the Privy
2
Council decision in Liyanaqe v. The Queen. which was 
delivered after the decision in Ualker v. Fry. The Divisional 
Bench in Moosajees v. Fernando held that the decision in 
Ualker v. Fry was inconsistent with the separation of powers 
which the Privy Council in Liyanaqe v. The Queen declared to be 
a fundamental feature of the Constitution to the extent that
1. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 414, see the next paragraph,
la. Ibid.
2. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 265; /I9667 1 All E.R. 650.
it held that arbitrators and Industrial Courts could be
validly appointed by any authority other than the Judicial
Service Commission. Accordingly, the decision in Ualker v.
Fry was revised to the effect that the position of an
arbitrator, and membership of an Industrial Court and a
Labour Tribunal alike constituted ‘judicial office'•
The Privy Council in Devanayaqam's case made no
reference to either Noosajees v. Fernando or Liyanaqe v.
The Queen. However, the Privy Council decision in
Devanayaqam1s case clearly shows that Noosajees v. Fernando
3
had been wrongly decided. As will be explained elsewhere, 
the Legislature stepped in to extend the rule in Devanayaqam1s 
case to those cases which had been finally disposed of in 
pursuance of the incorrect decisions of the Supreme Court.
The differing views expressed in Ualker v. Fry and 
Devanayaqam1s case illustrate how differently constituted 
courts may come to different conclusions by applying 
different criteria to the same factual situation. These two 
cases at least illustrate how difficult it is to define the 
limits of the rather amorphous phrase *judicial power1, 
although Lord Devlin thought that the concept could be
4
clearly delineated.
In fact there are factors which seem to support 
each of the opposing views. The view that a Labour Tribunal 
exercises judicial power may be supported on the following 
grounds: There need not be an industrial dispute to apply
3. See infra pp. 314-19.
4. See Devanayaqam1s case (1967) 69 N.L.R. 289, 
at p. 306, /I967/ 2 All E.R. 367 at p. 379.
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to a Labour Tribunal, The individual workman goes before 
such a Tribunal to seek a remedy for a personal grievance. 
Judicial proceedings and an application to a Labour Tribunal 
are alternatives. A Labour Tribunal decides on justice as 
between the parties, without being unduely influenced by 
extra-legal factors such as industrial peace, since what 
is in issue is a grievance of an individual. It is not 
infrequently that courts take into account policy considera­
tions. In fact, as Lord Devlin remarked, fthose who made
5
equity were judges and not administrators1• Finally, a 
decision of a Labour Tribunal is final and conclusive, 
subject to an appeal on a question of law.
On the other hand there are many factors which 
indicate that a Labour Tribunal is not analogous to a court.
An intention to create a court in introducing the Labour 
Tribunal into the fabric of the Industrial Dispute Act is 
not so easily imputed to the legislature, since the paramount 
consideration had rig ht through been the speedy disposal of 
disputes arising out of employment, without being limited 
to the strict legalities of courts of law. A just and 
equitable order is capable of extending far beyond the 
confines of a judicial decision. The power to look outside 
the contract of employment and the power to reinstate could
5. It has recently been observed that "although the 
lauyer may lack the expertise or knowledge necessary to 
determine what is the right decision in specific cases, he 
has a very good idea of what is the best way of reaching fair 
and correct decisions in general because this is the essence 
of law". U. H. B. Dean, "L/hither the Constitution?" 
inaugural lecture delivered on 2.10.1975. (New Series: No. 35, 
University of Cape Town) p. 9.
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have been conferred on a District Court instead of a Labour 
Tribunal created for that purpose, if the legislative intent 
uas to create a court possessing powers uider than those 
traditionally vested in a court of law. The legislature 
intended not to create a court but a new administrative 
tribunal in order to meet the increasing demands of a 
developing branch of the state economy*
In Liyanage v. The Queen^ the Privy Council rightly 
observed that it is important to look at the cumulative 
effect of a statute or the legislative plan, in deciding 
uhether a particular statute is tantamount to an exercise of 
judicial power. If this approach can be extended to the 
Industrial Disputes Act, the approach adopted by the minority 
in Ualker v. Fry and by the majority in Devanayagam1s case 
seems preferable*
6* See infra pp.281-85.
168
(4) Pouer to Impose a Penalty - A Comparison of 
the Pouers of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
uith Those of a Licensing Authority
The tuo cases^ ue propose to discuss here, and 
uhich uere decided concurrently by the Supreme Court 
of Ceylon, clearly demonstrate in uhat circumstances the 
imposing of a penalty may or may not amount to an exercise 
of judicial pouer. This is sufficient justification to 
discuss tuo different statutes under one heading, deviating 
from the general pattern adopted in this chapter of dealing 
separately uith each statute,
2
(i) Honey Penalty under the Income Tax Ordinance
Section 80(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance provides 
as follous:
Uhere in an assessment made in respect of any 
person the amount of income assessed exceeds 
that specified as his income in his return 
and the assessment is final and conclusive 
under section 79, the Commissioner may, unless 
that person proves to the satisfaction of the 
Commissioner that there is no fraud or uilful 
neglect involved in the disclosure of income 
made by that person in his return, in uriting 
order that person to pay as a penalty for 
making an incorrect return a sum not exceeding 
tuo thousand rupees and a sum equal to tuice 
the tax on the amount of the excess.
An appeal lies from such an order to the income tax 
3board of revieu, Uhere a penalty has been imposed on a 
person under section 80 such a person cannot be prosecuted
1. Xavier v. Ui jeyekoon (1966) 69 N.L.R, 197, and 
Ibrahim v. Government Agent, l/avuniya (1966) 69 N.L.R. 217.
2. Ordinance No. 2 of 1932. (L.E.C., cap. 242).
3. The Income Tax Ordinance, section 80(2).
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under section 90(2) (a), uhich provides that the making of 
an incorrect income tax return is an offence summarily 
punishable by a magistrate uith a fine not exceeding 
2000 rupees or imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, or both, 
in addition to being ordered to pay a sum equal to double 
the amount of tax uhich has been undercharged*
In Xavier v* Ui jeyekoon^ the petitioner applied to
the Supreme Court for a urit of prohibition to restrain the
Commissioner from recovering the penalty uhich the latter
had imposed on the petitioner for making an incorrect income 
tax return* It uas contended in support of this application 
that the imposition of such a penalty amounted to an exercise 
of judicial pouer.
It uas further argued that the imposition of a 
penalty under section 80 uas intended as an alternative to 
legal proceedings envisaged in section 90, and that it firmly 
supported the fact that section 80 confers judicial pouer*
The Supreme Court did not subscribe to the vieu 
that every exercise of pouer to impose a penalty involved 
the exercise of judicial pouer. Follouing the decision of 
the Supreme Court of the United States of America in
5
Ocean Steam Navigation Co., v. Stranham the court held that 
executive officers could impose reasonable money penalties 
in order to sanction the enforcement of statutory obligations, 
uithout seeking the assistance of judicial proceedings.
4. (1966) 69 N.L.R. 197.
5. (1909) 214 U.S. Reports 320j at 339.
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In the Ocean Steam case it uas observed that the Act in
question dreu a clear distinction betueen those circumstances
uhere it uas intended that particular violations of the Act
should be considered as criminal and be punished accordingly
and those uhere it uas contemplated that violations should
not constitute crimes, but merely entail the infliction of
penalties, enforceable in some cases by purely administrative
7
action and m  others by civil suit. The sole purpose of 
section 9, uhich empouered an administrative officer to 
inflict a fine on the master of a ship uho attempted to bring 
into the country *aliens afflicted uith loathsome or dangerous 
contagious diseases1, uas, the court held, to secure the 
efficient performance by those in charge of a ship of the 
duty to examine in the foreign country, before embarkation, 
all the uould-be passengers so that the aliens referred to
g
in section 9 uere not brought into the United States.
In the Ocean Steam case, thus, tuo points uere 
stressed; firstly, that section 9, as distinguished from 
some other sections, did not create a criminal offence and 
secondly, that the prime purpose of that section uas not to 
punish, but to secure the performance of a duty imposed by 
the Act.
6• Supra fn. 5.
7. Ibid., at paragraph 337.
8. Ibid.
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The Supreme Court of Ceylon in Xavier v. Ui ievekoon
9
cited uith approval the decision in Helverino v. hi tchel1 
to the effect that uhere a penalty is primarily intended as 
a safeguard for the protection of revenue it is a remedial 
sanction and not an exercise of judicial pouer.
In Helverinq!s case. Mitchell had been acquitted, 
by a Federal Court, of the offence of uilfully evading any 
tax. Later the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, uho found 
that Mitchell had fraudulently deducted an amount from his 
taxable income, ordered him to pay the deficiency and 50^ 
of the deficiency as a penalty under section 293(b) of the 
Revenue Act of May 29, 1928. It uas contended before the 
Supreme Court that the Commissioner could not impose a 
penalty on the same facts that formed the basis of the 
judicial proceeding. In other uords, the rule against 
double jeopardy uas relied on. The imposition of the penalty, 
the Supreme Court held, uas not a criminal proceeding, and, 
accordingly, the earlier acquittal uas not a bar to the 
action of the Commissioner.
The penalty uas imposed, the court observed, to 
'ensure full and honest disclosure, to discourage fraudulent 
attempts to evade t a x ' ^  . . .  'and to reimburse the govern­
ment for the heavy expense of investigation and the loss 
resulting from the taxpayer's fraud'."^ The Legislature
9. (1938) 303 U.S. Reports 391. 82 Lauyers*
Edition 917.
10. Ibid., para. 399.
11. Ibid., para 401.
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could, it uas further observed, impose both a criminal
and a civil sanction in respect of the same act or
omission. The imposition of a penalty by the
Commissioner uas only a civil incident of the assessment
1 2and collection of the income tax.
These tuo American decisions uere relied on by
the Supreme Court of Ceylon in Xavier v. Uijeyekoon to
emphasise that the penalty imposed by the Commissioner
of Income Tax uas a civil as distinguished from
criminal sanction, and that the provision of alternative
criminal lenal proceedings did not change the civil
nature of that penalty.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Xavier_ v.
Ui .jeyekoon uas subsequently approved by the Privy
1 3Council in Ranaueera v. Uickramasingha and in
1 4Ranaueera v. Ramachandran.
One of the arguments before the Privy Council in 
Ran a ue_er_a v. Ui c k ram a singh a uas that under section 80 
of the Income Tax Ordinance, the Commissioner of Income 
Tax had to determine uhether a taxpayer had ’proved’ 
the absence of fraud or wilful neolect, uhich uas 
essentially a judicial function, and one uhich when 
performed led to either to his discharne from all 
liability for penalties, or the infliction of them upon 
him. On that account, it uas argued that
12. I bid., para. 405.
13. '"(1969) 72 N.L.R. 553; /197C)J A.C. 951. 
1 4. (1 969) 72 N.L.R. 562; //\970j A.C. 962.
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section BO so confirmed judicial pouer on the Commissioner.
The Privy Council uas not uilling to accept that argument.
Their Lordships pointed out that:
Officers appointed by the Executive may find 
themselves hearing evidence, ueighing it, 
testing it, and coming to a conclusion upon 
it: and all the time having to do their best
to be fair and impartial. Iri a uord they have 
to act judicially. • . • /L/_7here the 
resolution of disputes by some Executive officer 
can be regarded as being part of the execution 
of some uider administrative function entrusted 
to him, then he should be regarded as still 
acting in an administrative capacity, and not as
performing some different and judicial function.^
Their Lordships concluded that a perusal of the Act 
indicated that the functions of the Commissioner of Income 
Tax uere overuhelmingly administrative and that in any event 
section 80 uhich undoubtedly imposed on him a duty to act
judicially uas just one of the many sections uhich set out
his various administrative duties and pouers.
In Ranaueera v. Ramachandran^  it uas argued that 
the Income Tax Board of Revieu exercised judicial pouer 
uhenever it entertained an appeal of a tax-payer against 
the determination of the Commissioner of Income Tax. In 
support of this argument it uas contended that, unlike the 
Commissioner of Income Tax uho performed many administrative 
duties, the Board of Revieu had only one function; namely 
to hear and determine appeals. The Board, it uas argued,
15. Supra fn. 13 at p. 558. 
15. Supra fn. 14.
decided a dispute between the Commissioner and the tax
payer. The Privy Council uas not prepared to subscribe to 
such a vieu. Their Lordships pointed out that an appeal 
uas allowed to the Board of Revieu so that it could re­
examine the tax payer!s claim and determine whether the 
Commissioner had made a proper assessment of the tax payer’s 
income. In fact, the Commissioner could send a matter
direct to the Board of Revieu, if he was of the opinion that
17
no useful purpose would be served by his hearing it.
The Privy Council came to the following conclusion:^"
On the whole of the material put before them 
on this part of the case their Lordships* 
conclusion is that the Board of Revieu does 
not exercise judicial power but is one of 
the instruments created for the administra­
tion of the Income Tax Ordinance, and that 
as such its work is administrative though 
judicial qualities are called for in its 
performance. It is irrelevant therefore 
that members of the Board were not appointed 
by the Judicial Service Commission.
(ii) The Infliction of a Penalty under the Licensing 
of Traders Act "^
The relevant portions of section 5 of the Act are
as follows:
5(1) (a) if the authority by whom a licence has 
been issued to any trader in any article is 
satisfied that such trader has contravened 
any of the provisions of this Act or of any 
regulations made thereunder; or
(b) . . .
(c) • • •
17. Income Tax Ordinance, No. 2 of 1932 (L .E .C ., 
cap. 242).
18. (1969) 72 N.L.R. 562, at p. 568; /I9707 A.C.
962, at p. 970 (per Lord Donovan).
1. Act No. 62 of 1961.
(d) if such authority is satisfied on . 
information supplied by any member of 
the public that such trader had acted 
or is acting in contravention of any 
provision of this Act, the Control of 
Prices Act No, 20 of 1950, or the Food 
Control Act, No, 25 of.1950, 
then such authority may, without pro­
secuting or sanctioning a prosecution 
of that trader, by order (hereinafter 
referred to as a !punitive order1)—
(i) suspend for any period specified 
in the order, or cancel, the licence 
issued to that trader, and
(ii) require the trader to pay into 
the general revenue within such period, 
and in such manner as may be specified 
in the order, a sum not exceeding five 
thousand rupees.
2
One of the Regulations made under thi$ Act and 
published in the Gazette of 10 August, 1961 provided that a 
licensed trader shall not sell any article specified in the 
Schedule of the Regulations at a price higher than the 
maximum price fixed by Order under the Control of Prices 
Act, 1950.3
4
In Ibrahim v. Government Agent, Vavuniya the 
respondent had ordered the petitioner to pay the sum of 
Rs, 5,000 for selling an article in excess of the controlled 
price in breach of Regulation 8(6), The order of the 
Government Agent uas sought to be quashed on the ground that 
the Parliament had conferred judicial pouer on a licensing 
authority when it empowered such an authority to order a 
payment of money to the Consolidated Fund.
2. Regulation 8(6), The Government Gazette of 
10 August, 1961.
3. Act No. 29 of 1950 (L .E.C . cap. 173).
4. (1966) 69 N.L.R. 217.
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H. N. G. Fernando, S.P.3., (uith Sri Skanda Rajah,
and G. P. A. Silva, 33., agreeing) found that the alleged
offence, namely, the selling of an article in excess of
the maximum price prescribed under the Control of Prices
Act, uas an offence under that Act uhich uas triable and
punishable in the ordinary course by a magistrate. Though
the petitioner had technically committed a breach of a
regulation made under the Licensing of Traders Act, that
regulation in fact sought to bring uithin the jurisdiction
of a licensing authority the pouer to punish breaches of
the Control of Prices Act.
Price control is not a neu invention of 
Parliament. Statutory control of prices 
and statutory provision for the trial and 
punishment by the judicature of contraven­
tions of Price Control Orders existed uell 
before the Constitution came into operation.
Moreover the trial and punishment of offences 
of the nature of such contraventions has 
always, under our law, been committed to the 
judicature. In purporting to empower some 
authority other than a court, to punish such 
contraventions by the infliction of a penalty 
uhich is nothing more nor less than a fine, 
the Licensing of Traders Act constitutes in 
the language of the Privy Council, /Liyanaqe v.
The Queen (1965) 68 N.L.R. 265__/, a usurpation 
and infringement of the separate power of the 
judicature.
If it is not lawful for a licensing authority to 
try, determine and punish a contravention of a Price Control 
Order, the Court observed, the method of authorising that 
authority to inflict the punishment on the ground that the 
Licensing Regulation mentioned the same contravention, is 
the method of doing indirectly that uhich cannot be done 
directly.^
5. Ibrahim v. G. A. Vavuniya, at p. 219. 6. Ibid.
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The pouer of a licensing authority to make a
*punitive order* uas clearly distinguishable from *a remedial
sanction* referred to in Xavier v. Uijeyekoon, the Court
pointed out* In fact,
having regard to the objects of the Licensing 
of Traders Act, as stated in the long title, 
the imposition of this penalty cannot be 
regarded as part of a composite legislative 
scheme to further those objects. This penalty 
has the same effect, uhether as punitive or 
deterrent, as uould a fine inflicted by a court 
for an offence under the Control of Prices Act.^
(iii) Criminal v. Civil Sanction
Xavier v. Ui jeyekoon  ^ and Ibrahim v* The 
Government Agent, Vavuniya the criterion uas Adopted that 
the nature of the sanction determines uhether the imposition 
of a penalty amounts to an exercise of judicial pouer. In 
Xavier v. Uijeyekoon, as uell as in the tuo American cases 
cited therein, a penalty had been imposed to secure the 
performance of a duty; the statutory provisions uhich formed 
the subject matter of each of the three cases instead of 
creating a criminal offence, merely contemplated an act or 
omission carrying uith it some form of civil or administra­
tive sanction, such as a penalty in default. On the other 
hand, in Ibrahim v. The Government Agent, Vavuniya a 
licensing authority had been empouered to impose a penalty 
for a breach of the Control of Prices Act, uhich had until 
then been regarded as a criminal offence cognisable in a 
court of lau.
7. Ibid., at p. 220.
1. (1966) 69 N.L.R. 197.
2. (1966) 69 N.L.R. 217.
The application of the principle that administrative
officers could impose a penalty in certain circumstances
3uithout infringing upon judicial pouer strongly indicates 
the uillingness of the courts to recognise the ever-increasing 
need to entrust administrative officers uith pouers of enforce­
ment in order to ensure that administrative regulations are 
adhered to by those to uhom they apply.
The Supreme Court seems to have accepted the premise 
that the entrustment of some judicial pouers upon an adminis­
trative officer does not change the administrative nature of 
his functions if the result of the exercise of all his pouers 
is an administrative act. Conversely, uhere i^ t does not 
appear that the purpose of the confer+ment of some judicial 
pouers on an administrative officer is to facilitate the 
performance by him of an overuhelmingly administrative act, 
such conferment of judicial pouer is open to attack on the 
basis of the doctrine of separation of pouers. Thus, in 
I'orahim v. The Government Agent, Uavuniya the penalty in 
question .uhich uas nothing less than a criminal punishment 
could not be regarded as forming part of a composite legis­
lative plan to further the objects of the Licensing of 
4
Traders Act.
The fact that the pouer to punish infringements of 
Price Control Orders had formed part of the 1 traditional 
jurisdiction of the courts' seems to have been instrumental 
in bringing about the decision that the fine in question 
before the Supreme Court in Ibrahim's case uas an exercise of 
judicial pouer. On the other hand, there uas no evidence
3. Supra at 172. 4• Supra at 177
that it formed part of the jurisdiction of the ordinary 
courts of law to impose penalties on persons evading tax 
in order to ensure that tax-payers duly fulfilled the 
obligations imposed on them by the Income Tax Ordinance.
In Ibrahim v. The Government Agent, Vavuniya, !judicial 
pouer* appears to have been understood as (a) a pouer that 
had generally been exercised by a court of lau and (b) a 
punishment, deterrent or otheruise, for the commission of 
a criminal offence.
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C H A P T E R  6
THE JUDICIARY AND SPECIAL TRIBUNALS— PAR.T II
In the previous chapter, ue sau hou the courts
construed the constitutional provisions relating to the
judiciary so as to require any person uho came uithin the
definition of a '*judicial officer* to be appointed by the
Judicial Service Commission, A number of judicial decisions
uere then examined, under four sub-headings, in order to
«
understand uhat factors’ determined, in a variety of factual 
contexts, uhether an ostensibly administrative officer uas 
in fact a judicial officer.
Tuo other important areas remain to be examined in 
this chapter. They provide good examples of hou the courts, 
by uay of interpretation, safeguarded their province of 
operation to the greatest possible extent in cireurnstances 
uhere a statute, the constitutionality of uhich uas un­
assailable, nevertheless, seriously circumscribed the juris­
diction of courts of lau. This is sufficient justification 
for discussing them apart from the instances that uere 
studied in the previous chapter. These tuo areas, namely, 
conciliation under the Conciliation Boards Act and arbitration 
under the Co-operative Societies Ordinance uill be discussed 
under the' first tuo sub-divisions of this chapter.
In the third and last sub-division uill briefly be 
surveyed the vieus expressed in the judicial decisions 
discussed in this and the previous chapter regarding the 
constituent elements and the boundaries of judicial pouer.
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(1) Conciliation Boards
The Conciliation Boards Act No. 10 of 1958, as 
amended by Act No. 12 of 1963,^ 1uas intended to provide 
an expeditious and inexpensive means of settling disputes 
between parties without the necessity of having recourse 
to the complicated process of a law suit1. The provisions 
of the Act apply only, in areas which are determined by the 
Minister of Justice to be Conciliation Board Areas. The 
Minister may appoint for each such area a Panel of
3
Conciliators of not less than 12 persons. Any person 
resident or any public officer engaged in work in a
4
Conciliation Board area is qualified to be so appointed. 
Although the Act specifies by designation certain persons 
and organizations that can recommend persons suitable to
5
be appointed as members of the Panel, in practice, 
recommendations of a wide variety of persons and organizations
For a thorough account of the historical background 
to the Conciliation Boards Act and a lucid and penetrating 
analysis of the provisions of the Act in their actual 
operation, see R. K. U. Gunasekere and Barry Metzger,
1 The Conciliation Boards Act: Entering the Second Decade’,
The Journal of Cevlon Law (June 1971) Volume 2, No. 1, 
pp. 35-100. Another interesting and thought provoking 
discussion is found in M. L. Marasinghe, ’The Use of 
Conciliation Boards for Dispute Settlement: The Sri Lanka
Experience1, unpublished paper presented at Xth International 
Congress of Comparative Law, held in Budapest, Hungary on 
August 23-30, 1978.
1. L.E.C., 1967 Supplement, Volume II.
2. Uickramaratchi v. I. P. Nittambuwa (1968)
71 N.L.R. 121, at p. 123.
3. The Conciliation Boards Act, supra n. 1, 
sec. 2(1), 2(2) and 3(1).
4. Sec. 3(4).
5. Sec. 3(3), (4).
are considered and not infrequently had grossly unsuitable
persons been appointed as conciliators.^ One of the
members of the Panel of Conciliators is appointed by the
7
Minister to be the Chairman.
The Chairman of the Panel shall constitute for that 
area any number of Conciliation Boards each consisting of
0
three members of the Panel. Section 6 of the Act together 
uith the Schedule to the Act enumerates the civil disputes 
and criminal offences uhich may form the subject matter of 
an inquiry before a Conciliation Board. A matter is 
referred to a Board for inquiry by the Chairman either of 
his oun motion or *upon. application made to him, in that 
behalff•^
Uhere a civil dispute or an offence is referred to 
a Conciliation Board for inquiry, it is the duty of the 
Board to summon the parties to such dispute or offence to 
appear before it and, after inquiring into such dispute or 
offence, make every effort to induce the parties, in case 
of a civil dispute, to arrive at an amicable settlement, 
and, in the case of an offence, to compound such offence.
A settlement effected by a Conciliation Board in a 
civil dispute may be repudiated by any party to such dispute 
uithin thirty days after such settlement•^  If a settlement 
is not so repudiated the Chairman of the Panel is under a
6. See Gunasekere and Barry Metzger, op.cit., 
pp. 78-79.
7. Sec. 4(1).
8. Sec. 5.
9. Sec. 6.
10. Sec. 12.
11. Sec. 13(1).
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duty to transmit a certified copy of such settlement to the
relevant court of first instance to be filed of record in 
12that court. Such a settlement is deemed to be a decree
of that court and may be executed as a decree or judgment 
13of that court.
No proceedings in respect of a civil dispute
falling uithin the scope of section 6 of the Act can be
instituted in a court of lau unless a certificate is
produced before the court issued by the Chairman of the
Panel of Conciliators that a settlement could not be
effected by a Conciliation Board or that the settlement made
by the Board has been repudiated.^ A similar,restriction
applies in respect of offences enumerated in section 6
in the absence of a certificate stating that the offence
15could not be compounded.
The opinion uas divided in the relevant decisions 
of the Supreme Court as to uhether it uas an infringment 
of the judicial pouer of the courts for a statute to make 
conciliation proceedings a condition precedent for legal 
proceedings. These decisions uill nou be examined, folloued 
by an examination of the devices employed by the Supreme 
Court to circumscribe the application of the Act.
12. Sec. 13(2).
13. Sec. 13(3) (a) and (b).
14. Sec. 14(1) (a).
15. Sec. 14(1) (b) and (c).
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(i) Conciliation Boards: Did They Occasion an Erosion
of the Judicial Pouer Vested in the Courts?
The first of the three relevant cases is 
Samarasinqhe v. Samarasinqhe^ uhere the Supreme Court of 
Ceylon held that an action concerning a dispute falling 
uithin the ambit of section 6 of the Act and uhich arose 
in a Conciliation Board area could not be entertained in 
a court of lau uithout the production of a certificate in 
compliance uith section 14(1) (a) of the Act.
Section 14(1) (a) reads as follous:
14(1) Uhere a Panel of Conciliators has been
constituted for any Conciliation Board area:
.. (a) no legal proceedings in respect of ’any 
dispute referred to in paragraph (a)
(b) and (c) of section 6 shall be 
instituted in, or be entertained by, 
a civil court unless the person 
instituting such proceedings produces 
a certificate from the Chairman of 
such Panel that such dispute has been 
inquired into by a Conciliation Board 
and it has not been possible to effect 
a settlement of such dispute by the 
Board, or that a settlement of such 
dispute made by a Conciliation Board 
has been repudiated by all or any 
parties to such settlement in 
accordance uith the provisions of 
section 13.
In the legal proceedings taken before the District 
Court against him, the defendant raised a preliminary 
objection on the ground that section 14(1) (a) barred the 
action in the absence of the requisite certificate. Some 
time after the objection uas raised, but before the conclusion 
of the proceedings, a certificate uas produced before the
1. (1967) 70 N.L.R. 276
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District Court to the effect that the dispute in issue 
had been referred to a Conciliation Board for inquiry 
and that a settlement could not be made.
The District Dudge after referring to the obiter
2
dictum of Basnayake, C.3., in Asiz v. Thondaman, that the 
right of a citizen to invoke the aid of the courts uas so 
fundamental that it could not be taken auay even by the 
Legislature, had concluded that the Conciliation Boards 
Act in the absence of express and unambiguous uords failed 
to take auay the plaintiff*s right to sue. It uas 
accordingly held by the District Budge that the,failure to
obtain the requisite certificate before instituting the
’ 3action did not affect its validity.
The Supreme Court on appeal held that the Act in
unambiguous terms made the production of a certificate, as
envisaged in section 14, a condition precedent for the
institution of legal proceedings. In any event, conciliation
as a preliminary to adjudication did not in any sense deprive
the citizen of his right of access to ordinary courts of
lau. T. S. Fernando, 3., uith Siva Supramanium, 3.,
agreeing, made the follouing observation:^
Uhat the ActJ  seeks to do is to place a bar 
against the entertainment by Court in certain 
stated circumstances of civil or criminal 
actions unless there is evidence of an attempt 
first made to reach a settlement of the dispute 
over uhich the parties appear set on embarking 
on litigation uhich is often expensive to the 
parties as uell as to the State and uhich almost 
aluays finishes up in bitterness.
2. (1959) 61 N.L.R. 217, at p. 222.
3. See Samarasinqhe v. Samarasinqhe (1967) 70 N.L.R.
4. Ibid., at p. 278, ad.fin. L 2 7 6 t  a t  P* 2 7 7  ’  2 7 8 ‘
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Alles, 3., in Uickramaratchi v. I. P. Nittambuua,^
an appeal arising from a criminal trial before a Magistrate1s
Court, expressed a different vieu. Rejecting the contention
on behalf of the accused-appellant made for the first time
before the Supreme Court that the Magistrate lacked
jurisdiction in vieu of section 14(1) (b) of the Act and
that he should not have entertained the police plaint in
the absence of a certificate that the alleged offence had
been inquired into by a Conciliation Board and had not been
compounded, Alles, 3., said:^
Section 6 • • • contemplates that the only 
disputes and offences uhich can be referred 
for inquiry to a Conciliation Board,are , 
such disputes and'offences of the kind 
enumerated in section 6(a) to (d) uhich 
the Chairman may of his oun motion refer to 
the Board or such disputes and offences 
uhich the parties desire should be referred 
to the Board. Disputes and offences of the 
kind enumerated in section 6 (a) to (d) 
uhich are not referred to a Board by either 
one or other of the tuo methods mentioned 
above uould ordinarily be justiciable by 
the established Courts, even uithout the 
required certificate.
According to his interpretation of sections 6 and 
14, conciliation as a preliminary to the institution of 
legal proceedings is merely voluntary, in that if the 
Chairman of the Panel refrains from making a reference to a 
Conciliation Board, either of his oun motion or on an 
application made to him, legal proceedings can be instituted 
in spite of section 14 of the Act.
5. (1968) 71 N.L.R. 121.
6. Ibid.. at p. 124.
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Alles, 3., held further that even assuming that 
the failure to produce the Chairman’s certificate prior 
to the institution of legal proceedings constituted an 
irregularity, it uas only a procedural defect uhich uas 
curable under section 425 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 
This section provided that a procedural defect uould not 
affect the validity of a legal proceeding if the defect 
had not resulted in a ’failure of justice’.
Indeed, the acceptance of the objection founded 
on section 14 of the Act uould have resulted in grave 
injustice:
This point uas not raised at the trial nor 
even in the petition of appeal and the only 
evidence in support uas filed in this court 
in the nature of affidavits eight months 
after the appeal uas filed. If the point 
taken by Counsel is entitled to succeed, it 
uould mean that the present proceedings uill 
have to be. quashed and fresh proceedings 
taken in the Hagistrate’s Court, only if the 
offence cannot be compounded after inquiry 
by a Conciliation Board, in respect of an 
offence committed as far back as February 
1966.?
Alles, 3., uent on to distinguish Samarasinqhe v.
g
Samarasinqhe on the ground that in that case, unlike 
the instance case, a reference had in fact been made to 
a Conciliation Board. In circumstances uhere a reference 
had not been made, section 14 of the Act did not apply. To 
hold otheruise uould be to completely oust the jurisdiction 
of courts in respect of disputes and offences enumerated in 
section 6: unless that section uas narrouly construed the
7. Ibid . , at p. 122.
8. (1968) 70 N.L.R. 276.
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9
jurisdiction vested in the courts would be eroded. In 
reaching this conclusion, Alles, 3., cited with approval 
tb® obiter dictum of Basnayake, C.3., in Asiz v. Thondaman 
that the right of a citizen to invoke the aid of the courts 
was so fundamental that it could not be taken away even by 
the legislature.^
A Divisional Bench of Three Budges of the Supreme
Court in Nonahamy v. Halqrat Si l v a ^  decided by a majority
of tuo judges (with Alles, 3., dissenting) that it uas not
open to the parties to a dispute to circumvent the
application of section 14 by preventing a reference being
made to a Conciliation Board, as uas suggested,by Alles, 3.,
12in Uickramaratchi v. I. P. Nittambuua.
13In Nonahamy v. Halqrat Silva the plaintiff had 
brought an action before the District Court claiming a 
right of uay over the defendants land and at the same time 
praying for an interim injunction restraining the defendants 
from obstructing the alleged right of uay. The District 
Budge upheld the objection raised on behalf of the defendant 
that the court had no jurisdiction even to grant an interim 
injunction in vieu of section 14 of. the Act. On appeal it 
uas contended by the plaintiff-appellant before the Supreme 
Court that an application for an interim injunction did not
9. (1968) 71 N.L.R. 121, at p. 122.
10. (1959) 61 N.L.R. 217, at p. 222.
11. (1970) 73 N.L.R. 217.
12. (1968) 71 N.L.R. 121.
13. (1970) 73 N.L.R. 217.
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fall within the scope qf section 14 of the Conciliation 
Boards Act and accordingly the non-production of a 
certificate uas not fatal to the legal proceedings.
The majority decision in Nonahamy1s case uas that 
an application for an interim injunction uas a proceeding 
within the meaning of that section. Moreover, section 
86 and 87 of the Courts Ordinance uhich empowered a District 
Court to issue injunctions indicated that an application 
for an interim injunction could not be made to it unless 
it uas accompanied by a plaint claiming a substantial 
relief.
H. N. G. Fernando, C.3., with Uijayatilake, 3.,
agreeing, disapproved of the interpretations placed by
Alles, 3., in Uickramaratchi v. I. P. Nittambuua on section
6 and 14. The learned Chief 3ustice could not agree with
the proposition that if a party did not desire a dispute
to be referred to a Conciliation Board, then that dispute
could be brought to the courts without the production of the
certificate referred to in section 14:
Section 6 does not mention the desire of parties 
to refer disputes for inquiry. Uhen section 14 
imposes a condition precedent of the production 
of a certificate from the Board, what is 
necessary is that the Board!s functions have 
been antecedently exercised; this exercise can 
take place because of action taken by the 
Chairman of his own motion, or because the 
parties have desired to seek the mediation of 
the Board, or else because a party who wishes 
to come to Court is compelled as a first step 
to submit to an attempt at conciliation. Thus 
it seems to me that a dispute can be referred 
to a Conciliation Board under section 6, not by 
two methods but by three, the first and the 
third being compulsory so far as the party is 
concerned.^
14. See ibid., pp. 219-20. 15. Ibid., at p. 221.
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The construction placed on section 14 and 6 of the
Act so as to make them applicable to any dispute or offence
of the kind enumerated in section 6 without exception, in
the opinion of the learned Chief Justice, did not occasion
an erosion of the jurisdiction of the courts. Section 14
merely laid down a condition that legal proceedings in
respect of matters falling within the ambit of section 6
should be preceded by an attempt at conciliation.
If the Board*s effort at making peace fails, 
and if recourse to the judicial power is not 
avoidable it is the Courts alone that can 
exercise that power. . . .  There is no 
ousting or erosion of judicial power, unless 
such a power is taken away from the Courts 
and conferred on some other a u t h o r i t y . ,
Alles, 3*, on the other hand, thought that an
application for an injunction should fall outside the scope
of the Act. An,interim injunction is issued by a court to
give immediate, relief to a party pending a judicial decision.
To insist on the need to have exhausted the conciliation
process would frustrate such object. Further, even if the
dispute regarding the right of way had been referred for
conciliation, !it would not have been open to the Board to
issue an enjoining order as this can only be done through
17the mediation of the Courts of law1. To regard the
conciliation process as mandatory in applications for
injunctions, Alles, 3., said, would only cause unnecessary
delay— a delay that would be fatal to the interests of the
18party making the application.
16. Ibid., at p. 220-21. 
3.7. Ibid., at p. 223.
18. Ibid.
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That the insistence upon an inquiry before a
Conciliation Board as a pre-condition to an application
for an injunction prevented the subject from obtaining
an effective remedy and made the law as laid down in
sectims 86 and 87 of the Courts Ordinance ’almost a dead
letter’, prompted Alles,.J., to make the following- 
19observation:
Yftien the relief . . .  is circumscribed 
in this manner, being dependent on a 
certificate issued by the Chairman of 
£  the Pane1^7 of Conciliators, there is, 
in my view, an ouster of the jurisdiction 
of the District Court and a conference 
of such power, however limited it may 
be, on a Conciliation Board . . .  in 
the sense that the subject is denied 
of an effective•remedy. *
The majority decision in Nonahamy v. Halgrat Silva 
did not share the sentiments expressed by the dissentient, 
Alles, J. The' case is taken to have authoritatively laid 
down that the Counciliation Boards Act was not inconsistent 
with the Independence Constitution of Ceylon. However 
the result of a series of decisions of the Supreme Court 
has been to restrict the application of the Act. Such 
cases will now be discussed.
19. Ibid., at p. 224.
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( i i )  The Scope o f  th e  Act  J u d i c i a l l y  Demarcated
In  Nonahamy v.  H a l q r a t  S i l v a , th e  m a j o r i t y  d e c i s i o n
uas that the Act introduced a mandatory, and not merely a
voluntary, conciliation process. However, certain subsequent
decisions seem to support the proposition that conciliation
is voluntary and not compulsory, at least in certain
circumstances. In fact, it appears to have been a rather
common practice for parties to a dispute falling within the
scope of section 6 to arrive at a gentlemen’s agreement’
to by-pass conciliation proceedings.^ By such arrangement
parties to a legal proceeding mutually agreed not to raise
the issue of the applicability of the Act during the court
proceedings. If each party honoured the agreement, or in
the event of a breach, the court, nevertheless, inferred a
waiver of objection due to a delay in raising it, the
validity of the legal proceedings was unaffected by the absence
of a certificate referred to in section 14 of the Act. This
is a direct result of the proposition judicially upheld that:
[ _ U_7hen a party relies on a plea that the 
court has no jurisdiction to entertain a 
plaint without a certificate from /the 
Chairman of the Panel of Conciliators_7> 
the burden is on him to show the existence 
of facts which deprive the court of such 
jurisdiction. In the absence of such 
facts being brought to its notice the court 
has no duty in every case to launch on an 
inquiry as to whether the dispute in 
question arose in a Conciliation Board area.2
1. Jayawickrema v. Naqasinqhe (1971) 74 N.L.R. 523, 
at p. 528.
2. Gunawardene v. Jayawardene (1971) 74 N.L.R. 248, 
head note,
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The Conciliation Boards Act uas intended to be
applicable only in such areas as are determined by the
2a
Minister of Justice to be a Conciliation Board Area* It
came to be accepted that the burden uas on the person uho
alleged the application of the Act to prove that the dispute
arose or offence uas committed in a Conciliation Board area*
The Supreme Court has refused to take judicial notice of 
3
such fact* The effect of these decisions is that if an 
objection is not raised during court proceedings at any 
stage, the proceedings are valid in spite of the fact that 
a requisite certificate had not been produced* /
The question arose as to the effect of,an objection 
taken either at a late stage during the proceedings before 
the court of first instance or for the first time on appeal* 
Wi ckremara tchi v. I, P. Mi ttambuua^ one of the factors 
that contributed to the rejection of the objection to 
jurisdiction uas, as ue have already seen, the late stage
5
of raising it on appeal* In Robison Fernando v* Henrietta 
Fernando,  ^ some time after the plaintiff!s case uas closed, 
the trial judge had alloued the defendant to amend the 
ansuer in order to raise the objection based on section 14 
of the Act* On appeal, it uas held that the defendant uas
2a* Supra p . 181•
3* Uijeuardane v* I* P. Panadura (1967) 70 N*L.R*
281, at p* 284* See also Samerauickrama v* Sebastian (1971) 
74 N.L.R. 101.
4. (1968) 71 N.L.R. 121.
5* See supra p*187.
6. (1971) 74 N.L.R. 57.
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precluded by delay and acquiescence from raising the objection 
to jurisdiction and that the defendant had in effect waived
7
it. G. P. A. Silva, S.P.3., in Gunauardena v. Jayauardena, 
affirmed the correctness of the ruling in Robison Fernando v.
Henrietta Fernando, explaining that there uas no inconsistency
8
between that and the decision in Nonahamy v. Halqrat Silva;
Robison Fernando!s case accepts the correctness of the
decision in Nonahamy1s case, but is based on a different
9principle of waiver by acquiescence. These cases lay down 
the principle that an unreasonable delay in bringing to the 
notice of the court that the dispute arose or the offence 
uas committed in a Conciliation Board area in qirder to 
invalidate the proceedings amounts to a uaiver of the 
objection.
If the objection relates to a patent uant of 
jurisdiction, on the other hand, it may be raised at any 
stage. In Nonah3my!s case, for instance, it being mutually 
agreed that the dispute arose in a Conciliation Board area 
the issue uas uhether an interim injunction came within the 
operation of the Act. Again, in Peiris v. I. P. Crimes, ;
Kalutara, ^  where the Police had filed a plaint in a 
Magistrate^ Court without producing a certificate due to 
the ignorance of the fact that the offence in question uas
7. (1971) 74 N.L.R. 248.
8. (1970) 73 N.L.R. 217.
9. Gunauardena v. Oayauardena (1971) 74 N.L.R. 248. 
Also see Hatheu Kurera v. Cyril Fernando (1972) 75 N.L.R. 179.
10. (1971) 74 N.L.R. 479.
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governed by the Act, it uas held that the objection could 
be raised for the first time on appeal* The lack of 
jurisdiction there uas patent, since the offence in question 
had expressly been mentioned in the Schedule to the Act*
This principle uas approved by H* N. G. Fernando, C.J., and 
Samerauickrama, J., in Mathew Kurera v* Cyril Fernando* ^
The position seems to b8 that uhere timely objection 
has not been raised as to the non-production of the 
certificate on the ground that the dispute arose or the 
offence uas committed in a Conciliation Board area, concilia­
tion proceedings cease to be a pre-condition of legal 
12proceedings. It is otheruise, if the objection is based
4
on the nature of the dispute or offence and not on the
occurrence of it uithin a Conciliation Board area.
The courts have narrowed the scope of the Act also
by reference to the time uhen the dispute arose. In
13Coates and Co* Ltd. v. Jones and Co. Ltd., it uas held
that a dispute that arose before the appointment of a Panel
of Conciliators did not fall uithin the scope of the Act.
14Likewise, it was held in Ui.jetunge v. Perera that where 
the cause of action arose at a time uhen a Panel of 
Conciliators had not yet been appointed, it uas open to the 
plaintiff to institute an action in a ci\/il court, even if 
a Panel uas appointed prior to the date of the plaint.
11. (1972) 75 N.L.R. 179.
12. See Goonesekere and Metzger, op.cit♦, p. 67
13. (1968) 70 N.L.R. 359.
14. (1971) 74 N.L.R. 107. Also see Brohier v.
Saheed (1968) 71 N.L.R. 151; and Uilsinahamy v. Karunauathie 
(1970") 79 C.L.U. 84 and the comment on that case in
The Journal of Cevlon Law (June 1971) p. 55.
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It has also been held in a number of cases that
certain matters by their very nature could not be regarded
as falling uithin the definition of disputes* for the
purpose of the application of the Act. For instance, in
15Chandra de Silva v. Ambauatte, the Supreme Court observed
obiter that a unilateral act, even if it be a wrongful one,
could not be considered a dispute, since a dispute necessarily
involved a controversy between two or more parties and
imported conflicting acts and statements by th e m . ^  In
17Arnolis v. Hendrick it was held that a partition action 
could be instituted in a civil court without first complying 
with the provisions of section 14 of the Act. For, a
i
partition action is not based upon a cause of action and
there need not necessarily be a dispute between the parties
to a partition action.
It appears that the courts by interpreting the Act
narrowly excluded its application in the circumstances
specified above, in order to avoid an injustice, or, in the
absence of any real injustice. Thus, in Mathew Kurera v.
18Cyril Fernando it was observed that since the parties
had entered into an agreement before the District Court, 
the objection that a reference had not first been made to a
15. (1968) 71 N.L.R. 348.
16. Ibid., at p. 350.
17. (1972) 75 N.L.R. 532.
18. (1972) 75 N.L.R. 179.
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Conciliation Board uas merely technical since the purpose
of such a reference is merely to effect a settlement.
19
Alles, 3., in Uickremaratchi v. I. P. Nittambuua and
20
expressing a minority view in Nonahamy v. Halqrat Silva
dreu attention to the difficulties attendant upon the
insistence upon a certificate in the particular circumstances.
It is also of interest to note that the decision in
Uickremaratchi1s case that the absence of the certificate
21constituted a mere procedural defect remains unaltered: 
this undoubtedly contributes to a ueakening of the mandatory 
nature of the certificate.
It may be noted that Conciliation Boards had come
* 22 under heavy attack from the legal profession. This is
primarily because conciliation succeeded in effectively
reducing the otherwise heavy litigation. The present
government has suspended the operation of the Act by
removing the members of all the Panels of Conciliators. The
future of the Conciliation Boards -Act therefore is nothing
but uncertain.
19. See supra p. 187.
20. See supra p. 190.
21. See Goonesekere and Metzger, on. cit., at p. 66.
(2) Arbitration Under the Co-operative Societies Ordinance
Many of the cases relating to arbitration under
the Co-operative Societies Ordinance^* dealt with the extent
of the jurisdiction of arbitrators exercising the powers
granted to them by that Ordinance* It uas not before the
2
decision in Karunatilleke v. Abeyweera, in 1966, that the 
Supreme Court entertained any doubt as to the validity of 
the empowering statutory provision* Consequently, in each 
of the early cases the decision uas limited to a finding 
whether the arbitrator had in fact overstepped his 
jurisdiction and by such means acted ultra vires the statute* 
These early cases clearly demonstrate how the Supreme Court 
prevented the arbitrators from exercising such jurisdiction 
as was considered to be within the sole province of the 
ordinary courts of law, by interpreting the relevant 
statutory provisions narrowly*
Some of the early cases were decided before the 
original Ordinance was amended in 1949 granting wider powers 
to arbitrators* It is.., therefore, proposed to examine the 
relevant provisions contained in the original Act followed 
by an examination of the relevant judicial decisions* The 
amendments introduced in 1949 will, then, be studied in 
the light of the case law*
1. Ordinance No. 16 of 1936, as amended by 
Act No. 21 of 1946*
2. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 503.
1S9
Section 45(1) of the Ordinance reads as follows:
If any dispute touching the business of a 
registered society arises—
(a) among members, past members, and persons 
claiming through members, past members 
and deceased members; or
(b) between a member, past member or person 
claiming through a member, past member 
or deceased member, and the society, 
its committee or any officer of the 
society; or
(c) between the society or its committee 
and any officer of the society; or
(d) between the society and any other 
registered society,
/
such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for 
decision* *
A claim by a registered society for any debt or 
demand due to it from a member, past member or 
nominee, heir or legal representative of a deceased 
member, whether such debt or demand be admitted or 
not, shall be deemed to be a dispute touching the 
business of the society uithin the meaning of this 
sub-section*
It was open to the Registrar, on receipt of a
reference under sub-section (l), to decide the dispute
himself or refer it for disposal to an arbitrator or 
3
arbitrators. Any party aggrieved by the award of an
arbitrator could appeal therefrom to the Registrar within 
4
a month* A decision of the Registrar under sub-section
(2) or in appeal under sub-section (3) was final and could
5
not be questioned in a civil court* Similarly, the 
award of an arbitrator was, in the absence of an appeal
3* Co-operative Societies Ordinance, No. 16 of 
1936, sec. 452*
4* Ibid., sec* 45(3) read together with rule No. 29.
5. Ibid *, sec. 45(4).
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final and could not b8 questioned in any civil court.^ Rule
29(k) made under section 46 of the Ordinance provided that
a decision or award shall, on application to any civil
court having jurisdiction in the area in which the society
carried on business, be enforced in the same manner as a
decree of such court.
The effect of these provisions was to confer a
jurisdiction, which was final and conclusive, on the
Registrar and arbitrators in respect of disputes touching
the business of a society that arise between such parties
as mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d) in the same section.
The courts, however, inquired into the authority of an
arbitrator or the Registrar to have made an award, in
7
proceedings to enforce such an award or to compel a person
g
to act in accordance with such award, or whenever the 
validity of such an award was in issue.
Cases where section 45(1) (b) was relied upon amply 
illustrate the determination of the Supreme Court to limit 
the jurisdiction of arbitrators under the Ordinance.
In Fieera Lebbe v. Wannarponnai Uest Co-operative
g
Society the plaintiff was a member of the defendant society 
and had functioned as the manager at the relevant time. His 
action for the recovery of a security deposited by him with 
the society had been dismissed in the court of first instance,
6. Ibid., sec. 45(5).
7. As in Nereus v. Halpe Katana Co-operative 
Society Ltd. (1956} 5 7 N.L.R. 505.
8. As in Ekanayake v. The Prince of Uales 
Co-operative Society Ltd. (’1949’) XXXIX C.L.U. 57.
9. (1947) 48 N.L.R. 113.
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In the appeal taken by him to the Supreme Court, the 
defendant society pleaded that the action could not be 
entertained by a court of law in view of section 45(1) (b) 
and (c), in addition to its original defence that the 
plaintiff had misappropriated a sum of money exceeding his 
deposit while he acted as the manager of the society and 
that the society was entitled to' a set-off against the claim 
of the plaintiff. In the absence of adequate evidence to 
show that the manager of a co-operative society was an 
officer of such a society, the court held that the dispute 
could not be brought within the ambit-of section 45(1) (c)."^
It then remained to be decided whether ^ the dispute 
could be regarded as one between a member and the society, 
within the meaning of section 45(1) (b). Canekeratne,'D •, 
observed that certain sections of the Ordinance specified 
some disputes that could arise between a society and one of 
its members. As a general rule, section 45(1) (b) applied 
only to a dispute which could be said to arise out of the 
relationship between a society and one of its members. To 
hold that any dispute, irrespective of its nature, to which 
a society and one of its members were parties could be 
referred to arbitration was, in the opinion of the court, 
to strain the language of the Legislature far beyond its 
natural meaning.^ Accordingly, it was held that neither
10. In Sanmuqam v. Badulla Co-operative Stores Ltd., 
(1952) 54 N.L.R. 16, however, where the Supreme Court examined 
the powers and functions of the manager who was a party to 
the dispute and held that the manager was an officer of the 
society within the meaning of section 45(1) (c).
11. Fleera Lebbe v. Uannarponnai Uest Co-operative 
Society, (194T )  48 N.L.R. 113, at p. 115.
2G2
the plaintiffs claim for the recovery of the security 
deposited with the society nor the society!s claim that the 
plaintiff did, in his capacity as the manager, misappropriate 
moneys belonging to the .society could be regarded as a 
dispute that arose out of the relationship between the 
society and a member*
12flohideen v* Lanka Hatha Co-operative Stores Ltd.,
is another case in point. There the plaintiff, who uas
admittedly a member of the defendant society and uas employed
by it at the material dates as a night uatcher, alleging that
his services had been wrongfully terminated, instituted an
action for the recovery of arrears of salary apd damages
for wrongful dismissal. From the decision of the court of
the first instance dismissing his action, the plaintiff
appealed. The counsel for the defendant-respondent contended,
inter alia, that the plaintiff could not have brought the
action before a court of law and that the proper procedure
would have been for him to make ah application to the
Registrar. The Supreme Court rejecting that contention
held that the true test whether a particular dispute falls
within the ambit of section 45(1) (b) was to ascertain
whether the dispute arose between the society and the member
qua member. Nagalingam, 3., said:
It is manifest that the dispute between the 
plaintiff and the defendant does not arise 
from his relationship to the society as 
member. Therefore the dispute is one which 
is not referable to the Registrar for decision 
but one that can properly be investigated by a 
court, g
12. (1947) 48 N.L.R. 177.
13* Ibid., at p. 178.
2G3
The non acceptance of such a limited meaning
of section 45:
uould lead to the necessity of having to 
attribute to the Legislature an intention 
to regulate dealings not merely between 
members and the society but also between 
third parties and the society--an intention 
which is difficult to conceive as ever 
having been in the mind of the Legislature*^
This restrictive interpretation placed on paragraph
(b) of section 45(1) was followed in Ilanqakoon v.
15Bogollaqama where Gratiaen, 3*, said that a statute which 
restricts a person’s right to have his dispute investigated 
in a regular action must be strictly construed.^ The
17object of that provision, it has judicially been observed, 
was merely to provide a speedy and expeditious disposal of 
a dispute between a member in his capacity as a member and 
the society by referring the dispute to a domestic tribunal*
The effect of the amendments introduced in 1949 uas 
to enhance the jurisdiction of arbitrators* Section 45(1)
(b) was expanded to include a dispute between a member and 
an employee of the society, whether past or present, while 
paragraph (c) of the same section was enlarged to include 
a dispute between the society and an employee whether past 
or present* The proviso to the same section was amended 
to include a fclaim* by a society against an officer or 
employee, whether past or present. This revised section 
appears as section 53(1) of the Ordinance as amended*
14. Ibid*
15. (1948) XXXIX C.L.U. 33.
16. Ibid*, at p. 35.
17* Mohideen v. Lanka Matha Co-operative Stories Ltd., 
(1947) 48 N.L.R. 177, at p. 178.
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At the least, the Supreme Court cast doubts on the
validity of the amending Act of 1949 in the case of
18Karunatilleke v. Abeyweera where the dispute uas between
a former manager of the respondent co-operative society,
and that society* The Ordinance, as amended in 1949,
defined the word Officer* to include the manager of a
19co-operative society* Thus the issue before the court
was whether a claim by a society against one of its officers
to account for goods or the value of goods shown by the books
of the society to have been under his control could properly
be the subject matter of arbitration* The principal ground
on which the petitioner asked for the quashing^of award
made against him by an arbitrator is that 1 the making and
enforcement of the award involves the exercise of judicial
power and conflicts with the principle of the separation
20
of powers which prevails under our constitution*.
The Supreme Court noted that the amending Act added 
the categories of officers and employees to the proviso to 
section 45(1) which, prior to that amendment, declared that 
a claim by a society for any debt or demand due to it from 
a member or past member should be deemed to be a dispute 
touching the business of the society*
18. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 503.
19. Co-operative Societies Ordinance No. 16 of 
1936, as amended by Act No. 21 of 1949, section. 65.
20. Karunatilleke v. Abeyweera, supra note 18, 
at p. 504.
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H. N. G. Fernando, S.P.3., delivering the judgment
of the Divisional Bench of three Budges in Karunatilleke v.
Abeyweera, found it useful to consider the objects uhich
were intended to be achieved by section 45(1) of the
original Ordinance, He said:
As between a society and its members, disputes 
can well arise as to the construction and effect 
of the rules governing relations between members 
inter se and the relations between a society and 
its members, as to whether a society had acted 
in breach of the rules, as to the qualification 
of members to hold office in the society, as to 
the validity of elections or appointments to 
office in society, as to the scope of the 
business which a society may lawfully carry on, 
and as to similar matters peculiar to associations 
of persons. It was clearly the intention of the 
Legislature that such disputes should be finally 
decided by the Registrar in the exercise of his 
supervisory functions, or by arbitrators appointed 
by him. Disputed claims by a society against its 
members, in their capacity as such, were also in 
contemplation, although it is arguable whether 
section 45 applied also to other claims against 
members, not arising by reason of their member­
ship of a society, but arising instead upon 
transactions involving ordinary contractual 
rights and obligations or else arising in delict.
Except in regard to claims of the nature lastly 
mentioned, I have no doubt that the determination 
by the Registrar or an arbitrator of a dispute 
affecting any of the matters just mentioned does 
not involve the exercise of the judicial power 
of the State,22
This passage affirms, in no uncertain terms, the
22 23view expressed in Neera Lebbe!s case and Mohideents case
that a dispute between a member and a society means a dispute
between such parties and arising out of that relationship;
moreover, it explains lucidly the kind of disputes that
can arise out of such relationship.
21* Ibid,, at p, 504,
22, Supra pp. 201-2,
23. Supra pp. 202-3,
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H. N. G. Fernando, S.P.3., observed that an officer
of a co-operative society uas not necessarily in a contractual
relationship uith the society. But, uhen for instance the
manager has custody or control .of goods of the society
contractual relations can exist. In the instant case, he
observed, the liability of the manager arose at the least
upon an implied contract, in the nature of an agency. * The
dispute concerning the existence of this liability and the
duty to perform it is an ordinary civil dispute uithin the
24traditional jurisdiction of the courts*.
Accordingly, he held that the dispute in issue uas
not one that might, prior to 1949, have been determined
under the special procedure provided by the Co-operative
Societies Ordinance. The court observed:
The amending Act purported to oust the 
jurisdiction of the courts over disputes 
which at the time when the Constitution 
came into force were exclusively within 
that jurisdiction. In the language of 
recent judgments, there has thus been a 
clear encroachment of the powers 
exclusively vested in the Courts . ^
The judgment does not specifically state that the 
amending Act is unconstitutional. The actual decision 
merely reads: * the award made against the petitioner is
quashed*. There is, however, no doubt that the result of 
this decision is that the amending Act is unconstitutional 
to the extent that it sought to confer judicial powers on 
arbitrators.25
24. Karunatilleke v. Abeyweera, (1966) 68 N.L.R. 
503, at p. 505.
25. Ibid.
26. C. F. Amarasinghe, Separation, at p, 259 and 
L. 3. H. Cooray, Reflections, at p. 86.
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The decision in Karunatilleke v. Abeyueera was 
taken a step further by a Bench of tuo judges in
273ayasekera v. Minuwanqoda Co-operative Society Ltd., 
where the issue uas whet,her the claim of a society that a 
member of its committee of management had failed to account 
for moneys entrusted to him uas a dispute that could properly 
be referred to arbitration under the Ordinance. Karunatilleke 
y * Abeyweera was sought to be distinguished on the ground 
that there the disputed lclaimf was between an officer and 
the society whereas in the instant case the ,claimt was by 
the society against a member of the committee, so that even 
the Ordinance in its unamended form could apply to the case. 
The Supreme Court refused to accept the argument that, 
despite the fact that adjudication upon a claim of the natue 
of that before the court did involve the exercise of 
judicial power, the exercise of such jurisdiction by an 
arbitrator uas valid since the original Ordinance itself, 
which was in operation at the time the Independence 
Constitution was enacted, had conferred such a jurisdiction.
H. N. G. Fernando, C.3., following his own judgment
in Karunatilleke v. Abeyweera said:
The jurisdiction to adjudicate upon such a 
dispute is vested by the Constitution in 
the courts, and that jurisdiction is not 
ousted by any provision of the Co-operative 
Societies Ordinance which purports to vest 
it in an arbitrator.
27. (1970) 73 N.L.R. 354
28. Ibid., at p. 357
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Here again, the statute uas not declared 
unconstitutional in specific terms, and the actual decision 
uas to quash the order made by the District Judge for the 
enforcement of the auard. of the arbitrator. The effect of 
these tuo cases is, houever, that an arbitrator has
jurisdiction to conduct a domestic inquiry and not to  .....
exercise the pouers uhich are uithin the traditional 
jurisdiction of the courts and that the Co-operative Societies 
Ordinance does not have the effect of conferring such judicial 
pouer on arbitrators acting on the pouers granted to them 
by that Ordinance.
The change of the attitude of the judiqiary that
appears from the above comparison of the early and later
case lau is easily referable to the epoch making *judicial
pouer cases*. Those cases on co-operative arbitrators
uhich uere decided before the Tjudicial pouer* cases accepted
as valid a legislative measure that took auay the jurisdiction
of the ordinary courts. For instance, in Ceylon Coconut
29Producers Co-operative Union Ltd. v. Jayakody 
T. S. Fernando, 3., accepted as an undoubtedly correct 
proposition that the jurisdiction of the courts uas ousted 
in the circumstances enumerated in section 45(1) of the 
Co-operative Societies Ordinance.
It is true that the Supreme Court in the absence 
of contrary argument assumed that Parliament could by an 
ordinary statute confer judicial pouer on extra judicial 
tribunals. The Supreme Court, houever, succeeded in
29. (1962) C.L.U. LXIII 48.
circumventing the pouers of the arbitrators so that the 
ousting of the jurisdiction of the courts uas kept to a 
minimum. Ue have already seen hou the relevant provisions 
uere strictly construed against this backdrop.
Aside from narrouing the province of an arbitrators
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court insisted upon being
satisfied, first as to the legality of the auard before it
could be given any legal effect. As ue have already seen,
an auard of an arbitrator uas final and not justiciable in
30a court of lau. Therefore, a court could probe into the
validity of an auard only uhen it uas called uppn to
31enforce it as a decree of that court. The procedure to
be folloued had not been prescribed. Commenting on this
Gratiaen, J., said in Barnes de Silva v. Galkissa
32Uatarappola Co-operative Stores Society:
• . . it is the clear duty of a Court of lau 
uhose machinery as a Court of execution is 
invoked to satisfy itself, before allouing 
urit to issue, that the purported decision 
or auard is prima facie a valid decision or 
auard made by a person duly authorised under 
the Ordinance to determine a dispute uhich 
has properly arisen for the decision of an 
extra-judicial tribunal under the Ordinance.^
An application must be made, the Court laid doun, 
either in a regular action or at least by petition and 
affidavit setting out the facts that the auard is prima 
facie entitled to recognition as a decree of court. The 
affected party must be served uith notice so that he could 
raise objections, if any, to the validity of such an auard.
30. See supra p. 199#
31. Rule 29 (k) cited at supra p. 200.
32. (1953) 54 N.L.R. 326.
33. Ibid., at p. 328.
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Explaining the role of the judiciary Gratiaen, 3*,
thus observed;
The Legislature had no doubt uithdraun from 
courts of lau their jurisdiction to determine 
disputes touching the affairs of co-operative 
societies or even to scrutinise the correctness 
of decisions or auards made by extra-judicial 
tribunals properly exercising jurisdiction 
under the Ordinance, But the right and the 
duty to examine the validity of such decisions 
and auards is still vested in the courts uhich 
are empouered to enforce them. And unless 
that duty be vigilantly performed, there is 
great risk that the judicial process may be 
abused.
34
This strict procedure prescribed in Barnes de Silvats 
case, uhich enables a court to closely examine uhether an 
auard is ultra vires, has been approved both b^ a Divisional 
Bench of three Budges of the Supreme Court and subsequently 
by a Full Bench.^
The determination of the Supreme Court to negate 
any auard made uithout jurisdiction finds expression also
3 6in Sirisena v. Kotauera Udaqama Co-operative Stores Ltd., 
uhere an application had been made to the Supreme Court for 
a urit of certiorari to quash an auard made by an arbitrator. 
It uas objected to on the ground that the petitioner could 
object to the auard in the enforcement proceedings uhich 
uere at that time pending before the District Court and 
that the urit should not be granted uhen another substantial 
remedy is available. Gratiaen, 3., held that the principle 
had no application to the proceedings of a tribunal uhich
34* Ibid., at p. 329.
35. 3ayasinqhe v. Boraqodauatte Co-operative Society 
(1955) 56 N.L.R. 462, approved in Bandahamy v. Senayake
(I960) 62 N.L.R. 313.
36. (1949) 51 N.L.R. 262.
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had flagrantly exceeded the limited statutory pouers 
conferred on it. Granting the urit Gratiaen, 3., observed 
that it uas the duty of a court to speedily uipe out an 
award made in such proceedings*.
The Supreme Court insisted on the legality of the 
auard so as to preserve the jurisdiction of the courts to 
the greatest possible extent. In addition, the courts 
emphasised that arbitrators should conduct their proceedings 
in a deliberate and cautious manner even uhen their 
jurisdiction uas beyond attack.
A general remark uas made by Basnayake,/C.3., in
37Nereus v. Halpe Katana Co-operative Stores Society Ltd. :
Uhere matters uhich, but for the statute, uould 
ordinarily have come before the courts are left 
to be decided by a special tribunal then its 
procedure should approximate as nearly as may be 
to the standards of the courts.„Q
JO
The degree of supervision the Supreme Court
exercised over arbitral proceedings is seen in Ekanayake v.
39The Prince of Wales Co-op. Society Ltd. The auards of
arbitrators uere usually made by filling in the blanks of a
standard auard form. The auard form in issue in that case
had not been completed in full. Uindham, 3., observed thus:
I may say that the leaving blank of some 
of the blank spaces in the above document 
indicates a most slovenly attitude on the 
part of the arbitrator or uhoever uas 
responsible for completing it, and it uould 
be most disturbing to think that this uas 
the manner in uhich auards made upon 
references made under the Co-operative 
Societies Ordinance or Rules uere commonly 
drafted.^g
37. (1956) 57 N.L.R. 505.
38. Ibid., at p. 510.
39. (1949) XXXIX C.L.U. 57.
40* Ibid., at p. 58.
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Illanqakoon v. Boqollaqama^  provides another
striking example. Here the petitioner had been deprived
of his right of appeal to the Registrar, uhich had to be
exercised uithin a month, after the auard is made, since
the auard uas communicated to him after nearly six months.
Gratiaen, 3., had this to say:
I earnestly hope that this deplorable state 
of affairs is not typical of the manner in 
uhich arbitrary proceedings under the very 
salutary provisions of the Co-operative 
Societies Ordinance are conducted.^
The foregoing discussion amply demonstrates hou 
the judiciary, in circumstances uhere in its opinion an 
extra-judicial body had.validly been created having the 
effect of restricting the jurisdiction of the courts, sought 
to ensure that such extra-judicial bodies functioned in a 
responsible and, judicious manner so that justice is done to 
parties before them.
In none of these cases uas an attempt made to define 
uhat is meant by 1 judicial pouer*. The court being content 
merely uith a reference to their traditional jurisdiction 
or the pouers formerly exercised by them.
The significance of these cases lie in that uell 
before the courts uere presented uith arguments based on 
the constitutional provisions relating to the judiciary, 
the judiciary did as a matter of course make an at.tempt to 
preserve their jurisdiction uhenever and houever possible, 
uhile recognizing at the same time, the Legislative 
Supremacy of Parliament.
41. (1948) XXXVII C.L.U. 33.
42. Ibid., at p. 34.
(3) The Nature and Scope of Judicial Pouer as Emanating 
from the Tribunal Cases
The difficulties involved in defining the precise
limits of the concept of 1 judicial pouer1, uhich has been
said to 1 defy, perhaps it uere better to say transcend,
purely abstract conceptual analysis*,^ have not been
2neglected by the courts in Ceylon. Houever, when they 
uere called upon to decide uhether a particular tribunal 
exercised judicial pouer1 for the purpose of the application 
of section 55 of the Constitution, the meaning and the scope 
of that concept had to be commented on*
As ue shall see in due course, the courts of Ceylon 
derived guidance not merely from abstract definitions or 
explanations of that concept but also from practical 
considerations. An attempt is made here to outline the 
various tests adopted in the ftribunal cases1 uhich have 
been discussed in this and the previous chapter and to 
examine the practical considerations that influenced the 
judiciary “in deciding those cases*
v# Trade Practices Tribunal (1970) 123 C.L.R. 
361, at p* 396, per Uindeyer, 3*
2* See, e.g., Senadhira v. The Bribery Commissioner,
(1961) 63 N.L.R. 313, at p. 318, and, Piyadasa v.
The Bribery Commissioner, (1962) 64 N.L.R. 385, at p. 391.
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(i) Tests Adopted in the 'Tribunal Cases*
It must be said, at the outset, that an exhaustive 
discussion of these tests is not permitted by the volume 
of this uork, nor is it essential for our purpose* However, 
there is abundant discussion of this aspect, especially in 
the Australian context*’*'
2
The most frequently cited definition in Ceylon, as
is the case in Australia, is that formulated by Griffiths,
C.CJ., in Huddart Parker & Co* Pty*, Ltd* v. floor head, uhich
is said accurately to state 1 the broad features* of judicial
5
pouer, rather than attempt an exclusive definition*
Griffiths, C.CJ*, understood judicial power to means
the power which every sovereign must of 
necessity have to decide controversies 
between its subjects or between itself 
and its subjects, whether the rights 
relate to life, liberty or property.
The exercise of this power does not begin 
until some tribunal uhich has power to 
give a binding and authoritative decision 
(whether subject to appeal or not) is 
called upon to take action*^
1* See, e*g., U. A* Uynes, Legislative. Executive 
and Judicial Powers in Australia (1976, 5th ed.), chapter 10,
1 The Judicial Pouer of the Commonwealth*•
2. See, e.g., Piyadasa v. The Bribery Commissioner, 
supra p* 392; Jailabdeen v. Danina Umma (1963) 64 N.L.R* 419, 
at p* 425; Ualker v. Fry (196^) 68 N.L.R♦ 73, at p. 81;
United Engineering Workers* Union v. Devanayagam (1967)
69 N.L.R. 289, at p. 306.
3. Essays on the Australian Constitution, ed.
Else-Mitchell (1961), 2nd ed.), at p. 72.
4. (1908) 8 C.L.R. 330, at p. 357.
5• Labour Relations Board of Sasketchewan v.
John East Iron Uorks, (1949) A.C. 134, at p. 139, per 
Lord Simonds.
6. (1908) 8 C.L.R. 330, at p. 357.
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This definition is the starting point but not the finishing
point, since judicial pouer may exist in the absence of any
one element integral to that definition, and arbitral pouer, 
uhich is outside the realm of judicial pouer, may satisfy 
that definition uithout losing its extra-judicial character.
In those cases uhere the court had to demarcate 
betueen judicial pouer and arbitral pouer further ramifica-e . 
tions had to be read into the above definition. The
7
follouing remarkable attempt has found favour in Ceylon:
The essential difference is that the judicial
pouer is concerned uith the ascertainment,
declaration and enforcement of the rights and
liabilities of the parties as they exist or
are deemed to exist at the moment the (
proceedings are instituted, uhereas the
function of arbitral pouer in relation to
industrial disputes is to ascertain and
declare but not enforce uhat in the opinion
of the arbitrator ought to be the respective
rights and liabilities of the parties in
relation to each other.Qo
This definition emphasises the enforcement of
existing legal rights and liabilities as opposed to the
creation of neu rights and duties uhich is the function of
the legislator. In fact, it has been said that 1 the arbitral
function is ancillary to the legislative function, and
provides the factum upon uhich the lau operates to create
g
the right or duty1. That,unlike the case of arbitral pouer,
7. See e.g., U/alker v. Fry, supra, at p. 84; 
Senadhira v. The Bribery Commissioner, supra, at p. 319.
8• Waterside Workers* Federation of Australia v•
3. IJ. Alexander Ltd. (1918) 25 C.L.R. 434, at p. 463, 
per Isaacs and Rich, 33.
Ibid., at p. 464 ad.fin.
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enforcement forms an inseparable part of judicial pouer
seems a natural deduction from the above definition in
Uaterside Uorkers1 cass. ^  In Senadhira!s case, ^  this
12position ran to the basis of the actual decision. Houever,
in later cases the Supreme Court of Ceylon, in keeping uith
the judicial authority in the United States of America and
Australia, expressly stated that enforcement uas not an
13indispensable attribute of judicial pouer.
In essence, the Uaterside Uorkers* definition 
distinguishes betueen a tribunal uhich gives effect to legal 
rights and duties and another uhich grants a remedy uhich is 
a novel creation. t
The observations of Lord Simonds in Shell Co. of
14Australia v. federal Commissioner of Taxation takes this
matter further ahead. There uas no doubt, his Lordship said,
in the opinion of the Privy Council:
that there are many positive features uhich 
are essential to the existence of judicial 
pouer, yet by themselves are not conclusive 
of it, or that any combination of such features 
uill fail to establish a judicial pouer if, as 
is a common characteristic of so called adminis­
trative tribunals, the ultimate decision may be 
determined not merely by the application of 
legal principles to ascertainqd facts but by 
considerations of policy also.^j-
10. Uhether enforcement uas indispensable uas left 
open in Uaterside Uorkerst case. See at p. 451, per Barton, 0.
11. (1961) 63 N.L.R. 313.
12. See the discussion on the Bribery Tribunals,
supra, pp. 135-44.
13. Supra pp.141-44.
14. (1931) A.C. 275, at p. 297.
15. Ibid.
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This definition stresses that ftrappingsf are not 
conclusive and that the nature of the considerations involved, 
i.e. whether legal or broader policy considerations, holds 
the key to the decision whether a tribunal exercises judicial 
power. The emphasis on policy consideration presents in a 
new dress the distinction highlighted in Uaterside Uorkers* 
case between pre-existing, legal rights and rights taking 
effect in future in terms of an arbitral award. The view 
that the !trappings! are not conclusive has had a mixed 
reception in Ceylon.^ It is wrong, however, to assume 
that the courts neglected similarities that existed between 
a court and a tribunal in deciding whether the latter did
.. % I
in fact exercise judicial power irrespective of the name by
17which such tribunal was known.
The observations of the Privy Council in the
Shell Co. case quoted above had a considerable effect on
18the final outcome in Devanayaqam*s case, where the Privy
Council held that none of the authorities created by the
19Industrial Disputes Act of Ceylon for the settlement of
16. This negative approach uas rejected by 
Sansoni, C.3., in Ualker v. Fry, supra, at p. 82, but 
referred to in Devanayaqamfs case, supra, at p. 294.
17. The discussion of specific areas in relation
to the applicability of section 55 of the Constitution makes 
it clear that the courts nearly always compared the 
procedure in and the powers possessed by tribunals.
18. (1967) 69 N.L.R. 289; £19677 2 All E.R. 367.
19. Act No. 43 of 1950, as amended by Act No. 62 
of 1957.
218
industrial disputes exercised judicial power primarily 
because they uere intended to exercise a wider administrative 
discretion taking into consideration not only legal matters 
but also the overriding policy consideration of maintaining 
industrial peace.
The *analogy test* propounded in Labour Relations
20case also was approved i.n Ceylon cases. Lord Simonds
had said there that:
it is as good a test as another of •analogy* 
to ask whether the subject matter of the 
assumed justiciable issue makes it desirable 
that the judges should have the same qualifi­
cations as those which distinguish the judges 
of the Superior or other courts.^
*
Applying this test it was held in Devanayaqam*s case that 
arbitrators and members of industrial courts and of labour 
tribunals should have qualifications different from those 
of judges of ordinary courts, having due regard to the 
functions performed by them.
From the above, though brief, discussion it appears 
that the basic test has been whether a particular tribunal 
gave effect to legal rights and duties which involved 
judicial power or granted a remedy by reference to wider 
considerations than those of law and by exercising broad 
discretionary powers of a kind not normally exercised by 
a court of law.
20. Per Tambiah, 3., dissenting, in Ualker v. Fry, 
supra, at p. 108; Devanayaqam*s case, supra, at p. 297.
21. (1949) fl.C. 134, at p. 151.
Enforcement as the essential attribute that
distinguishes judicial pouer from arbitral pouer, as has
been mentioned earlier, uas expressly rejected in the
Bribery Tribunal cases# In Ibrahim v. The Government Agent 
22Vavuniya, houever, the Supreme Court seems to have been
influenced, in deciding that the authority in question
exercised judicial pouer, by the fact, inter alia, that the
authority enforced a criminal sanction as opposed to a civil
or administrative sanction such as uas the case in
23Xavier v. Uijekoon.
It may also be noted that in the cases uhere
enforcement uas not regarded as an essential element of% <
judicial pouer the authority concerned, namely, a Bribery 
Tribunal and a Quazi, did in fact have the pouer of enforcing 
its decision either directly or on application to a court of 
lau.
One point remains to be mentioned* In the tribunal 
cases the approach adopted by the courts of Ceylon uas not 
stubborn adherence to definitions or general formulations, 
but an overall assessment of the pouers and functions 
conferred on the tribunal in issue* This approach is 
commendable in vieu of the fact that, as ue shall see in the
succeeding part, the task of the courts uas to drau a
dividing line betueen administrative tribunals uhich are a 
social necessity and courts of lau uhich, in the opinion of 
the courts, stand as the guardian of the citizen’s rights*
22* (1966) 69 N.L.R. 217.
23. (1966) 69 N.L.R. 197. See the foregoing
discussion on these tuo cases, supra, at p.168-72.
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(ii) Factors that influenced the .judges in the 
’Tribunal Cases1
Faced uith the task of drawing the dividing line
between judicial functions on the one hand and arbitral and
administrative functions on the other, the courts of Ceylon,
undoubtedly, derived much assistance from the definitions
and criteria outlined in the foregoing discussion. At the
same time, the important role played by certain considerations,
legal and practical, in the area of the Tribunal cases cannot
be discounted. An examination of such considerations or
factors amply demonstrates hou the judges endeavoured to
/
reconcile their deep-rooted commitment to the preservation
€
of the jurisdiction of -the courts of lau uith the ever-growing 
and inescapable need to entrust extensive powers of inquiry, 
dispute-settlement and sanction to the executive branch of 
government. Although those factors uhich influenced judges 
are inter-connected and inter-dependent, it is not a vain 
undertaking to attempt a categorisation of those factors.
Five such factors uhich are discernible will be discussed 
separately.
(a) The most important factor seems to be the 
issue whether the statute in question purported to confer 
on any authority other than a properly constituted court a 
power that had traditionally been exercised by courts of lau. 
Thus, in an attempt to distinguish Labour Tribunals from 
Bribery Tribunals, Tambiah, D., had this to say in Ualker v. 
Fry,^ in his dissenting judgments
1. ( 1 9 6 5 )  68 N . L . R .  73.
221
There uas a clear usurpation of the jurisdiction 
of the courts by the Bribery Tribunal uhich 
performed the same functions as a court. . . .
The effect of the legislation creating the Bribery 
Tribunals is in pith and substance an attempt to 
create a rival court. . . .  /^In creating Labour 
Tribunals^/ it uould never have been the intention 
of the legislature to provide an additional court 
uhich administers the lau of contract since such 
courts uere in existence and are still functioning.2
In Ibrahim v. G. A. Vavuniya it uas said that the Licensing
of Traders Act constituted a usurpation and infringement of
3
the separate pouer of the judicature.
Whenever 'the court came to the conclusion that the 
tribunal in question did in fact oust or usurp the jurisdic­
tion of the ordinary courts of lau, it uas inevitably decided 
that judicial pouer had been conferred on that tribunal. This 
rule of * the ouster of jurisdiction1 springs from the premise 
that the powers that traditionally belonged to the courts 
fall uithin the’meaning of *judicial pouer*. It is submitted 
that this rule"is both practical and safe: practical,
because, by confining to the courts alone the powers tradi­
tionally exorcised by them, the status quo uould not be 
disturbed; safe, because the phrase *judicial pouer* is 
given a strict meaning, without extending it beyond the 
normal jurisdiction of a court, thereby avoiding probable 
controversies.
2. Ibid., at pp. 105-6. See also Senadhira v. 
The Bribery Commissioner (1961) 63 N.L.R. 313, at p. 320.
3. (1966) 69 N.L.R. 217, at p. 219. A similar 
observation uas made in respect of Co-operative Societies 
Ordinance 1951, in Karunatilleke v. Abeyueera, (1966) 68 
N.L.R. 503, at p. 505, per H. N. G. Fernando, S.P.3.
See also Jailabdeen v. Danina Umma (1963) 64 N.L.R. 419, 
at p. 423.
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It is interesting to note that in respect of the
validity of the appointment of the President of a Labour
4
Tribunal the Supreme Court in Ualker v. Fry and the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy. Council in De vanayaqam* s 
case uere not unanimous in their decisions. This is a 
telling example of an instance uhere a rule uhich is simple 
and uncomplicated to all its outuard appearances gives rise 
to great difficulty in its practical application. As 
Uindeyer, 3. said in the Australian case of R. v. Trade 
Practices Tribunal  ^ the differing vieus in Devanayaqam1s 
case demonstrate hou amorphous really is the concept of 
judicial pouer.
(b) Secondly, the courts seem to have attached much 
ueight to the consideration that certain pouers by their 
very nature are essentially judicial. In Ualker v. Fry  ^
Sansoni, C. 3 . > who subscribed to the majority vieu there that 
a Labour Tribunal uas endoued uith judicial pouer, cited 
uith approval the follouing Australian judicial observations:
S__7onie functions are appropriate exclusively 
to the judicial pouer, for example, the 
punishment of crime or adjudication in actions 
in tort or contract.2
The truth is that the ascertainment of 
existing rights by the judicial determination 
of issues of fact or lau falls exclusively 
uithin judicial pouer.^
4. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 73.
5. (1967) 69 N.L.R. 289.
6. (1970) 123 C.L.R. at 361.
1. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 73.
2* Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Munro,
(1926) 38 C.L.R. 153, at 175; cited by Sansoni, C.3., at p. 80.
3* T he Q u e e n  v. D a v i s o n , ( 1 9 5 4 )  90 C . L . R .  353, a t  36 9.
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Accordingly, Sansoni, C.3., held that Labour Tribunals
were given judicial pouer to try disputes, to modify existing
legal relationships, to make orders uhich confer legal rights
and impose legal liabilities, and to determine, as betueen a
uorkman and his employer, uhether one of them possessed as
against the other some existing legal right or uas subject
4
to some existing legal liability.
5
In Senadhira v. The Bribery Commissioner Sansoni, 
C.3., recalled that the Privy Council in The Attorney-General
g
for Australia v. The Queen regarded certain pouers * such
as pouers to impose penalties for a breach of an order or
auard and to punish contempts of its pouers anc} authority1
as matters appertaining exclusively to the judicial pouer
and held that judicial pouer ’even to the extent of fining
7
a citizen or depriving him of his liberty1 uas not 
permissible•
g
C.T.B . v. Sama3tha Lanka Motor Sevaka Samithiya
provides a striking example of the tendency of the courts to
regard certain pouers as being intrinsically judicial. In
that case Sri Skandha Rajah, 3., ruled that the pouer
conferred on such a tribunal to punish contempts of its
authority amounted to judicial pouer. Similarly in
g
In Re Ratnaqopal it uas contended that the pouer reposed
4. Ualker v. Fry, (1965) 68 N.L.R. 73, at p. 80.
5. (1961) 63 N.L.R. 313, at p. 319.
6.  / 1 9 5 7 7  A.C. 268.
7. Ibid., at p. 309.
8. (1963) 65 N.L.R. 491.
9. (1968) 70 N.L.R. 409.
in a Commissioner of Inquiry to refer to the Supreme Court 
for decision uhat he determines to be a contempt of the 
authority of the Commission amounted to judicial pouer.
This argument uas rejected, houever, on the ground that the 
determination of the Commissioner did not bind the Supreme 
Court uhen deciding uhether in fact the accused committed 
the offence. Hinds v. The Queen^  provides a recent example 
of 1 intrinsically judicial functions1, uhere it uas held 
that *a discretion to determine the severity of the punish­
ment to be inflicted on an individual member of a class of 
offenders1 could not be conferred on an executive body, 
following Deaton v. Attornoy-General and Revenue Commissioners
9
It may be said that the notion that certain pouers 
are essentially judicial emanates from the idea that pouers 
uhich are traditionally exercised by courts are to be 
regarded as judicial pouers, because a pouer comes to be 
considered as inherently judicial by its long continued 
and exclusive association uith courts of lau.
(c) The third factor, like the first tuo, is based 
on historical criteria, but unlike the first tuo it has the 
effect of excluding from the judiciary certain functions 
uhich might properly be regarded as judicial pouer. The 
rule, as relied upon in Gunaseela v. Uduqama,^ is that if 
certain pouers uhich are judicial in nature have, nevertheless
10 .  / 1 9 7 6 7  All E.R. 355,  at pp. 3 7 0 -7 1 .
11 .  / 1 9 6 3 7  I . R.  170 at 182 ,  183 .
1. ( 1 9 6 8 )  69 N . L . R .  1 9 3 .
been historically vested in the executive or the legislative 
branch of Government and there is sufficient justification 
to treat such vesting as valid, the judiciary ought not to 
disturb such historical vesting*
In Gunaseela v* Uduqama the question arose uhether
the officers constituting a Court Martial could validly
exercise punitive pouers, uhich the court agreed uere
clearly judicial pouers, in the absence of such officers
being appointed by the judicial Service Commission. The
provisions relating to judicial officers did not apply to
members of a Court Martial since they did not hold a fpaid
2judicial office* and on this ground alone the validity of 
the jurisdiction of a Court Martial could have been upheld.
But the Supreme Court ventured to examine uhether a Court 
Martial could validly exercise judicial pouer.
H. N. G. Fernando, S.P.S., pointed out that for a 
long time before Independence the lau of Ceylon had provided 
for the trial by Courts Martial of certain offences committed 
by *persons subject to military lau*. It uas rightly observed 
that the constitution, pouers and functions of Courts Martial 
functioning in independent Ceylon uere not substantially 
different from those of the Courts Martial constituted under 
British rule.
2. See, supra, p. 124.
Having observed that it had long been recognised
in Ceylon that Courts Martial could exercise punitive pouers,
H. N. G. Fernando, S.P.D., uent on to find a reason sufficient
to justify that position* In the United States of America
as far back as in 1858, he pointed out, the Supreme Court
3
had held in Dynes v. Hoover that Congress had the pouer to 
provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval 
officers Tin the manner then and nou practised by civilised 
nations1 and, further, that that pouer uas entirely independent 
of the judicial pouer of the United States* This case had 
been folloued by the High Court of Australia in ,R. v. Beven 
ex p. Elias and Gordon,^ uhich decided that the, pouer to 
make laus for the defence of the Commonuealth and the control 
of the armed forces uas independent of the judicial pouer 
of the Commonuealth* Follouing these decisions H. N* G. 
Fernando, S.P.3., had no hesitation in concluding that the 
legislative pouer of the Parliament of Ceylon included the 
pouer to make laus for the good government of the armed 
forces and that Courts Martial in Ceylon uere traditionally 
distinct from the judicial system of Ceylon.
It is safe to assume that the Supreme Court of 
Ceylon appreciated the need to safeguard the interest of the 
State, by uay of recognizing the validity of the internal 
disciplinary machinery of the armed forces, as an exception 
to the exclusive vesting of judicial pouer in the ordinary 
courts of lau* Sauer*s observation that the decisions,
3* (1858) U. S. Reports 15, Lauyers1 Edition,
p. 838.
4. ( 1 94 2 )  66 C . L . R .  452.
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quoted above, from the United States of America and
5
Australia aimed at avoiding practical inconvenience1 is, 
it is submitted, equally true of the Ceylon decision.
(d) The fourth factor uas considered in tuo cases^
uhich uere decided concurrently by the Supreme Court. In
these tuo cases uhere the validity of the imposition of a
penalty by an administrative authority uas in issue, the
court acted on the principle that uhether the imposition
of a penalty uas or uas not a judicial pouer depended on
the nature of the sanction. If the penalty served the
purpose of securing compliance uith an administi*ative regu
regulation or order, such as the duty of an as^essee to
return a duly completed income tax declaration, then the
imposition of such a penalty, uhich at the same time
compensates the State for the loss caused to it by any uilful
evasion of tax, uas not to be regarded as a judicial function,
but merely as an administrative sanction.
Ordinarily, the imposition of a penalty is associated
uith judicial functions. The judiciary, houever, did
recognise the need to regard as valid the entrustment of
such a pouer to an administrative authority uhen such pouer
uas exercised in the furtherance of an administrative
2
object but not for the punishment of an offence.
5. Sauer, ’Judicial Pouer under the Constitution’, 
Essays on Australian Constitution, ed. R. Else-Mitchell
(1961), p." 76.
1. Ibrahim v. G. A. l/avuniya, (1966) 69 N.L.R. 217 
and Xavier v. Uijekoon "(1966) 69 N.L.R. 197.
2* Supra, pp. 169-71.
(e) Lastly, the courts appreciated the ever-grouing 
need for administrative tribunals to supply a need inadequately 
met by courts of lau* Accordingly, there came into being a 
judicial tolerance of the conferment of some judicial pouers 
on an administrative authority for the purpose of effectively 
securing the object of the establishment of the office*
This factor uas instrumental in arriving at the 
decision that a Commissioner of Workmen’s Compensation uas 
not a judicial officer in Panaqoda v. Budinis Sinqho.^ The 
Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance created a liability not 
based on any breach of lau but arising simply by the reason o 
of injury sustained out of and in the course of employment.
The Supreme Court entertained no doubt that in deciding 
uhether an employer is liable to pay compensation a 
Commissioner might be called upon to determine disputed 
questions of fact. But, the decision of such disputes forms 
only a small part of the duties and functions entrusted to 
such Commissioners, the Court held. The element of dispute 
settlement, uhich in the opinion of the Supreme Court in 
this case savoured of judicial pouer, thus, formed a part 
of a legislative plan to secure an improved scheme for the 
payment of compensation to uorkmen, uhich in its entirety 
uas a commendable administrative device.
1. ( 1 9 6 6 )  68 N . L . R .  49 0.
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This principle uas formulated in Ualker v. FT£,
by H. N. G. Fernando, S.P.3., uho later decided Panaqoda v.
Budinis Sinqho, in the follouing terms:
Section 55 of the Constitution • • • failed 
to preclude the possibility of the entrustment 
of judicial pouer to some authority bona fide 
established for administrative purposes. If 
administrative officials, the majority of 
uhose pouers and functions are administrative, 
are in addition entrusted on grounds of 
expediency uith judicial pouer, there uould 
not in my opinion be conflict uith Section 55,
But if, under cover of expediency, judicial 
pouers are vested in an office administrative 
only in name, then the principle that you 
cannot do indirectly that uhich you cannot do 
directly uill apply.£
Tambiah, 3., also expressed a similar opinion in
«
Ualker v. Fry, citing a number of examples from statutory
3
laus of Ceylon in support. In Devanayaqam!s case the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council recognised the
validity of this vieu uhen they said:
The holder of a judicial office exercises 
judicial pouer but the fact that some 
judicial pouer is exercised does not 
establish that the office is judicial.^
2. Ualker v. Fry (1965) 68 N.L.R. 73, at p. 101,
ad.fin.
3. Ibid., p. 104 .
4. United Engineering Uorkers1 Union v. Devanayaqam 
(1967) 69 N.L.R. 289, at p. 294, per Viscount Dilhorne.
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Of the fiv8 factors ue have discussed above, the 
first tuo tend to preserve certain pouers solely uithin the 
province of the ordinary courts of lau, uhereas, the other 
three factors tend to read some, exceptions into the exclusive 
vesting of judicial pouer in the judiciary. The emphasis 
the judiciary placed on the need for circumstances that 
justified a deviation from the general rule shous the 
manner in uhich the courts leant in favour of the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the courts uhile not altogether discounting 
the demands of social progress.
An application of these five factors, except the 
second one (i.e. that some pouers are essentially judicial), 
results in a decision uhich takes account of the overall 
effect of the legislative plan rather than some particular 
pouer that has been bestoued upon an authority. Thus, a 
Commissioner of Income Tax uas held entitled to impose a 
penalty as an incidental pouer, a Commissioner of Uorkman!s 
Compensation uas held entitled to determine questions of 
fact as an aid to performing his overuhelmingly administrative 
functions, and a Labour Tribunal uas held not to be analogous 
to a court, although some judicial functions uere entrusted 
to it since it uas part of a legislative scheme to provide 
for industrial peace through conciliation, arbitration and 
amicable dispute settlement. On the other hand, uhen in 
substance a substitute court had been created, the courts 
uere quick to strike out as invalid any mode of appointment 
to such tribunal uhich is inconsistent uith section 55 of 
the Independence Constitution.
CHAPTER 7 
THE JUDICIARY AND THE EXECUTIVE
In the ■1 Tribunal Cases1 the validity of appointment 
to certain ostensibly administrative tribunals uas challenged 
on the basis of a specific constitutional provision, namely 
section 55(1) of the Ceylon (Constitution) Order-in-Council, 
1946, uhich enjoined that judicial officers should be 
appointed by the Judicial Service Commission. In this 
Chapter and in the next uill be examineci a number of cases 
uhere certain acts on the part either of the executive or 
of the legislature uere challenged on the basis that they 
amounted to an exercise of or an interference uith judicial 
pouer. These decisions rest on the premise that as a matter 
of necessary inference arising from the basic structure of 
the Independence Constitution of Ceylon judicial pouer uas 
vested in the judiciary to the exclusion of the other tuo 
branches of the State. This inference had already been 
recognised in the *Tribunal Cases*. This inference, houever, 
is of special significance in respect of the cases discussed 
in this and more specially in the next chapter, for there 
uas not in existence any one specific constitutional pro­
vision of direct relevance.
In this chapter three instances of alleged 
interferences uith judicial functions by the Governor- 
General, a Minister or by the Attorney-General are ex­
amined. These three instances clearly indicate that the 
most fundamental consideration common to them uas that
I
the judiciary should be free from any unduergovernmental
interference. A fourth instance uhere the decision rested
on the difference betueen judicial and administrative
pouers is then studied. That case, namely Silva v.
1 \
Jayasuriya, is best understood in the light of the
principles emerging from the case lau examined in the next 
chapter.
Certain comments are made at the end of each case
V,
discussed in this ch-apter, but there is no general con­
cluding part in this chapter; the general conclusions are 
presented at the end of the next chapter.
It must be noted that in the cases discussed under 
sub-headings (2) and (3) of this chapter the constitutionality 
of a statute uas not in issue. The sole question in each 
of those cases uas uhether in the particular circumstances 
the action of the executive could be regarded as an attempt 
to undermine the independence of the judiciary.
1. (1 96 5 )  L X I X  C . L . U .  54.
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(1) Nomination of Judges by the Minister of Justice
The nomination of the judges to constitute a Bench 
of the Supreme Court uas held in The Queen v. Liyanaqe  ^
to be an exercise of the judicial pouer. Accordingly, the 
Criminal Lau (Special Provisions) Act No, 1 of 1962, uhich 
conferred this pouer on the Minister of Justice, uas held 
to be inconsistent uith the Constitution uhich vested the 
judicial pouer of the State exclusively in the judiciary.
The Criminal Lau (Special Provisions) Act No, 1 of 
1962, uhich uill be discussed in detail . later by section 
4 brought offences against the State uithin section 440A 
of the Criminal Procedure Code, uhich empouered the 
Minister of Justice to direct that the defendants be tried 
by three Judges of the Supreme Court uithout a jury in the 
case of certain offences. In pursuance of this statutory 
pouer the Minister of Justice," on the 23rd of June 1962, 
directed the trial of the 24 persons, an information against 
uhom uas exhibited to the Supreme Court by the Attorney- 
General on the same day, before thd^Supreme Court at Bar
by three Judges uithout a jury, \
\
2
In The Queen v, Thejauathee Gunauardene, the first 
Trial-at-Bar since Independence, the Supreme Court had 
held that section 440A of the Criminal Procedure Code uas 
a valid statutory provision, houever objectionable it
1, (1962) 64 N.L.R. 313.
2. (1954) 56 N.L.R. 193.
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uould seem to be* There the Supreme Court made the
3
following observation:
It is not, in our opinion, for us to consider 
the desirability or otherwise of this particular 
provision of the lau, which was introduced in 
1915 in a year of s t r e s s , 4 being retained upon 
the Statute Book* That is a question of policy 
uith which this Court is not concerned* It is 
not, in our opinion, for this Court to consider 
the desirability or the wisdom of the power 
retained in the Statute Book being invoked by 
the executive*
The Supreme Court had no hesitation in rejecting
the argument that the Ministers power to direct a
Trial-at-Bar uas unconstitutional, inasmuch as it (dl\o«ed
the decision in The Queen v* The.jawath.ie Gunawardene
without reservation*
A novel provision appearing in the Criminal Law
(Special Provisions) Act No* 1 of 1962 had conferred an
additional power on the Minister of Justice* That section
may be reproduced here:
9* Uhere the Minister of Justice issues 
a direction under section 440A of the 
Criminal Procedure Code that the trial 
of any offence shall be held before the 
Supreme Court at Bar by thre^e Judges 
without a jury, the three Judges shall 
be nominated by the Minister df Justice, 
and the Chief Justice if so nominated 
or, if he is not so nominated, the 
most senior of the three Judges so 
nominated shall be the president of the 
Court*
3* Ibid *, at p* 207*
4. This is a reference to ,the Sinhalese-Muslim 
riots of 1915 which led to a declaration of Martial Law* 
See, P. \ l . J. Jayasekera, Social and Political Change in 
Ceylon 1900-1919 (unpublished Ph*D* Thesis, London, 1969).
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The Court consisting of the three 
Judges so nominated shall, for all 
purposes, be duly constituted, and 
accordingly, the constitution of 
that Court and its jurisdiction to 
try that offence, shall not be called 
in question in any Court, uhether by 
way of urit or otheruise.
It uas not disputed that the second half of the 
section uhich purported to oust the jurisdiction of the 
Courts could operate only if that section uas intra vires 
the Constitution.'*
In order to assail the validity of the above quoted 
section, it uas contended on behalf of the defendants that 
the Constitution of Ceylon recognised a separation of 
pouers of Government. The Supreme Court decided this issue 
in the follouing terms:**
l _ l j f  by a separation of pouers or functions
of Government is meant a mutually exclusive
separation of such pouers or functions as
obtains in the American Constitution or
even in the Constitution of the Commonuealth
of Australia, uhich uas itself based on the
, American Constitution^ ' there is no such'
mutually exclusive separation of governmental
functions in our Constitution. Nor, on the / 9
other hand, do ue have a sovereign Parliament 
in the sense in uhich that expression is used 
in reference to the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom. That a division of the three main 
functions of Government is recognised in our 
Constitution uas indeed conceded by the 
learned Attorney-General himself. For the 
purposes of the present case it is sufficient* 
to say that he did not contest that judicial 
pouer in the sense of the judicial pouer of 
the State is vested in the Judicature, i.e., 
the established Civil Courts of this country.
5. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 313, at p. 348.
6. Ibid., at p. 350.
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IR The Queen v. Liyanaqe, the Supreme Court thus
S
laid doun the principle that a separation of pouers existed 
in the Independence Constitution of Ceylon at least to the 
extent that the judicial pouer of the State uas vested in 
the Judicature alone. Having recognised this principle as 
one that ran to the foundation of the Constitution, the 
Court uent on to determine uhether the pouer of nomination 
amounted to an exercise of judicial pouer.
The court rejected the argument that uhen the Minister 
purported to nominate a particular Bench of the Supreme Court 
he in fact appointed three Judges of the Supreme Court to a 
neu court uhich, apart from such nomination, had no existence. 
As the Supreme Court rightly observed the Judges nominated 
by the Minister uere already Judges of the Suprerne Court 
and in holding a Trial-at-Bar under section 440 A of the 
Criminal Procedure Code they functioned as Judges of the 
Supreme Court and in no other capacity. In fact, the pouer 
of nomination uhich the impugned'Act conferred on the 
Minister uas no different in substance from the pouer ex­
ercised by the Chief Justice in nominating a Bench of Judges. 
Had the Minister purported to nominate any person other than 
a Judge of the Supreme Court to officiate as a Judge at the 
Trial-at-Bar, he uould undoubtedly have been purporting to 
appoint a person to the office of a judge in contravention
of the provisions of the Constitution relating to the
7
appointment of judicial officers. This line of reasoning
7. Ibid., at p. 352.
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led itself to the conclusion that the Minister, by the 
act of nomination, did not create a neu tribunal distinct 
and separate from the Supreme Court.
The position is then that since a Trial-at-Bar uas 
just one of the modes in uhich the Supreme Court exercised 
its jurisdiction, it could not be said that the Chief 
Justice uas appointing judges or constituting neu tribunals 
uhenever he directed that a Divisional or a Full Bench 
nominated by him should assemble. It inevitably folloued 
from this position that uhen the Minister claimed such 
pouers of the Chief Justice on a particular occasion it 
could not bring about a different result.
It uas further argued unsuccessfully that the pouer
vof nomination given to the Minister violated the unity and
8indivisibility of the Supreme Court. But, by far the most 
* important argument uas that the act of nomination itself 
uas an exercise of judicial pouer.
The Supreme Court uas content, for the purposes of 
the case, to accept the broad classification of judicial 
pouer attempted by the Attorney-General himself. According 
to that classification !Judicial Pouer1 is used in three 
senses*
1. in the sense of the essence of judicial pouer, 
the strict judicial pouer;
2. in.the sense of the pouer of judicial revieu;
3. in a loose sense, as meaning the pouers of a judge,
e.g., disciplinary pouers and pouers ancillary to
I g
the judicial pouer.
8. Ibid., at pp. 352-353. 9. Ibid., at p. 353.
*Strict judicial power1 as explained by Griffiths, 
C»3., in Huddart Parker Pty., Ltd. v. Moorhead, ^  meaning 
the power to examine questions submitted for determination 
with a view to the pronouncement of an authoritative 
decision as to the rights and liabilities of one or more 
parties, did not include the power of nomination of judges, 
nor did the power of nomination form part of the power of 
judicial r e v i e w . T h e r e f o r e ,  the Supreme Court confined 
itself to a determination whether the power of nomination 
fell within the third category shown above.
The Attorney-General submitted that within the third
category were included both powers ancillary to judicial
power and powers not ancillary to judicial power. Neither
of these powers was judicial. He contended that the powers
ancillary to judicial power were given to judicial officers,
whereas powers not ancillary to judicial power, such as the
power to nominate judges^could be reposed in a person uho
12formed no part of the Dudicature.
The Supreme Court, however, leant in favour of the 
contention made on behalf of the defendants. According to 
that view, where a power that ordinarily falls within the 
third category (that is, judicial power in a loose sense) 
is consistent with executive or administrative power and is 
consistent also with judicial power, the matter has to be 
considered further in order to see whether that particular
10. (1908) 8 C.L.R. 330, at p. 357, cited in
(1962) 64 N.L.R. 348, at p. 353.
11. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 313, at p. 348.
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power falls actually within judicial power itself or outside
it* It was claimed by the defence that the power to
nominate judges, although it might have the appearance of
an administrative power, was itself so inextricably bound
up with the exercise of strict judicial power or the essence
of judicial power that it was itself part of the judicial 
13power* This claim found support in a judgment delivered
by the High. Court of Australia which declared that:
Many functions perhaps may be committed to a 
Court which are not themselves exclusively 
judicial, that is to say, which considered 
independently might belong to an administrator.
But that is because they are nnt independent 
functions but form incidents in the exercise 
of strict judicial power.^
The power to nominate a Bench of Judges resided 
solely with the Chief Justice prior to the enactment of the 
impugned Act in 1962, either by virtue of his statutory 
powers under section 51 of the Courts Ordinance, No. 1 of 
1889 or by convention. The .impugned Act sought to change 
this practice which had prevailed for about a century and 
a half in Ceylon.^ In the opinion of the Court, this 
historical setting attracted the historical test propounded 
by Dean Roscoe Pound:
13. Ibid.
14. Queen Victoria Memorial Hospital v. Thornton 
(1953) 87 C.L.R. 144, at p. l5i. Cited in (19627*34 N.L.R. 
313, at p. 354.
15. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 313, at p. 355.
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In doubtful cases, however, ue employ a 
historical criterion. Ue ask whether, 
at the time our Constitutions were 
adopted, the power in question was ex­
ercised by the Crown, by Parliament, or 
by the judges. Unless analysis compels 
us to say in a given case that there is 
a historical anomaly, we are guided 
chiefly by the historical criterion.^
17The Supreme Court of Ceylon also cited with approval a 
somewhat differently formulated test that had been introduced
by Kitto, S., in the Australian case of The Queen v.
n * 18Davison:
Uhere the action to be taken is of a kind 
which had come by 1900 /when the Commonwealth 
of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, came into 
operation/ to be so consistently regarded as 
peculiarly appropriate for judicial performance 
that it then occupied an acknowledged place in 
the structure of the judicial system, the con­
clusion, it seems to me, is inevitable that the 
power to take that action is within the concept 
of judicial power as the framers of the Constitu­
tion must be taken to have understood it.
These two tests, when applied to the factual 
situation in Ceylon that the power to nominate judges had
been reposed in the judiciary without exception, resulted
/
in the conclusion that such power was inextricably inter­
woven with the strict judicial power of the State which was 
vested in the judiciary and in the judiciary alone.
16. fThe Rule Makinq Power of the Courts*, 12 American 
Bar Association Journal ^1926} 599, p. 601.
17. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 313 at p. 355.
18. (1954) 90 C.L.R. 353, at pp. 381-383.
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The purpose test1 laid down by Holmes, 3., in the
American case of Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., that
1 the nature of the final act determines the nature of the
19previous inquiry1, was also applied by the Supreme Court 
of Ceylon to fortify its conclusion that the power of nomina­
tion belonged to the judiciary alone. The Supreme Court had 
no doubt that the end or purpose in view in making the
nomination was to exercise the strict judicial power of the 
20State. In arriving at this conclusion the Supreme Court
was influenced by the consideration that the Minister in the
exercise of his power of nomination could prevent certain
judges, including,even the Chief Justice, from exercising
21any part of the strict judicial power.
The Supreme Court took into account the fears that
might be entertained as to whether the Minister would use
his power of nomination to nominate a Bench that would not
conduct a fair trial. That justice should not only be done
but Should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done
22is the principle involved here. The Order of the Supreme 
Court may be cited extensively:
/P*_7rior to 1962 the Minister had merely the 
right to direct that the trial be held before 
the Supreme Court by three Judges without a 
jury. But the new legislation, passed, with 
retrospective effect, after the commission of
19. (1908) 211 U.S. 210, at p. 227.
20. The Queen v. Liyanaqe, supra fn. 17, at p. 359..
21. Ibid., at p. 358.
22. ,R. v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, )
(1924) 1 K.B. 256, at p. 259.
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the offences alleged, thus purported to 
vest in the Minister, a member of the 
Government which the defendants are alleged 
to have conspired to overthrow by unlawful 
means and who, it was not disputed, had 
participated in the investigation and 
interrogation of some of the defendants, 
the additional power to nominate the three 
judges. . . • This is the first occasion
on which an attempt has been made to vest 
this power in such an outsider, and that 
too in circumstances where the propriety 
of the nomination becomes, by reason of 
the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, 
discussable in Parliament involving, 
perhaps, the merits and demerits of respec­
tive judges, whereas under the previous law 
the judges enjoyed freedom from being the 
subject of such a discussion. . • • Will 
he, the ordinary or reasonable man, harbour 
the impression, honestly though mistakenly 
formed, that there has been an improper 
interference -with the course of justice?
In that situation will he not suspect even 
the impartiality of the Bench thus nominated?^^
The particular circumstances .leading to the enactment 
of the impugned Act and the very nature of the Act itself 
did, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that the .power of nomination con-
I
ferred on the Minister might be abused.
In spite of the fact that the three Budges could have
declined to enter upon a Trial-at-B,ar of the defendants on
the sole ground that the nomination of the Bench was invalid,
they proposed to examine the ’objection of a fundamental 
24character’, centred on the principle that ’justice should
be so administered as to satisfy reasonable persons that the
25tribunal is impartial and unbiased’. This principle was,
23. The Queen v. Liyanaqe (1962) 64 N.L.R. 313, 
at pp. 359-360.
24. Ibid., at p. 359.
25. Ibid., at p. 360, citing jl. v. Essex Justices, 
ex parte Perkins (1927) 2 K.B. 475, at p. 490.
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in the opinion of the Court, so fundamental that even had
the Court decided the nomination uas valid, it ’uould
have been compelled to give uay to this principle uhich
has nou become ingrained in the administration of common
2 6justice in this country’.
The preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of 
the three Judges uho constituted the Bench could thus 
succeed on tuo distinct and alternative grounds, namely:
(a) the pouer of nomination conferred on the 
Minister being a judicial pouer, in the 
sense that it uas an ancillary pouer uhich 
uas inextricably bound up uith the strict 
judicial pouer of the State, he could not,
consistently uith the Constitution, exercise
that pouer; and
(b) the nomination of the three Judges by the
Minister offended the cardinal principle
that a court should not only be impartial 
and unbiased but also should appear to be so.
There is no doubt, that the Court relied heavily on 
historical factors to designate the pouer of nomination as 
a judicial pouer. Nevertheless, the Court seems to have 
been much influenced by the fact that the vesting cf that 
pouer in a person outside the judicature uould constitute 
an undue interference uith the duties and functions of the 
judges. In fact it uas said:
26. Ibid.
Then, again, if the pouer to nominate or 
select judges can be constitutionally 
reposed in the Minister on the ground that 
it is no more than an exclusively adminis­
trative act, ue can see nothing in lau to 
prevent such a pouer being conferred on 
any other official, uhether a party interest­
ed in the litigation or not. The fact that 
the pouer of nomination so conferred is 
capable of abuse so as to deprive a judge 
of the entrenched pouer vested in him by 
virtue of his appointment under section 52 
of the Order in Council, or at least to 
derogate from that pouer, is a considera­
tion uhich is not an unimportant one in 
deciding uhether the conferring of this 
pouer by section 9 on a person uho is not 
a judge of the Supreme Court is ultra 
vires the Constitution. It may, of course, 
be contended that the pouer is capable of 
abuse if it is granted to a Judge of the 
Supreme Court or, for that matter, to the 
entire court.. However, the proper authority 
under the Constitution to exercise this pouer 
appears to be the Judicature itself . ^
The Queen v. Liyanaqe thus is authority for the
preposition that the executive could neither exercise nor
interfere uith the judicial pouer of the State, uhich uas
held to be exclusively uithin the province of the 
%
judiciary.
27. Ibid., at 358.
(2) An Inappropriately Uorded ♦Free Pardon1 by 
the Governor-General of Ceylon
The lau of Ceylon in no uncertain terms enabled 
the Governor-General to grant a free pardon.'*' That the 
Governor-General intended to grant a free pardon, however, 
had to be manifest in the instrument of such grant. If 
the instrument uas ambiguous or uas inappropriately uorded, 
it could not be judicially recognised as a grant of free 
pardon, in spite of strong but extraneous evidence of such 
intention. This uas the vieu that formed the ratio 
decidendi of the decision of the Supreme Court of Ceylon in 
The Queen v. Uimaladharma.z
In that case a government teacher had been convicted
of causing hurt and fined Rs.100 by a Magistrate. On appeal
the Supreme Court had affirmed the decision of the Magistrate
Thereafter, the accused made representations to the Governor-
General. In reply he received a letter dated 7th November
1963* stating that ’the sentence imposed on him has been 
3set ,aside1. Not being satisfied uith this letter unich
merely set aside the sentence leaving unaffected the convic­
tion, he further petitioned the Governor-General on 20th 
July 1964. He received a reply dated 5th August 1964 in 
Sinhala uhich uhen translated read as folious:
Uith reference to his petition dated 20th July 
1964, Mr. S. S. Uimaladharma of Menerepitiya,
Uarakapola, is informed that not only the
1. Section 10 of the Ceylon (Office of Governor- 
General) Letters Patent, 1947.
2. (1965) LXVIII C.L.U. 14.
3. Ibid., at p. 14.
sentence imposed on him but also his conviction 
uas quashed by His Excellency the Governor- 
General 1 s order uhich uas conveyed to him by 
letter No. M/3-R 148/63 of 7th November, 1963.
4
- By His Excellencyfs Command.
The accused produced this letter of the Governor- 
General before the Magistrate uho had passed the sentence 
on the accused and moved that the conviction be set aside. 
The Magistrate, uho entertained doubts uhether he had 
jurisdiction to deal uith such an application, referred the 
issue to the Supreme Court. The decision of the Supreme 
Court on this matter is reported sub nomine The Queen v.
5
Uimaladharma.
Sri Skanda Rajah, 3., uho heard the case in 
The Queen v. Uimaladharma, pointed out that the first 
communication from the Governor-General^ office merely 
stated that the sentence imposed on the accused had been 
set aside by the Governor-General. Therefore, the second 
commbnication uhich explained that the first communication 
had'also the effect of setting aside the conviction uas ill 
conceived. The first communication uas capable of only one 
construction, the learned 3udge observed; it remitted the 
sentence the Magistrate had imposed on the accused.
4* Ibid., at p. 14.
5. (1965) LXVIII C.L.U. 14.
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Section 10 of the Ceylon (Office of Governor-
General) Letters Patent, 1947 uhich is the key provision',
of lau relevant to the matter in issue may be quoted:
10. Uhen any offence has been committed for 
uhich the offender may be tried in the Island, 
the Governor-General may, as he shall see fit, 
in Our name and on Our behalf, grant a pardon 
to any accomplice in such offence.uho shall 
give such information as shall lead to the 
conviction of the principal offender, or of 
any one of such principal offenders if more 
than one, and further may grant to any offender 
convicted of any such offence in any Court 
uithin the Island, a pardon, either free or 
subject to lauful conditions, or any respite, 
either indefinite or for such period as the 
Governor-General may think fit, of the execu­
tion of any sentence passed on such offender, 
and may remit the unole or any part of such 
sentence or o-f any penalties or forfeitures 
otheruise due to Us.
The relevant parts of the above provision enable
the Governor-General to grant to any * convieted person a
free or conditional pardon, an infinite or limited respite
of the execution of any sentence, or a remission in uhole
or in^  part of such sentence• . The Court held that in order
to determine uhich of these several and distinct remedies
uas intended by the Governor-General, the uords used in the
communications should be given their ordinary meaning.
Accordingly, the first communication had to be regarded as
a remission of the sentence.^
The second communication from the Governor-General1s
office claimed that the first communication quashed the
conviction too. As regards this communication, Sri Skanda
Rajah, 0., said that quashing a sentence involved the
6. Ibid.t at p. 15
exercise of judicial pouer# Citing The Home Office by
Sir frank Neusam, the learned Judge conceded that:
A free pardon uipes out not only the 
sentence or penalty, but the convic­
tion and all its consequences, and 
from the time it is granted leaves 
the person pardoned in exactly the 
same position as if he had never . 
been convicted.^
The communications from the Governor-General, houever, the
Court observed, did not mention that a free pardon had been
granted. He could grant a free pardon uhich had the effect
of uiping out both the conviction and the sentence: but,
he could not direct that the conviction and the sentence be
set aside. Such a direction amounted to an exercise of
judicial pouer:
Judicial pouer is exclusively vested by 
the Ceylon (Constitution) □rder'-in-Council 
in the Supreme Court and other Courts and 
tribunals to uhich the Judicial Service 
Commission alone makes appointments.
Judicial pouer cannot laufully be exercised 
by the executive.Q
The Supreme Court accordingly held that the directions
/
contained in the second communication amounted to an exercise 
of judicial pouer and uere therefore invalid.
On the same day, December 2, 1965, that the court 
made the above Order, an application uas made funder extra­
ordinary circumstances1, on behalf of the accused, in that 
certain facts uhich uere not before the Supreme Court 
during the proceedings uere then brought to its notice. The 
Order dealing uith the second application is appended to the 
original Order.
7. Cited at p. 15. 8. Ibid., at pp. 14-15.
It uas stated in the second application that the
Minister of Justice, on whose advice the Governor-General
exercised his prerogative power, had in fact advised the
Governor-General in a communication written in English
that a free pardon be given. Uhen the Governor-General
received the second petition from the accused seeking an
explanation it was referred to the Minister. His advice
written in English uas as follows:
His Excellency the Governor-General has granted 
a Free Pardon, in this case in which he was 
convicted and fined. The Honourable Minister 
advises His Excellency to inform the petitioner 
that by the said order of His Excellency not 
only the penalty imposed on the petitioner but 
even the conviction gets wiped out.^
It was shown that the Governor-General acted on 
this advice when he sent the second 'communication to the 
accused. In the light of this new evidence Sri Skanda
Rajah, J., agreed that fit was not intended by His
Excellency the Governor-General to exercise judicial power.
In truth and in fact a free pardon had been granted1 The
/
communications from the Ministry of Justice addressed to 
the Governor-General, which constituted extraneous evidence, 
did not deter the learned Judge from adhering to the original 
Order he made that the Governor-General had not granted a 
free pardon.
9. At p. 16.
10. Ibid.
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In spite of the fact that the Governor-General
had, as appears from the advice of the Minister of Justice
on uhich His Excellency acted, intended to grant a free
pardon, such intention did not find expression in the
communications issued from the Governor-General's office.
This uas the result of the use of ’rather inappropriate
terms due to the inadequacy of legal terminology coined in
Sinhala’.^  Even the Governor-General’s office uas not to
blame, the learned judge observed, because the vocabulary
at their disposal uas inadequate,
Sri Sk.anda Rajah, J,, seems to have given much
ueight to the rule that uhat matters is the manifest
intention and not the true but undisclosed intention. This
led him to completely discount the evidential value of the
advice of the Minister uhich seems to have been regarded as
12extraneous evidence. Unmoved by the additional material 
placed before him, the learned judge reaffirmed the validity 
of the order he had originally made.
It is respectfully submitted that this decision is 
incorrect in lau, because there uas sufficient evidence, 
although extraneous in a strict sense, as emerging from the 
communications from the Ministry of Justice addressed to 
the Governor-General, to sufficiently support the belief
11, Ibid., at p • 16,
12. The judgment does not expressly exclude the 
advice of the Minister on the ground that it constituted 
extraneous or irrelevant evidence. Houever, this is the 
only basis on uhich is explicable the unuillingness of the 
learned judge to give effect to the true intention.
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of Sri Skanda Rajah, 3., that the Governor-General had
13
granted a free pardon *in truth and in fact1. Moreover, 
Uimaladharma1s case is not a commendable decision of policy, 
for it failed to take account of the difficulties involved 
in finding or creating Sinhala equivalents for English 
terminology. Specially in the field of lau, numerous 
difficulties have been encountered in translating concepts 
and principles uhich are alien to Sri Lanka, It is unfortu­
nate that the learned Judge based his decision on a highly 
technical point--namely the use of an inappropriate uord-- 
uhen all other indications squarely pointed to just one 
conclusion; that the Governor-General had granted a free 
pardon.
Apart from the assumption made, on the basis of 
the use of inappropriate language, that the Governor-General 
unduly interfered uith the judiciary in a technical sense, 
it appears that any such interference uas not in the con­
templation either of the Governor-General or of the Minister 
of Justice, The importance of this case therefore is limited 
to its recognition of the principle that the executive could 
not exercise judicial pouer under Ceylon (Constitution) 
Drder-in-Council, 1946.
A someuhat similar incident came before the Supreme
14Court in the case of In re Agnes Nona, the facts of uhich 
uere as follous. The accused, uho had been convicted and 
sentenced by a Magistrate^ Court, appealed against that
13. (1965) 1X7111 C. 1. W. 14, at p. 16.
14. (1951) 53 N. 1. R. 106.
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decision to the Supreme Court uhich dismissed the appeal. 
Thereafter the Magistrate ordered the accused to appear 
before him so that he could give effect to the order of the 
Supreme Court dismissing the appeal. The accused failed to 
appear before the Magistrate, and in the meantime, petitioned 
the Governor-General uho granted a conditional pardon; the 
condition being that she (the accused) should enter into a 
bond in Rs.25Q to be of good behaviour for a period of one
15
year. This, Dias, S.P.S., observed, uas a lauful order, 
but the Governor-General did not direct before uhom that 
bond uas to be executed.
The Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Justice 
foruarded a copy of the memorandum of the Governor-General 
granting the conditional pardon to the Magistrate 'for 
favour of necessary action’. He further requested the 
Magistrate to let him knou uhen the accused had entered into 
the bond. On receipt of this letter the Magistrate caused 
the accused to appear before him and enter into the bond.
The Magistrate then informed the Ministry of Justice that 
the accused had duly entered into the bond.
Having seen a report of these proceedings in the 
Daily Press, Dias, S.P.J., considered that this uas a case 
in uhich he should call for and examine the record of the 
proceedings under section 35 6 of the Criminal Procedure Code 
uhich provided that the Supreme Court could call for and
15. Ibid., at p. 108.
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examine the record of any case, uhether already tried or 
pending trial in any Court, for the purpose of satisfying 
itself as to the legality or propriety of any sentence or 
order passed therein or as to the regularity of the proceed­
ings of such Court.
Dias, S.P.3., explained his action in the following
terms:
On a perusal of the record it appeared to me 
that this uas a case in uhich it uas desirable 
that the relative legal position uhich the
executive government as represented by the
Minister of Justice bears towards the Courts 
should be clarified. The accused lady and the 
Attorney-General were therefore notified and 
the matter has been fully argued.^
It uas argued on behalf of the State that the order 
of the Magistrate that the accused should enter into the 
bond referred to in the conditional pardon uas merely an 
administrative act, and accordingly the Supreme Court could 
not exercise its revisionary powers in respect of it. 
Revisionary powers, it uas contended, could be' exercised
only in respect of the exercise of judicial pouers by the
inferior Courts. Dias, S.P.3., uas not inclined to agree 
uith that contention. In any case'statutory provision 
existed uhich empowered a Magistrate to order an accused to 
enter into a bond in certain specified circumstances. There­
fore, in the instant case the Magistrate had exercised a
pouer uhich necessarily had a judicial character, although 
there uas no statutory provision uhich applied to the situa-
17
tion in hand.
16. Ibid.. at p. 109.
17. Ibid.. at p. 110.
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The learned Judge recognised that the Minister of
Justice possessed certain Administrative1 powers,relating to
the appointment of the subordinate staff of a Court, the
emoluments to be paid to judicial officers and the hours
during uhich the office of the Court should be open,etc.
These Administrative1 powers are difficult, 
to define, and there may arise cases in which 
the Minister may inadvertently overstep the 
bounds and encroach either on the functions 
of the Judicial Service Commission on the one 
hand, or on the judicial functions of the 
Court on the other. In cases where there is 
ground to believe that the Minister has impro­
perly encroached on the judicial functions o f ; 
a Court, it is the undoubted right of the 
Supreme Court to examine the position, and 
Fearlessly to say so, if there has in fact 
been any illegal encroachment• ^g
The MagistrateA Court in the discharge of its 
duties as a Court was not under the administrative control 
of the Minister. Nor was there a statutory provision uhich 
enabled the Minister to give a direction of the nature that 
was in issue in the instant case. The learned Judge
emphasised that:
/
The point to be noted, however, is that whenever 
on grounds of public policy it is considered 
expedient that the Judge should render assistance 
to the executive, the law provides for it in un­
mistakable terms by imposing a statutory duty on 
the Judqe to do so.
19
Accordingly, the proper course would have been for the 
accused to have the memorandum of the Governor-General 
brought to the notice of the Court. The intervention of 
the Minister was wholly ina’ppropriate and illegal.
18. Ibid., at p. 113.
19. Ibid., at p. 115.
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The Solicitor-General concedes that if the 
Minister has, in fact, acted illegally, 
there is no distinction between a slight 
interference by the executive uith the 
judiciary and a major interference. In 
either case the independence of the 
judiciary would be affected and must be 
condemned *2q
It uas open to the Supreme Court to quash all 
the proceedings and to restore the status quo ante. Never­
theless, in vieu of the fact that the accused uas then 
lawfully at liberty, Dias, S.P.3., did not propose to take 
any action . ^  The whole purpose of his exercising the 
revisionary powers uas to lay down the principles- appli­
cable.
The principles laid down in this case were that 
a person who had been granted a conditional pardon should 
himself initiate proceedings necessary to fulfill the 
condition; that no executive officer could intervene in 
such a situation and direct a Court to take proceedings; 
and that as a general rule the executive should not inter­
fere- with judicial functions.
In spite of the illegality of the Ministers 
direction to the Magistrate, the Supreme Court did not 
propose to quash the proceedings before the Magistrate.
The fact that the grant of the conditional pardon had been 
valid dissuaded the learned Judge from nullifying the pro­
ceedings. This case thus provides a striking example of
20. Ibid., at p. 116.
21. Ibid.
the deep-rooted antipathy of the judiciary towards any 
interference uith the performance of judicial functions 
and shous hou a Court will go to the extent of initiating 
a judicial proceeding by itself, even uhere its final 
decision will not make a substantial impact on the subject 
matter of the proceeding*
There are tuo distinctions between In re Agnes Nona 
and The Queen v. Uimaladharma* Firstly, the grant of 
pardon by the Governor-General was held valid in the 
former and invalid in the latter. The Supreme Court over­
looked the technical illegality in the former, whereas in 
the latter it refused to recognise the validity of the 
grant. In re Agnes Nona amply fortifies the submission 
previously made that the final order in Uimaladharma^ case 
rests on insecure grounds.
A feature common to both cases is that there was 
no real intention on the part of the executive to inter- 
fere’uith the judiciary. On the other hand, in The Queen v 
Liydnaqe the Supreme Court entertained a reasonable doubt 
as to uhether the executive did intend such an interference 
The significance of Agnes Nona!s case and Uimaladharma1s 
case is, therefore, limited to the judicial recognition of 
the importance of ensuring that the judicial function can 
be exercised free from undue governmental interference.
22. See the discussion in Part 1 of this chapter
(3) The Attorney-General *s Pouer to give directions to 
a Magistrate
The Attorney-General could under the lau of Ceylon 
direct a Magistrate uho had discharged an accused^ after a 
preliminary inquiry to commit him for trial before the 
Supreme Court, So uas decided in The Attorney-General v.
Don Sirisena,^
In that case the Magistrate had discharged three 
out of four persons uho had appeared before him at a 
preliminary inquiry, on the basis that there uas no prima 
facie case against them. The Attorney-General then directed 
the Magistrate to commit the three persons uho had been 
discharged by him for trial before the Supreme Court, but he 
refused to give effect to this direction on the ground that 
it constituted an interference uith the discharge of his 
judicial functions. The matter uas then brought before the 
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its revisionary pouers, 
for a,binding decision uhether' the Attorney-General could 
validly issue such a direction.
The main argument uas that the Magistrate in 
discharging the accused persons performed a judicial function 
and that the Attorney-General uho uas part of the executive 
could not interfere in the exercise of judicial pouer by a 
judicial officer.
1. ( 1 9 6 8 )  70 N . L . R .  347.
The Supreme Court firmly rejected the argument that 
a Magistrate exercised judicial pouer uhen he discharged an 
accused at a preliminary inquiry. A preliminary inquiry 
uas held solely for the purpose of finding uhether there 
uas sufficient evidence to commit a person for trial. Such 
an inquiry did not result in a determination of either guilt 
or innocence. Section 162(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code 
provided that ’if the Magistrate considers that the evidence 
against the accused is not sufficient to put him on trial,
the Magistrate shall forthuith order him to be discharged’.
2
Citing an Australian authority, the Supreme Court of 
Ceylon held that,.in the absence of a determination by the 
Magistrate as to uhether the accused person had committed 
an offence, a preliminary inquiry did not involve the 
exercise of judicial pouer.
In the absence of an exercise of judicial pouer by
the Magistrate the Attorney-General could not be said to
have * interfered uith any exercise of judicial pouer.
Further, the Supreme Court observed that historically the
Attorney-General had aluays been vested uith this pouer:
Our lau has, since 1883 if not earlier, conferred 
on the Attorney-General in Ceylon pouers, directly 
to bring an alleged offender to trial before a 
Court, to direct a Magistrate uho has discharged 
an alleged offender to commit him for trial, and 
to direct a Magistrate to discharge an offender 
uhom he has committed for trial. These pouers of 
the Attorney-General uhich have commonly been 
described as quasi-judicial, have traditionally 
formed an integral part of our system of Criminal 
Procedure, and 'it uould be quite unrealistic to
2. A p p l e t o n  v. M o o r h e a d  ( 1 90 8 )  8 C . L . R .  330,
"'hold that there uas any intention in our 
Constitution to render invalid and illegal 
the continued exercise of those pouers.
This Court has, upon similar considerations, 
upheld the validity of statutes conferring 
criminal jurisdiction on Courts Martial and 
conferring on revenue authorities the pouer 
to impose penalties for the breach of revenue
restrictions. ^
It appears from the above quoted passage from the
judgment in The Attorney-General v. Sirisena that beside
the ruling that a Magistrate did not act in a judicial
capacity in conducting a preliminary inquiry, the over-
uhelrning consideration uas that for at least nearly one
hundred and fifty years this pouer, a quasi-judicial
pouer as the Court preferred to call it, had been exercised
by the Attorney-General. Houever, both these tuo grounds
uere instrumental in bringing about a decision favourable
to the Attorney-General. Therefore it follous that if a
similar pouer had been granted in a post-independence
statute the decision might have perhaps been different.
For, the Court could possibly resort to an eulogy uith
4the principle enunciated in The Queen v. Liyanage that 
pouers ancillary to judicial pouers uere also to be 
regarded as judicial pouers in certain circumstances: 
accordingly, it might have been held, relying on the 
historical test, that traditionally the preliminary 
inquiries had been so connected uith strict judicial 
proceedings that the preliminary inquiries did *in a 
loose sense* fall uithin the ambit of judicial pouer.
3. The Attorney-General v. Don Sirisena (1968) 
70 N.L.R. 347 at p. 355.
4. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 313.
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However, it is of interest to note here that
as far back as in 1898, the District Court of Ceylon in
5
Dadabhoy Nusserwanjee v. Nana Moona Sheriffdeen had held 
that a Magistrate^ Court inquiring into a non-summary 
charge uas not a court uithin the meaning of section 834 
of the Civil Procedure Code. Under that section a party 
to a case pending before a court having jurisdiction 
therein uas exempt from arrest under civil process uhile 
going to or returning from such court.
The decision in The Attorney-General v. Sirisena 
provides a striking example of the willingness of the 
Courts to recognise that the executive did have the power 
to control the working of the judiciary in respect of 
certain restricted areas. In permitting such controls or 
regulations the Courts, however, first satisfied themselves 
that the independence of the judiciary was not thereby in 
any sense impaired.^
5. (1898) 1 Browne’s Reports 3.
6. Elsewhere in this thesis reference has been 
made as to how the judiciary ensured through judicial 
scrutiny that the Attorney-General did not improperly 
use his powers. See the discussion on The Queen v. 
Abeysinqhe (1965) 68 N.L.R. 385, Urjocfr >^,
(4) Removal of the Chairman of an Urban Council 
by the Minister
It uas argued unsuccessfully in Silva v. Bayasuriya^
that the Minister of Local Government exercised judicial
pouer uhen he removed the Chairman of an Urban Council#
One of the consequences of such a removal uas that by reason
of section 9(3) of the Local Authorities (Elections)
2Ordinance the deposed Chairman became disqualified for a 
period of five years from being elected as, or voting at 
any election of, a Senator or Member of Parliament or a 
Member of any local authority. On this ground.it uas 
alleged by the petitioner that the order uas an exercise 
of judicial pouer and the court uas requested to defer a 
decision until a Bench of five Budges rendered its decision 
dealing uith certain tribunals, (This is undoubtedly a 
reference to the Supreme Court Proceedings in Walker v,
f£Y.-3).
» On the other hand, the Croun Counsel argued that 
the /Minister uas entrusted uith the supervision of the 
administration of local authorities and uith the executive 
pouer to be exercised in the course of such supervision. 
Removing a person from the office of Chairman, it uas 
submitted, uas one of such administrative pouers. The learned 
Judge was inclined to agree uith this proposition uhen 
he said:
Even if it be correct that the disqualifi­
cation created by section 9(3) (c) of the 
Local Authorities (Elections) Ordinance
1. (1 96 5 )  L X I X  C . L . U .  54.
3. ( 1 9 6 5 )  68 N . L . R .  73.
2. Chapter 262, L»E,C.
can attach only to an order made by the 
holder of a judicial office, the validity 
of the Order for removal from the office 
of Chairman is not thereby impaired. In 
so far, therefore, as the Order has the 
effect of removal from office, I must 
hold that the Minister uas duly empouered 
to make it. The petitioner can take such 
steps as he may be advised to do if it is 
thought that the Ministers Order cannot 
deprive him of electoral and voting rights.^
The learned Budge seems to have separated the 
civic disabilities uhich folioued the removal from the 
act of removal, and regarded the latter as clearly 
involving administrative functions. He left open the 
issue uhether civic disabilities could validly ensue from
such a removal. Ue may recollect here that in Sendhira v.
5
The Bribery Commissioner the Supreme Court came to the
conclusion that a Bribery Tribunal could find a person
guilty, uith the result that he became liable to civic
disabilities statutorily imposed. Later it uas held that
a Bribery Tribunal could not (even find a person guilty on 
$
the ground that ’enforcement1 uas not an essential ingredient 
of judicial pouer. As ue have noted, the decisions in the 
Bribery Tribunal cases uere strongly influenced by the fact 
that such tribunals uere created to exercise jurisdiction 
in respect of certain penal offences. Therefore, no 
definite ansuer is to be found there as to uhether an 
administrative act uhich results in civic disabilities is 
to be regarded as an exercise of judicial pouer. Houever,
4. (1965) LXIX C.L.U. 54, at p. 56.
5. (1961) 63 N.L.R. 313.
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the decision in Kariapper v. Lfi.jesinha, ^  where it was 
held that a statute which imposed civic disabilities on 
certain Members of Parliament who had been found to have 
committed certain bribery offences did not amount to a 
’legislative judgment’, might by analogy be applied here.
As in Kartapper v. Ui.jesinha the dominant purpose of the 
Act was to ’keep public life clean’, so too it seems was 
the overriding intention behind entrusting the Minister 
with certain regulatory powers, including that of removal 
from office in Silva v. Dayasur-iya.
From the judgment it appears that the action of the 
Minister followed 'a finding by an Assistant Commissioner of 
Local Government that allegations of maladministration 
which had been referred to him for inquiry by the Commissioner 
of Local Government had been proved against the petitioner.
The Court was satisfied that the rules of natural justice 
has been followed all throughout the proceedings. This
t
might have weighed heavily in favour of the validity of the
/
removal of the petitioner from office.
6. (1 96 7 )  70 N . L . R .  49; / 1 9 6 7 /  3 fill E.R. 48 5.
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CHAPTER 8 
THE JUDICIARY AND THE LEGISLATURE
The 1 Tribunal Cases1, where the principle was upheld 
that the legislature could not validly confer judicial power 
on extra-judicial bodies, undoubtedly established a significant 
limitation on the legislative powers of the Ceylon Parliament# 
The cases that are discussed in this chapter, however, had 
far more serious implications* The principle emerging from 
these decisions was that it was not open to Parliament itself 
to assume judicial power or even to interfere with its 
exercise by the courts# For, under the Constitution the 
judicial power of the State had been vested exclusively in 
the judiciary.
The story begins with the epoch-making decision of 
the Privy Council in Liyanaqe v# The Queen;^  in effect, 
with regard to Ceylon at least, the story also ends with 
that case# For although that decision was the basis of 
argument in a number of later cases, the Liyanaqe principle 
was not applied in any such local case in order to invalidate 
an Act of Parliament#
It is proposed in this chapter to explain the 
Liyanaqe principle followed by a review of its aftermath#
1. ( 1 9 6 5 )  68 N . L . R .  265; ^ 1 9 6 6 7  1 A l l  E . R.  65 0.
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(1) The Liyanaqe Principle
The celebrated ‘Judicial Power1 cases in Ceylon,
that series of cases where the primary issue was the
competence of any person other than a duly appointed
‘judicial officer* to exercise the judicial power of the
State, and which are discussed in this and the two
preceding chapters, reached their zenith in the well-known
Privy Council decision in Liyanaqe v. The Queen.^
It is far from an exaggeration to say that no
other Ceylon case attracted so much attention, admiration
2and criticism as did Liyanaqe v. The Queen, from both 
local and overseas legal circles. This case had five hearings 
before the Supreme Court, The first three were on preliminary 
points,^ and the fourth on an application for bail,^ the fifth
5
being the trial proper. The Order of the Supreme Court in 
the trial proper runs to 227 pages in the New Law Reports^ 
and is the lengthiest judgment in the area of the criminal
law of Sri Lanka,
* \
One of the major changes introduced into the consti­
tutional structure by the Republican Constitution of 
Sri Lanka of 1972 was, as we shall see later, specifically
1. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 265; ^19667 1 All E.R. 650.
2. Ibid,
3. Reported in (1962) 64 N.L.R. 313, (1963)
65 N.L.R. 73 and (1963) 65 N.L.R. 337 under the title
The Queen v, Liyanaqe,
4* The Queen v, Liyanaqe (1963) 65 N.L,R. 289,
5. The Queen v, Liyanaqe (1965) 67 N,L.R, 193.
6. Ibid., from page 198 to page 424.
directed to the deracination of the principles ordained
7
i-n Liyanaqe v. The Queen# Nevertheless frequent attempts 
were made, though unsuccessfully, before the Constitutional 
Court to resuscitate some of the doctrines expressed in
Q
that case* The interest aroused by ’ the most remarkable
exercise in judicial activism ever performed by the Privy
9 10Council1 in Liyanaqe v. The Queen has gained neu heights
elsewhere,^ and no standard text book on constitutional
lau in the Common Law world can now afford to omit a
12mention of Liyanaqe v. The Queen*
13The Privy Council in Liyanaqe v* The Queen held 
that there existed a separation of powers under the 
Independence Constitution of Ceylon, at least to the extent 
that judicial power was vested exclusively in the judicature, 
and that it was not open for the Parliament to pass an 
ordinary law amounting in substance to a usurpation of, or 
an interference with, that judicial power* The Criminal 
Law (Special Provisions) Act No* 1 of 1962, as amended by 
Act No. 31 of the same year, which had been enacted specially 
to be applicable to the apprehension, trial and punishment
7. Supra note 1.
8. See the discussion of the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court, Chapter 11, Part (2), infra.
9* S. A. de Smith, ;The Separation of Powers in
a Neu Dressr, (1966) 12 McGill L* 3. 491 at p. 492.
10. Supra note 1.
11. See Hinds v. The Queen /19767 1 All E.R. 353 
discussed in Chapter 12, Part (3). infra.
12. S. A. de Smith, ’The Separation of Powers in
a Neu Dress’, (1966) 12 McGill L. 3. 491 at p. 492.
13. Supra note 1.
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of the defendants who were alleged to have participated 
in a conspiracy to stage a Coup d ’Etat, was held by the 
Privy Council to be such a usurpation or infringment: 
accordingly the conviction entered against the defendants 
by the Supreme Court at Bar was set aside*
It is imperative, in order to view the Privy Council 
decision in its proper perspective, that the background to 
that decision should be briefly examined. The circumstances 
leading to the enactment of the impugned Acts of Parliament 
and the provisions of such Acts will now be outlined, 
followed by a short account of the Trial before the Supreme 
Court.
(i) The Circumstances Leading to the Enactment, and an 
Outline, of the Acts Nos. 1 and 31 of 1962
According to the prosecution c a s e , ^  some time in
January 1962 or thereabouts some of the twenty-four
defendants conceived a plan to arrest Members of Government,
»
certain prominent Leftist politicians, and a feu key officials,
/
and, relying on the military and police power available to 
15them, to replace the then existing Government of the country 
by some authority not constituted under the then existing law.
14. The Queen v. Liyanaqe. (1965) 67 N. L.R.193 at
198.
15. Thirteen of the defendants were high-ranking 
members of the Regular Army or the Voluntary Force; six 
were serving or retired senior officials or planters*
The Queen v. Liyanaqe (1965) 67 N.L.R. 193 at p. 199.
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All the defendants, according to the prosecution, at some 
stage or other agreed to participate in carrying out the 
plan* Two of the principal defendants conceded that they 
indeed prepared a plan for certain Army and Police action, 
but only for the purpose of preventing certain other parties 
from carrying out a Coup d fEtat*
The attempt to overthrow the Government uas foiled
at the last moment as a result of some finside information1
reaching the Prime Minister* Arrests and interrogations
followed, and it appeared that the existing substantive and
adjective criminal law uas inadequate to effectively try
and punish the perpetrators of the alleged crimes against
the State* A Uhite Paper issued by the Ceylon Government
which set out the story of the unsuccessful coup together
with the names of the alleged participants, ended with the
following observation:^^
It is also essential that a deterrent punishment 
of a severe character m.u;st be imposed on all 
‘those who are guilty of this attempt to inflict 
violence and bloodshed on innocent people through- 
' out the country for the pursuit of reactionary 
aims and objectives* The investigation must 
proceed to its logical end and the people of this 
country may rest assured that -the Government will 
do its duty by them*
The Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act No* 1 of 
1962, a_7n Act to make special provision for the 
apprehension, detention and trial of persons suspected of 
having committed, or charged with, offences against the State,
16. Issued on February 13, 1962. Cited in \
Liyanaqe v. The Queen (1965) 68 N*L*R. 265, at p. 273; s
£1966/1 All E.R. 650, at p. 652.
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to amend th8 Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code and
the Courts Ordinance, and to make provision for matters
17
connected therewith or incidental thereto*, uas passed 
or. the 16th of March, 1962. The Act had four Parts. Part 
I dealt with the arrest and detention of persons suspected 
of committing offences against the State, Part II made 
amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code and the Penal Code
Part III contained general provisions and Part IV set out
the miscellaneous provisions.
Tuo sections of the Act may be cited to shou that 
the Act uas intended to be applicable retrospectively to the 
events in issue, and to them alone.
19. The provisions of this Act, other than the 
provisions of section 17, shall be deemed, 
for all purposes, to have come into operation 
on January 1, 1962:
Provided, however, that the provisions of 
Part I of this Act shall be limited in its
application to any offence against the State
alleged to have been committed on or about 
January 27, 1962 or.any matter, act, or thing 
connected therewith or incidental thereto.
7 21. The preceding provisions of this Act, save 
and except Part I and section 17, shall cease 
to be operative after the conclusion of all 
legal proceedings connected with or incidental 
to any offence against the State committed on 
or about 27th January, 1962, or from 1 year 
after the date of commencement of this Act, 
whichever is later, provided that the Senate 
and the House of Representatives may by 
resolution setting out the grounds therefor 
extend the operation of this Act from time 
to time for further periods not exceeding 
one year at a time.
17. Long Title to Act No. 1 of 1962.
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Tho cumulative effect of these tuo provisions 
18uas to make section 17 the only exception to the
retroactivity of the provisions of Act No* 1 of 1962* The
provisions relating to arrest and detention uere to be
applicable only in respect of the alleged coup attempt,
uhereas the other provisions, uhich were designed to be
confined to the proceedings arising from the coup, could, by
a resolution of both the Houses of Parliament, be extended
beyond the conclusion of the proceedings. Houever, in
effect the uhole Act uas applicable only to the alleged coup
and the proceedings arising therefrom*
Part I of,the Act legalised the arrest and detention
of the defendants* Section 2 alloued arrest uithout a
warrant for the offence of waging war against the Queen,
uhereas under the previously existing law a warrant had been
necessary. Certain rules of general law— that an arrested
person must uithout unreasonable delay be taken or sent
19 ‘ *before a Magistrate, that if he is arrested uithout a
warrant the reasonable period shall not exceed tuenty-four 
20hours and that the police should report the arrest to
21 'the Magistrate’s Court— were superseded and the impugned Act
18* This section provided for the addition of tuo 
more judges to the Supreme Court on such date as the 
Minister might appoint*
19. Criminal Procedure Code, Ordinance No. 15 of 
1898 (L.E.C . , cap. 20), sec. 36*
20. Ibid., sec. 37.
21. Ibid., sec. 38.
/
legalised the detention for sixty days of any person having
committed offences against the State, but the fact of his
having been arrested had to be notified to the Magistrate^
22
Court#
Section 115 of the Penal Code dealing uith offences
against the State uas uidened to include conspiring to
overthrow otherwise than by lawful means the Government of 
23Ceylon, in an attempt to embrace certain acts attributed
to the defendants within the scope of section 115 of the 
24Penal Code* Not only uas the scope of the offence enlarged
but the punishment therefor uas enhanced* Previously the
Court could impose a period of imprisonment of either
description up to a maximum of 20 years and a fine, under
section 115 of the Penal Code* Act Mo. 1 of 1962 prescribed
a period of not less than 10 years and not more than 20 years
25and a compulsory forfeiture of all property.
The impugned Act effected changes in the law of
» ■ 26 evidence too. The Evidence Ordinance provides that no
confession made to a police officer shall be proved in
27evidence as against a person accused of any offence; that 
no confession made by an accused person in the custody of a
22. Act No. 1 of 1962, sec. 2(2).
23. Ibid*, sec. 6(2) (a).
24. See The Queen v. Liyanaqe £1963) 65 N.L.R*
73 at p. 80 and Liyanaqe v. The Queen £19667 1 All E.R.
650 at p. 653; (1965) 68 N.L.R. 265 at p. 275.
25. Supra note 23.
26. Ordinance No. 14 of 1895, (L.E.C. cap. 14).—■— — — *
27* Ibid., sec. 25(1).
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police officer shall be proved against him unless made in
28
the immediate presence of a Magistrate; and that a
confession made by one of several co-defendants shall not
29be used against the other. The Criminal Procedure Code 
excludes from admission all statements to a police officer 
in the course of an investigation.^
These protections were removed by the impugned Act
31in respect of offences against State, which allowed
statements made in the custody of a police officer to be
admitted provided the police officer was not below the
32rank of assistant superintendent. Deviating from the
33general practice which requires the prosecution to prove
a confession to be voluntary, Act No. 1 of 1962 laid on
the accused the burden of proving that a confessional
34statement made by him was not voluntary.
Section 12(2) provided that:
In the case of an offence against the State, 
a statement made by any .person which may be 
‘proved under subsection (1) of this section 
/i.e., whether or not in the custody of a 
- police officer__/ as against himself may be 
proved as against any other person jointly 
charged with such person if, but only if, 
such statement is corroborated in material 
particulars by evidence other than a 
statement proved under that subsection.
28. Ibid., sec. 26(1).
Ibid., sec. 30.
30. Ordinance No. 15 of 1898 (L.E.C., cap. 20). 
sec. 122(3).
31. Act No. 1 of 1962* sec. 12(4) and 12(5).
32. Ibid., sec. 12(1).
33. See for instance The Queen v. Gnanaseeha Thero 
(1968) 73 N.L.R. 154 at p. 161. ’ — ——
34. Supra note 32 sec. 12(3).
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The Attorney-General uas empouered to grant a
conditional pardon to any accomplice before or at any
stage during the trial, uith a view to obtaining his 
35evidence. This section is uider than the generally
applicable provision, section 284 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, i n  t h a t  under  th e  l a t t e r  a pardon may be g r a n t e d  o n ly
to an accused person and !at any time after commitment but
b e f o r e  th e  judgment  i s  p r o n o u n c e d * • A g a in ,  th e  l a t t e r
provision uas applicable only uhere a non-summary
proceeding had been held.
The mode of the trial for the offences in question
uas changed by bringing them uithin the scope of section
440 A of the Criminal Procedure Code uhich empouered the
Minister to direct that the defendants be tried by three
36
Judges o f  th e  Supreme C o u r t  a t  Bar u i t h o u t  a j u r y .
Further, the Minister uas empouered to nominate the three
Judges to preside over the Trial-at-Bar uhenever he issued
* 37such a direction. The Act took auay the right of appeal
to the Court of Criminal Appeal in the case of Trials-at- 
38Bar, but the right of appeal to the Privy Council
remained unaffected.
Ue have already seen hou the three Judges of the
Supreme Court nominated by the Minister to preside over the
Trial-at-Bar upheld the preliminary objection to their 
39jurisdiction. The Court, houever, did not discharge the
accused. Act No. 1 of 1962 uas thereafter amended by 
Act No. 31 of the same year.
35. Ibid., sec. 11. 36. Ibid., sec. 4.
37. Ibid., sec. 9. 38. Ibid., sec. 15.
39* Supra p p .  233-44.
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The Trial-at-Bar held under the provisions of 
Act No. 1 of 1962 as amended by Act No. 31 of the same 
year may now be discussed.
(ii) The Trial-at-Bar No. 2 of 1962
The first three of the four Orders^* made by the
Supreme Court during the Trial-at-Bar No. 2 of 1962 in
The Queen v. Liyanaqe dealt with certain objections to
the propriety of the proceedings.
One of the objections uas that the Parliament had
no pouer to uithdrau the first information filed by the
Attorney-General under Act No. 1 of 1962 and accordingly
uhen the Attorney-General exhibited an information on the
21st November, 1962 acting under Act No. 31 of 1962 there
came to be pending before the Supreme Court tuo informations.
It uas held that section 6 of Act No. 31 of 1962 effectively
rendered null and void the first information and the
Ministers nomination of the.Bench. The Court held, further,
*
that since the first Bench did not exercise judicial pouer
in the sense of conducting a judicial proceeding,
Parliament could not be said to haye interfered uith any 
2
judicial act. Even if the first information had not been 
uithdraun the only plea available to the accused uas one 
of protection against double jeopardy. This plea could not, 
houever, be set up successfully, since no order of acquittal 
or conviction had been made.
1. Reported in (1963) 65 N.L.R. 73; (1963) 65 N.L.R. 
337 and (1965) 67 N.L.R. 193.
2. The Queen v. Liyanage (1963) 65 N.L.R. 73, 
at p. 78.
o r*
The second objection related to the retrospective
amendment of section 115 of the Penal Code* It uas argued
that the third charge against the defendants, based on an
offence added to section 115 of the Penal Code by the
3
impugned Act, uas invalid* The Court said:
Ue share the intense and almost universal 
aversion to ej* post facto laus in the 
strict sense, that is laus uhich render 
unlauful and punishable acts uhich, at the 
time of their commission, had not actually 
been declared to be offences* And ue 
cannot deny that in this instance ue have 
to apply such a lau* Indeed, it is 
remarkable that this particular lau has 
only a retroactive effect; that it is 
applicable only to an alleged conspiracy 
in January 1962; and that Parliament 
has not thought it necessary to provide 
that a similar conspiracy against the 
State uhich may be planned in the future 
uill be punishable by lau* Nevertheless 
it is not for us to judge the necessity 
for such a lau*
The Court uhich held that the Parliament of Ceylon had the
pouer to pass retrospective laus, rejected the objection
to the retroactive amendment of the offence*
»
The second Order of the Supreme Court in the course 
of the Trial-at-Bar No* 2 of 1962^ uas in respect of the 
application made by the defendants requesting copies of 
statements made by prosecuting uitnesses and defendants, 
copies of documents the prosecution proposed to produce 
and inspection of documents.
3* Ibid*, at p. 84.
4* The Q u e e n  v. L i y a n a q e  ( 1 9 6 3 )  65 N . L . R .  337.
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In trials on Information, the Court pointed out, 
there uas no proceeding at all before the information 
uas exhibited, uhereas in a trial on indictment non­
summary proceedings preceded, so that the accused kneu 
beforehand the nature of ev/idence there uas against him* 
The Court observed that offences of a more serious nature 
uere tried upon indictments after non-summary proceedings
and that only less serious offences uere triable
5
summarily in a Magistrates Court*
It offends our sense of justice that persons 
should be put on their trial on Capital 
offences in a summary manner uithout even 
knouing uhat evidence is proposed to be led 
against them'in proof of the charges against 
them* Ue are satisfied that they uill be 
hampered in their defence by this mode of 
trial* An innocent man may find it difficult 
to vindicate his innocence in such circumstances*
The purpose of the Legislature in providing 
for trial by Information before the Supreme 
Court instead of trial on indictment, uas 
clearly and solely to expedite the trial, It 
cannot be conceived that the Legislature 
}intended in such cases,-to deprive the defendants 
of a fair trial and of a reasonable opportunity 
to vindicate his innocence, if they are innocent.^
!In the interest of justice and uith a vieu to
7
affording the defendants a fair trial1 the Supreme Court 
utilised section 440 A (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 
as enacted by Act No* 31 of 1962, requiring that a 
Trial-at-Bar should proceed as far as possible in the
5* Ibid*i at p* 338-339.
6. Ibid*, at p. 339*
7* Ibid*, at p* 341*
manner provided for other trials before the Supreme 
Court, subject to modifications as might be ordered by 
the Court, and ordered that the Attorney-General should 
supply the defendants with copies of all statements of 
prosecution witnesses and of the defendants and the docu-
0
ments the prosecution proposed to put in evidence*
The effect of this ruling uas that the accused
persons uere given the advantage that accrues to an accused
uho is tried on indictment. In other uords the rigour of
the impugned Acts uas to some extent mitigated*
The third Order in the course of the 2nd Trial-at-
g
Bar dealt uith the unsuccessful application for bail* Ue
nou come to the trial proper*
The trial proper^ commenced on the 3rd June, 1963
and after almost 300 sittings the Court delivered its Order
on the 6th April, 1965 uith unanimity on every finding*
The Court uas firm about its attitude:"^
*
To the Courts, uhich must be free of political 
. bias, treasonable offences are equally heinous, 
whatever be the complexion of the Government 
in power or whoever be the offenders.
It must be noted here that 'the trial proper
commenced on the basis that it uas within the legislative
competence of the Parliament to have passed the tuo impugned
8• Ibid*
9. (1963) 65 N.L.R. 289.
10. (1965) 67 N.L.R. 198.
11* Ibid*, at p* 424.
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Acts of 1962, a finding th8 Court arrived at an earlier
12hearing* Consequently much of the Order of the Court 
deals uith various pertinent aspects of substantive 
and adjective criminal lau* These are outside the scope 
of this uork* Certain aspects, houever, need mention 
here*
Firstly, the amendment of section 115 of the Penal 
Code, uhich defined offences against the Stats, uas not 
considered by the Court to be a serious peril to the 
defendants:
The third charge, that of conspiring to overthrou 
the Government, uas framed in terms of ths 
retroactive amendment of section 115 of the Penal 
Code made by the Criminal Lau (Special Provisions)
Act No* 1 of 1962. This circumstance has not in 
fact been seriously disadvantageous to the 
defendants, because ue hold in any event that 
those defendants uhom ue convict are guilty on 
the other charges, uhich do not depend on the 
amendment* Probably also, the proved conspiracy 
uould have been punishable under other sections
of the Code.^2
. Secondly, section 12(2) of Act No* 1 of 1962, 
uhich made admissible in evidence as against the other 
accused an out-of-court statement made by a co-accused 
falling uithin the scope of section 12(1), uas narrouly 
construed*
It is not necessary for us to decide uhat 
the true meaning of this provision exactly 
is. The lau has aluays been that a statement 
made outside the uitness box is inadmissible
12. See supra pp.274-5 (1963) 65 N.L.R. 73.
13. (1965) 67 N.L.R. 198, at pp. 423-424.
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against anyone except the person making it*
Ev/en if it is the statement of a fellow 
conspirator, it will not be admissible except 
against the person making it if at the time 
it was made the conspiracy had come to an end*
Ue do not think that the legislature, in 
enacting section 12(2), intended to depart 
from this salutary rule.^
In effect the Court acted in disregard of that
provision which was gravely prejudicial to the accused*
As regards the sworn evidence of the defendants the Court
15had this to say:
There is no such thing as a cut-throat 
defence here, and we consider the evidence 
of any defendant may be treated in the same 
way (although with much caution) as that of 
any other witness who came to the witness 
stand not from the dock but from the witness 
room*
Fourthly, the Supreme Court interpreted the
section, which laid on the accused the burden of proving
that a confession made by him was not voluntary, in
favour of the defendants by requiring only the bare minimum
evidence to discharge the burden of proof on a balance of
probabilities. As a consequence certain confessionary
16statements were excluded.
Fifthly, the Court, whenever it opted to conduct
its proceedings in the absence of any defendant as
specially provided by Act No. 10 of 1963, obtained the
consent of the absent defendant to the conduct of procsed-
ings in his absence.
14. H i H . , at P* 205. cf. the earlier view quoted
at note 3 supra.
15. Ibid., at P* 206.
16. Ibid., at P* 262.
17. Ibid., at
I P-
198.
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Thes8 instances clearly indicate hou the Trial 
Court construed statutes and applied rules of lau 
having the interest of justice as the primary considera­
tion. In the light of these protections it extended to 
the defendants, the Supreme Court seems to have assumed 
that they uere given as fair a trial as possible uithin 
the confines of the specially amended lau.
The Court, houever, expressed its dissatisfaction
uith the provision relating to punishment of the offenders:
But ue must drau attention to the fact that 
the Act of 1962 radically altered ex. post 
facto the punishment to uhich the defendants 
are rendered liable. The Act removed the 
discretion of the court as to the period of 
the sentence to be imposed, and compels the 
Court to impose a term of ten years1
imprisonment, although us uould have uished
to differentiate in the matter of sentence 
betueen those uho organised the conspiracy 
and those uho uere induced to join it. It 
also imposes a compulsory forfeiture of 
property. These amendments uere not merely 
retroactive; they uere also ad_ hoc, applicable 
only to the conspiracy uhich uas the subject of 
tthe charges ue have tridd. Ue are unable to 
understand this discrimination. To the Courts 
uhich must be free from political bias, 
treasonable offences are equally heinous, uhat- 
ever be the complexion of the Government in 
pouer or uhoever be the offenders.
It may be noted in passing that in Hinds v.
19
The queen, the Privy Council reiterated the principle 
that the legislature, under a Uestminster Model constitution, 
cannot prescribe the sentence to be imposed in an 
individual citizen!s case.
18. Ibid., at p. 424*
19. /T976_7 1 All E.R. 353 at p. 371. per 
Lord Diplock.
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The Court accordingly imposed on the eleven 
defendants it found guilty the minimum period of imprison­
ment it could impose, a period of ten years and compulsory
20forfeiture of property*
(iii) The Privy Council Decision
The eleven appellants uho had all been found guilty
by the Supreme Court raised many points uhich demanded a
very extensive consideration of evidence and factual detail*
All the appeals, houever, shared a common submission that,
uhatever be the details of fact or evidence, the convictions
should be quashed ouing to the invalidity of Acts Nos. 1 and
31 of 1962. It uas agreed betueen the parties that if the
impugned Acts uere invalid the convictions could not be
sustained. Their Lordships, therefore, decided that before
embarking on an investigation of the facts and evidence
they should first decide as a primary point uhether the
impugned Acts uere valid.^ .
*
Their Lordships examined the provisions contained
/
2
in the tuo Acts and came to the conclusion that the Acts 
uere intended to be applicable to the alleged conspiracy 
alone and therefore ex, post facto, ad hoc and atd hominem. 
Lord Pearce, delivering the opinion of the Privy Council, 
observed that by the time the proceedings came to an end
20. Ibid., at p. 424.
1. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 265, at p. 273} Z.19667 1 All 
E.R. 650, at p. 652.
2. see supra p. 267-74.
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the Acts uould have served their purpose, uhich appeared 
to be the fulfilment of the promise implied in the White 
Paper, namely to impose a deterrent punishment of a 
severe character on all those guilty of the alleged offences 
against the State*
The principal contention on behalf of the
appellants uas that:
the Acts of 1962 offended against the Constitution 
in that they amounted to a direction to convict 
the appellants or to a legislative plan to secure 
the conviction and severe punishment of the 
appellants, and thus constituted an unjustifiable 
assumption of judicial pouer by the legislature, 
or an interference uith judicial pouer, uhich is 
outside the legislature^ competence and is 
inconsistent uith the severance of pouer betueen 
the legislature, executive and judiciary uhich 
the Constitution ordains.^
The Privy Council uas, thus, called upon to 
decide (a) uhether the impugned Acts amounted to a 
usurpation or infringment of judicial pouer and (b) if 
so, uhether it uas inconsistent uith the Constitution uhich
recognised the existence of a separation of pouers.
/
(a) Were the tuo Acts judicial in nature? The
major premise for the Privy Council decision on this aspect
5
clearly appears from the follouing passage:
It goes uithout saying that the legislature may 
legislate, for the generality of its subjects, 
by the creation of crimes and penalties or by
3. Quoted supra p. 268.
4. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 265 at p. 278; ,719667 All E.R.
650, at p. 655.
5. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 265 at p. 283-4; £T9667 1 All
E.R. 650, at p. 659.
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enacting rules relating to evidence. But the 
Acts of 1962 had no such general intention.
They uere clearly aimed at particular known 
individuals uho had been named in a Uhite 
Paper and uere in prison awaiting their fate.
• • •
Such a lack of generality, however, in 
criminal legislation need not, of itself, 
involve the judicial function, and their 
Lordships are not prepared to hold that every 
enactment in this field which can be described 
as ad. hominem and ex. post facto must inevitably 
usurp or infringe th8 judicial power. Nor do 
they find it necessary to attempt the almost 
impossible task of tracing where the line is to 
be drawn between what will and what will not 
constitute such an interference. Each case 
must be decided in the light of its own facts 
and circumstances, including the true purpose 
of the legislation, the situation to which it 
uas directed, the existence (where several 
enactments are impugned) of a common design 
or restriction, the discretion or judgment of 
the judiciary in specific proceedings.
It is abundantly clear that ,the Privy Council was
not willing to commit itself to a general exposition of
what amounts to a usurpation or infringement of judicial
power. The method adopted by.the Privy Council was to 
*
determine whether the Acts in issue amounted to an exercise 
of judicial power.
Much emphasis uas placed by the Privy Council on
the cumulative effect of the relevant statutory provisions,
as appears from the following passage:^
The pith and substance of both Acts was a 
legislative plan £x. post facto to secure 
the conviction and enhance the punishment 
of those particular individuals. It 
legalised their imprisonment while they were 
awaiting trial. It mad*e admissible their
6. ( 196 5 )  68  N . L . R .  2 6 5 ,  a t  p. 28 4}  (_19667 1 A l l
E.R. 650, at p. 660.
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statements inadmissibly obtained during that 
period. It altered the fundamental lau of 
evidence so as to facilitate their conviction.
And finally it altered ex. post facto the 
punishment to be imposed on them. . . .  The 
true nature and purpose of these enactments 
are revealed by their conjoint impact on the 
specific proceedings in respect of uhich they 
uere designed, and they take their colour, in 
particular, from the alterations they purported 
to make as to their ultimate objective, the 
punishment of those convicted. These altera­
tions constituted a grave and deliberate 
incursion into the judicial sphere. Quite
bluntly, their aim uas to ensure that the
judges in dealing uith these particular persons 
on these particular charges uere deprived of 
their normal discretion as respects appropriate 
sentences.
It is uorth mentioning here that the impugned
7
Acts uere attacked, before the Supreme Court on the basis
that the Parliament of Ceylon could not pass ex. post facto
laus. This uas unacceptable to the Court. The Privy 
Council too did not think fit to hold otheruise. The 
Parliament could pass a lau not only uith retrospective
effect, it could also pass aid hoc or ad[ hominem laus, the
» 8 Privy * Council observed. Houever, the statutory provisions
contained in the tuo Acts of 1962 uere of an exceptional
nature so as to constitute a serious inroad into the
exclusive province of the judicature. The refusal of the
Supreme Court to recognise a limitation on the pouers of
Parliament, preventing the passage of ex. post facto laws,
g
rested on the follouing reasoning:
If upon considerations of uhat may appear to be 
unjust or inexpedient, ue uere to read into the 
Constitution a restriction against ax post facto
7. (1963) 65 N.L.R. 73.
8. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 265, at p. 284} /T966~J 1 fill E.R. 
650, at p. 659.
9. (1963) 65 N.L.R. 73, at p. 83.
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lau uhich is not expressed therein either 
directly or by necessary implication, ue 
uould be adding to our Constitution, a 
limitation directly stated in the Consti­
tutions of India, France and the United 
States, uhich for good reasons or bad uas 
not stated in our Constitution. That uould 
be to arrogate to the Court the pouer to 
legislate.
In contrast to the self-restraint exhibited by 
the Supreme Court in refusing to read into the Constitution 
a limitation uhich the Court held could not be attributed 
to the Constitution at least as arising by necessary 
implication, the Privy Council ventured to gather from the 
Constitution a binding principle uhich prohibited uhat have 
been termed ’legislative judgments1
Hou the Supreme Court interpreted laus and applied 
principles to the best advantage of the defendants, and hou 
this resulted in reducing the severity of the impugned Acts 
has earlier been referred to.^ It is unfortunate that the 
Privy Council did not have occasion to refer to the part 
played by the Supreme Court. It is respectfully submitted 
that this is a very pertinent consideration in vieu of the 
fact that their Lordships, instead of laying doun a general 
principle, examined uhether in that particular instance an 
injustice uas caused to the defendants. On the other hand, 
it may be argued that the changes made in the lau of evidence
10. ’These acts uere legislative judgments; and 
an exercise of judicial pouer’, per Chase, 3., in the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Calder v. Bull 
(1789) 3 Dallas U.S.S.C. 386. Cited in Liyanaqe v.
The Queen ^1*966J 1 All E.R. 650, at p. 660; 68 N.L.R.
265, at p. 285.
11. See supra pp. 276-9.
235
so as to make admissible evidence uhich is otheruise 
inadmissible, and the removal of the judicial discretion 
as to the degree of punishment to be imposed on a convicted 
person, uere by themselves sufficient to support th8 
conclusion of the Privy Council that the impugned Acts 
usurped or at least unduly interfered uith the administration 
of justice.
12It must also be noted that some of the arguments
raised by the Solicitor-General received little attention.
He argued that the amendment of section 115 of the Penal
Code did not have the effect of making uhich uas innocent
before an offence; that it became necessary to empouer the
Minister to grant a conditional pardon in the absence of a
Magisterial inquiry uhich uas necessary under the then
13existing lau to tender such a pardon: that the right of
appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal uas taken auay as 
the trial uas held uithout a jury but an adequate right
I
existed in the right of appeal to the Privy Council; and, 
that although the impugned Acts made admissible certain 
types of evidence uhich under the general lau uers 
inadmissible, sufficient safeguards uere provided.
These arguments, perhaps uith the exception of the 
last, seem to be substantial. As uas pointed out sarlier, 
their Lordships could have paid more attention to the uay
12. These arguments are summar ised in (1966) 68 
N.L.R. 265, at p. 270. See also ^19677 A.C. at pp. 269-275.
13. See supra p., .273.
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the tuo Acts in_ fact affected the particular defendant- 
appellants rather than vieuing the nature of the statutory 
provisions as an academic exercise. That this omission is 
not to be easily over-looked is all ths more clear in vieu 
of the absence of a general test to determine uhat amounts 
to usurpation or infringement of judicial pouer by the 
legislature.
(b) Did the Constitution of Ceylon prohibit 
the exercise of judicial pouer by the Legislature? The 
affirmative ansuer to this question given by the Privy 
Council uas founded on the basis that the Constitution of 
Ceylon embodied the doctrine of the separation of pouers 
and as a consequence that judicial pouer resided uith the 
judiciary, and uith the judiciary alone.
That the Parliament of Ceylon uas sovereign, the 
Privy Council thought, had been uell established.^* The 
pouers of the legislature, houever, had to be exercised in
I
accordance uith the terms of the Constitution from uhich
2the pouer derived.
The fact that there uas no .express vesting of 
judicial pouer in the Courts, such as in the United States 
of America or Australia, their Lordships pointed out, uas 
not necessarily decisive. For, in the latter tuo countries
/396§7 1 A11 650> a t  P* 657;_68 N.L.R.
265,  at p. 281. Citing Ibralebbe v. Reqinam / 1 9 6 47 1 
All E.R. 251; (1963) 65 N.L.R. 433.
2. Ibid.
the federal courts uere introduced in each country by the 
Constitution which also created the executive and the 
legislature* !Unless such courts uere created and vested 
with power by the Constitution they had no existence or 
power1•
In Ceylon, however, the position was different.
The change of sovereignty did not in itself 
produce any apparent change in the constituents 
or th8 functioning of the judicature. So far 
as the courts were concerned their work continued 
unaffected by the new constitution, and the 
Ordinances under which they functioned remained 
in force.^
The Privy Council traced the history of the
judicial system of Ceylon back to the Charter of Justice
of 1833. Ordinances which later replaced the Charter had
in fact continued the jurisdiction and the procedure of
the courts established in 1833. 1 There was no compelling
need therefore to make any specific reference to the
judicial power of the courts when the legislative and
• * ' 5executive powers changed hands1•
The Independence Constitution of Ceylon, 1946, did 
not make provision for the constitution, jurisdiction and 
the powers of the judiciary. Owing to the fact that an 
independent judiciary was already in existence. Nevertheles 
those who framed the Constitution did not overlook the
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. /T9667 1 fill E.R. 650, at p. 658; (1965) 68 
N.l.R. 265, at p. 282.
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importance of securing the independence of the judges and
maintaining the dividing line between the judiciary on
the one hand and the executive and also the legislature
on the other hand, the Privy Council noted*6
In the absence of a specific provision which
expressly vested judicial power in the judiciary, the
Privy Council ventured in search of an implied provision*
They noted that the Constitution was Significantly*
divided into parts, variously dealing with the executive,
legislature and the judiciary etc. Further, provision had
been made with the intention of securing the independence
7
of the judiciary* «
Their Lordships made the following observations 
regarding the constitutional provisions which were intended
g
as safeguards of the independence of the judiciary:
These provisions manifest an intention to secure 
in the judiciary a freedom from political, 
legislative and executive control* They are 
wholly appropriate in a .constitution which 
intends that judicial power shall be vested only 
in the judicature* They would be inappropriate 
in a constitution by which it was intended that 
judicial power shall be shared by the executive 
or the legislature. The Constitution *s silence 
as to the vesting of judicial power is consistent 
with its remaining, where it had lain for more 
than a century, in the hands of the judicature.
It is not consistent with any intention that 
henceforth it should pass to or be shared by, 
the executive or the legislature.
6* Ibid., citing The Bribery Commissioner v. 
Ranasinqhe /I964/ 2 All E.R. 785, at p. 787; (1964) 66 N.L.R. 
73, at pp. 74-5*
7. Ibid*
8. /I9667 1 All E.R* 250, at p* 658; (1965) 68 
N.L.R. 265, at p. 282.
2S0
The conclusion arrived at by the Privy Council
that judicial power was exclusively vested in the judiciary,
thus, was founded on two factors, namely, (a) that
historically judicial power had been exercised by the
judiciary alone and (b) that the constitutional provisions
which safeguarded the independence of the judiciary were
consistent solely with an intention that the historical
vesting of judicial power was not to be disturbed*
That in pre-independence Ceylon judicial power
resided solely in the judicature, as has been observed 
g
earlier, seems not without sufficient ground, at least to 
the extent that the courts very often asserted their power 
and sternly resisted any interferences with or control over 
their functioning* But, as regards the second factor, it 
has been doubted whether the conclusion drawn was entirely 
correct*^ It is an open question whether the conferment 
of sovereign legislative power on the Parliament of Ceylon 
did not affect the exclusive vesting of judicial power in 
the pre-independence period, when Ceylon did not have a 
sovereign local legislature*
A clear distinction exists between the notion 
that the judiciary must be independent from undue external 
influences and the doctrine that the legislature is not
9. See generally Part I of this thesis-
10* S* A. de Smith, ’The Separation of Powers in 
a New Dress’, (1966) 12 McGill L. 3. 491, at p* 494; and 
Garth Nettheim, ’Legislative Interferences with the 
Judiciary’, The Australian L* 3. Vol. 40 (1966) 221-231.
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competent to exercise what may be termed, in a given
situation, judicial power* The former does not, but the
latter inevitably does, depend on a strict application of
the doctrine of the separation of powers* Moreover, during
the Colonial period when the administration controlled the
judiciary to a greater extent than in the post-independence
period in Ceylon, the judiciary emphasised over and over
again the need for independence in carrying out its duties*
And it has been argued that in the Colonial times a
separation of powers did not exist, on the basis that there
existed then certain tribunals and administrative offices
which were entrusted with some judicial functions.^
Their Lordships in Liyanaqe v* The Queen were,
however, firm in their conviction that a separation of powers
12did exist in Ceylon;
/b_7ut in their Lordships* view that decision 
/The Queen v. Liyanaqe, (1962) 64 N.L.R. 31^7 
was correct and there exists a separate power 
in the judicature which.under the constitution 
&s it stands cannot be usurped or infringed by 
the executive or the legislature.
/
A distinction, however, may be made between the 
earlier Supreme Court decision approved by the Privy Council 
and the Privy Council decision itself* In the former the 
power of the Minister of Justice, a member.of the executive, 
to nominate judges was in issue whereas in the latter the
11. See, for instance Tambiah, 3., in Ualker v. Fry
(1966) 68 N.L.R. 73, at p. 104. “ ”  *
12. /T9657 1 All E.R. 650, at p. 659; (1966) 68
N.L.R. 265, at p. 283. ;
9 0,9(J  O M
competence of the legislature itself to exercise judicial 
pouer uas challenged* It must be noted that certain 
factors existed in favour of the legislature, namely 
that it uas sovereign and could pass retrospective, .ad hoc 
or ad. hominem laus, and, that the Parliament could by an 
ordinary statute create courts and confer or take auay 
the jurisdiction of the courts* Such pouers could not be 
attributed to the executive branch of the State*
The Privy Council seems to have treated any 
attempt either by the executive or the legislature to 
exercise judicial pouer on an equal footing, ouing to the 
recognition it accorded to the existence of a separation 
of pouers in the Independence Constitution of Ceylon*
(iv) An Assessment of the Liyanaqe Principle
That the legislature uas incompetent to exercise
or interfere uith judicial functions, as ue have seen above,
rested not on any specific prohibition contained in the
Constitution, but on uhat the Privy Council regarded as a
necessary implication arising from its general structure
and its provisions relating to the judiciary. Therefore,
the existence of a separation of pouers forms part of the
ratio decidendi as much as the conclusion that the impugned
acts amounted to an erosion of the judicial pouer does*
Accordingly, th9 Liyanage Principle may be
formulated as follous:
The existence of a separation of pouers is a 
fundamental feature of the Ceylon (Constitution)
Order-in-Council, 1946, and as a result judicial 
pouer is exclusively vested in the judiciary*
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A legislative enactment uhich assumed or 
interferes uith judicial pouer, such as 
a legislative judgment, violates those 
principles uhich are necessarily implied 
in the Constitution.
This principle has been severely criticised. It
has been said that *a ueighty conclusion uas thus draun
from relatively slender constitutional foundations *^  and
that */ t_7he more closely the argument of the Board is
examined, the more sueeping appear the inferences supporting
2its conclusions1• But, S. A. de Smith added that *^ t_7his 
is not to say that the decision in the instant case is to be 
deprecated, but rather that the necessity of the implications
3
on uhich it rests ought to be vieued uith a uary scepticism*.
In laying doun this principle the Privy Council
seems to have given much thought to the desirability of
genera Xly preventing undue interferences uith judicial 
4pouer:
If such Acts as these uere valid the judicial 
pouer could be uholly absorbed by the legislature 
and taken out of the hands of the judges. It is 
appreciated that the legislature had no such 
general intention. It uas beset by a grave 
situation and it took grave measures to deal uith 
it, thinking, one must presume, that it had pouer 
to do so and uas acting rightly; but that consi­
deration is irrelevant, and gives no validity 
to acts uhich infringe the Constitution. Uhat is 
done once, if it be alloued, may be done again and 
in a lesser crisis and less serious circumstances; 
and thus judicial pouer may be eroded.
1. Garth Nettheim, op.cit.» at 225.
2.. S. A. de Smith,* MThe Separation of Pouers in a
Neu Dress”, (1966) 12 McGill L. 3. 491, at p. 494.
3. Ibid.
4. Liyanaqe v. The Queen /19667 1 All E.R. 650, 
at p. 660; (1965} 68 N.L.R. 265, at p. 285.
This is similar to the caution sounded by Lord
, 5
Pearce himself in The Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe,
that if the term ’judicial officer1 uas construed to
include only judges of the ordinary courts,
it might be open to the executive to appoint 
uhom they chose to sit on any number of neuly 
created tribunals uhich might deal uith various 
aspects of the jurisdiction of the ordinary
courts and thus, by eroding the Court’s
jurisdiction, render section 55 valueless.g
In Ranasinqhe’s case, unlike Liyanage’s case, the 
Privy Council sought to sustain the applicability of a 
clearly defined principle in different factual circumstance 
the principle there uas that a judicial officer, meaning an 
person uho held a judicial office and not merely the judges
of the ordinary courts, should be appointed by the Judicial
Service Commission. Further, there existed some general 
criterion as to uhat constituted a judicial office. In 
Liyanaqe’s case, houever, there uas lacking a general 
criterion as to uhat constituted an exercise of judicial 
pouer by the legislature. Accordingly, the propriety of 
relying on the likelihood of future violations of the 
Constitution as one of the justifications for invalidating 
the impugned Acts in Liyanaqe’s case seems not entirely 
beyond question.
5. ^19647 2 All E.R. 785? (1964) 66 N.L.R. 73.
6. /T9647 2 All E.R. 785, at p. 789; (1964) 66 
N.L.R. 73, at p. 76.
One last comment may be made on a remark made
by Lord Pearce in Liyanaqe’s case:
During the argument analogies uere naturally 
sought to be draun from the British Consti­
tution; but any analogy must be very indirect, 
and provides no helpful guidance. The British 
Constitution is unuritten uhereas in the case 
of Ceylon their Lordships have to interpret 
a uritten document from uhich alone the 
legislature derives its legislative pouer.^
This indicates not merely that one constitution
is uritten and the other unuritten. It also brings to
light the fact that a constitution patterned on the
0
’Uestminster Model* may in certain circumstances deviate 
so much from its model that the model itself becomes 
irrelevant in the matter of the interpretation of the 
constitution uhich is supposedly based on it. The reason 
for this is not difficult to apprehend: although the
British lauyers uere committed to the doctrine of the 
sovereignty of Parliament, the only real control of uhich 
remained uith the electorate, uhen it came to the creation 
of legislatures for neuly independent states, they placed 
limitations on both the legislature and the executive, due 
to the uidespread belief that the inhabitants of the former 
colonies uere not sufficiently mature to use a proper 
political judgment.
7. /T9667 X All E.R. 650, at p. 658;
(1965) 68 N.L.R. 265, at p. 282. 1
8. See generally S. A. de Smith, The Neu Commonuealth 
and its Constitutions. (London, 1964) at 77.
Whatever the merits of such a belief, the 
result of the built-in limitations uas that developments 
uere to take place enabling the Privy Council to discern 
elements in such constitutions uhich cannot readily be
g
attributed to the English Constitutional jurisprudence.
9. See also the discussion of Hind’s case 
in chapter 12, Part (3).'
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The Aftermath of Liyanaqe v. The Queen
The local response to the creative judicial innovations 
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Liyanaqe1s 
case uas a number of cases brought both before the Supreme 
Court of Ceylon and the Privy Council in an attempt to apply 
or extend the principles enunciated in that case# None of 
these attempts met uith success# Nevertheless an examination 
of these cases is not without its rich reward, for they amply 
illustrate the caution and exactness uith uhich both the 
Supreme Court and the Privy Council set about their delicate 
task of pronouncing upon the constitutionality of Acts of 
Parliament, the bold venture of the Privy Council in Liyanage1s 
case notwithstanding#
The most outstanding of those cases will be reviewed 
now, classifying them into three categories:
(1) The Kariapper situation;
(2) The Tuckers situation; and
(3) The conceptual difference between judicial power 
and jurisdiction.
(2) The Kariapper Situation
(i) The Facts and Setting of Kariapper v. Ui.jesinha^
A Commission of Inquiry was appointed in 1959, under 
the warrant of Governor-General, during the late
Mr. Bandaranayakefs government, to inquire into, and report upon, 
allegations of bribery made against certain persons who were
1. (1966) 6B N.L.R. 529 (S.C.); ^1967/ 3 All E.R. 485,
(1967) 70 N.L.R. 49.
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or uho had been members of the Senate, the House of 
Representatives or the State Council* In the report of 
the Commission, tabled in Parliament in December 1965 during 
Mrs* Bandaranayake1s government, uere stated the names of the 
six persons found by the Commission to be guilty of the 
charges made against them* Tuo of these six persons had been 
elected to the House of Representatives at the General Election 
held in July 1960, and both relinquished their seats,
3
understandably at the request of their party leadership.
Houever, no formal steps (such as a legislative enactment)
uere taken by the government to give effect to the findings
of the Commission.'
It uas the coalition government led by the United
National Party uhich came into pouer at the July 1965 General 
4
Election uhich introduced the Imposition of Civic Disabilities
5
Act, designed to impose civic disabilities on the six persons 
named in the Commission report. All the political parties 
acquiesced in the passage of the Bill, and it uas passed 
unanimously except for just one vote against it at the first 
reading.
2. The State Council uas the Legislative Assembly
that existed in Ceylon at the promulgation of the Ceylon
(Constitution) Order in Council, 1946.
3. Ceylon Daily Neus of August 5, 1978, published a 
collection of extracts from the Hansard directly relevant to 
this issue.
4. For a stimulating account of the policies of
Ceylon betueen 1948 and 1972, see A. J. Uilson, Politics rn
Sri Lanka (1972), specially chapter 4.
5. Act No. 14 of 1965.
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The Act uhich applied only to the six persons named
by the Commission and listed in the Schedule to the Act
had the effect of imposing civic disabilities such as
disqualification from being a voter or candidate at a
Parliamentary or local government election6 for a period
7
of seven years from the commencement of the Act, and
disqualification for life from being employed as a public
servant.8 Section 7 of the Act, uhich had the most direct
bearing on Kariapper!s case, is as follous:
Where, on the day immediately prior to the 
relevant date,^ a person to uhom this Act 
applies uas a Senator, or a member of the 
House of Representatives or of any local 
authority, his seat as a Senator or such
member as the case may be, shall be deemed,
for all purposes to have become vacant on 
that date.
Kariapper, uho uas not returned at the General 
Election held in July I960, and another, both of uhom uere
among the six persons named by the Commission, had been duly
elected to the House of Representatives at the July 1965 
elections. Both of them belonged to the Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party uhich had to cross the floor to lead the opposition, 
as a result of the General Elections held in 1965. By virtue 
of section 7 of the Act quoted above, Kariapper and the other 
member became disqualified from sitting in Parliament. 
Kariapper applied to the Supreme Court of Ceylon10 for a urit
6. Ibid., secs. 2 to 6.
7. November 16, 1965.
8. Sec. 8.
9. i. e., the day of the commencement of the Act.
see sec. 11, the interpretation section.
10. K a r i a p p e r  v. Ui.jesinha ( 1 96 6 )  68 N . L . R .  529.
of Mandamus against the Clerk to the House of Representatives
and his assistant ordering them to recognise him as a Member
of Parliament and to pay him his remuneration and allowances
uhich had been withheld from him since the passing of the Act.
The Supreme Court, whose decision on this point received the
unreserved approbation of the Privy Council,^ unanimously
held that Mandamus was not available to the petitioner on two
grounds: namely,
(i) that there was no legal duty on the Clerk
of the House to pay the petitioner his
remuneration and allowances; and,
(ii) that the Clerk, when he paid Members of
Parliament their remuneration and allowances,
acted as a servant or agent of Croun and Mandamus
did not lie against a servant or agent of Crown
to compel him to perform a duty he owed to the 
12Crown.
, Inspite of the fact t*hat the action could have been 
dismissed on the preliminary objection alone, the Supreme 
Court went on to examine the arguments relating to the alleged 
unconstitutionality of the Act fin 'deference to the arguments’. 
Similarly the Privy Council thought it proper to deal uith 
the merits of the appeal before considering whether the 
procedure actually adopted (i.e. an application for a mandate 
in the nature of Mandamus) was appropriate.^^ This indicates 
the willingness of both the Supreme Court and the Privy Council
11. (1967) 70 N.L.R. 49 at p. 64; /T9677 3 All E.R.
485 at 496.
12. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 529 at p. 533.
13. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 529 at p. 535, per Sansoni, 0.
14. /196773 All E.R. 485 at p. 496; 70 N.L.R. 49  at p.
to pronounce their considered opinion on matters of great 
constitutional importance, in appropriate circumstances, 
notwithstanding the uell established rule of constitutional 
interpretation that a constitutional issue will not be 
decided if the matter can be disposed of on some other 
ground."^
15, See Ashwarder v. Tennessee Valley Authority 
(1936) 297 U.S. 288 at p. 345-48. The judgment of 
Lord Denning, H. R., in the Court of Appeal decision in 
Gouriet v._ Union of Post Office Workers /1977/ 1 All E.R. 696 
(reusd. /1978/ A•C . 435 House of Lords) deserves mention 
here although it is not strictly relevant. In that case,
Lord Denning held, inter alia, that where the Attorney- 
General had refused his consent to a relator action, his 
action could be overriden, indirectly, by the court to the 
extent that if he refused leave in a' proper case, the 
plaintiff could himself apply to the court for a declaration 
or an injunction, in particular when the proceeding had 
been taken to enforce the law. Faced with an impending 
breach of the law1, his Lordship asked whether courts were
1 to stand idly by! when there uas involved *a matter of great 
constitutional principle1 (at p. 702). Although the decision 
was overruled by the House of Lords, which found certain 
views of the Court of appeal 1regrettable1 ( /1978/ A.C. 435 
at p. 506 ), it stands as a telling example of the initiative 
the Courts are some times willing to show, deviating from long 
established tradition in a crisis situation involving matters 
of great constitutional importance.- Lord Denning in his 
recent book asks a very pertinent question: !Uere we wrong
to grant that injunction that Saturday Horning?1 
(The Discipline of Law, 1979, London, Butterworths, at p. 142).
( l i )  The C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  I s s u e s  R a is e d  b e f o r e  th e  Supreme 
C o u r t  and th e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l
As a prelude to a detailed examination of the 
constitutional issues involved in Kariapperfs case, they may 
first be summarised. Both the Supreme Court and the Privy - 
Council reiterated the position that the Ceylon Parliament 
could pass ex^  post facto, ad hoc or ajd hominem laus* The 
argument that the impugned Act amounted to a legislative 
judgment or an act of attainder uas rejected on the grounds, 
(a) that Parliament neither determined the guilt of the 
affected persons nor indirectly influenced the inquiry into 
the allegations, (b) that the imposition of disabilities in 
the civic life uas not a punishment but a mere exercise of 
the inherent pouers of Parliament to* regulate its discipline, 
and, (c) that since the constitutional provisions relating 
to the judiciary, or any necessary implication arising there­
from, f uere not unalterable, Parliament could pass a lau even 
if it amounted to an assumption of judicial pouer provided 
it satisfied the requirements laid doun in section 29 (4), 
namely, those relating to amendment' of the Constitution*
The constitutional issues summarised above uill nou 
be examined under the follouing tuo heads:
(a) uas the impugned Act tantamount to an exercise 
of judicial pouer by Parliament; and
(b) could the Independence Constitution be amended 
by implication?
It must be mentioned that since the decisions of the 
Supreme Court and the Privy Council have much in common, they 
uill be discussed not separately but together under the above 
tuo heads.
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( a )  Uas the  Act ta n ta m o u n t  to  an as sum pt io n  o f  / j u d i c i a l  
pouer  by P a r l i a m e n t ?
The primary argument seems to have been that, the
acceptance of a bribe being an offence punishable under the
Penal Code,^ the impugned Act, uhich had as one of its
objects the disqualification of a Member of Parliament for
acceptance of a bribe, indirectly had the effect of convicting
a person uhereas there should properly be a conviction by a 
9
court of lau. If this argument • uere sound, the impugned
Act could have amounted to a blatant usurpation of the judicial
pouer uhich uas vested in the judiciary alone# In order to
label the impugned Act as an unuarranted assumption of judicial
3p o u e r ,  L iy a n a q e  v# The Queen uas h e a v i l y  r e l i e d  upon.
G. P. A. Silva, 3#, entertained little doubt that
Liyanage!s case uas authority for the proposition that the
passing of an act of attainder against a particular person, or
of an act instructing a Judge to bring in a verdict of guilt 
%
against someone under trial, uould patently be usurpations 
of judicial pouer. Houever, the Imposition of Civic 
Disabilities Act could not be equated uith the Criminal Lau 
(Special Provisions) Act, uhich had been, described by the 
Privy Council in Liyanaqefs case a legislative judgment.
1. Ordinance No. 2 of 1883.
2. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 529 at p. 545 per G. P. A. Silva,
3. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 265; /I9667 1 All E.R. 650.
4. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 529 at p. 546-47 £er Silva, J.,
and at p. 536-37 per Sansoni, C.J. .
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In Liyanaqe^ case, the impugned Acts uhich uere
ex post facto had the effect of securing the conviction and
enhanced punishment of certain persons uho uere auaiting
trial uith the presumption of innocence operating in their
favour. But in the instant case, although the impugned Act
operated uith retrospective effect (a vieu not shared by the
Privy Council uhich thought that disabilities uere imposed
prospectively)J and applied to certain named individuals, it
did not seek to change any substantive or procedural laus, as
did the Acts successfully impugned in Liyanage's case, in
order to facilitate the conviction of the affected persons.
They had been found guilty by a Commission of Inquiry
appointed, independently of the impugned Act, at the instance
of a previous government. The Commission uhich, to the
satisfaction of both the Supreme Court of Ceylon and the Privy
Council, had conducted its proceedings in an unquestionably
6impartial manner, alone made the declaration of their guilt;
Parliament did not modify or qualify the Commission Report 
7
to any degree. The fact that the finding of guilt and 
the imposition of disabilities uere carried out under tuo 
different governments prompted the Supreme Court to observe 
that there uas obviously lacking a legislative plan
5. /19677 3 All E.R. 485 at p. 492; (1967) 70 N.L.R.
49 at p. 58.
6. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 529 at p. 547 per Silva, S., and
at p« 531-32 per Sansoni, C.3. It may safely be assumed that 
the Privy Council did not disagree uith this vieu in the 
absence of any contrary comment by their Lordships# ^
7. Ibid., at p. 547.
305
directed against the six persons named in the schedule to 
the Act resulting in their conviction and punishment 
undermining to that extent the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
courts,®
Uhen one considers all the qualifications contained 
in the conclusions arrived at by the Privy Council 
in / Liyanaqe1s _7 case it seems to me that their 
Lordships did not base their decision on one 
particular fact or circumstance# Like the necessity 
for the presence of all the links in a chain of 
circumstances the totality of uhich goes to prove a 
case of circumstantial evidence it is the presence 
of a number of circumstances at the same time in the 
coup case • • • that made the Privy Council 
characterise the Acts as legislative judgments# Oust 
as a case of circumstantial evidence uould fail ouing 
to the absence of a necessary link in the chain of 
circumstances, the absence of any one of these 
essential circumstances may have led the Privy Council 
to take a different vieu and to hold the impugned 
provisions to be intra vires the Constitution# It 
uill therefore be unsafe on the authority of the 
Privy Council decision to rush to a conclusion that 
Parliament has enacted a legislative judgment by 
reason of the mere presence of one or more of the 
features that are present in the Criminal Lau 
(Special Provisions) Act in such an enactment.g
Perhaps, the admirably convincing manner in uhich 
the Supreme Court distinguish'ed Liyanaqefs case prompted 
the appellant to shift the emphasis from Liyanaqe^ case 
to certain American cases relating mainly to acts of 
attainder, in the appeal before the Privy Council# It 
uas argued that, since the appellantfs seat uas vacated on 
a ground not found in the Constitution as it stood before 
the Act came into force,^ Parliament had in effect passed
8. Ibid,, at p. 547 per Silva, 3., and at p, 537 
per Sansoni, C.3.
9. Ibid#, at p, 550-51, per Silva, 3#
10. /”” 196 1 J  3 All E.R. 485 at p. 488; 70 N.L.R. 49 
at p. 53.
an act of attainder uhereby punishment in the nature of 
civic disabilities uas imposed, uith retrospective effect, 
on certain persons* The Privy Council in rebutting this 
argument adopted the follouing definition of an act of 
attainder:
A bill of attainder is a legislative act uhich 
inflicts punishment uithout a judicial trial*
• • • In these cases the legislative body
• * . assumes, in the language of the text 
books, judicial magistracy; it pronounces upon 
the guilt of the party, uithout any of the 
forms or safeguards of trial; it determines
the sufficiency of the proofs produced, uhether 
conformable to the rules of evidence or otheruise; 
and it fixes the degree of punishment in accordance 
uith its oun notions of the enormity of the offence.^
Follouing -the decision of the Supreme Court of the
12United States of America m  United States v. Lovett,
Sir Douglas Menzies, delivering the opinion of the Privy
Council, found tuo essential elements of an act of attainder;
namely, declaration of guilt for an offence specified and
imposition of punishment. It uas reiterated that * the
deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously
enjoyed, may be punishment, the circumstances attending and
13the causes of the deprivation determining this fact1•
The Privy Council pointed out that Parliament made 
no finding of its oun against the affected persons and that 
the disabilities imposed by the Act lacked the character of 
punishment. The imposition of disabilities, their Lordships
11. Cumminq v. State of Missouri (1866) 4 Uall. 277 
at p. 323.
k
12. (1945) 328 U. S. 303. ’
13. Ibid., at p. 323-24. Cited in Kariapperfs case 
at p. 490 (All E.R.) and p. 56 (N.L.R.).
3G7
thought, should properly be regarded as an exercise of the 
inherent pouer of Parliament to regulate its oun internal 
matters and to maintain discipline among its members. Such 
pouers had been regarded throughout the course of the English 
history,
as not strictly judicial but as belonging to 
the legislature, rather as something essential, 
or, at any rate, proper for its protection.
. . .  It is sufficient to say that they uere 
regarded by many authorities as proper incidents 
of the legislative functions, notuithstanding 
the fact that considered more theoretically-- 
perhaps one might even say, scientifically--they 
belong to the judicial sphere.^
Both the Supreme Court and the Privy Council concluded that
Parliament did not directly or in any indirect manner make
any finding of guilt and that the imposition of civic
disabilities uas effected in the exercise of the special
pouers of the legislature and did not partake of the exaction 
15of retribution.
Moreover, the acts of bribery relevant to the 
impugned Act uere different from the offences of bribery 
defined in the Penal Code:
14. R_. v. Richards, Ex parte Fitzpatrick and Broune
(1955) 92 C.L.R. 157 at p. 167. Cited by the Supreme Ccjrt-- 
68 N.L.R. 529 at p. 538 and by the Privy Council-~at p. 491 
(All E.R.) and p. 57 (N.L.R.).
15. See, Privy Council decision pp. 490-92 (All E.R.) 
and 56-59 (N.L.R.), and Supreme Court decision 68 N.L.R. 529
at pp. 536-38 and 547-48.
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/"B 7ribery among Senators and Members of 
Parliament is an area uhere each House by 
virtue of the Constitution itself exercise 
a sort of special jurisdiction and a 
finding by a Commission appointed uith the 
approval of the Senate or the House of 
Represenbatives or a Committee thereof uill 
have the same force as an adjudication by a 
competent Court, Uhat the present Act seeks 
to achieve is to extend this disqualification 
to certain persons found guilty of this same 
offence by a Commission of Inquiry appointed 
under the Commissions of Inquiry Act.^g
The cumulative effect of the tuo decisions in 
Kariapper’s case is that the impugned Act did not amount 
to an exercise of judicial pouer by Parliament because
1 *7
(a) the Commission, uithout any constraints or compulsions, 
inquired into certain alleged acts (and not penal offences) 
of bribery and (b) Parliament imposed civic disabilities, 
houever serious, on persons proved to have committed the 
acts of bribery, in the exercise of its special pouers, in 
order to ’keep the public life clean for the public good*,18
16. (1966) 68 N,L,R, 529 at p, 550, This vieu .is 
shared by the Privy Council. See /1967 7 3 All E.R, 485 at 
p, 492; 70 N.L.R, 49 at p. 57 ad.fin.
17. Ibid.
18. / I 9 6 7 7  3 Al l E. R.  4 8 5  at p. 49 1.
3G9
( b )  Could Ceylon P a r l i a m e n t  e x e r c i s e  . j u d i c i a l  pouer  even  
u i t h  a tuo t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y  i n  t he  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , 
u i t h o u t  f i r s t  amending the  C o n s t i t u t i o n ?
Section 10 of the Imposition of Civic Disabilities 
Act provided that any provisions of the Act uhich uere 
inconsistent uith any constitutional provision uere to be 
operative notuithstanding such inconsistency as if such 
inconsistent statutory provisions uere contained in an Act 
for the amendment of the Constitution enacted after compliance 
uith the requirement imposed by the proviso of sub-section (4) 
of section 29 of the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council 
(namely, Ihe requirement of a tuo-thirds majority). There 
uas endorsed on the Bill, uhen it uas presented for the 
Royal assent, the necessary certificate of the speaker that 
the number of votes cast in favour of it in the House of 
Representatives amounted to not less than tuo-thirds of the 
uhole number of the Members of Parliament (including those 
not present) • . -
It uas argued before the Supreme Court that the 
legislature could not even after compliance uith section 29 
(4) exercise judicial pouer uhich had solely been committed 
to the judiciary. This argument did not find favour uith 
either of the tuo presiding judges of the Supreme Court, 
Sansoni, C.3., having observed that an act of attainder as 
knoun in American jurisprudence could be imported into the 
constitutional jurisprudence of Ceylon through the notion of 
Usurpations of judicial pouer*, cautioned that a distinction, 
houever, had aluays to be draun betueen Acts passed in the
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ordinary uay and those passed under section 29 (4) of the
C o n s t i t u t i o n ,1 A c c o r d i n g l y ,  t h e  l e a r n e d  C h i e f  D u s t i c e
remarked that the Legislature uas uell uithin its authority
uhen it enacted the impugned Act *uith the necessary tuo-
2
t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y 1.
The position is explicitly stated in the judgment 
of Silva, 3 • Having referred to the uords of Pearce, L.3., 
in Liyanaqe!s case that 1 in so far as any Act passed uithout 
recourse to section 29 (4) of the Constitution purports to
3
usurp or infringe the judicial pouer it is ultra vires1,
Silva, 0,, said that 'uhere an Act is passed after due 
recourse to section 29 (4) of the Constitution, even though 
that Act usurps or infringes the judicial pouer it is intra 
vires1.^ For, the pouers of the judicature as set doun in
5
Part VI of the Constitution uere not unalterable.
Counsel for the appellant sought to attack the 
procedure by uhich Parliament had passed the impugned Act,
The argument uas that the proper procedure uould have been
for Parliament to have amended the Constitution first, 
empouering Pariiament to exercise judicial pouer, and then to 
have enacted the objectionable clauses by a separate Act,
1. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 529 at p. 536.
2. Ibid., at p. 538.
3# Liyanaqe v. The Queen (1965) 68 N.L.R. 265 
at p. 283; /1966/ 1 All E.R. 650 at p. 659.
4. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 529 at p. 548. See also 
Sansoni, C.J., at p. 538.
5. Ibid.
Sil
The proviso to section 29 (4) uas to the follouing effect:
Provided that no Bill for the amendment or 
repeal of any of the provisions of this 
Order shall be presented for the Royal assent 
unless it has endorsed on it a certificate 
under the hand of the Speaker that the number 
of votes cast in favour thereof in the House 
of Representatives amounted to not less than 
tuo thirds of the uhole number of members of
the House (including those not present).
The uords 'Bill for the amendment or repeal of any
of the provisions of this Order1 uere sought to be construed
as a reference to a Bill uhich specifically amended or
repealed a constitutional provision and not a Bill containing
any provision inconsistent uith the Constitution, Sansoni, C
met this argument by referring to the Privy Council decision
i-n McCauley v. The Kinq^ uhich had authoritatively laid doun
that a Constitution could be amendedtby implication too.
The Ceylon C o n s t i t u t i o n  uas ' c o n t r o l l e d '  i n  t h e  sense t h a t
it could be altered only 'uith some special formality'. It
uas held by the Supreme Court that the only special formality 
*
required in Ceylon uas that contained in Section 29 (4), 
Therefore, it uas urong to insist on any additional 
formalities not expressly mentioned there.
6. (1920) A.C. 691.
7, (1966) 68 N.L.R. 529 at p. 539-40 per Sansoni, C 
and 551-52 per Silva, 0.
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(lii) Concluding Remarks
The Imposition of Civic Disabilities Act, No. 14 of 
1965 shared certain features in common with the statute 
that was successfully impugned in Liyanage v. The Queen. 
Nevertheless, both the Privy Council and the Supreme Court 
came to the conclusion that the imposition of civic 
disabilities on certain persons, who had been found guilty 
by a Commission of Inquiry of bribery offences, could not 
be regarded as a legislative judgment. This conclusion 
was based on the grounds, inter alia, that the Commission, 
which made the declaration of guilt of the affected persons, 
was appointed by one government whereas the impugned Act, 
which imposed civic disabilities on the persons named by 
the Commission, was enacted by another government and that, 
although the imposition of civic disabilities might in 
certain circumstances be regarded as an exercise of judicial 
power, in the particular circumstances of the case it had 
to be recognised that Parliament was entitled to exercise 
certain powers, which are in a strict sense judicial, as 
incidents of its inherent powers. Another significant 
factor has been the near unanimity with which the Act had 
been passed.
It appears that in place of creative law making in 
Liyanage v. The Queen what we witness in the decisions of 
the Privy Council and The Supreme Court in Kariapperfs case 
is what is commonly known as 'judicial restraint1.
O-j 9
UXN
It is not for the Court to say that a lau 
passed by two-thirds of the uhole number 
of members of the House does not conduce 
to peace, order and good government. The 
Court is not at liberty to declare an Act 
void because it is said to offend against 
the spirit of the Constitution though that 
spirit is not expressed in words. ’It is 
difficult upon any general principles to 
limit the omnipotence of the sovereign 
legislative power by judicial interposition, 
except so far as the express words of a 
written Constitution give that authority1.
per Kania, C.D., in Gopalan v. The State of Madras 
(1950) 63 L.U. 638,x
Reference was also made to the oft-quoted words of
Sir Owen Dixon highlighting the need for ’strict and complete 
2
legalism!•
Kariapper’s case also provides an example of the 
general unwillingness of courts to decide issues which are 
not directly relevant to the decisions before them. In 
response to the argument that specific provisions contained 
in the American Constitution prohibiting the passage of acts 
of attainder and e x  post facto laws were superfluous, in 
that the general doctrine of separation of powers itself 
was sufficient to prevent the passage of such laws in that 
country, Sir Douglas Menzies said that their Lordships were 
not prepared to express any opinion on the hypothetical
3
question. Nor was he willing to decide whether the impugned 
Act would fall within the category of acts of attainder in 
the United States of America, because !it is unwise in the 
sphere of constitutional lau to go beyond what is necessary 
for the determination’ of the case in hand1.4
1. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 529 at p. 537. -
2. (1952) 26 Australian L.3., at p. 4*
3* Z196!/ 3 A11 E.R. 485 at  P* 490; 70 N.L.R. 49
a t  p. 55.
4 * I b i d * * at P* 4 0 0  (All E . R . ) ;  at p. 55 ( N . L . R . ) .
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It is submitted that two factors influenced the 
two decisions in Kariapper’s case. Firstly, since the 
Act had been passed with near unanimity in the House of 
Representatives, a judicial decision denying legal validity 
to the Act would amount to a serious undermining of the 
deliberate and unanimous action of the representative body. 
Secondly, a decision to the effect that the Act amounted to 
a legislative judgment would have had little practical effect, 
for there was no opposition to the passage of the Bill in 
Parliament. However the overriding motivation seems to have 
been the declared adherence to ’positivism* and ’judicial 
restraint*•
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(3) The Tuckers Situation
In Tuckers Ltd, v. Ceylon Mercantile Union,^ the 
Supreme Court of Ceylon was called upon to determine the 
constitutionality of an enactment of a type of which there 
had been no previous instance in Ceylon. The impugned Act,
The Industrial Disputes (Special Provisions) Act, No. 37 
of 1968, was enacted in order to remove certain difficulties 
in the settlement of industrial disputes and other matters 
under the Industrial Disputes Act which had arisen in
consequence of certain decisions made by the Supreme Court
3 4and the Privy Council, namely, Ualker v. Fry, Noosajees v.
5 6Fernando and United Engineering Workers Union v. Devanayaqam,
and certain cases which had been decided on the basis that
Ualker v. Fry and Moosajees v. Fernando represented correct
laws.
In Ualker v. Fry the Supreme Court held that the
President of a Labour Tribunal, when he inquired into an 
»
application made by a workman, exercised judicial power.
In Moosajees v. Fernando the Supreme Court held that an 
arbitrator and an industrial court also likewise exercised 
judicial power and therefore that the Act was ultra vires 
to the extent that these bodies were provided to be appointed 
or nominated otherwise than by the Judicial Service Commission.
1. (1970) 73 N.L.R. 313.
2* Ibid., at p. 324-.
3. See the Long Title of Act No. 37 of 1968.
4. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 73.
5. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 414.
6. (1967) 69 N.L.R. 289.
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This position was reversed when the Privy Council 
held in Devanayaqam1s case, overruling the Supreme Court 
decision in Ualker v. Fry, that none of the bodies created 
by the Industrial Disputes Act for the settlement of 
industrial disputes consisted of judicial officers.
Uhile the constitutional issue whether section 55(1) 
of the Independence Constitution applied to the president 
of a labour tribunal was being judicially considered,
Parliament intervened to remove the administrative difficulties 
which had arisen as a result of the judicial decisions.
In response to the decision in Ualker v. Fry, the
power to appoint members of labour tribunals was transfered
from the Public Service Commission to the Judicial Service 
7Commission.
However, when the opinion of the Privy Council 
decision was delivered, the resulting position was so complex 
that Parliament felt obliged to pass the impugned Act by 
recourse to section 29(4) of the Independence Constitution, 
which provided that any law amending any constitutional 
provision had to be passed by a two thirds of the members 
of the House of Representatives (including those not 
present)•
7. *Report of the Commission on Industrial Disputes: 
Ceylon1, Sessional Paper IV of 1970, para. 80.
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The difficulties that arose as a result of the 
conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court and the Privy 
Council may be stated ‘thus*:
(a) The decisions of the Supreme Court, uhich were 
founded on the basis that the presidents of 
labour tribunals uere .inv.alidly appointed, in 
keeping uith the decision in Ualker v. Fry, 
represented incorrect lau. These decisions 
remained unaffected by the contrary decision 
given by the Privy Council in Devanayaqam1s 
case since they uere res ad.judicatae. There 
uas no method of agitating the matters uhich 
had been incorrectly disposed of in such cases.g
(b) The appointments to labour tribunals made by 
the Judicial Service Commission follouing the 
decision in Ualker v. Fry could not be sustained 
after the decision in Devanayaqam1s case. In 
fact any auard made by a labour tribunal so 
appointed could have been successfully challenged 
on the ground that a non-judicial officer could
not be appointed by the Judicial Service Commission.
(c) In the light of the decision of the Privy Council 
in Devanayaqam1s case to the< effect that appointments 
under the Industrial Disputes Act uere not to any 
Judicial Office, provision had to be made to relieve 
the Judicial Service Commission from the duty of 
appointing such non-judicial Officers.
(d) Lastly, the decision in Moosajees v. Fernando,
* uhich purported to extend ths rule in Ualker v. Fry 
to industrial courts and arbitrators uas equally 
urong in lau. As a result, such decisions uhich 
folloued Moosa.joes case uere untenable in lau.
The Industrial Disputes (Special Provisions) Act
No. 37 of 1968 uas passed in order to overcome the above
difficulties. It declared that all decisions of the Supreme
Court uhich relied on the premise that the presidents of
g
labour tribunals uere judicial officers uere null and void; 
that the Public Service Commission should have the pouer to 
appoint presidents of labour tribunals;^ and that any
8. Tuckers case (1970) 73 N.L.R. 313; at p. 320.
9. Act No. 37 of 1968, sec. 6.
10. Sec. 2(2).
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appointments that had been made by the Judicial Service
Commission uere valid.^ The impugned Act provided that
any decisions of the Supreme Court based on the principle
that arbitrators and members of industrial courts uere
12
judicial officers uere null and void.
The impugned Act undoubtedly sought to nullify 
certain decisions of the Supreme Court, and, as a result, 
it uas contended that the Act uas an exercise of judicial 
pouer; for, the nullification of such decisions solely 
belonged to the Privy Council, the highest appellate court 
of Ceylon. It uas contended that on previous occasions 
uhen the legislature had stepped in to correct an erroneous 
vieu of the lau taken by the courts or to restate the lau 
contrary to the vieu taken by the courts, care uas taken 
uhile correcting or restating the lau for the future, not 
to interfere uith previous judicial decisions uhich uere
found unacceptable to the legislature and uhich gave
-» 13'occasion to such enactment. Although the legislature had
11. Ibid.
12. Secs. 4 and 7.
13. For instance Act No. 11 of 1965, uhich 
retrospectively validated the appointment of Quazis by the 
Minister, declared that it did not affect the decision of 
the Supreme Court in Jailabdeen v. Danina Umma /J"l962)
64 N.L.R. 41£7 uhich had quashed an order made by a Quazi 
on the ground that he uas a judicial officer and had not 
been appointed by the Judicial Service Commission. Here, 
the legislature validated a statutory provision, as an 
implied amendment to the Constitution, leaving the judicial 
decision uhich uarranted the enactment undisturbed. See 
further: The Kandyan Succession Ordinance No. 23 of 1917
necessitated by Mudiyanse v. Appuhamy ^ 1 9 1 3 )  16 N.L.R. 117 7  
but left unaffected by the Ordinance; and other instances 
cited by Ueeramantry, J., in Tuckers1 case, at pp. 324-326.
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the indisputable right to alter or redirect the lau,
judicial decisions uhich had already been entered, the
argument uent, uere inviolable*
The Supreme Court, in rejecting the above argument,
emphasised that it uas the duty of the court to look at the
14
substance rather than the form of the impugned Act*
To understand the true nature of the impugned Act
some sections may be examined* Section 6 is as follous:
Where any order of any labour tribunal uas 
subsequently quashed by a relevant decision 
of the Supreme Court on appeal or on 
application by uay of urit on the ground 
that the president of such tribunal, not 
having been validly appointed, had no 
jurisdiction to make such order, the
follouing provisions shall apply in the
case of such appeal or application by uay 
of urit, as the case may be:
(a) such decision of the Supreme Court 
shall be deemed to have been, and to 
be, null and void;
(b) such appeal or application by uay 
of urit shall be deemed to be an
t appeal or application uhich uas not 
decided by the Supreme Court, but 
to be an appeal or application made 
de novo to such court on the
relevant date:lc.15
(c) the Supreme Court is hereby 
empouered and authorised, and shall 
have jurisdiction, to entertain, 
hear and decide such appeal or 
application dj3 novo; and
(d) the practice and procedure to be 
folloued by the Supreme Court in 
entertaining, hearing and deciding 
such appeal or application die novo 
shall be as determined by order of 
the Chief Justice*
14* Tuckers case, at p* 323 per Tennekoon, J*
15. Relevant date means March 9, 1967. See ths 
interpretation section*
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Similar provision uas made in section 7 in 
respect of industrial courts and arbitrators*
Thus, although it appears at first sight that the 
impugned Act uas intended to have the negative effect of 
nullifying certain decisions of the Supreme Court, the Act 
had a commendably positive effect too: namely, it enabled
the Supreme Court to rehear appeals or applications uhich 
had been incorrectly disposed of but uhich had become 
res adjudicatae. Accordingly, being far from entertaining 
an intention to interfere uith the exercise of judicial 
pouer by the courts, the legislature uas bent on removing 
a technical bar to. correcting an error committed by the 
Supreme Court.
The Act had the salutary effect of empouering the 
courts to decide the substantive issues involved in the 
urongly dismissed cases, and thereby assisting the courts 
in the discharge of their duties.^ In fact, the Act is 
unambiguous that any decision of the Supreme Court based
on any ground other than the binding effect of Ualker v.
17Fry uas not to be perturbed, the impugned Act did not 
validate orders of labour tribunals that had been quashed 
by the Supreme Court in pursuance of Ualker v. Fry» but 
merely facilitated their being re-examined cte novo*
16* See Tuckers case at 319, per Sirimane, 3*
17* Ibid., at 318, per Sirimane, 3*, Act No* 37 
of 1968, secs. 2(2), 4(3), and 5(3).
/
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In arriving at the conclusion that the impugned Act
did not violate the exclusive vesting of the judicial power
of the State in the judiciary, both the Liyanaqe case and
the Kariapper case uere referred to. The words of wisdom
expressed in Liyanaqefs case, that, in view of the
difficulty of laying down general rules as to what amounts
to an exercise of judicial power by the legislature, each
case must be decided on its own merits and that the Act
18must be viewed in its entirety, were acted upon.
Tennekoon, 3., observed that as in Kariapperfs case,
Parliament exercised its own disciplinary powers and not
judicial power, so.in the instant case did' the Parliament
grant a new jurisdiction to courts and alter the rules
19relating to precedent and res judicata.
Sirimane, 3., and Ueeramantri, 3., were strongly
20
of the opinion that as a result of The Queen v. Liyanaqe,
21 22 Liyanaqe v. Queen and Kariapper v. Uijesinha it was
beyond controversy that the principle of separation of
23powers was a settled feature of the Ceylon Constitution. 
Tennekoon, 3., on the other hand, merely referred to
1 a supposed application of the doctrine of separation of
t 24 powers1.
18. Tuckers case, at 317-318 and 331.
19* Ibid., at 321-322.
20. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 331.
21. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 265; /T966.7 1 All E.R. 650 (P.C.).
22. (1967) 70 N.L.R. 49; /J967J  3 All E.R. 485. ,
23. See Tuckers case at p. 316 per Sirimane, 3., 
and at p. 327 per Ueeramantri, 3.
24. Ibid., at 323.
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As uas mentioned in the beginning, the impugned
Act uas passed under section 29(4) of the Independence
Constitution. In fact it had been passed unanimously in
25the House of Representatives. The argument uas pressed, 
as in Kariapper*s case, that the legislature could not 
exercise judicial pouer even after complying uith the 
procedure prescribed for constitutional amendment. Since 
the Supreme Court held that the impugned Act did not amount 
to an exercise of judicial pouer, this argument uas left
^  -rl a  2 6undecided.
The issue before the Supreme Court in Tuckers case,
namely, uhether the Legislature could step in to correct
an erroneous vieu of the lau laid doun in certain judicial
decisions in order to overcome certain administrative
difficulties created by such judicial decisions, did not
as such directly involve any sensitive political controversies.
KariapperTs case, on the other hand, the impugned Act
uhich imposed civic disabilities on certain persons
including some Members of Parliament uas not devoid of
27party political implications.
25. Ibid., at 316.
26. Ibid., at 319 per Sirimane, 3.,
at 324 per Tennekoon, 3., and at 331 per Ueeramantri, 3.
27. See case note on Kariapper v. Uijesinha, 
(1968) 3uridical Revieu 66, especially at 67.
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Judicial activism uhich eminently characterises
the Privy Council decision in Liyanaqe v. The Queen is
evidently lacking in the Supreme Court decision in
Tuckers case. For instance, Sirimane, 3., said:
In dealing uith this question one must 
bear in mind that a court should be 
slou to strike doun an Act of Parliament 
unless there is a clear encroachment on 
the judicial sphere . ^
28. (1970) 73 N.L.R. 313.
(4) The Conceptual Difference betueen Judicial 
Pouer and Jurisdiction
The distinction that the Supreme Court of Ceylon 
so finely marked betueen judicial pouer and jurisdiction 
halted the vigorous attempts to invalidate tuo important 
pieces of legislation, namely, The Rent Restriction 
(Amendment) Act No. 12 of 1966 and the Conciliation Boards 
Act No. 10 of 1958. The uords of Tambiah, J., succinctly 
state the principle acted upon in the relevant judicial 
decisions:
The pouer to vest jurisdiction in courts is 
conferred on the Legislature and could be 
exercised by an ordinary majority of 
Parliament. The pouer to confer jurisdiction 
also includes the pouer to take auay the 
jurisdiction conferred on the courts. If, 
houever, the Legislature confers jurisdiction 
on other tribunals uhich have to exercise 
judicial pouer then it can only be done in 
the manner contained in the provisions of 
the Constitution.^
The case lau under the tuo relevant Acts uill be 
discussed separately in order to properly appreciate hou 
the above principle uas applied in tuo different set3 of 
circumstances.
(i) The Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act
This Act of 1966 had the principal effect of 
restricting the grounds on uhich a landlord could bring 
an action in a court of lau for the ejectment of a tenant
1. Anthony Naide v. Ceylon Tea Plantations. 
(1966) 68 N.L.R. 558, at p. 571.
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of premises the standard rent of uhich did not exceed
Rs • 100• Section 4 of the Act, uhich purported to make the
Act operative retrospectively from the tuentieth of Duly,
1966, further declared that:
(a) any action uhich uas instituted on or 
after the date of the commencement of 
this Act for the ejectment of a tenant 
from any premises to uhich the principal 
Act as amended by this Act applies shall, 
if such action is pending on the date of 
commencement of this Act, be deemed at all 
times to have been and to be null and void;
(b) any appeal preferred to the Supreme Court 
from any judgment or decree of a court in 
any such action as is referred to in 
paragraph (a) and is pending before the 
Supreme Court on the date of commencement 
of this Act shall be deemed at all times
to have been and to be null and void; and
(c) proceedings shall not be taken for thfe 
enforcement of any judgment or decree in 
any such action as is referred to in 
paragraph (a), and uhere such proceedings 
have begun before the date of commencement 
of this Act but have not been completed on 
the date of commencement of this Act, such 
proceedings shall not be continued*
Objection uas taken to this section on the ground
that it nullified decrees that had already been entered
and that it directed the courts as to hou the cases pending
before them uere to be disposed of: this, it uas alleged,
uas tantamount to a usurpation of the judicial pouer
exclusively vested in the judiciary*
It uas rightly held that the Act did not have the
effect of nullifying cases uhich had been finally disposed
of; the Act applied only to such cases as uere pending
before an original or appellate court and to such decisions »
uhich uere the subject matter of pending enforcement proceedings.
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As H. N. G. Fernando, S.P.O., observed, the intention of
the legislature uas to protect tenants uho, on the date
of commencement of the Act, uere in occupation of premises
having a standard rent not exceeding Rs.100 against ejectment
except on the grounds specified in the impugned Act* This
protection uas extended to those tenants, ejectment
proceedings against uhom uere pending, so that their occupancy
too received the benevolent assistance of the impugned Act.^
It uas not argued that the legislature uas
incompetent partially to abolish the jurisdiction of the
civil courts to execute decrees; it uas, houever, forcefully
contended that the abolition of jurisdiction to execute
decrees previously entered constituted an improper exercise
of, or an interference uith, the judicial pouer of the State,
2uhich uas exclusively vested in the judiciary*
Unforgetful of the ability of the Parliament of
Ceylon to pass retrospective laus, the Supreme Court had
no hesitation in rejecting that argument* There existed no
3
similarity betueen Liyanaqe v* The Queen and the instant
case, the Supreme Court observed* The impugned Act uas not
ad hominem nor did it disclose a legislative plan to mete
out a discriminative punishment.^ The Act in fact uas
designed to achieve the salutary object of relieving a class
5
of people uho uere undergoing hardships*
1. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 558, at p. 568.
2. Ibid*, at p. 569.
3. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 265; / T 9 6 6 7  1 All E.R. 650 (P.C.).
4. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 558, at p. 569.
5. Ibid., at p. 572, per Tambiah, 3.
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The following observations made by Sansoni, C.3.,
are representative of the stand taken by the Supreme Court
in respect of the distinction that exists betueen judicial
pouer and jurisdiction:,^
The Legislature for its part cannot dictate 
to the Court hou it should decide a dispute.
It can, however,mprescribe the conditions 
that govern the jurisdiction of the Courts, 
and declare the terms under which a justiciable 
dispute can or cannot arise, since under our 
Constitution the jurisdiction of all the Courts 
is purely statutory. This is not to be 
confused uith an assumption of judicial power.
The two concepts are distinct. ^Jurisdiction 
is the authority of a Court to exercise 
judicial power in a specific case and is, of 
course, a prerequisite to the exercise of 
judicial power, which is the totality of 
powers a court exercises when it assumed 
jurisdiction and hears and decides a case.
— See the Commentary on the Constitution of 
the United States of America (1963 Edition) 
p. 563.
7Anthony Naide v. The Ceylon Tea Plantations Co* Ltd.j 
is not, however, authority for an unqualified proposition 
that since the jurisdiction of the courts had been conferred 
by ordinary enactments the Parliament could take away 
completely the jurisdiction of the courts, without creating
g
new institutions to replace them. Tambiah, J., said:
No doubt if there is a legislative plan or 
design by the Legislature to take away the 
judicial power conferred on the judicature 
then such legislation may be ultra vires.
6. Ibid., at p. 560.
7. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 558.
8. Ibid., at p. 571.
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H. N. G. Fernando, S.P.O., entertained some doubt
whether the Parliament could by an ordinary enactment>for
instance, abolish the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
g
issue prerogative writs. He pointed out that section 52 
of the Independence Constitution recognised the existence 
and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.^ The argument 
seems to be that as long as the Constitution remained 
unaltered the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court could not 
be taken away so as to destroy the identity of that court 
as enshrined in the Constitution. It also flows from the 
reasoning in this case that since the Constitution recognised - 
the exclusive vesting of judicial power in the judiciary, 
an ordinary law which completely abolished the jurisdiction 
of the courts and thereby wound up the judiciary was bound 
to be unconstitutional.
It is of interest to note how the distinction 
between the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on the one 
hand, and the jurisdiction of the inferior courts on the 
other hand, was heavily relied on by the Privy Council in the 
the Oamaican Gun-Court case. ^  There, the Privy Council 
held that whenever a new court was created by an ordinary 
statute to exercise the jurisdiction of a type which had 
previously been allocated to the Supreme Court to the 
exclusion of the inferior courts, the members of such new 
court should be appointed in the same manner and entitled to 
the same security of tenure as the judges of the Supreme Court*
9. Ibid., at p. 568. 10. Ibid., at p. 570.
Hinds v. The Queen /19767 1 All E.R. 353*
Hinds case may be said to have La step further the principles 
evolved in the judicial power cases in Ceylon, inasmuch as 
it recognized a distinction betueen the judicial power of 
the superior courts and the judicial power belonging to 
inferior courts.^
(ii) The Conciliation Boards Act
The Conciliation Boards Act No* 10 of 1958, which 
has been considered elsewhere in this work, directed that 
petty disputes that arise in Conciliation Board areas should 
first be brought before a Conciliation Board for amicable 
settlement• An action could not be instituted in a court 
of law in respect of a dispute or offence covered by the 
Act unless a certificate was issued by the Chairman of a 
Conciliation Board that a settlement .could not be made by 
the Board or that the settlement made by the Board had been 
duly repudiated*
The argument uas presented to the Supreme Court that
»
the impugned Act deprived the citizen of his right to invoke
/
the assistance of the judiciary* Alles, 3*, whose views on 
this question were not shared by other judges of the Supreme 
Court who decided the cases arising in this area, firmly 
asserted that the insistence on a certificate issued by a 
person appointed by the Executive before judicial proceedings 
could be initiated was a threat to the independence of the 
judiciary from legislative and executive control.^
12. See further chapter 12, part (3).
1. Nonahamy v. Halqrat Silva (1970) 73 N.L.R. 217, 
at p. 223.
The majority opinion, as here represented by
H. N. G. Fernando, C.3., uas clear:
. • • if the Board*s effort at making peace 
fails, and if recourse to the judicial pouer 
is not avoidable it is the courts alone that 
can exercise that p o u e r ^
Accordingly, the Supreme Court authoritatively held that a
Conciliation Board did not exercise judicial pouer*
The Rent Restriction Act had the effect of
restricting the grounds on uhich a land lord could bring
an action in a court of lau to eject a tenant of certain
prescribed premises, uhereas the Conciliation Boards Act
made the production of the requisite certificate mandatory
for the institution of judicial proceedings in respect of
certain specified matters* In both the areas the jurisdiction
of the courts uas affected in a particular area of the lau*
3
It has aptly been said:
It is conceivable, houever, that the 
argument that uhere there is a right
there must be a remedy should apply,
in the sense that uhere a substantive 
.right exists uhich is meant to be 
enforceable there must be access to the 
courts to facilitate its enforcement*
This lends support to the proposition that, although
Parliament had the undoubted pouer to alter the jurisdiction
of courts in certain areas, the jurisdiction of the courts
could not have been completely ousted uithout impinging
upon the constitutional vesting of judicial pouer in the
judiciary*
2* Ibid., at p. 220*
3* C. F. Amerasinghe, Separation, at 232*
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(5) Concluding; Remarks
In the 'tribunal cases’, which are discussed in
chapters 5 and 6, the issue was whether judicial power
:iould be exercised by any other than a judicial officer,
appointed by the Judicial Service Commission; the
substantive principle here being that judicial function
should be performed by legally qualified persons whose
independence and impartiality is constitutionally
guaranteed. The rule that judicial power should be
exercised only by judicial officers who are appointed in
accordance with the relevant constitutional provisions
might itself exclude the exercise of judicial power by
the legislature. However, different considerations
apply here. In Tribunal cases the central issue can be
said to be 'who may be regarded as members of the judiciary?'
(or in other words, are they to be appointed and
disciplined in a special way?), whereas in the cases,
v/hichare discussed in this chapter, the relevant question
is 'is the judicial power exclusively vested in the 
£0
judiciary gfchat neither the legislature nor the executive 
shall exercise it?'.
To accept that the judicial power of the State is 
exclusively vested in the judiciary is to recognise the 
existence of a separation of legislative, executive and 
judicial powers. Once the existence of the exclusive 
vesting of judicial power in the judiciary#together with 
the separation of powers, was upheld it followed that
in addition to the inability of Parliament to sit as a
court of lav/ Parliament also could not indirectly influence
the manner in v/hich a particular case was to he disposed
of . Parliament could not, in keeping with that
principley exercise any powers v/hich are ancillary to the
exercise of judicial power. These observations made in
respect of the legislature applied equally to the
executive too.
The Ceylon (Const r >./ u ^ a. on) Order in Council, 194-6, as
amended in 194-7* contained only one limitation as to
the subject matter for legislation, namely section 29 (2),
1which was designed to protect minority rights.
Otherwise, the legislative competence of the Ceylon
2Parliament was as ample as could be. The actual effect 
of the Ljvaname Pr1nc1v1c is to prescribe another 
limitation, this time by implication, on the legislative
supremacy of the Ceylon Parliament. The majority decision
3
o ' the Privy Council in Hinds v. The Queen 9 as we shall 
see later, strongly defends the propriety of implying a 
separation of powers in a TV/estminster model Constitution’ .
The lily ana r;e Pr inci pie, it is submitted, marks the 
most significant deviation in a ’V/estminster Model
1. Section 39 of the Constitution, v/hich related to
lav/s dealing with Ceylon Government Stock had ceased to be
of any importance.
2. Section 29 is quoted in full at 107-8 and
discussed at 107“111 supra.
3. /1976.7 1 All TM R. 353 at p. 360.
4. See infra pp. 470-75 (majority decision) and
478-SO (1)i s senl ing Jud g;nent).
Constitution’ from the Constitutional system in the 
United Kingdom, where the traditional theory of the
3 .voreignty of Parliament precludes the application
ere of anything like Liyanane: -■ Principle*
The legislative Supremacy" of the 
British Parliament, as well as Being 
a legal concept, is also the result 
of political history and is 
ultimately based on fact, that is, 
general recognition by the people and 
the courts. It is therefore at the 
same time a legal and a political 
principle.,
The fact that the authority of the British Parliamen 
is referable to history whereas in a country having a 
written constitution based on the ’Westminster Model’ 
the authority of Parliament is that which is derived from 
the Constitution itself is the only possible explanation 
for this difference.
5. The modern tendency is to use the term 
’legislative supremacy’ in place of ’Sovereignty of 
Parliament. See for instance 0. Hood Phillips, ’Self 
Limitation by the United Kingdom Parliament’, Hastings 
Constitutional Lav/ Review« Vol. 2, Ho. 2 (Spring 19755, 
478. 1 If Sover* by is used merely for legislative
cor; pete nee it is ambiguous and confusing. A better 
term is legislative supremacy,’ at p. 450.
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C H A P T E R  9
THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN CEYLON 1948-1972
The most outstanding feature of constitutional 
developments during the period under review is undoubtedly 
the contribution made by judicial interpretation as an agency 
of growth. The courts, however, repeatedly asserted that 
their function was merely that of interpreting the
Constitution and not that of law making. The words of
1 2 Sir Owen Dixon, cited in Kariapper v, Ui.jesinha are well
representative of this view:
/Tj7he Court’s sole function is to interpret a 
constitutional description of power or restraint* 
upon power and say whether a given measure falls 
. on one side of a line consequently drawn or on 
the other, and • • • it has nothing whatever 
to do with merits or demerits of the measure,
, . , There is no other safe guide to judicial 
decisions in great conflicts than a strict and 
complete legalism.
In spite of the reluctance of judges to admit to
being lau makers, as Roscoe Pound has observed, they evolve
law in a creative fashion:
A process of judicial law making has always 
gone on and still goes on in all systems of 
law, no matter how completely in their 
juristic theory they limit the function of 
adjudication to the purely mechanical.^
1. Sir Dixon Owen on his appointment as Chief Justice
of the High Court of Australia in 1952, reported in (1952)
Aus. L.3. 3-5.
2. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 529 at p. 537.
3. Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 
(1921) p. 172.
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Our survey of the 1 judicial pouer cases* clearly 
indicates hou intensive analysis and creative exposition of 
principles led the courts to uphold as a basic feature of 
the Independence Consti’tution of Ceylon the doctrine of 
separation of pouers, at least to the extent of committing 
judicial pouer to the judiciary alone, as a matter of 
necessary implication. Although.the evolution of this 
principle by the courts of Ceylon, reaching its high uater
mark in Liyanage v. The Queen, has attracted much criticism
5 6from academic circles, Lord Diplock in Hinds v. The Queen
has more recently gallantly championed the cause of upholding
certain constitutional doctrines uhich are said to be
necessary ingredients of a Westminster Model Constitution*:
/I__/t is uell established as a rule of construction 
applicable to constitutional instruments under uhich 
this governmental structure /namely, one based on 
the Westminster Model*__/ is adopted that the 
absence of express uords to that effect does not ' 
prevent the legislative, the executive and the 
judicial pouers of the neu state being exercisable 
by the legislature, by the executive and by the 
judicature respectively.^
4. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 265; /1966/ 1 All E.R. 650.
5. S. A. de Smith, * The Separation of Pouers in a 
Neu Dress’, (1966) 12 McGill L . 3 . 491; Garth Nettheim,
* Legislati ve Interference uith the Judiciary*, (1966)
4° Australian Lau Journal 221-231; S. A. de Smith in (1966) 
Annual Survey of Commonuealth Lau. 5 7-59.
6* L l 9 1 ^ 7  1 A11 E.R. 353.
7* Ibid., at p. 359-60.
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In the performance of their duty as interpreters 
of the Constitution, courts seek the assistance of a uide 
variety of uell-established rules of interpretation, as a 
matter of course* An examination of the types of rules 
frequently adopted by Ceylon Courts uill be of much assistance 
in understanding the judicial attitude touards the supremacy 
of Parliament and certain other matters of constitutional • 
importance.
(i) Rules of Interpretation Folloued in Ceylon Cases
One of the basic rules of interpretation uhich have
been folloued by the Courts of Ceylon seems to be that
constitutional issues uill be decided only if it is absolutely
necessary to do so."*" Secondly, the courts uere inclined to
presume the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament until
2
the contrary uas proved. It has been recognised that, being
general in nature, constitutional provisions must be given a
3broad interpretation as against a narrou interpretation.
Allied to this is the fundamental consideration that a 
constitution must be interpreted in a generic manner so that 
it applies to changing circumstances.^ Alles, 3., brings 
this idea foruard very clearly in Peiris v. Perera.
1. Podiapou v. the Assistant Commissioner of 
Agrarian Services (1970) 73 N.L.R. 225.
2* The Queen v. Liyanaqe (1962) 64 N.L.R. 355, citing 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Munro (1926) 38 C.L.R. 153 
at 180: ’Unless, therefore, it becomes clear beyond reasonable
doubt that the legislation in question transgresses the limits 
laid doun by the organic lau of the Constitution, it must be 
alloued to stand as the expression of the national uill1 
(per Isaacs, 0.).
Pe*ris Perera (1968) 71 N.L.R. 481 citing
Martin v. Hunters Lessees (1861) 1 Uheat 304, at- 326.
Ibid., citing Maxuell, Interpretation of Statutes 
(10th ed.), p. 79.
5. I b i d .
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The Constitution uas intended not only as 
a document that uas to be efficacious in 
1947, but uas intended to serve future 
generations of the subjects of the country 
under changing conditions. Lau is never 
static and must develop uith changing 
times and it should be the endeavour of all 
persons interested in the progress of the 
country to ensure that changing legislation 
is aluays in conformity uith the provisions 
of the Constitution. It is for this reason 
that Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v.
Virginia ( (1821)' 6 Uhea't., 264 at p. 387) 
remarked that Ta constitution is framed for 
ages to come, and is designed to approach 
immortality as nearly as human institutions 
can approach it1.^
Implicit in the above statement is the need for a 
Constitution to be interpreted as a living institution, so 
that it suits the ever-changing needs of the society uithout 
becoming static and dated. At the same time, in interpreting 
a Constitution reference must necessarily be made to history 
and tradition. Tambiah, J., dreu attention to this rule in
7
Piyadasa v• The Bribery Commissioner:
A Constitution must be interpreted by 
attributing to its uords the meaning 
uhich they bore at the time of its 
adoption and in vieu of the commonly 
accepted cannons of construction, its 
history, early and long continued 
practices under it. Louis Myers v. U.S.
( /19267 272 U.S. RepT 'at 238).
This observation uas particularly relevant in the Ceylon
context since the type of constitutional development in Ceylon
uas one of gradual evolution.
The rules of interpretation stated above, uhich have 
been folloued by the courts of Ceylon, have, undoubtedly, been 
formulated to ensure that courts uill not uithout compelling
Ibid., at p. 489.
7. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 385, at p. 390_.
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reason nullify laus enacted by the legislature uhich, as
a basic principle of democracy, is said to represent the will
of the electorate. The uords of Isaacs, 3., in Federal
Commissioner of Taxation v. Hunro, uhich have been repeated
g
more than once in Ceylon, succinctly declare the duty of 
the court:
It is aluays a. serious and responsible duty 
to declare invalid, regardless of consequences, 
uhat the national Parliament, representing the 
uhole people of Australia, has considered 
necessary or desirable for the public uelfare.
Even in circumstances uhere a statute appeared to be
inconsistent uith a cons titutional provision, the courts-
acted on the principle that whenever possible the objectionable
clauses should be severed from the innocuous ones, so that
only the objectionable portions of the statute were rendered
nugatory. Sansoni, C.3., delivering the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Senadhira v. The Bribery Commissioner^
explained the duty of the court:
It is right that we should preserve as much 
of the uill of Parliament as possible; and 
so far as that uill, as expressed in a 
statute, is not repugnant to the Constitution, 
ue should uphold those provisions uhich .ue 
consider not to conflict uith the Constitution.^
8. (1926) 38 C.L.R. 153, at p. 180.
9. See e.g. The Queen v. Liyanaoe (1962) 64 N.L.R.
313 at p. 355; Tuckers Ltd., v. Ceylon Mercantile Union (1970) 
73 N.L.R. 313, at p. 319; and Peiri s vT Pereira (1968) 71 N.L.R. 
481 at p. 490.
10. (1961) 63 N.L.R. 313.
11. Ibid., at p. 321.
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Again, as H. N. G. Fernando, C.J., asserted in Ranasinqhe v. 
The Bribery Commissioner:
In examining an enactment uith reference to 
any alleged constitutional invalidity, a 
court must strive to reach a conclusion 
uhich uill render the uill of the Legislature 
effective, or as effective as possible.^
This attitude of the courts--namely that of making
the greatest possible allouance, to respect the supremacy of
the legislature, as the circumstances permit— is clearly born
out by the insistence of the courts that an impugned Act
13must be vieued as a uhole. This rule becomes all the more
relevant uhen a statute, valid upon its face, is alleged to
be directed to achieving indirectly something uhich the
legislature has no pouer to perform directly. Applying this
rule to the Ceylon Pariiamentary Elections (Amendment) Act,
No. 48 of 1949 and the Citizenship Act, No. 18 of 1948, both
the Supreme Court‘d  and the Privy Council^ held that those
tuo Acts did not impose any disability on a particular
community uhich had not been imposed on other communities
and, accordingly, they uere not inconsistent uith section
29 (2) of the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946.
If there uas a legislative plan, the plan
must be looked at as a uhole and uhen so
looked at it is evident in their Lordships’
opinion that the legislature did not intend
to prevent Indian Tamils from attaining
citizenship provided that they uere sufficiently
connected uith the Island.,c
1 b
13. See foot note 12 below.
12• (1962) 64 N.L.R. 449 at 450, cited uith approval
in Peiris v. Perera (1968) 71 N.L.R. 481 at p. 493.
14* Nudanayake v. Sivaqnanasunderam (1951) 53 N.L.R. 25 t
15. Kodakan Pillai v. Mudanayake (1953) 54 N.L.R. 433.
Ibid., at p. 439.
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17
On the other hand, in Liyanaqe v• The Queen the Privy
Council detected the existence of a legislative plan in
18
viewing the Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act, and 
declared it unconstitutional.
The idea of looking at the actual effect, or the pith 
and substance, of an impugned Act necessarily imports the 
need to examine, and whenever possible give effect to, the 
policy behind such enactment. Certain instances when courts 
drew heavily on policy considerations have already been
19referred to in the concluding part of the preceding chapter.
Even when the constitutionality of an Act was not in issue,
courts have examined the policy behind it so that the legislative
20intent could accurately be fulfilled. In order to discern 
the policy background of a legislative enactment, it has been
21judicially held permissible to make reference to Uhite Papers, '
22Commission Reports and other matters which are extraneous 
to the legislation itself. To what extent this principle was 
in conflict with ’strict legalism’, Ueeramantry, 3., left
17. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 265; /19667 1 All E.R. 650.
18. Ibid., at p. 284 (N.L.R.); 660 (All E.R.).
19. See supra pp. 330-32.
20. See e.g. Dias v. Peries (1950) 53 N.L.R. 51 at
p . 5 3; Andiris v. Uanasinohe (1950) 52 N.L.R. 83, specially at 
p. 86; and Ceylon State Fiortoaoe Bank v. Fernando (1970)
74 N.L.R. 1.
2i* Liyanaqe v. The Queen (1965) 68 N.L.R. 265 at 
p. 273; /1966/1 Ail E.R. 650 at p. 652.
22. Soulbury Commission Report was referred to in 
Kodakan Pillai v. fludanayake (1953) 54 N.L.R. 433 at p. 438-39; 
Senadhira v. The Bribery Commissioner (1961) 63 N.L.R. 313 
at p. 321; and The Queen v. Liyanaqe (1962) 64 N.L.R. 313 
at p. 349.
23
open in Tuckers Ltd., v. Ceylon Mercantile Union. Houever,
in the light of the judicial pronouncements in favour of
examining such documents to shed light on the real legislative
intent and policy, Ueergmantry, 3*, firmly asserted that
Tit uould be legitimate for a court to have regard to such 
24matters 1•
One thing is clear. The courts recognised that their
duty was to validate as much legislation as uas reasonably
possible under uhatever firmly established rules there uere.
The rationale for such a course is not difficult to apprehend.
The high responsibility involved in the process 
and the fallibility of human judgment combine 
to make the courts entrusted uith the duty of 
adjudicating upon questions of constitutionality 
reluctant to refuse to give effect to the 
expressed uill of the legislature . ^
23. (1970) 73 N.L.R. 313 at p. 330.
24. Ibid.
25. Uynes, Legislative, Executive and Judicial 
Pouers in Australia ~(lTth ed. ), at 80.
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(ii) The Judiciary as the Guardian of the Constitution 
and of Liberty
While recognising the need to preserve the uill of
the legislature, the judiciary uas committed, at the same time,
to another and no less important cause, namely, the protection
of the rights of the citizen from undue encroachments either
by the legislature or the executive. It is this commitment
that explains the sternness uith uhich the judiciary
safeguarded its independence free from legislative and
executive interferences. The uords of Blackstone, quoted
more than once in the Neu Lau Reports,^ provide the classic
statement of this principle:
In this distinct and separate existence of the 
judicial pouer, in a peculiar body of men, 
nominated indeed, but not removable at pleasure, 
by the Croun, consists one main preservative of 
the public liberty; uhich cannot subsist long in 
any state, unless the administration of common 
justice be in some degree separated both from the 
legislative and also from the executive pouer.^
Broadly speaking, a constitution prescribes the limits 
uithin uhich the executive and the legislature may operate. 
Transgressions of such boundaries invariably conflict uith 
the rights of the subject uhich that constitution protects. 
Accordingly, being the interpreter of the constitution, the 
judiciary is also entrusted uith the duty of upholding uhatever 
rights uhich may reasonably be attributed to the citizen.
1. Senadhira v. The Bribery Commissioner (1961)
63 N.L.R. 313 at p. 317; Piyadasa v. The Bribery Commissioner 
(1962) 64 N.L.R. 385 at p. 389-90.
2. Blackstonefs commentaries Vol. 1 (7th ed.) at 269.
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As uas pointed out in The Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinqhe3
1 the court has a duty to see that the Constitution is not
infringed and to preserve it inviolate1•
Certain interesting aspects of the performance by
the judiciary of its interconnected roles as interpreter of
the constitution and legislation, guardian of the Constitution,
and ’final bulwark’^ of the liberty of individual deserve
reference here.
Firstly, courts uere willing on more than one occasion
to overlook technicalities in the interests of justice. In
5
floosa jees v. Fernando the decision of the Supreme Court in
Ual.ker v. Fry^ uas altered in order to bring that decision
in line uith the Privy Council decision in Liyanaqe v.
7
The Queen. The Bench of Five Budges of the Supreme Court 
specially convened to decide f-1 oosajees v. Fernando overruled 
the technical objections raised against reagitating the 
issues in Ualker v. Fry on the ground that the Privy Council 
decision in Liyanaoe’s case, delivered after the decision in 
Ualker v• Fry, had materially altered the legal position and 
that it uas necessary to bring the decisions of the Supreme 
Court in line uith the decisions of the highest court of 
Ceylon.
3. (1964) 66 N.L.R. 75 at p. 78.
4. In re Agnes Nona (1951) 53 N.L.R. 106 at p. 112.
5. (1966) 68 N.L.R. 414.
6. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 73.
7. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 265; /T9667 i f \ n  650.
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Instances uhen courts overlooked technical 
irregularities in the interest of justice abound the Ceylon 
Neu Lau Reports, in areas not involving constitutional issues,
o
Ra,1 u v, Jacob is a fine example. In that case a person uho 
had been sentenced to a term of one year!s rigorous imprison­
ment by the Magistrate applied to the Supreme Court to revise 
that sentence. The Supreme Court ordered the stay of the 
execution of the sentence pending the hearing, and, after 
the hearing, concluded that the sentence had been validly 
passed. Then there uas a delay in taking steps to execute 
the sentence of imprisonment. The accused pleaded in the 
instant case that time he had spent in remand, from the time 
of the staying of the execution ordered by the Supreme Court 
to his ultimate committal to the prison, must be set off 
against his term of imprisonment. Statutory provision existed 
for such a set-off in regard to a period of time spent in
respect of an appeal, but none in regard to any time spent on
a revision action. Ueeramantry, 3., held that in the absence 
of a specific provision, a remedy must be provided by uay of 
drauing an analogy uith the provisions relating to appeals:
I do not think that it uould be correct to
deny relief to the applicant on the mere
technicality that uhat came before this 
court uas a revision application and not an 
appeal.g
Accordingly, the court remitted a period of time that the 
court thought uas called for by the facts.
8. ( 196 8 )  73 N . L . R .  517.
9* I b i d ., at p. 519.
t) 4
The initiative taken by judges of the Supreme Court 
in convening a judicial hearing without an application by 
the affected parties is another interesting feature of the 
judicial role. In Bandlya v. Rajapaksa^  the Chief Justice, 
who had read a newspaper report of a District Court decision, 
detected that the decision was untenable in law and called 
on the parties to show cause why it should not be set aside.
In the course of the judgment reversing the incorrect decision, 
which related to an important aspect of election law, the 
learned Chief Justice explained that he undertook Tthe unusual 
course* of initiating legal proceedings as the case involved 
a matter of fpublic importance1. Ue may recall here that 
In re Agnes Nona— a case we have already examined in detail‘d  
--was also decided by a Supreme Court Judge on his own motion, 
in the exercise of his statu tory power to call and examine 
the record of any case.
The manner in which the Supreme Court supervised and 
instructed the inferior courts so that they conducted their 
proceedings impartially and according to the well established 
traditions is indicative of how conscious the Supreme Court 
was of the functions and duties of courts. Although a 
thorough account of this aspect falls outside a work of this 
nature, the following uords of wisdom, addressed to a
magistrate in Narthupana Tea and Rubber Estates Ltd., v.
12Perera, at least, must be quoted:
10. (1967) 69 N.L.R. 508.
11. See supra pp. 251-256.
12. (1962) 66 N.L.R. 135, at p.138,
m  *  * *
6 Lx*d
Precisely because judicial power is unfettered, 
judicial responsibility should be discharged 
with finer conscience and humility than that of 
any other agency of Government,
How the courts went to great lengths to ensure that
administrative officers whose decisions materially affected
the rights of the subject, but who did not come within the
definition of a ’judicial officer1, performed their functions
in keeping uith justice and fairness is another aspect of the
judicial role which, cannot be discussed in detail here.
However, the discussion of arbitration under the Co-operative
Societies Ordinance in Chapter 6 provides ample evidence of
13this judicial attitude, Moreover, there is already a rich
14literature on this aspect.
Discharging its duty as guardian of the citizen’s
rights, the Supreme Court rightly assumed that it was its
inescapable duty to ensure that the police did not encroach
upon such rights. Allied to this in a broad sense is the
manner in which the judiciary assumed supervision over the
functioning of the Attorney-General’s Department in matters
affecting legally protected rights of the subject. This kind
of super vision-super vision in a very general and broad sense
--was all the more important because the Constitution of Ceylon
did not contain a Bill of Fundamental Rights, unlike the more
15recent constitutions on the Uestminster Model.
13. See supra pp. 209-12.
14. See generally, 3. A. L. Cooray, Constitutional 
and Administrative Law of Sri Lanka (1973), Cap. 19.
15. See Hinds v. The Queen /T9767 1 All E.R. 353* 
at p. 360.
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In The Queen v. Gnanaseeha Thero and Others,16 a
case uhere the court uas concerned uith the propriety of the
recording of statements, under section 134 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, by a magistrate, the three Judges of the
Supreme Court uho presided at the Trial-at-Bar made certain
observations, by uay of obiter dieturn, in regard to the
detention under the Emergency Regulations of certain accused
persons uithout serving on them the detention orders. Three
accused persons had been arrested uithout a uarrant and the
fourth had been arrested by a police officer armed uith a
uarrant, uhich, houever, had not been served on the arrested
person, nor uas he informed of the existence of the uarrant.
The Supreme Court observed that since the accused persons had
not committed an offence for uhich they could be arrested
uithout a uarrant under the Criminal Procedure Code, their
arrest and detention uas illegal inasmuch as detention orders
had not been served on them, and that the service of detention
orders some time after their arrest did not legalise
their detention until the orders uere served on them. Although
this illegality 'did not have a significant bearing' on the
17issue before it, the Supreme Court expressed its considered
opinion on this matter:
The liberty of the subject is a sacred right 
that courts of lau have to safeguard and the 
least that a police officer uho interferes 
uith that right can do is to inform a person 
arrested of the reason therefor and no court 
should countenance a police officer acting in 
contravention of that requirement•,Q
1 o
16. (1968 ) 73 N . L . R .  154.
1 7• I b i d . , at p. 171.
I b i d ., at p. 170.
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The Supreme Court uhich examined, in determining 
uhether the confessions in issue had been made voluntarily, 
the manner in uhich the police had conducted its investigations 
and interrogations, disapproved strongly of certain methods of 
interrogation adopted by police officers.
19
Seneviratne v. The Attorney General is also relevant 
here. Examining an application to quash a finding made by a 
Magistrate at the conclusion of an inquest into the death of 
a person uhich occurred during a police interrogation, the 
Supreme Court disapproved of certain methods !uhich our police
2
are not unknoun to use in the course of their investigations1. 
Tennekoon, 3., thought it highly improper for the Attorney- 
General’s Department to have provided a Croun Counsel to 
look after the interests of the police at the inquiry into 
the death:
It is hardly necessary to add that the Attorney- 
General^ Department (and its members) should 
avoid, at the early stages of any death in unusual 
circumstances, allying itself uith any personsuho 
are interested in establishing a particular cause 
of death; this nan only lead to stultifying that 
department, much to the public disadvantage, in 
the performance of any duties that may arise for 
it under the Criminal Procedure Code in relation 
to that death. If a police officer or group of 
police officers uish to have their interests 
uatched at an inquest they should retain private 
counsel for that purpose . ^
From the above observations, uhich stress the 
necessity for the Attorney Generates Department to maintain 
impartiality so as to uin public confidence, ue may nou proceed
19. (1968) 71 N.L.R. 439.
20. Ibid., at p. 449.
21* Ibid., at pp. 449-50.
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to look at the order of the Supreme Court-at-Bar in
22The Queen v. Abeysinphe, a case involving the power of
the Attorney-General to withdraw a conditional pardon he had
previously granted. The two defendants were among those who
were suspected of conspiring to stage an unsuccessful
coup d ’etat in 1962 and had turned witnesses for the State
23in the Trial-at-Bar following the alleged coup attempt.
Each of them was granted on becoming a State witness a pardon
by the Attorney-General ’on the condition of his making a full
and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within
his knowledge relative to that offence and to every other
person concerned whether as principal or abettor in the
24commission thereof’.
Later, the Attorney-General exhibited an information 
in the Supreme Court charging the two defendants, who in his 
opinion had violated the condition attached to the pardon, 
with offences identical to those appearing in the information 
filed against the twenty four defendants in Liyanaqe’s case.
At their Trial-at-3ar it was argued, inter alia, that the 
Attorney-General did not have an unfettered and non-reviewable 
discretion in determining whether the grantee of a conditional 
pardon had failed to fulfill the condition attached to it.
The argument went that a conditional pardon could be withdrawn 
by the Attorney-General only when upon a reference made to the 
Supreme Court it determines that there has been a breach of 
the condition.
22. (1965) 68 N.L.R. 386.
23. See supra pp. 267-8.
24. Criminal Law (Special Provision) Act, No. 1 of 1962, 
Section 11(1).
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The Supreme Court pointed out that there uas no
express provision uhich authorised the Attorney-General to
launch on a prosecution in the event of a breach of the
condition attached to a.pardon tendered by him. Nor uas
there a provision uhich stated uhether the correctness of
the Attorney-General^ decision uas justiciable. Further
there existed no knoun instance of the Attorney-General
prosecuting a person for such a breach. Reasoning, therefore,
from first principles, the Supreme Court agreed that
in the absence of any specific provision to 
the contrary, a court should decide uhether 
there has been a failure by the person 
pardoned to keep his undertaking, if the tuo 
parties are at issue as to uhether there has 
been a breach by one party or not.25
Although the determination of the Attorney-General uas 
justiciable, as the Supreme Court held, his authority to 
prosecute a person uho, in his opinion, had committed a 
breach of the condition uas not dependent on a judicial 
decision preceding such prosecution. Uhether the Attorney- 
General had sufficient reason to make the determination 
adverse to the pardoned person could properly be decided as 
a preliminary issue by the court before uhich such person 
is ultimately prosecuted.
The Supreme Court had no hesitation in rejecting the 
argument advanced on behalf of the State that the pouer of 
the Attorney-General to tender a conditional pardon, in fact, 
uas in the nature of a prerogative pouer and, thus, beyond 
revieu by a court of lau. Having observed that, unlike the 
pouer of the Governor-General to grant a pardon uhich he
25. (1 96 5 )  68 N . L . R .  3 8 6  at p. 390.
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exercised by virtue of the prerogative powers of the Crown,
the powers of the Attorney-General were purely statutory,
the Supreme Court expressed the following sentiment:
The courts are the watchdog of the liberty 
of the subject and have ever to be vigilant 
against any arbitrary or pretended use of 
prerogative powers and should be slow to 
accept any implied powers resting on the 
prerogative or anything in the nature of a 
prerogative•
In this case the Supreme Court expressed its reluctance 
to extend judicial immunity to any acts of the Attorney- 
General, except those which, by express statutory provision
27or long established tradition, were beyond judicial scrutiny. 
This restrictive interpretation of the Attorney-General1s 
powers inevitably resulted, at the other end of the spectrum, 
in enhancing the freedom of the subject.
Our discussion has so far brought out, through a 
perusal of case law, whether or not involving constitutional 
issues, certain patterns of judicial behaviour during the 
period under review. To summarize them: the courts were
faced with two equally important, and not too infrequently 
conflicting, values, namely, that of giving effect to the 
legislative intent and that of protecting the rights of the 
subject as enshrined in the Constitution. In order to 
reconcile these two interests or to prefer one of them the 
courts acted in disregard of technical irregularities, paid 
due attention to policy behind legislation and initiated 
judicial proceedings on their own motion. In order to protect 
the freedoms of the subject to the greatest possible extent,
26. Ibid., at p. 392.
27, Ibid., at pp. 390-91.
especially in the absence of a bill of fundamental rights,
the Supreme Court uas ever vigilant to ensure that inferior
courts did not depart from treasured traditions of the
judiciary, that administrative officers observed certain
minimum standards uhen their decisions affected human rights
and that government agencies, such as the Attorney-General
and members of his department and the police, carried out
their duties and exercised their pouers so as not to conflict
uith the basic rights that are enjoyed by the subject in a
democratic society.
There nou remain to be discussed certain difficulties
that arose as a result of the exercise of the pouer of
judicial revieu of the constitutionality of legislation.
This discussion uill lead to the conclusion that the
Republican Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972 uas enacted
mainly to redeem the supremacy of the legislature from uhat
28has in America been called ’judicial supremacy’.
(iii) Difficulties Connected uith Judicial Revieu
In the absence of a constitutional provision vesting
the pouer of judicial revieu of legislation in a particular
court, the pouer came to be used not only by the Supreme Court
but also by the District Court,^ and even by administrative 
2officers. If the refusal by administrative officers to 
give effect to statutory provisions on the ground of their
28. See Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, (1962), 
specially at pp. 16-17.
1. As in Kodeesuaran v• The Attorney General D .C . 
Colombo 1026/Z.
2. As by a revising officer in Nudanayake v. 
5-ivaqnanasunderam (1951) 53 N.L.R. 25.
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unconstitutionality became common practice, government
activities could have been subjected to undue delay if not
rendered ineffective* Fortunately, perhaps, the only instance
uhere an administrative officer so acted seems to have been
that mentioned in Fludanayake v. Sivaqnanasunderam*
An inevitable consequence of the assumption of the
pouer of juddcial revieu by the courts uas the introduction
of an element of uncertainty into the laus of Ceylon* The
outstanding example is provided by the Official Language Act,
3
No. 33 of 1956. In The Attorney-General v. Kodeesuaran the 
Supreme Court uas called upon to examine the validity of 
the decision of the District Court^ that the Official Language 
Act uas inconsistent uith section 29 (2) of the Ceylon 
(Constitution) Order in Council, 1946. Disposing of the case 
on the ground that a public servant had no right to sue the 
Croun for the payment of arrears of salary, the Supreme 
Court did not consider it necessary to pronounce its opinion 
on the constitutional issue. Uhen the case came before the 
Privy Council, it reversed the decision of the Supreme Court 
on the availability of an action against the Croun in the 
particular circumstances and sent the case back to the 
Supreme Court so that full argument could be heard on the 
validity or otheruise of the impugned Act. Until the 
Supreme Court had the first opportunity of hearing arguments 
on the constitutional issue the Privy Council uas not uilling 
to give a ruling on it.
3. (196?) 70 N.L.R. 121.
4. D. C. Colombo 1026/Z.
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Meanwhile the United Front under the leadership of
Mrs. Bandaranaike, uhich returned to power with a clear
two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives, took
measures to implement one of its election pledges, by setting
up a Constituent Assembly to draft and adopt a new
Constitution, uhich among other things, would protect
legislation from judicial review. These events naturally had
the effect of delaying a further decision of the Supreme
Court in Kndeeswaran*s case, which, as was widely believed,
would uphold the decision of the District Court. The
unsatisfactory nature of this state of affairs uas adverted
to by the then Minister of Constitutional Affairs,
Dr. Colvin R. de Silva:
Fifteen years after /its enactment in 195^7 the
position is that the Official Language Act is
under challenge in the Courts, the only judgment
by any competent Court in the matter being the
judgment of the District Court that the Official
Language Act is invalid, and in the meantime,
quite rightly, the Government of Ceylon continue
to apply the Official Language Act, for the matter
is on appeal and therefore the decision is_not
binding on the Crown. . • . I f  ue have /the power
of judicial review of legislation/, if the Courts
do declare this law invalid • • . the chief
work from 1956 uill be undone. You will have to
restore the egg from the omelette into uhich it
was beaten and cooked . c
b
Uncertainty of law resulting from the exercise of 
the pouer of judicial revieu generates confusion in its most 
acute form uhen over a period of time judicial opinion itself 
becomes divided with regard to the constitutionality of a 
particular legislative enactment. Although a strict adherence
5. Constituent Assembly Debate, Vol. 1, 2833-4.
to stare decisis would, in theory, militate against such 
inconsistent decisions, experience has shown how frequently 
courts arrive at conclusions clearly contrary- to previous authorit 
"by resorting to the ..devices of overruling, distinguishing 
and refusal to follow.
An interesting argument uas advanced before the 
Supreme Court in Perera v. Peiris.^ There it uas argued 
that a previous decision of the Supreme Court holding a 
particular statutory provision to be unconstitutional should 
not be reviewed by the Supreme Court to test its correctness.
The acceptance of this argument, uhich, however, was not 
supported by any authority, would have had the effect of 
attributing certainty to a decision of the highest Court of 
original jurisdiction in Ceylon on a matter of the constitutional 
validity of a statute by ensuring that such decision would 
not thereafter be departed from. (if this argument were 
sound, it would have been possible to apply this rule in 
regard to -Privy Council decisions; i.e. the Privy Council 
would in all circumstances be bound by its previous decisions 
on matters concerning the constitutionality of a statute).
The Supreme Court, however, did not think that the
argument uas tenable, at all, in law:
/That argument/7 is contrary to the attitude of 
the United States Supreme Court, uhich on several 
occasions departed from precedent in order to 
uphold the validity of statutes. It implies that 
this court must stubbornly adhere to previous error, 
even if the rule of stare decisis does not prevent 
revieu of a former decision. If accepted, the 
proposition will tend to place the judiciary in a 
position of obstructive opposition to the Legislature, 
uhich is not the position which the judiciary in my 
understanding occupies under our Constitution.^
6. (1969) 72 N.L.R. 217.
Ibid., at pp. 222-23 per H. N. G. Fernando, C.3.
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Aside from the difficulties that might arise as a 
result of the uncertainty of lau, uhich undoubtedly is an 
inherent characteristic of judicial revieu of legislation, a 
number of other difficulties uere experienced in Ceylon. One 
of them arose from the need to make legislative or administra­
tive adjustments in order to bring the lau in conformity 
uith a judicial decision declaring some constitutional 
provision ultra vires. The discussion under the sub-heading 
The Tuckers Situation, contained in the last chapter, provides 
the most vivid example of this. There the Parliament had 
to enact a lau (i) nullifying certain judicial decisions,
(ii) extending the lau stated in a Privy Council decision to
a number of Supreme Court decisions uhich uere res adjudicatae,
(iii) revoking an administrative regulation uhich proved 
untenable in the light of the Privy Council decision and
(iv) legalising certain appointments made under the authority 
of the revoked regulation prior to the enactment of the 
statute.
Uhen a statutory provision uas declared unconstitutional 
by the courts, Parliament could, in order to ensure the 
uninterrupted operation of the statute, either pass such 
statutory provision as a constitutional amendment or remove 
the inconsistency by altering or repealing the objectionable 
provision uith a simple majority. Generally, it uas not 
uithout a long delay that the legislature intervened to put 
things right. The interval betueen the judicial decision 
and the legislative enactment formed the basis of certain 
interesting, though unsuccessful, arguments.
356
0
Karunaratne v. The Queen provides a telling example.
There the accused had allegedly committed a bribery offence
in 1960 uhen Bribery Tribunals uere in operation. In response
to the decisions of the Supreme Court as approved by the
Privy Council that members of Bribery Tribunals had not been
validly appointed, Parliament passed a lau in 1965 transfering
the jurisdiction conferred on Bribery Tribunals back to the
District Court. Uhen the accused uas prosecuted before the
District Court after the passage of the Bribery (Amendment)
Act, No. 2 of 1965, he took objection to the jurisdiction
of the court on tuo accounts.
First, he argued that an offence consists of tuo
indispensable elements namely, (a) an act or omission
punishable (b) uith a certain penalty. It uas argued that,
since the amending Act enhanced the punishment that might
be imposed on an accused for an offence uhich previously
attracted a lesser punishment, uhat obtained under the
amending Act uas a neu offence. Uithout any hesitation, the
Supreme Court rejected this argument, recollecting that at
the time uhen capital punishment had been temporarily suspended
the offence of murder did not become a lesser or different 
g
offence. Thus, even after the enactment of the amending 
Act, the accused stood charged uith the same offence that 
he might have been charged uith at the time of its commission.
8. (1973) 76 N.L.R. 121.
9. Ibid., at p. 122.
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Further advancing on his first argument the accused
contended that a particular act or omission constituted an
offence only uhen, at the time of its commission, there
existed machinery to enforce the prescribed punishment*
.Since, from the time of creating Bribery Tribunals in 1958
there uas not such machinery (the Bribery Tribunals uith
exclusive jurisdiction having been declared invalidly
constituted) the act.for uhich the accused stood charged
could not be regarded as an offence. This argument too did
not convince the Supreme Court* As T. S. Fernando, J., had
observed in Karunaratne v* The Queen, ^  a previous case uhere
the identical arguments had been raised unsuccessfully:
By an offence is meant an act or omission made 
punishable by lau. This much is the substantive 
part of the lau and must not be confused uith its 
procedural part. That the machinery devised for 
trial and punishment is illegal, unconstitutional 
or otheruise defective cannot have the' effect of 
rendering such act or omission not an offence*^
The above decision received the unreserved approbation
of the Divisional Bench of Three Judges of the Supreme Court
12in Karunaratne v. The Queen, uhere G. P. A* de Silva, J*,
added the follouing explanation:
The provision that offences uere to be tried before 
a tribunal could uell have been implemented if the 
tribunal uas appointed by the proper authority in 
terms of the constitution. There uas therefore in 
lau a Court or Tribunal uhich could validly take 
cognisance of the offence of bribery if only it had 
been properly appointed. In the circumstances, even 
if the counsel’s premise uas sound that there uould 
be no offence uithout a tribunal to try it, the 
ansuer to that is that there uas a tribunal though 
the mode of appointment uas misconceived.^
10. (1966) 69 N.L.R. 10.
11. Ibid.. at p. 14.
12. (1973) 76 N.L.R. 121.
13. I_bid. . at pp. 123-24.
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The arguments raised before the Supreme Court in 
the tuo cases appearing under the same title Karunaratne v.
The Queen‘d  did not add a real difficulty to those already 
emanating from judicial revieu, merely because they uere 
rejected by the court. If such arguments had become acceptable 
to the courts at a later time the picture uould have certainly 
been different.
Another, but someuhat similar, problem arose in
15Ismail v. Muthu Maraliya. There the defend ant-appellant,
against uhom the magistrate had made an order for maintenance
in favour of the applicant-respondent, contended in appeal
before the Supreme Court that the order uas a nullity because
the Magistrate had no jurisdiction in vieu of section 4 8
of the Marriage and Divorce (Muslim) Act, No. 13 of 1951,
uhich uas to the follouing'effect:
Sec, 48. Subject to any provision in that 
behalf contained in this Act, the jurisdiction 
exercisable by a Quazi under section 47 shall 
be exclusive and any matter falling uithin 
that jurisdiction shall not be tried or inquired 
into by any other court or tribunal uhatsoever.
The Supreme Court observed that the matter in dispute betueen
the parties, namely, a claim for maintenance, fell uithin
section 47 (1) (b) and that section 48, uhich conferred
exclusive jurisdiction in respect of matters falling uithin
section 47 on Quazies, uas entirely valid before lau.
Houever, as had been held in Sailabdeen v. Danina Umma, ^
the provision relating to the manner of the appointment of
Quazies uas unconstitutional.
14. (1966) 69 N.L.R. 10; (1973) 76 N.L.R. 121.
15. (1963) 65 N.L.R. 431.
16. (1962) 64 N.L.R. 419.
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The mere fact that the appointment of any 
particular quazi is void does not invalidate 
the jurisdiction conferred by our legislature 
upon the office of Quazi created by it and upon 
the valid creation of the exclusive jurisdiction 
given in certain matters. That question of 
exclusive jurisdiction has nothing to do uith the 
validity of any particular appointment.^,-,
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the order made by 
the magistrate uas a nullity inasmuch as the subject matter 
of the order fell uithin the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
quazies. The resulting position uas that, until the 
legislature intervened to regularise the method of appointing 
quazies there uas, in effect, no tribunal uhich could inquire 
into matters uhich uere reserved exclusively for the 
determination of quazies.
This unsatisfactory state of affairs uas brought to 
an end in 1965, three years after the decision in Jailabdeen 
D a n i n a  I j n m a ,  uith the passage of Act No. 1 of 1965, uhich 
vested in the Judicial Service Commission the pouer of 
appointing quazies, uho uere held to be judicial officers in 
Jailabdeen v. Danina Umma.
Ismail v. Nuthu Maraliya clearly indicates that the 
exercise by the courts of the pouer of judicial revieu 
resulted in disadvantages also to individuals, as it did 
to Parliament, such as in relation to the Official Language 
Act. Inasmuch as judicial revieu has its inescapable 
disadvantages, it also served the uorthy cause of being the 
most significant method by uhich the courts safeguarded the 
liberty of the subject. The inevitable question is: did the
disadvantages outueigh the merits of judicial revieu?
17. ( 1 96 3 )  65 N . L . R .  431  a t  p. 432.
3G9
It is only in respect of the independence of judiciary that 
the courts of Ceylon used its pouer of judicial revieu to 
nullify statutes. These cases, although they undermined the 
uishes of the legislature to the extent that certain statutory 
provisions uere declared invalid, did in fact seek to ensure 
that a fair and impartial mode of settling disputes and of 
administering criminal, as uell as civil, justice uas available 
to the ordinary citizen. This no doubt is a salutary object 
to those uho uish to see the powers of the legislature and 
the executive curbed in order to uphold uhat are often 
referred to as fundamental or inalienable rights of the 
subject.
It could, houever, be argued, as uas in fact done by 
those uho favoured the enactment of a neu Constitution in 
1972, that the conferment of the pouer of judicial revieu 
on the courts uas to create a third Chamber, to replace the 
supremacy of Parliament uith judicial supremacy. These 
arguments uere fortified by reference to the case lau 
relating to the Official Language Act, as ue have already 
noted. Moreover, there uas no guarantee that the courts 
uould not venture to render nugatory important social 
legislation. So, at last, in 1972 the courts uere expressly 
denied the pouer to declare invalid any lau that had been 
passed by the legislature. This uas a significant feature of 
the Republican Constitution, 1972, and one uhich has not 
been abandoned uith the adoption of the Presidential 
Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of 
Sri Lanka, 1978.
PART III
THE REPUBLICAN ERA
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C H A P T E R  10
THE REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION OF 1972:
A COMPLETE SEVERANCE FROM THE PAST?
In the Sri Lanka Press Council Bill decision, the
Constitutional Court stated that the Constitution of
Sri Lanka, 1972 involved a complete severance from the past
or from any preceding constitution,^ As the Minister of
Constitutional Affairs uas quoted to have said in an interview
he gave to the press:
This is not a matter of tinkering with 
some Constitution. Nor is it a matter 
of constructing a new superstructure 
on an existing foundation. We are 
engaged in the task of laying a new 
foundation for a neu building which the 
people of this country will occupy^
In this Chapter an attempt will be made to find 
out to what extent the then existing Constitution underwent 
change. It will be shown that as to its method of creation 
the Constitution was undoubtedly autochthonous. After a 
brief discussion of the major features of the Constitution 
we will discuss the extent to which it can be regarded as 
an autochthonous constitution in substance. •
1. Decisions of the Constitutional Court of 
Sri Lanka, Vol. I (T9~7T), p. 5.
2. Ibid.
(l) An Autochthonous Constitution
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Justice uill not be done if reference is not made
to uhat Uheare had to say about 1autochthony1
For some members of the Commonuealth it is not 
enough to be able to say that .they enjoy a 
system of government uhich is in no uay' subordinate 
to the government of the United Kingdom. They 
uish to be able to say that their Constitution 
has the force of lau and,, if necessary, of 
supreme lau uithin their territory through its 
oun native authority and not because it uas 
enacted or authorised by the lau making authorities 
of the United Kingdom: that is, so to speak !home-
groun’, sprung from their native soil, and not 
imported from the United Kingdom. They assert not 
the principle of autonomy only: they assert also
a principle of something stronger, of self-sufficiency, 
of constitutional autarky or, to use a less familiar 
but accurate uord^ a principle of constitutional 
autochthony, of b..eing Constitutionglly rooted in their 
'oun native soil.’*
The foregoing, and oft-quoted, uords of K. C. Uheare
are self-explanatory and need no further comment here. Ue
may nou examine uhcther the Republican Constitution of
Sri Lanka uas‘an autochthonous Constitution in relation to
the method of its adoption.
Ue seek your mandate to permit the members of 
Parliament you elect to function simultaneously 
as a Constituent Assembly to draft, adopt and 
operate a neu Constitution. This Constitution 
uill declare Ceylon to be a free, sovereign 
and independent Republic pledged to realise 
the objectives of a socialist democracy; and 
it uill also secure fundamental rights and 
freedoms to all citizens.
1. Uheare, K. C., The Constitutional Structure of 
the Commonuealth, (1960, Clarendon Press, Oxford; at p • 89.
See for the origin and meaning of 1 autochthony1, I/* .0* Achimu, 
Autochthony: An Aspect of Constitutionalism in Certain
African Countries (London, Ph.D., 19 72).
364
The foregoing clause contained in the election 
manifesto of the United Front led by firs. Sirimavo 
Bandaranaike, uhich uon 115 out of the 151 seats at the 
general election of Hay 27, 1970, holds the key to the 
legal and political source of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Sri Lanka, 1972.
Pursuant to the mandate sought from the electorate 
and the election pledge* given by the United Front to enact 
a neu Constitution, The Prime Minister, Mrs. Sirimavo
2
Bandaranaike^ extended an invitation to all the 157 members
of the House of Representatives to participate in a meeting
3of the members of Parliament at the Navarangahala on
July 19, 1970 in order to function as a Constituent Assembly
in the exercise of the clear mandate given by the people by
democratically casting their vote. At this meeting
Mrs. Bandaranaike explained uhy the meeting uas convened
4
outside the House of Representatives:
2. The communication is dated July 11, 1970. The 
House of Representatives consisted of 151 elected members 
and 6 members appointed by the Governor-General. (See 
Chapter 4).
3. This is an auditorium cum Concert Hall.
4. The proceedings of a meeting of the Members 
of the House of Representatives at the Navarangahala,
Royal Junior School, Colombo, on the 19th day of July, 1970, 
at 11 a.m. and continued in the House of Representatives at 
3 p.m.
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Ue have met here in this hall to emphasise 
the fact that this is a meeting of the 
Members of the House Representatives as 
representatives of the people of Sri Lanka, 
but not a meeting of the House of Represent­
atives. Ue have adopted this course to 
underline the fact that both the Constituent 
Assembly uhich ue have met to establish, and 
- the Constitution uhich the Constituent Assembly 
uill draft, enact and establish, uill derive 
their authority from the people of Sri Lanka 
and not from the pouer and authority assumed 
and exercised by the British Croun and 
Parliament in establishing the present 
Constitution they gave us.^g
At this meeting, the Prime Minister moved the
resolution to set up the Constituent Assembly, uhich
5
motion uas carried unanimously on July 21, 1970.
The Constituent Assembly as a matter of priority 
debated, and on August 11, 1970 unanimously adopted, the 
Standing Orders of the Constituent Assembly.^ Acting
7
under Standing Order No. 1, the President of the Assembly 
nominated 15 members, including the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Constitutional Affairs, after consulting the 
Prime Minister, to serve on the Steering and Subjects Committe
4a. The Senate, the Upper House of Parliament, had 
not been officially informed of the meeting at Navarangahala 
since it uas not a meeting of the House of Representatives. 
See Senate Official Report, August 5, 1970.
5. Ibid., July 21, 1970 column 508.
6. Constituent Assembly : Official Report, Volume 1
No. 2, August 11, 1970, at column 133.
7. The Speaker of the House of Representative had
been elected unanimously as the President of the Constituent
Assembly on July 19, 1970.
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This committee uas entrusted uith the serious task of 
preparing the basic resolutions. On January 17, 1971 
the Minis/ter of Constitutional Affairs placed before the
g
Committee the draft basic resolutions uhich uere 
subsequently adopted by the Committee, The delay in 
submitting the draft, the Minister explained, uas mainly 
due to the fact that the opportunity had to be made 
available to the public to voice their opinions uhich 
then received the careful consideration of the Committee.
Qn March 14, 1971 commenced the debate in the 
Hnnstituent Assembly on the Basic Resolutions adopted 
by the Steering and Subjects Committee. The Constituent 
Assembly completed its debate on the Basic Resolutions 
on July 10, 1971. The Minister o.f Constitutional 
Affairs explained on that day that the next stage uas 
the preparation of the first-draft of the Constitution. 
The Steering and Subjects .Committee uould finalize that
draft to be in accordance uith the basic principles
/
the constituent Assembly had adopted. The draft uould
1 0then be placed before the Constituent Assembly. If 
it be resolved by the National State Assembly that the 
draft uas in accordance uith the Basic Resolutions 
adopted by it, it uould divide itself into a number 
of committees.
8. The Minister so placed the draft at the 
request of the Committee to prepare and place before 
it such a draft. See Constituent Assembly: Official 
Report, Vol. 1, No. 8, 22.1.1971, col. 162.
9. Ibid., at colomns 162-3.
10. Constituent Assembly: Official Report, Vol. 1 
No. 35, col. 2395. See also the Standing Orders of the 
Constituent Assembly,
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Each such Committee uould examine a particular part of the 
Constitution* Committees uere also required at this stage 
to receive uritten memoranda and oral evidence from the 
public* Then the draft Constitution uould be finalized by 
the Steering and Subjects Committee on the lines suggested 
by the Committees* This draft uould be open to a clause by 
clause examination, then, by the Constituent Assembly*^
The draft Constitution, uhich had been prepared by
the Minister of Constitutional Affairs at the invitation of
the Steering and Subjects Committee, and later approved by
it, uas presented before the Constituent Assembly on December
29, 1971* This draft uas approved unanimously to be in
accordance uith tho Basic Resolutions on January 3, 1972,
On the same day the Constituent Assembly agreed to the motion
put by the Minister of Constitutional Affairs that the
Assembly be divided up into eleven committees, each to consider
that part of the Draft Constitution uhich uould be assigned
12to it in the motion. Each Committee considered the part 
assigned to it and prepared its report uith or uithout 
amendments* The eleven committee reports uere then foruarded 
to the Steering and Subjects Committee. These reports and 
certain recommendations of the Minister of Constitutional 
Affairs uere considered by the Steering and Subjects Committee 
uhich approved the Draft Constitution in a revised form. On 
May 8, 1972 the revised draft uas placed before the Consti­
tuent Assembly sitting- as a committee of the uhole Assembly
11. Ibid., coin. 2995-7. See also Standing Orders 
of the Constituent Assembly.
12. See for the names of the M.P.s uho constituted 
each of the 11 Committees Constituent Assembly: Official 
Report, Vol. 2, No. 3.
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for it to be examined clause by clause* The Constituent
Assembly agreed by a majority of 119 to 16 that the Draft
Constitution as discussed in the Assembly sitting as a whole
be adopted ;’as the Constitution of the Free Sovereign and
Independent People of Sri Lanka’• On the same day the
members of the Constituent Assembly met at the Navarangahala
where the President of the Constituent Assembly certified
that the Constitution had been adopted and enacted by the
Constituent Assembly*
Having, thus, briefly examined the events leading
upto the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of
Sri Lanka, 1972 in chronological order, it is fair to
conclude that the drafting of that Constitution uas the
outcome of serious and thorough deliberation* Moreover,
the various acts done, from the seeking of the electoral
mandate through to the final certification of the
Constitution, were all performed in such a manner so as to
declare unambiguously that the proposed Constitution.would
not derive its authority under the then existing Soulbury
Constitution* In fact the Constitution begins uith
assertion of its autochthonous origin:
Ue the people of Sri Lanka being resolved in the 
exercise of our freedom and independence as a 
nation to give to ourselves a constitution • • • 
which will become the fundamental law of Sri’Lanka 
its power and authority solely from the people do 
• • • acting through the Constituent Assembly 
established by us hereby adopt, enact and give to 
ourselves this Constitution.^g
12a* See further on the making of the Republican 
Constitution: 3 • A. L. Cooray, Constitutional and
Administrative Law of Sri Lanka (1973) Chapter 3j 
L. 3 • M* Cooray, Reflections, Chapter 8 ; and John Kirkwood 
’Constitutional Change in Sri Lanka: a Peaceful Revolution’
Lawasia Vol* 3, No* 1, (April. 1 972) , p. 194•
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It is useful to examine briefly, at this stage, why 
an attempt was not made to bring about the constitutional 
innovations acting under the provisions of the Ceylon 
(Constitution) Order in Council, 1946, In the first place, 
there existed certain doubts as to whether Parliament 
of Ceylon was competent to alter section 29(2) of the' >
13Soulbury Constitution, which protected minority rights.
It could have, however, been possible to request the
United Kingdom Parliament to enact a new Constitution
for Ceylon, since under section\l(l) of the Ceylon
Independence Act, 1947 the Parliament of the United
Kingdom retained the power to legislate for Ceylon at her
* 13a
request and with her consent. This alternative,
however, did not prove readily acceptable. As Mr. Jaya 
Pathirana, M. P., (who was later appointed a Judge of 
the Supreme Court and a member of the Constitutional 
Court) said in 1962: 'we can give this consent, but
I think it will be derogatory to our sense of 
independence1. ^
13. See supra Chapter 4, Part (2), specially 
at foot notes 7 - "1'1.
13a. Section 1 (1) of the Ceylon Independence Act, 
1947: *No Act of the Parliament of the United
Kingdom passed on or after the appointed- v ;■ 
day /^February 4, 1948/ shall extend, 
or be deemed to extend, to Ceylon as 
part of the lav/ of Ceylon, unless it is 
expressly declared in that Act that 
Ceylon has requested, and consented to, 
the enactment thereof'.
14. The Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) ,
March 9, 19^2, col. 5132.
Mrs. Bandaranaike said at the meeting of the
Members of Parliament convened by her to adopt the
resolution to establish a Constituent Assembly:
Our people have clearly expressed their 
desire to have a Constitution of their 
oun making, of uhich, as a self-respecting 
nation, they can be proud— a Constitution 
uhich uill reflect their highest aspira­
tions and help to ensure the uell being 
and happiness of future generations.^^
Before ue proceed to examine the salient features
of the Republican Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972 ue may
briefly look at uhy the then existing Constitution did not
prove acceptable to the United Front led by Mrs. Bandaranaike.
«
As Peter Keuneman, a Minister of the United Front government,
observed,the Independence Constitution, uhich had been imposed
on the people of Ceylon, sought to protect vested interests
and to perpetuate the status quo. It not only limited the
Sovereignty of Parliament but also acted as a brake on
progressive development. The .bureaucratic administrative
structure then existing was another evil that had to be
swept auay. Mr. Keuneman said that the country needed
fa Constitution that uill be an accelerator and not a brake
on progressive development1, and he added this reminder:
Let us be quite clear in our minds about 
this question of the independence of the 
judiciary. It does not and cannot deprive 
the legislature of its rightful supremacy 
in the constitutional order of things.
15. Quoted by the Constitutional Court in the Sri 
Lanka Press Council Bill Decision. Decisions of the 
Constitutional Court of Sri Lanka \JoYl I (1973), p7 5.
16. The proceedings of a meeting of the Members of 
the House of Representatives at the Navarangahala, Royal 
Ounior School, Colombo, on the 19th day of Duly, 1970 at
11 a.m. and continued in the House of Representatives at 
3 p.m. July 21, 1970. Columns 386-390.
Ue may nou examine hou and to uhat extent these vieus found 
expression in the Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972.
(2) The Salient Features of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Sri Lanka, 1972
The Republican Constitution of 1972 did not abandon 
altogether the system of Parliamentary democracy uhich had 
first been introduced in 1946. The major institutions of 
government then in existence uere adapted uith necessary 
modifications to suit the neu constitutional structure.
The Parliament, uhich as introduced in 1946 consisted of 
the tuo houses of Parliament and the Queen,^ uas replaced 
uith the National State Assembly as the neu Legislature of 
Sri Lanka. The President, Head of State, took the place of 
the former Governor-General, uho uas the Queen’s represen­
tative in Ceylon. Together uith the Cabinet of Ministers, 
the President exercised the executive pouers. The 
President, houever, did not have any part in the legislative 
process, as uill be seen later. As regards the judiciary 
and the public service, provision uas made in such a manner 
that the legislature and the executive had more control 
over the members belonging to these tuo bodies. If the 
major institutions of the constitutional system in existence 
uere not materially -altered, the question arises as to the 
nature of the major changes brought about by the Republican 
Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972. To ansuer that question it
1. Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946.
Sec. 7.
OfMO 
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is necessary to examine the provisions relating to the 
constitutional principles uhich constituted the foundation 
of the Constitution,folloued by an examination of the 
composition, pouers and functions of the various organs 
of government created by the Republican Constitution.
(i) The Doctrinal Basis of the Constitution
Supremacy of Parliament operating uithin a frame­
work uhich recognized the doctrines of separation of pouers 
and independence of the judiciary provided the essential 
basis of the Soulbury Constitution of Ceylon. The practical 
effect of this uas to confer on the courts the pouer to 
review either an executive or a legislative measure in 
order to determine whether there had been an overstepping 
of the authority granted to the legislature or the executive. 
Thus legislation enacted by Parliament had only a provisional 
effect in the sense that the courts had the pouer to declare 
laus unconstitutional and invalid.
In order to overcome these difficulties firstly the
/
doctrine of separation of pouers uas rejected. The
Constitution provided that * in the Republic of Sri Lanka,
2Sovereignty is in the people* and that 1 the Sovereignty
of the people is exercised through a National State Assembly
3
of elected representatives of the people*• Section 5 is 
the pivotal sections
1. But as uill be shoun in the next chapter, the * 
Constitutional Court decided that the National State Assembly 
could not directly exercise judicial pouer.
2. The Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972, sec. 3.
3. Ibid., sec. 4.
“73o
5. The National State Assembly is the 
supreme instrument of State pouer of 
the Republic, The National State 
Assembly exercises—
(a) the legislative pouer of the People;
(b) the executive pouer of the People, 
including the defence of Sri Lanka, through 
the President and the Cabinet of Ministers; 
and
(c) the judicial pouer of the People through 
courts and other institutions created by lau 
except in the case of matters relating to its 
pouers and privileges, uherein the judicial 
pouer of the People may be exercised directly 
by the National State Assembly according to 
lau*
Reading the three sections referred to above, 
namely sections Z y  4 and 5, together it may be said that the 
sovereignty of the people,uhich included the legislative, 
executive and judicial pouers, uas to be exercised by the 
National State Assembly representing the people of Sri Lanka, 
Houever, since it uas impractical for the National State 
Assembly to exercise all the diverse pouers of State, the 
executive and judicial pouers uere to be exercised through 
the institutions referred to in 5(b) and 5(c), respectively. 
As a doctrine, separation of pouers uas not enshrined 
in the Constitution, The Constitutional Court made the 
follouing observation in The Associated Neuspapers of Ceylon
Ltd, , (Special Provisions) Bill Decision:
374
In our vieu, the doctrine of
Separation of Powers has no place '
in our Constitution. The National
State Assembly is the Supreme
Instrument of State Pouer and
exercises the legislative pouer
of the people, the executive
pouer of the people, and also the
judicial pouer of the people.^
The question arises whether the rejection of
the doctrine of separation of pouers carried uith it
the consequence of entrusting all pouers--judicial,
executive and legislative--to the National State
Assembly. Dr. Colvin R. de Silva, the Minister of
Constitutional Affairs, reminded the Constituent
Assembly that instead of discussing the merits and
demerits of the abstract theory of separation of
powers, the Members should examine the concrete
proposals relating to the sovereignty of Parliament.
Having observed that separation of pouers in a strict
sense does not exist in gny modern state he-uent on 
*
to emphasize the need to Tkeep at least the judiciary
. /
completely separate in so far as they should act 
independently1. It uas, however, necessary, he 
added, that the Constitution should be drafted in 
such a way that it does not hinder the progress 
of* the country. Mr. Felix R. D. Bandararfaike, the 
Minister of Public Administration and Local 
Government explained the proposed change quite 
clearly:
4. Decisions of the Constitutional Court of 
Sri Lanka^ Vol. 1 (19 73), at p. 53. Affirmed in the
Administration of Justice Bill Decision, Ibid.,
at p . 67.
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Ue are trying to reject the theory of .
Separation of Pouers. Ue are trying
to say that nobody should be higher
than the elected representatives of
the people, nor should any person not
elected by the people have the right
to throu out the decisions of the
people elected by the people. Uhy are
you saying that a judge once appointed „
should have the right to declare that
Parliament is urong? That you must have
judges to do the job of judging is true.
Ue do not want to be judges.
f : . i
From uhat ue have quoted above tuo specific issues
may be formed, namely (a) should the courts have the pouer
to nullify legislation? and (b) is it desirable that the
legislature should assume judicial functions that had till
then been discharged by judicial officers? The intention
of the makers of the Constitution seems to have been to
remove the pouer of judicial revieu but not to enable the
legislature to perform the duties of judicial officers.
The conclusion then is uarranted that the rejection of the
doctrine of separation of pouers amounted no more than to
a removal of the pouer of judicial review. Section 48(2)
is the excluding clause:
48(2) No institution administiering justice 
and likewise no other institution, person 
or authority shall have the power or juris­
diction to inquire into, pronounce upon or 
in any manner call in question the validity 
of any lau of the National State Assembly.
Having removed the pouer of judicial revieu uhich 
acts as a fetter on the supremacy of legislature, the 
Republican Constitution sought to place as little restriction
i
________________________  l
. /> .-V , .
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as possible on the pouers of the National State Assembly.
It uas for this purpose that the legislative pouers of the
National State Assembly uere clearly specified:
Sec. 44. The legislative pouer of the 
National State Assembly is supreme and 
includes the pouer--
(a) to repeal or amend the Constitution 
in uhole or in part; and
(b) to enact a neu Constitution to replace 
the Constitution.
Provided that such pouer shall not 
include the pouer--
(i) to suspend the operation of the 
Constitution or any part thereof; and
(ii) to repeal the Constitution as a 
uhole without enacting a neu Constitution 
to replace it;
According to section 51(5) the Constitution could be 
replaced, repealed or amended uith a tuo-thirds majority, 
sub ject, however^ to the requirements laid doun in section 44. 
Section 52(1) permitted the enactment of a lau inconsistent 
uith 'any constitutional provision provided, houever, that 
such' legislative measure uas passed in accordance uith the 
procedure prescribed for constitutional amendment.
Unlike the Soulbury Constitution under uhich doubts 
lingered as to whether the Parliament of Ceylon uas competent 
to pass laus contravening certain express or implied pro­
visions of that Constitution or to amend it, the Republican 
Constitution prescribed in unambiguous terms the procadure 
for amending or repealing or replacing the Constitution 
uith a neu one: the main requirement being tuo-thirds majority.
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Therefore, in circumstances uhere the concurrence of tuo- 
thirds at least of the uhole number of members of the 
National State Assembly (including those not present) could 
be secured,the National State Assembly uas able to pass a 
lau of any description as long as certain other technical 
requirements uere fulfilled."’ Houever, it must be noted 
that, according to the proviso to section 44, the National 
State Assembly could neither suspend the operation of the 
Constitution, in'Uhole or in part, nor repeal the Constitution 
as a uhole uithout enacting a neu Constitution to replace it, 
This proviso then is an absolutely entrenched provision 
incorporated in the Constitution to ensure that at no time 
uould Sri Lanka be uithout a Constitution or uith a 
Constitution suspended in uhole or in part.
In spite, of the fact that the Judiciary uas deprived 
of the. pouer to invalidate laus enacted by the National State 
Assembly, it uas recognized that the interpretation of laus 
falls uithin the province of the judiciary. It is this 
recognition that led to the introduction of the Constitutional 
Court uhich uould determine uhether any Bill duly submitted 
to it uas inconsistent uith any constitutional provision.^
A Bill declared by the Constitutional Court to be in conflict 
uith any constitutional provision could be passed only if the
5. Such as for instance that any Bill for the 
amendment of the Constitution should expressly state such 
object in its long title (sec. 51(1)). See sections 51 and 52.
6. Whether the Constitutional Court uas fa court1 is 
a matter open to argument. See the discussion in the next 
chap ter.
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procedure prescribed for constitutional amendment uas 
adhered to* Once a lau uas enacted it enjoyed complete 
immunity from judicial revieu* This arrangment, uhile 
allouing the Constitutional Court to perform the role of 
interprefr&f of the Constitution, ensured that laus enacted 
by the Legislature uould not later be rendered nugatory by 
courts of lau*
Ue may nou examine the provisions relating to
(a) the Legislature (b) the Executive and (c) the Judiciary 
in order to find out hou the doctrines and principles 
referred to above: had in fact been given effect to*
(li) The Legislature
The National State Assembly replacing the Ceylon 
Parliament became the sole legislature in Ceylon. Section 
45(1) provided that the National State Assembly could not 
abdicate, delegate or alienate its legislative pouer* Nor 
could it set up any authority uith any legislative pouer 
other than the pouer to make subordinate laus* Houever, 
as an exception to this rule the National State Assembly 
could delegate to the President the pouer to make, in 
accordance uith the lau for the time being relating to 
public security and for the duration of a state of emergency, 
emergency regulations*^ Section 134(2) provided that tho 
President should declare a state of emergency only upon the 
Prime Minister advising him of the existence or the imminence 
of a state of public emergency, and that he should act on
1* T h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  of  S r i  L a n k a ,  1 9 7 2 *  Sec* 4 5 ( 4 ) *
379
the advice of the Prime Minister. Uith the other safeguards 
intended to secure the control of his pouers by the National 
State Assembly the President, uhen exercising the emergency 
pouers, could not be regarded as a rival legislative 
authority.
A Bill introduced, read and passed according to the
Standing Orders of the National State Assembly and the
Constitution, became lau uhen the Speaker endorsed on it the
certificate that it had been duly passed by the National
2
State Assembly. Thus uhereas under the Soulbury Constitution 
laus could be enacted only uith the approval of both Houses 
of Parliament (exceptionally uith the House of Representatives 
alone) and uith Royal assent, nou a legislative measure duly 
approved by the National State Assembly became a lau at once 
uithout any further approval.
Ue have noted in Chapter 4 that Section 29(2) of 
the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946, uhich related
to the protection of minority rights,uas regarded by some as
/
an unalterable provision--as a provision uhich imposed an 
absolute limitation on the legislative pouer of the
3
Legislature. Uhile leaving no room for the existence of
la. See further, on the emergency, pouers of the 
President^J. A. L. Cooray, Constitutional and Administra tive 
Lau of Ceylon (1973), pp. 554-9.
2. See Sections 46-49.
3. See C. F.. Amerasinghe, Separation, pp. 53-6; and 
the obiter dieturn of Lord Pearce in The Bribery Commissioner 
v. Ranasinqhe (66 N.L.R. 73 at p. 78’) that the * entrenched 
religious and racial matters* uere inalterable under the '* 
Constitution*. According to Professor M. L. Marasinghe, uhen
an electoral mandate uas sought to set up a Constituent Assembly 
*Poised in that manner, the Bribery Commissioner*s Case uent 
up, as it uere on a further appeal, to the electorate*.
*Ceylon: a Conflict of Constitutions*, 20 I.C.L.Q. 645-74
at p. 650,(1971).
any such unalterable provision limiting the legislative
competence of the National State Assembly in respect of
minority rights, the Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972
introduced a Bill of Fundamental Rights.
The inclusion of a Bill of Fundamental Rights in
the Republican Constitution uas intended to allay 1 those
4
uorries and anxieties* of the minority communities and
those uho had been consistently engaged in demanding the
replacement of section 29(2) of the Soulbury Constitution
5uith a more comprehensive Bill of Rights. As the Minister 
of Constitutional Affairs emphatically stated^the protection 
of fundamental rights could not, houever, be alloued to 
*prevail absolutely*;^ in other uords, fundamental rights 
could constitutionally be safeguarded only in so far as 
the supremacy of the National State Assembly uas not unduly 
curtailed thereby. Accordingly, the fundamental rights and 
freedoms uhich uere enumerated in Chapter VI of the
Republican Constitution uere not justiciable in a court of
/
lau. The only opportunity there uas for someone to object 
to the constitutionality of a particular legislative measure 
on the basis of an infringement of fundamental rights came 
in the form of obtaining a decision of the Constitutional 
Court, uhile the legislative measure uas in its B511-stage.-
4. Constituent Assembly Official Report, column 2917
5. See for'a brief account of the long standing 
agitation for a Bill of Fundamental Rights, 3. A. L. Cooray, 
Constitutional and Administrative Lau of Sri Lanka (1973)
pp. Bu B-13; the debate In the constituent Assembly "on '!
fundamental rights is contained in the Official Report of 
the Constituent Assembly, Nos. 20 and 21. See also Nos.
14-17 on the position of Buddhism.
6. Constituent Assembly Official Report, column 2917
0  0-1 
0 0 1
Section 18(2) of the Republican Constitution
provided that the exercise and operation of fundamental
rights and freedoms:
shall be subject to such 
restrictions as the lau prescribes 
in the interests of national unity" 
and integrity, national security, 
national economy, public safety, 
public order, the protection of public 
health or morals or the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others 
or giving effect to the Principles of 
State Policy set out in section 16*
The restrictions contained in Section 18(2) seem to
•  '
have been drafted in very broad terms, and the
objection had been raised that this categorisation
uould allou any lau to be interpreted as being
covered by one or the other of the various subjects
referred to in that section. In spite of the fact
that the Principles of State Policy, according to
Section 17, did not confer legal rights and uere not
enforceable in courts of lau, they could be, and had
in fact been, relied on in determining the validity
8of Bills referred to the Constitutional Court,
7. S, Nadesan, Some Comments on the Constituent 
Assembly and the Draft Basic Resolutions (1971),
at p. 34,
8, See e.g., the Sri Lanka Press Council Bill 
decision and the Places and Objects of Worship Bill * 
decision; Decisions of the Constitutional Court of 
Sri Lanka, Vol. 1 (1973), at pp. 14-15 and 34 
respectively.
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Since the restrictions contained in Section 18(2)
were vague and broad it uas not easy, in the generality 
9of cases, to successfully impugn the constitutionality of 
a Bill on the ground of a breach of fundamental rights; 
even if a Bill uas declared by the Constitutional Court to 
be inconsistent uith a constitutional provision, it could 
find its uay into the statute book provided that not less 
than tuo-thirds of the uhole number of M.R.’s supported its 
uay through.
It is clear from the above discussion on the
legislati ve pouers of the Nat ional State Assembly that the
National State Ass'embl y could pass laus either ui th a simple
majority or in the spe cial ci rcums tances ue have uitnessed
above after ha ving res ort to the amendment proced ure: the
only absolute prohibition being that contained in the proviso
to sec tion 44 uh ich pro hib ited total or par tial suspension
of the Consti tut ion or the tojtal rep eal of the Constitution
ui thou t repla cem ent,
10
» The relaxati on of the restrictions
th
/
at prevaile d over the po uer of the legisl ature prior to
9. In each of the follouing decisions and in some 
others the Bill in question uas held to violate fundamental 
rights, although in many of these decisions Section 18(2) 
uas not applicable:. The Church Union Bill decision (Ceylon 
Hansard, November 21, 1975, column 2048); The Pirivena 
Education Bill decision (Ceylon Hansard, Vol. 18, No. 7, 
February 19, 1976, column 1001); and The Local Authorities 
(imposition of Civic Disabilities) Bill decision (Ceylon 
HansardI, Vol. 28, No. 15 of 1978, column 1655-168l)\
10. Could it not' have been possible for the 
National State Assembly to repeal that provision first and 
then suspend or repeal the Constitution in the manner s
prohibited by that provision?
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1972 provides the essential theme of the Republican 
Constitution, Ue may nou proceed to see hou this theme 
is sustained throughout the Constitution, through our 
discussion of the executive and the judiciary,
(iii) The Executive
The executive pouer vested in theory in the National
State Assembly uas exercised in fact through the President,
1 2 the Head of the State, and the Cabinet of Ministers,
3
The President, nominated by the Prime Minister, uas
the Head of Executive and the Commander in Chief of the 
4Armed Forces, His pouers and functions uere to a great 
extent similar to those exercised and performed by his 
predecessor the Governor-General; a notable difference being 
that he did not take part in the legislative process by uay 
of signifying his assent to a Bill passed by the National 
State Assembly, The practice of inviting the Head of the 
State, to read the statement of- government policy— or make 
1 the thronG-speech1 as it uas uidely knoun before 1972-- 
uas abandoned. Instead, the Prime Minister read the state­
ment in the National State Assembly*.^
1, The Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972, Sec, 19.
2, Ibid., sec. 5.
3, Ibid., sec. 25.
4, Ibid., sec, 20.
5, See National State Assembly Debates, Vol. 1
p. 190.
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Required by the Constitution to act on the advice
of the Prime Minister^ or of such other Minister to uhom
the Prime Minister might have given authority to advise
the President on any particular function assigned to that 
7
Minister, the President had very feu functions he could 
perform on his oun initiative. It uas in his oun discretion 
that the President appointed a Prime Minister !uho, in the 
Presidents opinion, is most likely to command the confidence
Q
of the National State Assembly*. Likeuise, if the National
State Assembly rejected the Statement of Policy at its
first session and the Prime Minister advised the President
to dissolve the National State Assembly, the President
could refuse to accept such advice; then, the Prime Minister
9uas deemed to have resigned.
While prior to 1972 the rules governing the relation­
ship betueen the Governor-General and the tuo Houses of 
Parliament uere in the form of conventions, they uere incor-
t * '•
porated as constitutional provisions in 1972. Houever, it
/
uas specifically provided that the President uould be immune
6. E.g., in appointing the Cabinet of Ministers
(Sec. 92(1)), and Judges of the Supreme Court (Sec. 122(1)),
and in- summoning, proroguing and dissolving the National 
State Assembly.
7. Proviso to Section 22 laid doun that in granting 
a pardon to an offender sentenced to death, the President 
should act on the advice of the Minister of Justice.
8. Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972, sec. 92(2).
9. Ibid., sec. 100(1)
^ O Cf OOD
from civil or criminal proceedings in respect of anything 
done or omitted to be done by him in either- his official 
or private capacity^ and that no act or omission on the 
part of the President could be inquired into or called in 
question by any authority on the ground that the President 
had not complied uith the provisions of Section 27(1).*^
These provisions ensured that uhile certainty uas achieved 
by reducing the conventions into uriting, the fundamental 
nature of conventions,namely that they are not justiciable 
in a court of lau,uas retained#
In addition to the requirement that unless otheruise 
provided by the Constitution the President should act on 
the advice of the Prime Minister or a Minister, the President 
uas made responsible—
/ to the National State Assembly for the due 
execution and performance of the pouers and 
functions of his office under the Constitution 
and any other lau, including the lau for the 
time being relating to public security.^
* '
This section uhich did not have its counterpart in
/
the Soulbury Constitution highlights hou the central theme 
of the Constitu tion, namely, the preservation of the supremacy 
of the National State Assembly,uas maintained in respect
10. Ibid., Sec. 23(1).
11. Ibid., Sec. 27(2). Section 27(1) laid doun 
that generally the President should act on advice.
12. Ibid., Sec. 91.
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of the Head of State, uho could be removed by the National
13State Assembly, Section 92(1), uhich laid doun the
principle of the collective responsibility of the Cabinet
of Ministers, completed the requirement of the theoretical
14
subjugation of the executive to the Legislature,
Deviating from the Soulbury Constitution uhich 
vested the pouer of appointment, transfer, dismissal and 
disciplinary control of public officers in the Public 
Service Commission,^ the Republican Constitution vested
such pouer in the Cabinet of Ministers."^ Of course, there
* 17uas established a State Services Advisory Board and a
18State Services Disciplinary Board to advise the Cabinet 
of Ministers in the exercise of such pouers, Whereas under 
the Soulbury Constitution matters relating to appointment, 
transfer, dismissal and disciplinary control of public 
officers could not come up for discussion in Parliament,
13, This could be done by passing a vote of no 
confidence proposed by the Prime Minister (Sec, 26(2)(d)); 
if the resolution uas proposed by any other Member of the 
National State Assembly it had to be passed by a tuo-thirds 
majority. The Prime Minister could remove the President
on account of Cental or physical infirmity* (Sec, 26(2)(c)),
14, But, in fact, the Cabinet of Ministers controls 
the legislature through the majority in the legislature it 
uields. See Sir Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government (Cambridge 
1965, 3rd, ed,) Chapter XV 'Government and Parliament*,
'The Continuation in Pouer of any particular Government depends 
upon the contunued support of Parliament, or, more particularly, 
of the Commons, and thus the legislature and the executive are 
closely dovetailed in the British Constitution*,
D, C. M. Yardley, Introduction to British Constitutional Lau 
(5th, ed,, Butteruorths, 1978) p, 39, This uas true of the 
position under the Republican Constitution of Sri Lanka,
1972 too.
i
15• Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946,
Sec • 60(1).
16. .The Constitution of of Sri Lanka, 1972, section
17. Ibid., sec. 111. ^106(1).
18. Ibid., sec. 112.
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it uas nou possible to discuss such matters in the National
State Assembly since the Cabinet of Ministers uas made
19
ansuerable to the National State Assembly* The effect of
this arrangement uas to confer on the Cabinet of Ministers
a .greater degree of control over state officers, uhile at
the same time ensuring, in theory at least, that through
the concept of ansuerability of the Cabinet to the National
State Assembly the latter had the final decision in respect
of the tenure of state officers.
It is clear from the above discussion of the
provisions relating to the executive that the Constitution
of Sri Lanka, 1972 restricted the opportunities that the
President uould have of exerting any control over the
Legislature: his pouers uere closely defined uith the
requirement that subject to specific exceptions he should
act on ministerial advice, he uas ansuerable to the
Legislature and could be removed by a resolution of the
Legislature. The Constitution also gave expression to
the rule that the executive uould, in theory, operate
uithin the frameuork of the supremacy of i'tfre legislature.
Ue nou come to the relationship betueen the
legislature and the judiciary— ’perhaps the single most
20crucial relationship in a constitutional system1.
19. Ibid., sec. 106(1).
20. Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Theory, 
(Clarendon. Lau Series, ed. H. L. A. Hart., Oxford, 1971) 
p. 97.
(iv) The Judiciary
/a_7y the long and uniform usage of 
many ages, our kings have delegated 
their whole judicial power to judges 
of their several courts . . .  In 
this distinct and separate existence 
of the judicial power in; a peculiar 
body of men, nominated indeed, but 
not removeable at pleasure by the 
crown, consists one main preservative 
of the public liberty, which cannot 
subsist long in any state unless the 
administration of common justice be 
in some degree separated both from 
the legislative and also from the 
executive pouer,^
These*well known words of Blackstone, who in the
same treatise said that the United Kingdom Parliament
could do Everything that is not naturally impossible1,
indicate in no uncertain terms that while recognizing
the supremacy of Parliament it is equally important to
uphold the independence of the judiciary. Independence of
the judiciary, however, does not imply that the Legislature
or the Executive should have no form of control over the
Judiciary, Prior to 1972 it had been recognized in Ceylon
that the legislature could, for instance, take away the
jurisdiction of the courts even with retrospective effect,
as long as that jurisdiction was not conferred on a non- 
2judicial body. Further it is recognized that as the 
representative of the electorate Parliament should pos:'. rs
1, Blackstone, .Commentaries, Vol. 1, p, 257 and 
269. ■
2. See the discussion in Chapter 8  Part 4*
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some pouer in respect of the appointment, at least, of 
judicial officers: hou far this pouer could travel, in
keeping uith the independence of the judiciary, it is not 
easy to determine* An attempt is made here to examine the 
provisions contained in the Republican Constitution of 
Sri Lanka, 1972 relating to the judiciary in order to 
find out the degree of independence secured to the judiciary 
in comparison uith the position obtaining before 1972*
3
As before 1972, the judges of the Superior Courts
4
uere to be appointed by the Head of the State. Every such
■ .» * * *
Judge held office during good behaviour and uas not removable 
except by the President upon an address of the National
5
State Assembly. The salaries of such judges uere determined 
by the National State Assembly and became a charge on the 
Consolidated Fund. Not only the salary payable, as before
7
1972, to any such judge but also the age of retirement
g
could not nou be reduced during his term of office. Prior 
to 1972 the age of retirement uas sixty-tuo years, reneuable 
for a period not exceeding tuelve months.^ Removing this 
objectionable provision the Republican Constitution fixed
3. Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946,
Sec. 52(1).
4. Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972, Sec. 122(1).
5. Ibid., Sec. 122(2); Ceylon (Constitution)
Order in Council, 1946, Sec. 52(2).
6. Constitution of 1972, Sec. 122(4); Constitution 
of 1946, Sec. 122(4).
7. Constitution of 1946, Sec. 52(6).
8. Constitution of 1972, Sec. 122(5). \
9. Constitution of 1946, Sec. 52(3).
3S0
the age of retirement at sixty-three years and to be
non-reneuable•^  This comparison shous that as regards
the Judges of the Supreme Court the Republican Constitution
has made improved and less objectionable provision, although
as before 1972 it uas still open for the Government to
make political or patronizing appointments*
In place of the Judicial Service Commission the
Republican Constitution introduced a Judicial Services
Advisory Board and a Judicial Services Disciplinary Board*
The Judicial Services Advisory Board consisted of
five members uith the Chief Justice as Chairman* The
other four members, including a Judge of an inferior
court and a President of a Labour Tribunal, uere appointed
by the President.^ A Member of Parliament could not be
12appointed to this Board* Every member except the Chairman
13uas appointed for a period of six years, and could be 
removed from office by the President uithout assigning
any reason,^4 The salary or allouance paid to a member
/
uas'determined<by the National State Assembly and became 
a charge on the Consolidated Fund. Such salary uould not 
be diminished during the term of office of such member.^
10* Constitution of 1972, Sec. 122(3). 
11# Ibid., Sec. 125(2) and (3).
i2* Ibid., Sec. 125 (4).
Ibid., Sec. 125(5).
14. Ibid.j Sec. 125(6).
15. Ibid., Sec. 125(9).
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The Judicial Services Advisory Board uas a 
consultative body uhich advised the Cabinet of Ministers 
in respect of appointing inferior judges and judicial 
officers.^ In addition, the Board had the pouer to 
transfer such officers, subject to an appeal to the
17Cabinet of Ministers against such order of transfer*
To exercise the pouers of dismissal and
disciplinary control of inferior judges and judicial
officers, uas created the Judicial Services Disciplinary
Board consisting of the Chief Justice and tuo other judges
18of the highest court nominated by the President*
The Cabinet of Ministers had the pouer in 
consultation uith the Disciplinary Board to make
(a) rules of conduct for such Inferior 
judges and judicial officers;
(b) rules of procedure for matters 
connected uith the holding-of discipli­
nary inquiries; and
,(c) provision for such'other matters as ~ 
are necessary or expedient for the 
performance of the duties of the Judicial 
Services Disciplinary Board.^g
16* Ibid♦, sec. 126(1), The term judicial 
officer is used here to denote !all state officers, 
the principal duty or duties of uhose office is the 
performance of functions of a judicial nature* See 
sec* 124(l)(c).
17* Ibid *, sec. 130(1) and (2).
18. Ibid *, sec. 127(1) and (2). Similar provision 
had been made in 1946 in respect of the Judicial Service 
Commission. Constitution of 1946, sec. 53(1).
19. Ibid., sec. 127(5).
332
The National State Assembly retained the pouer to
remove an inferior judge or judicial officer for misconduct:
this could be done by uay of presenting an address to the
20President in that behalf* This pouer uas, houever, subject
to a significant qualification:
129(3)* No motion for such removal shall be 
placed on the Agenda of the National State 
Assembly until the Speaker has obtained a 
report from the Judicial Services Disciplinary 
Board on such particulars of the Charge as are 
alleged in the motion against a judge or state 
officer uho is the subject of such motion*
129(4)* The findings of the Judicial Services 
Disciplinary Board on the particulars of the 
charge referred to it under sub-section (3) of 
this section,shall be final and shall not be 
debated by the National State Assembly*
These tuo sub-sections reserved the right of inquiring
into any allegations of misconduct brought against an inferior
judicial officer exclusively to the Disciplinary Board* Its
report could not be debated by the National State Assembly
uith a vieu to contradicting *the findings of the Board* It
9
is implied by these tuo provisions that if the Board decided 
in any particular case that the allegations had not been 
proved against the judicial officer in question, the National 
State Assembly uould not proceed to cause him to be dismissed: 
for, there uould then be no misconduct uithin the meaning 
of section 129 for uhich the judicial officer could be 
dismissed* The real value of this provision, then, lies
2°. I b i d . , Sec. 1 2 9 ( 1 )
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in that the National State Assembly could at any time set
in motion disciplinary proceedings against a judicial
officer, against whom the Disciplinary Board, perhaps by
oversight, failed to initiate inquiries of its oun motion:
in other words, the National State Assembly had a kind of
residual power in respect of the removal of inferior
judicial officers*
Section 127(6) provided that whenever the
Disciplinary Board dismissed a judicial officer, it had
to forward a report on it to the Cabinet of Ministers with
a copy to the Speaker of the National State Assembly. This
provision ensured that in the exercise of its pouer of
removal the Board uas ultimately ansuerable to the National
State Assembly* It must be noted, that there uas no
corresponding provision in the Soulbury Constitution, nor,
was there a provision enabling Parliament to remove an
inferior judicial officer*
»
As regards the powers of removal and disciplinary
/
control the Disciplinary Board was allowed a fair degree 
of independence subject, however, to the limitations 
referred to above* As regards the appointment of judicial 
officers, on the other h^nd, the power was more in the hands 
of the Executive than in the Advisory Board*
The appointment of inferior judicial officers was 
made by the Cabinet of Ministers which acted on the 
recommendations of the Advisory Board* However, as section 
126(4) declared:
334
The Cabinet of Ministers may appoint an 
applicant not in the recommended list,; 
and, if such appointment is made, the 
Cabinet of Ministers shall table in the 
National State Assembly the name of the 
person appointed and the reasons for not 
accepting the recommendation of the 
Judicial Service Advisory Board and the 
list of persons recommended by the Judicial 
Services Advisory Board*
Thys the Cabinet of Ministers had a uide discretion 
as to the minor judicial appointments, the only limitation 
on that discretion being that the Cabinet uas responsible 
and ansuerable to the National State Assembly*
That the legislature' and the executive should play 
a leading role in respect of judicial appointments uhereas 
in respect of discipline--an essential internal matter—  
their influence should be kept uithin reasonable limits 
seems to form the theoretical background to the provisions 
relating to the judiciary.
The Republican Constitution of 1972 laid doun in 
no uhcertain terms that judges, in the performance of their 
duties and functions, should be placed beyond any undue 
and unlauful interference. Section 131(1) provided that 
every judge or any person entrusted uith judicial pouers 
should exercise such judicial pouers *uithout being subject 
to any direction or other interference preceding from any 
other person, except a superior court or institution 
entitled under lau to direct or supervise1 such judge or 
person. It uas made an offence, by section 131(2) to 
interfere or attempt to interfere uith the exercise of 
judicial pouers, uithout legal authority.
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Ue have seen that the above provision applied to 
judges of inferior courts and judicial officers. The term 
judicial officer is not used in the Republican Constitution 
and has been used in this essay to signify fall state officers 
the principal duty or duties of whose office is the perform­
ance of functions of a judicial nature* referred to in 
section 124(1) (c). Section 124(1) specifies the officers 
to whom the provisions relating to the two Boards apply. It 
must be noted here that whether an officer came within the 
definition of section 124(1) (c) was to be determined finally 
and conclusively by the Cabinet of Ministers,
No institution administering justice and likewise 
no other institution, person or authority shall 
have the power or jurisdiction to inquire into, 
pronounce upon or in any manner call in question 
any such decision,
This provision effectively avoided any possibility 
of the emergence of cases of the-*tribunal cases* category, 
since whether a particular office was a judicial office to
9 * '
which the relevant constitutional provisions applied was to
/
be determined by the Cabinet of Ministers and not by the 
courts.
As ue concluded in respect of the provisions relating 
to the legislature and the executive, so we may confirm here 
that thegeneral theme of the Republican Constitution was the 
need to uphold the Supremacy of the Legislature, It must, 
however, be added that the fact that the judiciary in the 
performance of its functions should be kept free of 
interference had not been lost sight of, \
21, The  C o n s t i t u t i o n  of Sri  L a n k a ,  1 9 7 2 ,
S e c t i o n  1 1 0 ( 2 ) ,
r O o £>
(3) Concluding Remarks
In the foregoing discussion it has been shown that 
the primary object of adopting a new Constitution in 1972 
uas to remove the fetters that operated on both the 
legislature and the executive under the Soulbury Constitution 
Among the changes introduced uith a view to realizing this 
object, the denial to the courts of the pouer of reviewing 
the constitutionality of laus passed by the legislature 
stands out as the single most crucial innovation: the
Constitutional Court uhich uas given restricted pouers of 
review is the subject matter of the next chapter.
An examination of the concepts and doctrines that 
formed the basis of the Republican Constitution clearly 
discloses that the Republican Constitution uas intended to 
mark a significant deviation from the constitutional system 
then in operation. But, it is equally true that the 
Republican Constitution did not abandon the machinery of
government that had been in operation for nearly twenty-
/
five years. That the President merely took the place 
previously occupied by the Governor-General, subject of 
course to certain changes, has already been shown in 
Part (2) (iii) of this chapter.'*' The Judicial Service 
Commission introduced by the Independence Constitution of 
Ceylon survived, subject to alteration, in the form of the 
tuo Boards— Advisory and Disciplinary.
1. As Dr. U. Dahanayake, a former Prime Minister of 
Ceylon, said in the Constituent Assembly: *Uhat change is
there except that a high-sounding uord--the President--is 
used instead of the Governor-General?* Constituent Assembly: 
Official Report, column 2675.
387
Parliamentary democracy, the essential foundation
of the Soulbury Constitution, infact, uas adopted in 1972#
The House of Representatives served as the model for the
2
National State Assembly* Its pouers and privileges, the
3 4standing orders, the officers, conventional and traditional
rules had their counterpart in the previous Constitution*
The members of the National State Assembly uere designated
5
Members of Parliament. Given the continuation of the House
of Representatives under a neu name (in respect of its 
6proceedings) it. uas natural to expect that the members of 
the National State Assembly, many of uhom had been Members 
of Parliament for quite sorne time, including the veteran 
statesmen, could continue to cherish and uphold the traditions 
of the Ceylon Parliament*
It is a truism that the Westminster Model that 
characterized the Constitution of 1946 provided the basic 
structure for the Republican Constitution too* Although 
it is true that the Constitution of 1972 sought to bring the 
NatioVial State Assembly closer to the United Kingdom 
Parliament in respect of Supremacy of the Legislature, the 
basic constitutional frame underuent only minor changes in 
1972* As a veteran statesman remarked:
2. The Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972, sec* 38(1)*
3* Ibid *, sec* 37(1)*
4* Cf. sec. 28 (1946 Constitution) and sec. 35
(1972 Constitution); sec. 17 (1946) and Sec. 32 (1972).
5. Ibid *, sec. 29*
6. Cf* Sec* 41 (1972) and sec* 15 (1948)— Sessions s 
of Parliament.
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The system which the Hon. Minister proposes to 
introduce is the same existing one. If ue call 
it the Westminister Model* uhat the Minister 
plans to do is merely to redecorate it. ^
The question uas asked at the beginning of this
chapter— uas the Republican Constitution autochthonous in
substance? This in fact is a question that a political
Q
scientist rather than a lauyer uould ask. It has been said
that a truly indigenous constitution is extremely difficult
to find, for it is inevitable that in drafting a Constitution
guidance must be Sought from the previous experiences of other 
g
systems. Naturally, the Republican Constitution too is based 
on the experience of Ceylon and other countries and therefore 
cannot be called autochthonous in substance. But, it is 
submitted, the Republican Constitution introduced very 
significant changes relating to the pouer and authority of 
tho legislature ’as uoll as of the executive. In this sense 
the Republican "Constitution uas not merely a redecoration
t
of the Constitution of Ceylon of 1946.
One last uord remains to be said: the supremacy of
the National State Assembly could not be said to be equal to
the Supremacy of Parliament as that term is used in respect of
the United Kingdom Parliament. Because, being a creature of
the Constitution, the National State Assembly could operate
only as long as it acted according to the Constitution. In
10 ’
a sense then the Constitution *stands supreme*.
7. Dr. IJ. Dahanayake, a former Prime Minister of 
Ceylon. Constituent Assembly: Official Report, column 2671.
B. Leslie Uolf-Phillips, Comparative Constitutions,
(1972) p. 34.
9. Ibid., at p. 19.
10. Colvin R. de Silva, Constituent Assembly:
Official Report, column 2914.
CHAPTER 11
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION UNDER THE REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION 
OP SRI LANKA OP 1972: AN ASSESSMENT OP THE ROLE
OP THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
It is necessary, at the outset, to mention that 
objection may be taken to the use of the phrase * constitutional 
adjudication* to describe the function performed by the 
Constitutional Court under the Republican Constitution of 
Sri Lanka of 1972. ‘Since no court of lav/ and likewise no 
other institution had the authority to question the validity 
of a lav/ on account of its unconstitutionality it may be 
argued that there was no scope for * constitutional adjudication* 
in the sense that term is popularly understood, for instance, 
in the United States of America or in India.
If the power of the courts to declare a law invalid is 
an indispensable attribute of constitutional adjudication, 
then, the Constitutional Court may be said to have performed 
an advisory rather than an adjudicatory function. It is 
submitted that this is not so. As will be shown in the course 
of this chapter, the decisions of the Constitutional Court 
share many features that inhere in decisions of courts of lav/. 
Apart from the fact that the machinery of constitutional 
adjudication could be invoked only when a legislative measure 
was in its Bill stage and not after it had entered the statute 
book, not many significant differences could be found between 
a court of lav/ in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction
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and the Constitutional Court, The question we will try to 
answer in the final part of this chapter —  *was the 
Constitutional Court fa court*?*—  is crucial in determining 
whether we have used the term 1 constitutional adjudication* 
with sufficient justification.
As a prelude to an examination of the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court, we shall first look at the provisions 
relating to the constitution and the working of the 
Constitutional Court.
(1) The Constitutional Court
(i) Composition
The Constitutional Court consisted of five members 
appointed by the President for a term of four years. In 
accordance with the rules of the Constitutional Court, three 
members were chosen to inquire into and decide upon the
i
constitutionality of a Bill referred to it.
As to what qualifications such members should have, the
Constitution was silent. Introducing the proposals relating
to the Constitutional Court, the Minister of Constitutional
Affairs emphasized in the Constituent Assembly that the members
of the Constitutional Court should be drawn not only from
among Judges of the Supreme Court but also from persons of
proven ability and experience: proper attitudes were as
2
important as legal expertise, the Hon. Minister added. It must 
be mentioned that the general practice was . to appoint 
Judges of the Supreme Court as members of the Constitutional Court.
1. The Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972, sec. 54(1).
2. Constituent Assembly: Official Report, column 2920.
The Constitutional Council of Prance, which served as
a model for the Constitutional Court of Sri Lanka, is not a
judicial body at all. All former Presidents of the Republic,
who are ex-officio members, together with nine other
members, each appointed for a term of nine years, constitute
the Council. The latter nine members are appointed by the
President of the Republic, the President of the Rational
Assembly and the President of the Senate, in equal
proportions. No qualifications are specified for membership
except that a Member of Parliament or a Minister is
3
ineligible for appointment.
Apart from being a non-judicial body, it performs
functions other than that of determining the constitutionality
4
of Bills referred to it. Thus, the Constitutional Council
appears to be an essentially political institution whereas
the Constitutional Court of Sri Lanka, which consisted of
4ajudges and lawyers and had the function only of determining 
the constitutionality of Bills, can be likened more to a 
court of law than to a political organ of the government.
The salaries of members of the Constitutional Court, 
determined by the Rational State Assembly, prior to 
their appointment, were to remain throughout the 
four year term for which they (p.t.o)
3. The Constitution of Prance, art, 56.
4. Por instance, the Constitutional Council ensures 
the regularity of the election of the President (art.58)
and rules in case of disagreements relating to the regularity 
of referendum procedure (art.60) and of the election of 
deputies and senators (art.59).
4a. Only judges or former judges of the Supreme Court
had been appointed to the Court with the exception of the
leading constitutional lawyer, Mr. J. A. L. Cooray.
were appointed and be a charge on the Consolidated Pund.^
No member could be removed except by the President on account 
of 1 ill-health or physical or mental infirmity’. The safeguard 
as to the tenure of office, though it fell short of what was 
accorded to judges, was of sufficient degree to permit the 
Constitutional Court to function as an independent body.
(ii) Procedure of the Constitutional Court
The Clerk to the National State Assembly was the Registra
A
of the Constitutional Court and convened it.
The Constitutional Court was authorised to make rules
p
regulating its practice and procedure. Such rules became
3
effective when published in the Gazette subject, however, to 
the subsequent disapproval of the National State Assembly.^
5
All hearings before it were to be open to the public.
The decision of the Constitutional Court was by majority 
6
vote: no member present at a session could refrain from
7 8voting, but a member could enter a dissenting decision.
The Attorney-General had the right to be heard on all
g
matters before the Constitutional Court. Who else could
appear before the Constitutional Court was a matter left
. 10entirely to its discretion : it could summon and hear
witnesses and order the production of any document or other 
11thing. That legal representation was in the contemplation
5. The Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972, sec. 57.
6. Ibid., sec. 56(1)(c).
1. Ibid., sec. 58. 2. Ibid., sec. 59(1)
3. Ibid., sec. 59(2). 4. Ibid., sec. 59(3)
5. Ibid., sec. 62. 6. Ibid., sec. 61(1)
7. Ibid., sec. 61(2). 8. Ibid., sec. 65.
9* Ibid.t sec. 63(1). At what stage he would be allowed 
to address it seems to have been determined by the Court. See 
Hansard Vol. I 4(1) No. 7, Columns 543-6.
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of the draftsmen is clear from the express prohibition that
no Member of the National State Assembly should appear before
1 2
it as an Advocate or a Proctor.
(iii) Scrutiny of Bills by the Constitutional Court
Por the purposes of scrutiny by the Constitutional Court 
different rules applied to urgent Bills and to ordinary Bills.
Vve will first look at the position in respect of ordinary Bills.
An ordinary Bill could come before the Constitutional 
Court firstly for its determination whether the Bill involved 
any question of inconsistency with the Constitution: this
happened when a citizen petitioned the Constitutional Court, 
within a week of the Bill being placed on the Agenda of the 
National State Assembly, alleging any inconsistency with the 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court should, thereupon, 
advise the Speaker as to the existence or otherwise of any 
question of inconsistency. ( Here, the Court does not finally 
decide the issue of inconsistency, which would be done when 
the speaker referred the Bill to it for its decision as to the
Constitutionality of the Bill).
Secondly, a Bill could come before the Constitutional 
Court for a determination as to its constitutionality. Any 
question as to whether any provision in a Bill contravened
10. Ibid., sec. 63(2). 11. Ibid., sec. 63(3)
12. Ibid., sec. 63(4).
1. Ibid.c sec 55(2)(e). 2. Ibid.
the Constitution was required to be referred to the Constitutional 
Court by the Speaker if —
(a) the Attorney-General communicated to the 
Speaker his opinion that a particular Bill 
should be referred to the Constitutional Court 
for a decision as to any inconsistency between 
that Bill and the Constitution; or
(b) the Speaker received within a week of the
Bill being placed on the Agenda of the National
State Assembly a written notice signed by the
leader in the National State Assembly of a
recognised political party raising a question .
4
of inconsistency with the Constitution; or
(c) such question was raised within a week and 
signed by at least such number of members of 
the National State Assembly as would constitute 
a quorum of the National State Assembly; or
(d) the Speaker took the view that there was 
such a question; or
(e) the Constitutional Court, on being moved by
any citizen within a week of the Bill being
placed on the Agenda of the National State Assembly,
5
advised the Speaker that there was such a question.
3. Such as in respect of the Associated Newspapers of 
Ceylon Ltd., (Special Provision) Bill. See the decision of the 
Constitutional Court reported in Decisions of the Constitutional 
Court Vol. I, p. 35.
4. Por instance, in respect of the Sri Lanka Press Council 
Bill, Mr. J. R. Jayewardene, the leader of the United National 
Party, submitted such a notice. See Decisions of the Constitutio­
nal Court Vol I, p. 1.
5. As in respect of the Places and Objects of Worship 
Bill. See Decisions of the Constitutional Court Vol I, p. 27.
The above five methods of making a reference to the 
Constitutional Court are laid down in section 54(2) of the 
Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972.
The availability of these five methods ensured that 
access to the Constitutional Court was within easy reach of
any interested party. By contrast, in Prance a Bill other
6
than a prospective Organic Law, which had compulsorily to be
7
submitted to the Constitutional Council, could be referred 
to it only by the President of the Republic, or the Eremier
Q
or the President of one or the other Assembly.
No proceedings could be had in the National State
Assembly in relation to a Bill referred to the Constitutional
Court in the manner stated above until the decision of the
9
Constitutional Court had been given. The decision of the
Constitutional Court was final and conclusive:
No institution administering justice and 
likewise no other institution, person or 
authority shall have the power or 
jurisdiction to inquire into, pronounce 
upon or in any manner call in question 
a decision of the Constitutional Court.^
These two provisions ensured that the National State 
Assembly could not ride roughshod over a decision handed 
down by the Constitutional Court and thereby preserved the 
Supremacy of the Constitution, while at the same time 
excluding any possibility of judicial review by way of revisin 
or scrutinizing a decision of the Constitutional Court.
6. Lav/s dealing with certain specified matters are. 
regarded as organic lav/s. Por instance, it is only an organic 
law that can determine the term for which each assembly is 
elected, the number of its members, their emolument etc., 
(arti. 25), or the conditions under which finance Bills may be 
passed (arti. 47), or the composition etc., of the High 
Court (arti. 67).
7. Constitution of France, arti. 61. 8. Ibid.
9. The Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972, sec. 54(3).
10. Ibid., sec. 54(4).
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Due to the fact that the Speaker and the National State
Assembly were hound by a decision of the Constitutional Court,
a hill declared to be inconsistent with a constitutional
provision could be passed only if the procedure for
constitutional amendment was adhered to* To state the principle
in a different way, a Bill declared by the Constitutional Court
to be unconstitutional could nevertheless be enacted provided
that not less than two thirds of the whole number of members
of the National State Assembly (including those not present)
voted in favour of such enactment.
In France, on the other hand, a decision of the
Constitutional Council declaring a Bill submitted to it to be
unconstitutional had a more serious effect: such a Bill
11could not be promulgated or implemented at all. This rule
v/as not adopted in Sri Lanka mainly because it was one of the
basic principles of the Republican Constitution that the
Constitution could be amended in whole or in part by the National
State Assembly, which also had the power to pass a law
inconsistent with the Constitution leaving, however, the
Constitution intact.
In the case of an urgent Bill —  that is, a Bill which
bears an endorsement that in the view of the Cabinet of
1 2Ministers it is urgent in the national interest —  different 
rules applied. Such a Bill had to be referred by the Speaker
11. The Constitution of France, arti. 62.
12. The Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972, sec. 55(1)
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1 ‘3>to the Constitutional Court which had to advise him  ^whether -
(a) in its opinion the provisions of the Bill 
were inconsistent with the Constitution; or
(b) in its opinion the Bill or any provision 
therein was inconsistent with the Constitution; or
(c) it entertained a doubt that the Bill or any
provision therein was inconsistent with the
Constitution...
14
If the Constitutional Court advised the Speaker that
the Bill was inconsistent with the Constitution or that it
entertained a doubt whether the Bill or any provision therein
v/as inconsistent with the Constitution such a Bill could be
passed only with the special majority required for
15Constitutional amendment.
Unlike in respect of ordinary Bills, here the Constitutional
Court v/as required merely to express an opinion on an urgent
16Bill without the assistance of parties appearing before it.
17The advice had to be communicated within twenty-four hours
whereas in respect of ordinary Bills the Constitutional Court
1 fthad fourteen days to arrive at a decision. In France, the
time limit is one month for an ordinary Bill and eight days
19for an urgent Bill.
13. In respect of urgent Bills, the words Tdecide* and 
’decision* were carefully avoided in describing the opinion 
of the Constitutional Court. This is perhaps because the 
Constitutional Court had to deliver its opinion within twenty- 
four hours of the assembling of the court and without a
hearing as in respect of ordinary Bills.
14. The Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972, sec. 55(2).
16* Ibid.. secs 55(1) and 63(2) which have the cumulative 
effect of excluding the appearance of interested parties.
15. Ibid., sec. 55(4).
17. Ibid., sec. 55(2). 18. Ibid.» sec. 65.
19. The Constitution of France, arti. 61.
Next, we will look into a dispute that arose between the 
Constitutional Court and the government as to the nature of 
the fourteen day time limit.
(iv) The Fourteen Day Rule: Mandatory or Directory?
The very first reference made under the Republican
Constitution to the Constitutional Court for its decision
gave rise to a sharp division of opinion between the members
of the Constitutional Court and the government. While
inquiring into the Sri Lanka Press Council Bill, the Chairman
of the Constitutional Court, Mr. T. S. Fernando, a former
Judge of the Supreme Court, expressed the view that section 65
of the Republican Constitution which enacted that fthe decision
of the Constitutional Court shall be given within two weeks
of the reference together with the reasons1 was merely a rule
of guidance. He was quoted to have said that the Constitutional
Court would conduct its proceedings for any length of time
1
as v/as necessary —  even for four years. It is interesting 
to note that he said to a newspaper that he who had spoken 
against the concept of a Constitutional Court to examine Bills, 
replacing the traditional method of judicial review, had now 
been appointed the Chairman of that institution —  the bad 
boy had been made the monitor of the class, as he wished to 
put it.^
The Minister of Justice, Mr. Felix R. Bias Bandaranaike, 
explaining the events connected with this dispute said in the 
National State Assembly that the Attorney-G-eneral as well as
1, See the speach of Mr. Felix R. Dias Bandaranaike, 
Hansard Vol 4(1) No. 7 of December 12, 1972, column 1543.
2.TSun’ newspaper of November 27 > 1972.
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the leading lawyer for the petitioners had submitted that
3
the two week time limit was mandatory. In order to break
the deadlock the Hon. Minister had suggested to the Chairman
of the Constitutional Court that if he made a request to
the National State Assembly for an extension of the time limit
for that particular occasion, the Minister would personally
take the responsibility of moving a resolution in the
Assembly to be seconded by the Leader of the Opposition
4
acceding to such request.
As the Constitutional Court showed no signs of altering
its view, a meeting v/as arranged betv/een the three members of
the Constitutional Court and the President of the Republic,
v/hich was attended also by the Minister of Justice, the
permanent secretary to the ministry of justice and the 
5
Speaker. This long discussion failed to make any impact on 
the three judges. As Mr. T. S. Fernando had said:
Y/e are clear in our own minds about the 
interpretation of this section. Y/e do not 
admit that anybody has the right to give 
an extension of time or that we are 
obliged to ask for time.g
The refusal by the members of the Constitutional Court 
to make a request to the National State Assembly, Mr. Felix 
R. Lias Bandaranaike thought, prevented the creation of a
7
!healthy convention1. Moreover, the insistence of the 
Constitutional Court that it was not bound by the constitutional 
provision amounted to a challenge to the legislative Supremacy
g
of the National State Assembly.
3. Hansard Yol 4(1) No. 7 of December 12, 1972, column 1543
4. Ibid., column 1546-7. 5. Ibid., column 1550.
6. Ibid., column 1553. 7. Ibid., column 1547.
8. Ibid., column 1535.
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After the expiry of the fourteen days the Minister
withdrew the Attorney-General from the proceedings before
the Constitutional Court which the Minister characterized as 
9
a mock trial. On December 7, 1972,the Speaker informed the
National State Assembly that since the Constitutional Court
had failed to communicate its decision within two weeks,
10the proceedings in the House could continue. This ruling 
may be objected to on the ground that it had the effect of 
nullifying the constitutional provision that *no proceedings 
shall be had in the National State Assembly . . . until the
11decision of the Constitutional Court . . . has been given*.
Soon afterwards, the three members of the Constitutional
Court resigned from their office. Three members were
appointed in their place, and the Bill was referred de novo
to a newly constituted Court which communicated its decision
1 2well within fourteen days to the Speaker. The making of 
a fresh reference to a newly constituted Court clearly shows that 
the National State Assembly v/as not willing to create the 
impression that it v/as leap-frogging constitutional adjudication.
The events leading to the resignation of the members 
of the first Constitutional Court came up for discussion 
before the Special Presidential Commission, established to 
inquire into maladministration particularly during the
9. Ibid.t column 1553-4*
10. Hansard.. Vol 4(1) No. 4. column 854.
11. The Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972, sec. 54(3).
12. The Sri Lanka Press Council Bill Decision, v/here 
it v/as held that the time limit of 1 within two weeks1 v/as 
mandatory. Decisions of the Constitutional Court Vol I
(1973), p. 1, at p. 3.
period commencing May 28, 1970 and ending July 23, 1977,
13when Mrs. Bandaranaike1s Government was in power. The 
events under discussion here were cited as an example of the
manner in v/hich that government had attempted to interfere
14with the judiciary.
One may conclude that this incident. is evidence of 
executive interference with judicial functions(if we may use 
that term in respect of the function performed by the 
Constitutional Court). On the other hand, it may be argued 
that this v/as a situation where the legislature and the 
executive were faced with an unforeseen exigency and where 
a mutually acceptable solution had to be found without 
imparing the supremacy of the legislature. Aside from the 
issue whether the Constitutional Court was correct in making 
that ruling as to the nature of the time limit, what we can 
clearly see is the adamant insistence of each of the authoritie 
on its primacy, over the other.
Having examined how the Constitutional Court v/as 
constituted and how it worked, v/e may proceed to examine some 
of the decisions of that Court,
13. The Commission v/as established by the President 
by Warrant dated March 29, 1978 and published in Gazette 
Extraordinary Ho. 310/9 of March 30, 1978, under sec. 2(1) of 
the Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry Lav/ Ho. 7 of 
1978. See also the Special Presidential Commissions of 
Inquiry (Special Provisions) Act Ho 4 of 1978 specifically 
stating that the original lav/ has retrospective effect.
14. The Commission acquitted Mr. Hector Kobbekaduwa, 
a former Minister, of allegations of his involvement in 
the events leading to the resignation of the members of the 
Constitutional Court. See Dinamina (a Sinhala Daily) of 
November 28, 1978, front page.
i 2 L  The Decisions of the Constitutional Court with Special 
Reference to the Meaning Attributed to * Judicial Power*
In view of the fact that the constitutional experience 
of the post-independence period was heavily drawn upon in the 
drafting of the Republican Constitution of 1972, the 
introduction of the Constitutional Court stands out as the 
single most significant constitutional innovation of 1972: 
even the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of 
Sri Lanka of 1978, which has as one of its principal objects 
the guarantee of the independence of the judiciary, accepts 
the desirability of' a Constitutional Court when it confers on 
the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka powers and functions similar 
to those exercised and performed by the Constitutional Court,
Being a novel institution, the Constitutional Court 
had to develop its own method of performing the functions 
entrusted to it. Its most obvious model was the manner of 
proceeding that had traditionally been observed in the courts 
of lav.7. However, in view of the fact that it was not a 
court in the strict sense of the term, it was open to the 
Court to have deviated from the general practice of the 
courts. What choice the Constitutional Court made must of 
necessity precede an examination of the various decisions 
of that Court.
(i) The Procedure Adopted by the Constitutional Court
in Determining the Constitutionality of a Bill
The constitutional provisions relating to the procedure 
of the Constitutional Court have already been outlined. Y/hat 
is proposed to be done here is to determine to what extent 
xhe Constitutional Court acted in the manner in which an 
ordinary court of law would set about deciding a constitutional 
issue, in relation to (a) rules of interpretation and
(b) precedent.
(a) Rules of Interpretation: In the first decision of
1
the Constitutional Court this matter, naturally, attracted
argument and comment. It was submitted on behalf of the
petitioners that due regard must be paid to the fact that the
Constitutional Court was required to perform a function
different from that of the courts: it determined the
constitutionality of a Bill whereas a court of lav/ v/ould decide
upon the constitutionality of a law in operation. In view of
this basic distinction, it was contended, the following tv/o
principles of statutory interpretation were inapplicable:
(a) that all laws are presumed to be constitutional until the
contrary is proved and (b) that when two interpretations are
possible, the court v/ould lean in favour of that which is
2
consistent with the validity of the statute.
1. Sri Lanka Press Council Bill Decision. Decisions of 
the Constitutional Court Vol. I, p. 1.
2. Ibid., p. 4.
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These two rules have been acted upon by courts of law 
in order that the Sovereignty of the legislature is duly 
respected unless it is clearly proved that it had stepped 
beyond its legislative competence: for, a decision that the 
legislature acted beyond its authority inevitably resulted in 
negating the effect of the statute involved. In view of the 
fact that a decision of the Constitutional Court did not have
this serious effect, it is reasonable to suppose that these
two rules of interpretation were not applicable in an inquiry 
before the Constitutional Court.
This view seems to have been accepted by the Constitutional
Court when it said:
In deciding whether a provision in a Bill 
presented to the National State Assembly
and referred to this Court by the Hon.
Speaker under section 54(2) of the 
Constitution is inconsistent or not, 
we take the view that the correct 
approach is to examine the provisions 
vis-a-vis the Constitution and thereafter 
decide the question without resort to 
presumptions and counter presumptions.7
While conceding that precedents, principles and practices in 
the interpretation of other constitutions were of undoubted 
value, the Constitutional Court emphasized that in the task 
of interpreting the Republican Constitution the principles 
and concepts that underlie the Constitution should receive 
primary consideration. In other words, the Constitutional 
Court had to decide whether the various relevant 
constitutional provisions v/ould, in the light of the basic 
concepts of the Constitution, uphold the validity of any
5. Ibid., p. 6.
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particular Bill, In determining this issue reference could 
legitimately be made to general constitutional principles 
and prac ti c e s.
While hesitant to rely on- the Tpresumptions or counter
presumptions* the Constitutional Court, nevertheless, pointed
out the need to interpret the constitution in such a manner
so as not to unduly hamper the efficacious operation of
the Constitution:
IyJ7e should interpret the Constitution 
as~*far as possible in a manner that 
will make the Constitution work and not 
in a manner that will place impediments 
and obstacles to the working of 
the Constitution.^
The Constitutional Court pointed out that the Soulbury
Constitution proved to be an obstacle to solving the problems 
5
of the people. It was in order to overcome this difficulty 
that the Republican Constitution was conceived.-. Therefore, 
particularly when a private right or freedom was alleged to 
have been infringed,it was imperative to find out whether 
that ostensible infringement was justifiable as an 
implementation of the duty of the State to safeguard the 
interests of the people as a whole —  since the Republican 
Constitution had as its conceptual background the development 
of the society as a whole, even undermining to that extent 
certain rights and freedoms of the individual, particularly 
the right to private property, which the Constitution did not 
recognise as a fundamental right.
4. Ibid. 5. Ibid., at p. 4.
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This is-what the Constitutional Court seems to have 
said: in determining the constitutionality of a Bill, the
Constitutional Court must find out whether or not the Bill 
cones within the protection of any constitutional provision; 
and, in arriving at that conclusion, it should always be 
mindful of the principles and concepts that underlie the 
republican Constitution; it is not right to start with 
pre-conceived notions of what a Constitution or a statute 
in general ought or ought not to do.
The view of the Constitutional Court on the correct 
approach to constitutional interpretation, it is submitted, 
is unobjectionable, to say the least, on two accounts.
Firstly, Bills had to be tested against a Constitution which 
preferred public rights to personal rights and the advancement 
of the society to that of an individual. Secondly, an 
ordinary court, in determining the effect of a statute,tries 
to construe it as innocuously as circumstances permit so that 
while upholding the wishes of the legislature the freedoms 
and rights of the subject could be accorded the fullest 
possible operation, whereas such a course was not called for 
when the Constitutional Court advised the legislature 
whether it would be within its authority to pass the impugned 
Bill: for, a Bill inconsistent with the Constitution could 
only be enacted if the Bill was either amended excluding 
the objectionable features or passed in its original form 
as a constitutional amendment. It is right to say that the 
members of the Constitutional Court were not called upon, nor 
did they have the occasion, to be the guardian of the freedoms 
of the subject to the same great extent an ordinary judge 
would reach.
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It is not necessary to mention the various principles
of interpretation which were acted upon by the Constitutional
Court: those rules of interpretation, followed by the Courts
of Ceylon, and mentioned in Chapter 9, above, proved generally
acceptable to the Constitutional Court. One such rule,
however, needs comment. The relevant paragraph from the
Sri Lanka Press Council Bill Decision is as follows:
Objection has been taken to the constitution 
of the Press Council on the ground that the 
members of the Press Council are to be 
appointed by the President on the advice of 
the Minister. It was argued that the '
Minister can pack the Council with 
nominees of his choice and of his political 
persuation. . . . Must we in considering 
this Pill presume that the Minister will 
act mala fide and not in the interests 
of the country? To give such an 
interpretation and to hold that therefore 
this is a violation of the Constitution 
would be doing injustice to the Constitution.g
The above view is based on the rule of interpretation 
that the mere possibility of future abuse should not 
constitute ground for declaring a statute unconstitutional. 
Such a rule is justifiable when a court of lav; examines an 
already operative lav; in relation to a concrete factual 
situation before it. But, since the function of the 
Constitutional Court was to determine whether a particular 
legislative measure had the prospect of being an infringement 
of the Constitution, it could not rule out the relevance of 
any possibility of future abuse of powers conferred by such 
Bill. Moreover, there is ample judicial opinion to show
.6. Decisions of the Constitutional Court Vol. I, p. 1, 
at p. 17.
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that the likelihood of future violations of the Constitution
are not altogether irrelevant in a decision as to the
7
constitutionality of a law. With regard to the particular 
circumstances before it j_n the Sri Lanka Press Council Bill 
reference, the Constitutional Count might probably have been 
justified in refusing to accept as a basis of the invalidity 
of the Bill the possibility of the abuse of powers by the 
Minister. But as a general rule it does not seem commendable 
in proceedings before the Constitutional Court.
M .  Precedent: As we have already seen, there was a
fundamental difference between courts of lav/ in the exercise 
of their constitutional jurisdiction and the Constitutional 
Court. This distinction, however, did not deter the 
Constitutional Court from placing reliance on judicial decisions 
in arriving at a decision as to the constitutionality of a 
Bill: in fact, there is hardly a decision of that Court 
where interpretations placed by the courts, both local and 
foreign, on provisions or concepts similar to those contained 
in the Republican Constitution were not referred to.
A number of such decisions will be referred to in 
sub-division (ii) of this part of the chapter, and it v/ill 
become clear that by their reliance on such judicial decisions, 
the decisions of the Constitutional Court themselves rightly 
took the appearance of decisions of ordinary courts of law.
It must, however, be noted that previous judicial 
decisions v/ere not regarded as being in any sense binding on
7. See for instance Livanage v. The Queen /19667 1 All 
E. R. 650, at p.. 660; (19b5; 68 R . L. RV_265, P* 285, and 
The Bribery Commi ssioner v. Ranasinghe 964/ 2 All E. R.
alT~p. 7857 bcTL. L. R. T5 at p7~T6. These passages are 
quoted in Chapter 8(1)(iv) supra.
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the Constitutional Court: the doctrine of stare decisis
was not applicable to it for the simple reason that it did
not form part of the system of courts in Sri Lanka. Be that
as it may, previous judicial decisions carried with them a
1
kind of persuasive authority.
Apart from the frequent reference to local and foreign
judicial decisions, the Constitutional Court resorted to its
own previous decisions,thereby evolving a sort of 1 judicial
precedent1 in the Constitutional Court itself. For instance,
in the Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd., (Special
2
Provisions) Bill Decision the Constitutional Court in
interpreting the phrase 'in the interests of' occuring in
section 18(2) of the Constitution referred to the interpretation
placed by the Constitutional Court in the Sri Lanka Press
. . 3Council Bill Decision and said that 'we see no reason to 
depart from the view we have already expressed' in that case.^
5
Likewise in the Administration of Justice Bill Decision the 
Constitutional Court cited with approval the view expressed 
by it in a previous decision.^
That the Constitutional Court v/ould set about interpreting 
the Constitution generally in the manner as if it were a court 
seems to have been taken for granted. As J. A. L. Cooray,
1. Even the term 'persuasive authority’ is not strictly 
applicable since in ordinary courts of lav/ a previous decision 
is regarded as 'persuasive authority’ due to the fact that 
such authority carried with it the possibility of being 
adopted as a binding precedent in a judicial decision directly 
requiring the support of such authority.
2* Decisions of the Constitutional Court Vol I, p. 35.
3. Ibid., p. 1. 4. Ibid., at p. 52.
5. Ibid., p. 57, at p. 64.
6* The Sri Lanka Press Council Bill Decision. Ibid., at p. 17
420
a distinguished, constitutional lawyer who participated in
the drafting of the Constitution and was later appointed as
one of the first members of the Constitutional Court (one of
the three who resigned oyer the fourteen day time limit
issue), wrote:
The Constitutional Court naturally follows 
the well-accepted rules of interpretation 
of statutes for the purpose of deciding 
whether a provision in a Bill is 
inconsistent with the Constitution. The 
Court will also develop its own rules of 
interpretation having regard to the nature 
of our Constitution.^
One last comment remains to be made before we proceed 
to examine some of the decisions of the Constitutional Court.
Q
In the Sri Lanka Press Council Bill' Decision the Constitutional 
Court having referred to the fact that the Republican 
Constitution did not derive its authority from any .past 
constitution or from a foreign authority, remarked that 
that factor justified the exclusion, if necessary, of rules 
and principles that have been developed by courts in respect 
of other constitutions. This argument is not convincing in 
the ■ least, it is repectfully submitted. The mere fact that 
the Republican Constitution was autochthonous in respect of 
its origin does not justify the exclusion of rules and 
principles that are applicable in respect of constitutional 
provisions from other jurisdictions which are similar in 
effect to those contained in that Constitution.
7. J. A. 1. Cooray, Constitutional and Administrative 
Law of Sri Lanka (1973), at p. 200 (stress added).
8. Decisions of the Constitutional Court Vol. 1, at p. 6.
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In determining whether guidance is to he derived from 
interpretations placed on, and concepts underlying, another 
constitution, the proper question to he asked is: ’are 
there similarities between the two constitutions in the 
general design and particular details?’. If the answer is 
in the affirmative, the Court would he justified in inquiring 
further as to the relevance of the authorities in question 
to the issue before it. The fact that in respect of the 
method of adoption the Constitution maintained no link with 
the past is no ground for refusing to derive assistance from 
previous judicial decisions, when the Republican Constitution 
had so freely drawn upon the constitutional experience of 
Ceylon as well as come other countries such as the United 
Kingdom, the United States of America, Prance and India.
In any event, it is to the consolation of all those 
interested in preserving the -traditional method of judicial 
process that the Constitutional Court referred to and derived 
assistance from interpretations placed on, and rules and 
practices relating to, other constitutions.
422
(ii) Some Aspects of Constitutional Interpretation 
“by the Constitutional Court
Y/hen the Republican Constitution was enacted in 1972,
There was a general feeling of triumph and achievement
following the landslide victory of the United front —  the
People's G-overnment as it was popularly known —  at the
general election of 1970. (This jubilation, however, was
stained to a considerable extent by the 'eruption of the
volcano*, the outburst of the insurrection of April 1971).
The euphoria prevalent in the country did not fail to leave
its impression on the members of the Constitutional Court.
The earlier decisions of that Court expressed the
sentiments of liberation 'after over 400 years of foreign,
2imperialist and colonial domination' and referred
extensively ' . to how the Republican Constitution came to be
enacted in pursuance of the mandate referable to the 'clear
3
majority given to the United front Parties'.
The initial impression created by the expression of 
such views by the Constitutional Court is that it was 
generally committed to the preservation of the Republican 
Constitution in such a fashion as to lead to the realisation 
of the hopes and aspirations that found expression through 
the enactment of that autochthonous constitution.
1. In November 1971, the Prime Minister said: 'V/e are all
sitting on top of a volcano today. V/e are unable to say at what 
moment this terrible volcano will erupt*. Hansard. Vol. 96,
No. 10, column 2211.
2. Decisions of the Constitutional Court Vol.I at p. 4*
3. Ibid., at p. 38.
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Y/e must find out, through a discussion of a cross- 
section of the decisions of the Constitutional Court, 
whether the Constitutional Court remained a passive 
observer or assumed the role of a creative critic.
The Constitutional Court has been called upon to 
interpret a.number of constitutional provisions and to 
determine their application in a wide variety of circumstances. 
Its attention was frequently drawn to the provisions 
relating to the fundamental rights, the judicial power and 
the sovereignty of the people. Before we embark on a 
discussion of some such decisions, it is advisable to find 
out how the Constitutional Court viewed the constitutional 
provisions as a whole.
It was argued by Counsel for the State in the Associated
Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd., (Special Provisions) Bill 
4
Reference that the Republican Constitution did-: not 
guarantee the fundamental rights enumerated in section 18(1) 
inasmuch as they .were not enforceable in a court of law.
This argument, which was a personal view and not representative 
of the position taken by the government on that issue, 
did not find favour with the Constitutional Court. Refusing 
to accept the proposition that the Constitution merely 
declared the rights and freedoms which previously existed, 
the Constitutional Court pointed out that the inclusion of 
a Bill of fundamental Rights in the Constitution was the 
result of serious deliberation and that within the framework 
of the supremacy of the National State Assembly fundamental 
rights were protected.
Decisions of the Constitutional Court at pp. 38-9.
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The Constitutional Court v/as cautious, however, to
point out that the fundamental rights guaranteed by section
18(1) of the Constitution were subject to the limitations
laid down by the other relevant provisions:
Y/hat is granted, however, is not an
absolute right but a right subject
to permissible limitations. These
rights represent the claims of the
individual. The limitations' protect
the claims of other individuals and
the claims of society or the State.
To say that the rights are fundamental
and the limitations are not is to
destroy the balance which subsection
(2) was designed to achieve._
5
In the recent decision of the Constitutional Court
on the local Authorities (Imposition of Civic Disabilities)
6
Bill, of which more shall be said later on, a very 
interesting argument was commented upon. According to this 
argument certain provisions of the Constitution were 
fundamental and the other provisions were incidental to the 
fundamental provisions. If any Bill was inconsistent with 
a fundamental provision, such a Bill could be passed only 
if the fundamental constitutional provision v/as first amended.
Disagreeing with the above proposition, the 
Constitutional Court pointed out that its sole duty was to 
decide on inconsistencies: it could not advise the Speaker
that the Constitution should first be amended in certain 
particular cases.
5. Ibid., at p. 40.
6* Hans.ard Vol. 28, No. 15, Part 1, col. .1655-81 (1978).
Nor can we by reference to a nebulous 
concept of an all-pervading spirit in 
the Constitution declare certain 
matters fundamental and others merely 
incidental to it. . . .  It being 
the fundamental law of the land, 
every section in it must be given 
weight as being fundamental and not 
merely incidental to it. Y/here the 
Constitution itself does not expressly 
so state, it is not competent to us 
by a process of interpretation to 
give more weight to a section being 
fundamental to it and less weight 
to another as being merely incidental.
Ironically this argument was raised before the 
Constitutional Court by Mr. Colvin R de Silva, under whose 
direction as the Minister of Constitutional Affairs the 
Republican Constitution was drafted, and who had time and 
again referred to the difficulties arising from certain 
pre-1972 cases where the view had been expressed that the 
Soulbury Constitution contained some entrenched provisions. 
Here he was advocating the view that section 52(1), which 
enabled the National State Assembly to enact a law 
inconsistent with the Constitution with the special majority 
prescribed for constitutional amendment,was subject to a 
limitation, though not expressed, arising from what has 
been termed the basic structure or the spirit of the
Q
Constitution. This is the type of problem that the 
Republican Constitution was intended to eliminate I
1, Ibid., column 1662.
8. See Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)
4 S. C. C. 225, particularly at pp. 225, 366 £er Sikiri, C.J. 
on the meaning of basic structure of the Constitution.
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The refusal of the Court to accept this argument 
meant that the National State Assembly had the unrestricted 
power either to amend the Constitution or to pass a law 
inconsistent with the Constitution provided that the 
special majority prescribed for constitutional amendment 
could be procured: the National State Assembly, however,
lacked authority to suspend the operation of the 
constitution in whole or in part, nor could it repeal the
Q
constitution without replacement.
This is how the Constitutional Court viewed the effect 
of the various provisions of the Constitution: having
regard to the particular circumstances leading to the 
enactment of, and the basic concepts underlying, the 
Constitution, it was with caution that precedents and rules 
evolved elsewhere could be used in the interpretation of 
the Constitution; each provision in the Constitution was 
as fundamental as any other provision; and, in determining 
the constitutionality of a Bill the right method v/ould be 
to test the Bill against the applicable provisions. These 
rules were to be applied, however, having reference to the 
overriding consideration that the Constitution ought to be 
interpreted in such a manner as to ensure its efficacious 
operation. Bor instance, fundamental rights could be 
safeguarded in so far as that would not violate the Principles 
of State Policy or the restrictions placed on such rights 
in the common interest.
9. See supra chapter 10 (2) (i), text at footnote 5.
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It was not infrequently that the Constitutional 
Court was called upon to decide on alleged violations
10of fundamental rights, such as equality before the law
11 12and the freedom of speech, of assembly, of thought,
13conscience and religion. A survey of the decisions 
dealing with fundamental rights is outside the scope of 
this work. Certain aspects of equality before the law, 
however, will be dealt with in the discussion of the 
cases dealing with the judicial power of the people.
The rejection of the doctrine of separation of 
powers, as we have already seen, was central to the 
constitutional innovations of 1972.^ To what extent 
the Republican Constitution succeeded in fusing powers 
we will examine now with reference to the relevent 
decisions of the Constitutional Court.
10. See e.g., the Sri Lanka Press Council Decision 
and the Associated Nevrspapers of Ceylon Ltd.. Tl3pecial 
Provisions) Bill Decision reported in Decisions of the 
Constitutional Court of Sri Lanka Vol. I "(13T5)
pp. 1 and 3*3 respectively; and the Local Authorities 
.(Imposition of Civic Disabilities) Bill Decision,
National State Assembly Debates Volume 28, No. 15 (Part 1) 
of August 11, 1978, columns 1655-81.
11. See e.g., the first two decisions mentioned in 
the preceding footnote; and the Places and Objects of 
Worship Bill Decision, Decisions of the Constitutional 
Court Vol."l, p. 27.
12. See e.g., the Associated Newspapers of Ceylon 
Ltd.. (Special Provisions r^BTIlV "D'eTfisiohs^ "of tfTe 
Constitutional Court Vol. I, p. 35.
13. See e.g., the Places and Objects of Worship 
Bill Decision, Decisions of the Constitutional Court Vol. I, 
p. 27; and the Panvena Laucation _biI T jje c i s i q n , National 
State Assembly Debates, Vol. 18, No. 7, of February 19*
1976, columns 1001-43.
14. See Chapter 10 (2) (i) supra.
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In Part I of this thesis we saw how the courts 
authoritatively laid down that, under the Soulbury 
Constitution of Ceylon, the judicial power of the 
State was vested exclusively in the judiciary. Under 
the Republican Constitution, on the other hand, judicial 
power was to be exercised, though indirectly, by the 
National State Assembly. Notwithstanding the fact that 
the Republican Constitution was intended to overcome 
difficulties of the type that arose before 1972 from 
thefjudicial power cases', arguments identical to those 
advanced before the courts in •the * judicial power cases', 
based on the premise that judicial power could be 
exercised only by such persons as governed by the 
constitutional provisions relating to the judiciary, 
were presented to the Constitutional Court.
The first Bill referred to the Constitutional Court 
was impugned, though unsuccessfully, on the ground, inter 
alia, that it sought to confer judicial powers on an 
essentially non-judicial body. The Sri Lanka Press 
Council Bill, which was subsequently enacted as the Sri 
Lanka Press Council Lav;, No. 5 of 1973, provided for the 
appointment of a Sri Lanka Press Council to regulate and 
tender advice on matters relating to the Press in Sri 
Lanka, for the investigation of offences relating to the 
printing or publication of certain matters in newspapers 
and for incidental and connected matters. The Council 
was to consist of the Director of Information and six 
other persons appointed by the President.^
15. Clause 3 of the Bill; sec. 3 of the Law.
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Clause 9 of the Bill provided that where the Press 
Council had reason to "believe that there had been 
published in a newspaper a statement, picture or other 
matter which was untrue, distorted or improper, the 
Council might hold an inquiry and order a correction 
approved by the Council to be published in the appropriate 
newspaper, or, censure the proprietor, printer, publisher, 
editor, journalist or other officer or authority of such 
newspaper, or, order that an apology be tendered by such 
proprietor, printer, publisher, editor, journalist or 
other officer or authority to the appropriate party.
Any order or censure of the Council, according to clause 
9(5), was final and conclusive and could not be 
questioned in a court of lav;.
It was argued that when the Press Council ordered
a censure, apology or correction it in fact inflicted a
’punishment1. The Constitutional Court, having pointed
out that certain persons were empowered to inflict a
censure or an admonition or a correction, such as when
the Head of a Department censured a public servant,
concluded that ’by no stretch of imagination can it be
16said that that is exercise of judicial power’.
Clause 12 provided that if in the opinion of the 
Council a person had committed a contempt of its authority, 
it could send to the Supreme Court a certificate setting
16. Decisions of the Constitutional Court Vol. I, 
at p. 11.
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out the facts on which its determination was based. In
determining whether a contempt had in fact been committed,
the Supreme Court had a discretion to take cognizance of
the facts stated in the certificate. As the Constitutional
Court pointed out, the Supreme Court, which was not bound
by the certificate of the Council, decided whether a
contempt had been committed after having conducted its
own inquiry. In view of the fact that it was the Supreme
Court which finally decided whether a contempt of the
authority of the Council had been committed, the
Constitutional Court was unwilling to acquiesce in the
argument that the Council had been given judicial power
in respect of contempts of its authority. The case of
• 17In Re Ratnagonal, where the Supreme Court of Ceylon
had arrived at a similar conclusion in repect of
provisions similar to those discussed above, was relied
upon by the Constitutional Court to support its decision.
Neither the power to order a censure etc., nor the
power to commit a person for contempt of authority was
considered to be a judicial power by the Constitutional
Court. In determining what is meant by ’judicial power’
reference was made to the various tests that had been
18
adopted in the 'tribunal cases’ particularly in The
19United Engineering Workers Union v. Devanayagam. V/e may
17. (1968) 70 N. 1. R. 409.
18. The 'tribunal cases' are discussed in chapters 
5 and 6 supra.
19. (1967) 69 IT. b. R. 289; /19677 2 All S. R. 567.
recall here that the concept of judicial power is given 
rather a narrow meaning i n ’the tribunal cases', limited 
only to the aspect of dispute settlement. In any event, 
it is abundantly clear that the powers such as those 
possessed by the Press Council would not have been held 
to be judicial pov/ers if they came up for decision 
before a court of lav/ prior to 1972.
Since the Constitutional Court could dispose of 
the matter on the ground that no judicial pov/ers had 
been conferred on the Press Council the Court did not 
have occasion to make a deliberate statement as to 
whether the National State Assembly could, consistently 
with the Constitution, confer judicial powers on a non­
judicial body. However, it did not let the matter pass 
unnoticed:
Assuming that Clause 9 confers judicial 
power on the Press Council, the 
Attorney-General submitted that there 
is no provision in the Constitution 
which prevents an institution created 
by law from performing judicial 
functions by officers other than those 
appointed under Section 124 of the 
Constitution. We are in total 
agreement with this submission.^
The Constitutional Court went on to point out that section 
124 made special provisions applicable to those state 
officers whose office was the performance of functions of 
a judicial nature. In view of this section which required 
the state officers of the category mentioned in that 
section to be governed by the constitutional provisions
20. Decisions of the Constitutional Court Vol. I, p.
relating to the judiciary, it is submitted, the 
statement quoted above is untenable. When the Constitution 
empowered the National State Assembly, by section 121, 
to fcreate and establish institutions for the 
administration of justice and for the adjudication and 
settlement of industrial and other disputes and 
institutions vested with the power of making decisions of 
a judicial or quasi judicial nature*, * subject to the 
provisions of the Constitution1, it is not correct to 
say that the National State Assembly could confer judicial 
powers and functions on a person or a body of persons in 
contravention of the relevant constitutional provisions.
On two occasions the Constitutional
Court was called upon to decide whether judicial powers
had been conferred on a Minister. Firstly, in the Bribery
21(Special Jurisdiction) Bill Reference it was argued 
that the power given by Clause 2 of the Bill to the 
Minister of Justice, where he considered it expedient to 
do so, by Order published in the Gazette, to nominate an 
appropriate Court or Courts situated anywhere in Sri 
Lanka for the purposes of trial and disposal of offences 
under the Bribery Act, irrespective of the place where 
such offences had been committed amounted to a * judicial 
power*.
Having observed that if the power to nominate a 
court was judicial, then, the Clause in question v/ould 
contravene the Constitution, the Constitutional Court 
went on to determine v/hether that clause conferred any 
judicial powers on the Minister.
21* Decisions of the Constitutional Court Vol.I, p. 23.
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Here too, as in the Sri Lanka Press Council Decision,
the Constitutional Court was not willing to travel
beyond the oft-quoted definition of Griffiths, C. J.,
22in Huddart Parker Pty., Ltd. v. Moorhead which is
23limited to what may be called * strict judicial power*.
24In The Queen v. Liyanage the Supreme Court of Ceylon 
attributed a wider meaning to * judicial power* so as to 
include powers ancillary to the exercise of strict 
judicial powers in deciding that the power given to the 
Minister of nominating a Bench of the Supreme Court
amounted a usurpation of the judicial power exclusively
25vested in the judiciary. The Constitutional Court in the 
Bribery (Special Jurisdiction) Decision sought to distinguish 
the decision in The Queen v. Liyanage on the basis that 
in the latter case the nomination of the judges by the 
Minister was for a special case in a special situation 
to try specific offences against specific defendants, 
whereas the Bribery (Special Jurisdiction) Bill did not 
give the power to the Minister to nominate a particular 
court to hear a particular case.
It must be pointed out that the decision in The 
Queen v. Liyanage was not founded on the basis that the 
nomination of judges was applicable to a particular case 
alone. The major premise of the decision was that the
22. g 308/ 8 C. 1. R. 330, at p. 357.
23. As to the meaning of ’strict judicial power*, 
see liyanage * s case (S. C.) cited in the following foot­
note.
24. (1962) 64 H. 1. R. 313.
25. See Chapter 7 (1) supra for a discussion of the
decision of the Supreme Court in The Queen v. Liyanage.
power of nominating judges to hear any particular case 
had traditionally been exercised by the Chief Justice.
In other words it was the ’historical criterion’ that 
determined that the power of nominating judges was a 
judicial pov/er.
The Attorney-General had been granted by the 
26
Courts Ordinance the power to transfer any inquiry or 
trial to a court chosen by him for reasons which he 
considered sufficient. Any possible abuse of this power 
by the Attorney-General, who was an executive officer, 
was sought to be prevented when the proviso to section 
43 of that Ordinance provided that a party aggrieved by 
such a transfer could apply to the Supreme Court for 
the review of such order of transfer.
Under the Bribery (Special Provisions) Lav/ the 
Minister’s order v/ould not be justiciable. This fact 
did not, as the Constitutional Court decided, make the 
power of the Minister any different from the power 
possessed by the Attorney-General. It is submitted that the 
conferment of non-reviewable powers of nomination on the 
Minister could have easily been considered an 
interference with the judicial function, if the reasoning 
in The Queen v, Liyanage proved acceptable to the 
Constitutional Court.
Our second relevant decision is the one given in
27respect of the Administration of Justice Bill. This
26. Ordinance No. 1 of 1889, L . E . C., cap. 6.
27. Decisions of the Constitutional Court Vol. 1, p. 57.
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Bill, which provided for the establishment and constitution
of a new system of courts, empowered the Minister of
Justice, by regulation, to nominate' ’a court or courts
situated anywhere intSri Lanka for the purposes of trial
and disposal of such categories of actions, proceedings
28
or matters as shall be specified in such regulation1.
Such regulations became operative only when approved by
29the National State Assembly. Following its decision in
the Bribery (Special Jurisdiction) Bill Reference, the
Constitutional Court held that this power of nomination
30was not the exercise of judicial power.
Arriving at the above conclusion, the Court yet 
again attributed a narrow meaning to ’judicial power’.
On the basis that the Republican Constitution was a 
complete breakaway from the past constitutions, the 
Constitutional Court refused to apply the historical test 
and the Holmes test, which is also known as the end purpose 
test.
To consider the meaning of judicial power 
in the light of the Charter of 1801 and 
so forth, which were imposed on us by 
the British Crown, will be in our view 
to put the clock back many years.^
The Republican Constitution did not define ’judicial 
power*. It is, therefore, imperative that when inter­
preting that phrase guidance must be derived from 
elsewhere. The Constitutional Court limited itself to 
the dispute settlement aspect of judicial power alone.
28. Clause 47 0). 29. Clause 62.
30. Decisions of the Constitutional Court Vol 1, p. 69.
31. These tests are discussed in The Queen v. Liyanage.
52. Decisions of the Constitutional Court Vol 1, p. 68.
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Griffiths, 0. J.’s definition is appropriate when the 
question is whether a particular? tribunal is judicial or 
not: in other situations, such as that presently under
consideration, that definition is neither appropriate 
nor adequate. If that definition could he relied on, 
it is submitted, the other definitions and criteria 
were also equally relevant in' determining the content 
of ’judicial power’ under the Republican Constitution, 
Moreover, in view of the provisions incorporated in the 
Republican Constitution so as to safeguard judicial 
independence which were much similar to. those contained’ in 
the Soulbury Constitution, it is difficult to understand 
the reluctance of the Constitutional Court to 
recognise the true extent of ’judicial power’ as laid 
down by judges and jurists. It is well to repeat that 
how the Constitution was adopted should not be the sole 
criterion in determining the scope of the substantive 
provisions of that Constitution,
So far we have examined two aspects of the argument 
that judicial power could not be conferred on non-judicial 
officers. V/hether the National State Assembly could, 
by way of legislation, exercise judicial power remains 
to be discussed now.
It was argued before the Constitutional Court that 
the Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd., (Special 
Provisions) Pill was unconstitutional on the ground, 
inter alia, that by enacting that law the National State 
Assembly v/ould in fact be exercising judicial power,
33. See Part (2) (i) of this Chapter, supra.
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in contravention of section 5 of the Constitution,
which prescribed that the National State Assembly
should exercise its judicial power indirectly through
the courts and other institutions created by law.
The impugned Bill had been designed to alter the
status of the Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd., as
a private company and vest not less than seventy-five
per cent of the shares in the Public Trustee, thereby
reducing the shareholdings of the persons,who were
shareholders on January 4, 1972,to a maximum of twenty-
five per cent. These restrictions and limitations
were imposed only on that particular company. It was
argued that in the absence of any reasonable basis to
justify the differential treatment of the Company, the
Bill amounted to a denial of the equal protection of the
law guaranteed by section 18 (1) (a) of the Constitution.
34Relying on the findings of a Royal Commission the
Constitutional Court held that certain violations of the
foreign exchange regulations by certain directors of
the affected Company provided sufficient basis for fan
intelligible differentia1 which distinguished that
35company from other companies.
Allied to the arguments based on the alleged 
violation of the equal protection of the lav/ was the 
contention that the provisions of the Bill were in their
34. Sessional Paper VIII of 1971.
35. Reference was made to the decision of the 
Supreme Court of India in Chiranjit' Lai v. Union of India 
1951 A. I. R. (S.C.) 41. ~ “
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totality punitive and imposed on the directors and its 
members punishment. Disagreeing with this contention 
the Court pointed out that adequate compensation had 
been provided to all .the affected shareholders and that 
if the State wanted to punish the company it could have 
acquired the company under the Business Acqusitions Act. 
The contention that the National State Assembly was 
in fact exercising judicial power by passing the punitive 
Law was not apparently put forward seriously.
Having referred to the Imposition of Civic 
Disabilities (Special Provisions) Act, No. 14 of 1965,
the validity of which had been upheld in Kariapper v.
56
Winesinha. the Constitutional Court made the following
observation:
The principle has been accepted 
in Ceylon to disqualify persons 
from holding office in public 
institutions who have been found 
to have contravened the laws of 
the land involving moral turpitude 
or who have been found by tribunals 
or commissions of inquiry to be 
guilty of anti-social or 
corrupt conduct,^
The Constitutional Court concluded that no 
provision of the Bill conferred judicial powers on anybody. 
In 1978 the Constitutional Court was afforded the 
opportunity to determine whether the Local Authorities 
(imposition of Civic Disabilities) Bill amounted to an 
exercise of judicial power by the National State Assembly.
36. (196?) 70 N. L. R. 49; D9&lJ 3 All E. R. 485.
See Chapter 8 (2) surra.
37. Decisions of the Constitutional Court 
Volume 1, at p. 54.
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The Local Authorities (Imposition of Civic
38
Disabilities) Bill, No. 2 of 1978 was designed to impose 
civic disabilities on those persons who, being responsible 
in some way for the local government administration, had 
been found guilty by a Commission of Inquiry of abuse of 
power, corruption or other irregular acts. A list of the 
persons on whom the Bill imposed civic disabilities 
appeared in the Schedule to the Act. It was contended 
on behalf of the petitioners-
(i) that there were persons against whom no 
specific findings had been made in the report of the 
Commission of Inquiry, but, nevertheless, whose names 
appeared in the Schedule to the Bill as relevant persons 
on whom disabilities had been imposed by the Bill; and
(ii) that there were persons against whom there 
were findings by the Commission of Inquiry but whose 
names were not included in the schedule to the Bill as 
revelant persons— that is, persons to whom the Bill 
applied.
The argument, then, was that although the Bill had the 
ostensible object of imposing civic disabilities on those 
persons who had been found guilty by the Commission of 
Inquiry, the Bill, in truth, arbitrarily selected certain 
persons who were to be visited with the disabilities 
prescribed in it.
38. Hansard. Vol. 28, No 15, Part 1, col. 1655-81, 
(1978).
Agreeing with, this contention, the Constitutional 
Court went on to determine whether such arbitrary selection 
was contrary to section 18(1)(a) of the Republican 
Constitution of 1972, which guaranteed equality before the 
lav/. Having referred to previous judicial authorities 
on the distinction between reasonable classification and 
discrimination, the Constitutional Court had no hesitation 
in concluding that the arbitrary selection of certain 
specific persons for the purposes of the application of 
the Bill was discriminatory since such selection or 
classification had no relation to the object of the Bill, 
namely to impose disabilities bn those found guilty by 
the Commission. On that account’ the Bill was inconsistent 
with section 18(1)(a) of the Constitution.
As a corollary to the above contention it was
further argued that the Bill which altered the legal
rights of the named persons was inconsistent with section
5(b) of the Constitution (which declared that judicial
power should be exercised by courts and other similar 
\39institutions) inasmuch as it was a legislative judgment 
which imposed punishment on the named persons. The Solicitor- 
General argued, echoing the reasoning of Sir Douglas 
Menzies in Kariaoper v. Wijesinha, ^  firstly that the Bill 
did not contain a declaration of guilt since it merely 
attracted the findings of the Commission of Inquiry, and
39. See supra Chapter 10, Part 2(i).
40. See fn. 36 above and Chapter 8 Part (2)
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secondly that it imposed no punishment as the imposition 
of civic disabilities could not be regarded as punitive.
The first half of this argument had necessarily to be 
rejected on account of the Court’s finding that the persons 
against- whom findings had been made by the Commission of 
Inquiry and the persons named in the Schedule to the Bill 
were not the same. In order to assess the validity of 
the second half of the argument, the Constitutional Court 
examined in some detail the decision of the Privy Council 
in Kariapper v. Wijesinha.
It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that 
the decision in Kariapper v. Wijesinha. which held that 
Parliament could validly impose civic disabilities on its 
members who had been found guilty by a Commission of 
Inquiry of bribery offences, should be limited to the facts 
of that case since one of the major premises of that 
decision was the special jurisdiction which Parliament 
possessed in respect of its internal matters: in the 
instant ce.se, it was contended, Parliament was not acting 
in the exercise of that special jurisdiction. Therefore, 
if in the instant case it could be proved that the imposition 
of civic disabilities amounted to an exercise of judicial 
power, then, there was no ground on which the legislature 
could plead exception, unlike in Kariapper v. Wijesinha , 
where the Privy Council accepted that Parliament has a 
special jurisdiction as an exception to the exclusive 
vesting of judicial power in the judiciary. With this 
preliminary contention the Constitutional Court agreed.
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The substantial question was whether the imposition 
of civic disabilities could be regarded as punishment 
and consequently an exercise of judicial power. In order 
to answer this question the Constitutional Court referred
A 1
to the following quotation from. Cumming v. State of Missouri:
The deprivation of any rights, 
civil or political, previously 
enjoyed, may be punishment, the 
circumstances attending and the 
causes of deprivation determining 
this fact.
Kariapper v. Wijeslnha the above quoted observation 
was referred to. The Privy Council found:
(a) that the Commission.of Inquiry 
had been appointed by one government 
whereas the findings of that Commission 
were implemented by another government; and
(b) that there v/as near unanimity in 
Parliament as to the need for the 
enactment of the Act impugned in that 
case.
In those circumstances the Privy Council could not resist 
the conclusion that the impugned Act, far from being a 
punitive legislative measure, v/as a valid exercise of the 
power of Parliament to keep the public life clean for the 
public good.
In the Local Authorities (imposition of Civic 
Disabilities) Bill Decision those circumstances which 
existed in Kariapper v. Wi.iesinha v/ere absent. This
41. (1866) 4 Wall., 277 at p. 323.
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prompted the Constitutional Court to make the following 
observations:
We are of the view that when the 
present Bill directly deprives a 
state officer or employee of local 
government from holding such office 
for all time, it is the severest 
punishment that could be inflicted 
on such a public officer.^
/ The deprivation of the right to 
vote at local elections for seven 
years is/ more than a mere 
disqualification. It is a clear 
punishment depriving him of the 
right to participate in the 
democratic process of choosing 
those who will guide the destinies 
of his city or his town or his 
village.45
In order to hold that the imposition of civic
disabilities could be rightly regarded as punishment, the
Constitutional Court rejected a restricted meaning of
’judicial power’ contended on behalf of the State. The
Solicitor-General argued that the term ’judicial power*
should be understood in the sense that term is defined by
Griffiths C. J., in Huddart Parker Pfcv., Ltd. v. Moorhe ad.
In. spite of its previous refusal to go beyond that
definition which adopts only the aspect of dispute
44settlement, the Constitutional Court, in the Local 
Authorities (Imposition of Civic Disabilities) Bill 
Decision, v/as willing to attribute a v/ider meaning to 
’judicial power*.
42. Hansard Vol. 28, No. 15, Part 1, col. 1677-8, (1978).
43. Ibid., col. 1679-80.
44. This is the view taken by the Constitutional Court 
in all the previous cases, which have been discussed 
earlier in this part of the chapter.
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The most crucial question was whether the National
State Assembly could, consistently with the Constitution,
exercise judicial power in a legislative form. In view
of section 5 of the Republican Constitution of 1972, and
the constitutional provisions dealing with the method of
appointment and security of tenure of judges and those
state officers who performed, in the main, judicial
functions, the Constitutional Court concluded that judicial
power could not be directly exercised by any other than
judges and those who may be called ’judicial officers’.
In the result the National State Assembly was not
competent, under the Republican Constitution of 1972, to
directly exercise judicial power. Having referred to the
American cases on ’legislative judgments’ the Constitutional
Court observed:
By parity of reasoning, section 5(b)
of the Constitution prohibits the
direct exercise by the National State
Assembly of passing legislative
judgments, punishments and penalties
on specified individuals as this is
a direct exercise of judicial pov/er
in a legislative form.,._
45
This decision of the Constitutional Court laid down 
the principle that under the Republican Constitution of 
1972, judicial power could be exercised only by persons 
whose appointment and tenure of office were governed by 
the constitutional provisions relating to the judiciary, 
and that, accordingly, neither the legislative nor the
45. Hansard Vol. 28, No. 15, Part 1, col. 1678, (1978).
executive could exercise judicial power. This principle 
was extracted from a Constitution which embodied the 
doctrine of concentration or fusion of powers in the 
legislature. In the’judicial power cases’- of Ceylon, on 
the other hand, the exclusive vesting of the judicial 
pov/er in the judiciary was considered to be an inevitable 
incident of the separation of powers, which formed the 
foundation of the Soulbury Constitution.
The question then arises whether this decision did 
not render nugatory the attempt made in 1972 to depart 
from the doctrine of separation of powers, thereby 
equalling the position under the Republican Constitution 
of 1972 to that which prevailed under the Soulbury Constitution 
with regard to the exercise of judicial power. Or, is it 
that the principle that the legislature should not exercise 
judicial power does not necessarily hinge on the doctrine 
of separation of powers? However, in view of the recent 
pronouncement of the Privy Council’s opinion in Hinds v.
The Queen indicating that the exclusive vesting of the 
judicial pov/er in the judiciary is a necessary corollary 
of the doctrine of separation of powers— an essential 
feature of a V/esminster Model Constitution—  , it is 
submitted that the effect of the decision of the 
Constitutional Court v/as to recognise the doctrine of 
separation of powers at least to the extent that judicial 
pov/er could be exercised only by the judiciary.
46. /.19767 1 All E. R. 555. This case is discussed
in Part (3) of the next chapter.
With this apparent resuscitation of the liyanage 
47Pricinle by the Constitutional Court which, undoubtedly, 
would not have been approved by the creators of the 1972 
Constitution, we may in the next, and the last, part of 
this chapter examine whether the Constitutional Court could 
be regarded as a ‘court’.
(1) The Constitutional Court: V/as It a Court?
In determining whether it is justifiable to regard 
the Constitutional Court as a Court in the sense that 
term is generally used we must look at -
(a) the functions performed by it; and
(b) its composition and actual working,
(a) Its only function v/as to determine whether 
a Bill referred to it v/as inconsistent with the 
Constitution and advise the Speaker accordingly. This 
was not a function that the Courts of Ceylon had 
exercised before. However, as we shall see in Part (2) cf 
the next chapter, the Supreme Court today performs this 
function. And, in the performance of this function, 
the Supreme Court does not assume a character different 
from its fundamental character, namely that of a court 
of lav/. It follows, then, that the mere fact that the 
Constitutional Court performed its function of interpretation 
prior to the enactment of the Bill does not necessarily 
prove that it v/as merely a type of an advisory body,
and not a court. As has been pointed out earlier in this
47. See supra chapter 8 part 1 for a discussion of
the Liyanage Principle,
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chapter, if the power to declare laws invalid is a 
necessary attribute of constitutional adjudication, then, 
the Constitutional Court can not be regarded as a Court.
(b) As regards the composition of the Constitutional
Court we have noted that, inspite of the fact that the
Constitution did not specify the qualifications its
members should possess, the general practice was to
appoint Judges or former Judges of the Supreme Court.
The provisions relating to their appointment, tenure of
office and removal were designed to secure a commendable
2
degree of independence to the members of the Court; 
firmly-rooted independence is an outstanding 
characteristic of a court of lav;.
ho also have seen that the Constitutional Court 
made frequent reference to previous judicial decisions 
and other authorities, in addition to evolving a type of 
precedent in the Constitutional Court itself, for 
instance, in the Local Authorities ( Imnos i t.i on of Civic 
Disabilities ) Bill Decision a number of decisions from 
the United States of America and Ceylon were referred to 
in arriving at the conclusion that the legislature could 
not exercise judicial pov/er. This decision, together 
v/ith a number of other decisions, declaring certain Bills 
inconsistent with the Constitution, provides ample 
evidence that the Constitutional Court performed the
1. See part 1 (i) of this chapter.
2. Ibid.
3. Hansard Vol. 28, Ho. 15, Part 1, col. 1655-81 (1978).
function of interpreting the Constitution and Bills in 
accordance with judicial practice instead of merely acting 
in aid of the legislature, providing its seal of approval.
It is true that the Constitution- makers, in 1972, 
intended to create an institution in the form of the 
Constitutional Court— which would he different from a 
court of law. That is why a Constitutional Court v/as 
specially created, instead of conferring that jurisdiction 
on the Supreme Court. On the other hand, it may he said 
that the main object in creating that court was to 
introduce a type of judicial tribunal consisting of 
persons who had special acquaintance with Constitutional 
matters. This, together with the fact that in practice 
its members were chosen from among Judges and former 
Judges of the Supreme Court,'fortifies our contention that 
it v/as a court, and if one needs to be quite specific,
’a special court*.
In part (1) (iv) of this chapter we made a passing 
reference to the proceedings before the Presidential 
Commission where the events leading to the resignation 
of the three members of the first Constitutional Court 
were cited as an example of the manner in which the previous 
government, of the 1970-1977 period, interfered with the 
independence of the judiciary. Is this not indirect 
evidence of the fact that, in general practice, the 
Constitutional Court v/as regarded as a Court, the 
independence of which had been constitutionally guaranteed?
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The decisions of the Constitutional Court are not 
as wholesome as one expects a decision of a superior court 
to he, perhaps because the Constitutional Court had to 
deliver its decision within a short period of time. This, 
however, cannot detract much from the judicial nature 
of the Constitutional Court, which was generally referred 
to even in the Constitution as ’the court’,^  since the 
quality of judgment cannot determine conclusively 
whether the institution delivering the judgment is a 
court or not.
In conclusion it may be said that, although strictly 
speaking the Constitutional Court v/as not a ’Court’ since 
it did not form part of the system of ordinary courts of 
lav/, and performed a function till then unknown to the 
courts of Ceylon, having examined its composition and its 
actual operation one could hardly deny that it is no 
different from a court of law.
4. The Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972, secs. 55(2) 
ad. fin., 56(3) and 58.
EPILOGUE
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CHAPTER 12
THE mJDICTARY OF SRI LANKA: THE PAST, THE PRESENT
APE) THE FUTURE
(1 ) P r p 1 j n 1 n a r y
It is a truism that the modern administrative 
and judicial system of Sri Lanka has its origins in 
the institutions introduced by the British in Ceylon 
at the time it uas ruled by them. The absence in this 
book of a detailed account of the native administrative 
and jud.icial systorn that existed in Sri Lanka prior 
to the British occupation follows from that historical 
fact..
In view of the fact that the colonial rulers uere
particularly interested in the material benefits that
accrued from Ceylon, it is not surprising to come across
rnounIinr• cri tj c i m of Bri t j.ch policy as a uhole in
Ceylon, especially when the critic is motivated by
nationalist fervour. The present writer confesses that
he has not de1ved into the historica1 records
sufficiently to enter into that debate. However, from
the material that has been seen in the archives, it is
difficult to disagree with what Mills said:
The record of Bri 11 sh pol j. c v in 
Ceylon is not free from hi em is ties,
hut on the whole it is one of which
the Empire has no occasion to be ashamed.
1 « L . A . h ills, r: e v 1 o n u n d e r rj r i t i s h R u 1 e :
This is particularly true of the attitude of the 
colonial officers in London and the administrative 
officers in Ceylon towards the administration of justice. 
In Part 1 of this thesis we hove shown how the 
Governors of Ceylon expressed their respect for an 
independent judiciary, which many Governors thought was 
an indispensable requirement in order to uphold justice 
and order. Ue have also noted that these convictions 
of the Governors could find expression in the form of 
1 ecific policies only to the extent permitted by the 
overriding considerations of economy and the safety of 
the state.
It is in this context that we must assess, 
particularly, the entrustment of judicial functions 
to civil servants during the early years of British 
rule. The combination of civil and military functions 
with judicial functions was prompted by the need to 
ensure that the government officers commanded the 
respccr and obedience of the native pbopiti: ± n i act,
under the Sinhalese kings the Ceylonese had been used 
to an administrative system which did not make a clear 
delineation between judicial and administrative 
functions. ~
The observations that have been made on the 
colonial system of administration in East Africa by 
Read warrant mention here. He says:
2. See Sir John D ’Oyly, A Sketch of the 
Constitution of the Kandyan Kingdom, ed., L. J. B. 
Turner, Colombo, 19 29.
r o
O ’ el
A dm inis t. native officers, closer
to the disti n c t i v e realities of
A f ri can .1 5 f e , sounht to modify
a 1 icn methods of justi.ee by a
process of adaptation uhich they
saw themselves alone as being
fitted to carry out.„P
In Ceylon, too, claims had been made that it uas 
only a civil servant-judge, familiar ui.th the language, 
habits and the way of life of the native people, who 
could administer justice in a manner readily 
acceptsb1e in the Island.
The question may be asked whether the fusion of 
.judicial and administrative functions or the 
appointn mi of civil servants as judges uas prompted 
by anythin' other than expediency, economy and 
convenience. It has been sljgqested that it is possj.b.1 e 
to gather from communis a t.i ons between the authorities 
in London and the administrative officers in African 
Colonial territories, which were often confidential 
and were not meant, in any event, for publication, that 
it uas assumed by them that their aim uas to find a
5
more just system for the adm.inistrnt.ion of justice.
It appears to have been commonly 
understood by administrative officers, 
colonial officers in London, and the
3. Prof, J . S . Read, ’The Search for Justice1,
H . f . F o r ri s an d J . S . Read, In di rent Rule and t he 
Search for .lust 1 cr:: Fssavs in Cast. f'r 1 r "n L o r d
I I1 stor v , (1 9 72), a t n . 293 .
4. Sec, e.g., C . 0. 54/514, Dispatch No. 243 
of July 24, 18 78.
5. H. F. Harris and J . S. Read, op. clt., pp. 290-1 .
lawyers and judges with whom they 
were often to disagree concerning 
policies, not merely that they all 
had a common aim in the devising 
of a sound and appropriate system 
for the administration of justice, 
but that their success in a 11 ain in n 
that object uas likely to be a 
crowning achievement of British 
Colonial rule. ^
In the light of our discussion in Part 1 of this 
thesis, the above vieu is strikingly applicable in 
the Ceylon context too.
During one hundred and fifty years of British 
occupation of Ceylon we uitness a gradual evolution 
towards responsible self-government. Advancement in 
economy and literacy, together with the emergence 
of a powerful free press, did much to militate against 
the conferment of wide powers on the administration.
A gradual weakening of the powers of the Covernor 
brought with it a strenqthoning of the position of 
the representatives of the people-*-elec ted or 
nominated. At the same time this meant that the 
administration became more and more reluctant to 
interfere with the judicial process, deviating from 
the general practice in the early years of 0ritish 
rule.
Together with the political, administrative 
and social reforms was evolved the judicial system,
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which by Independence took the form of a system 
of courts manned by judicial officers who were 
protected from legislative and executive 
interference.
During colonial rule, the independence and the
powers of the judiciary were upheld only so far as
the supreme authority of the colonial administration
6a
uas not impaired thereby. As independence drew near, 
however, the colonial authorities changed their 
attitude towards the relationship that ought to 
exist between the administration and the judiciary: 
they realized the importance of checks and balances 
to the authority of the legislature and the executive 
Ceylon uas about to be endoued with, and, as a result, 
the judiciary of independent Ceylon uas to be 
immune from lenislative and executive control in 
order to guarantee its independent authority. With 
the grant of independence, as the colonial authorities 
believed,, it uas necessary to place restrictions on 
the law-making and lau-enforcing authority of the 
government in order to prevent misuse or abuse of 
pouer, especially in violation of the rights of the 
minorities. The colonial authorities seem to have been 
preoccupied uith the follouing question:
In granting full self-government, what 
1 imitations must be proscribed in the 
Constitution of Ceylon ?
6a. See for instance supra pp. 72-74.
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In fact, during the tuenty-tuo years the Soulbury 
Constitution uas in operation, it uas subjected to 
erious criticism,especially by politicians of the 
left and centre-left parties. In Chapters 9 and 10 
ue saw the various objections raised against the 
suitability of that constitution for the needs of 
the Ceylonese community.
So, in 1 972, uhen the Republican Constitution uas *
adopted by the Constituent Assembly, this uas the
relevant q u e s t i o n :
Hou are the limitations pJ.aced on 
the authority of Parliament to be 
removed?
In other uords, the pouersof the legislature and of 
the executive were sought to be enhanced, thereby 
reviving more or less the position that existed in 
Ceylon under Colonial rule: a central government to
whose power and authority all other institutions and 
authorities should dp for. It is uith this object in 
mind that the doctrine of separation of powers uas 
categorically rejected in drafting the Repub.1 ican 
Constitution. In its place uas ordained the concept 
of the fusion of powers in the National State Assembly. 
Curther, the pouer of judicial revieu of legislation, 
uhich uas regarded as a stumblino-block to progressive 
legislation, uas taken auay from courts.
The result, then, uas, as ue sau in the previous 
chapter, a judiciary dcprived of the pouor of judieia1 
rev/leu-- but ensured of the exclusive exercise of 
otrmr judicial functions.
Pou uas this position changed in 1978?
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(2) Th^ Const! tut ion of th e Dpnocratlc. Socialist
Reput1 i£ °f L£i I-2Hka and the 9ud ic iarv
The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist 
Republic of Sr: Lanka, 19 78 made many fundamental 
changes in the constitutional structure of Sri Lanka,
It introduced an elected, execution President ui th 
substantial powers, in place of the nominal Head of the 
State under the Soulbury Constitution and the Republican 
Constitution of 1972. Tho National State Assembly 
uas replaced with a Parliament uhose members are to be 
elected according to proportional representation,
instead of merely by territorial representation as
2
before.' The general features of the Constitution 
cannot be discussed in detail in this thesis: it rnay
be said that the Constitution of 1978 adopts the 
Parliament as the legislature of Sri Lanka subject to 
tho essential qualification that the President 
possesses a high degree of control over it.
The provisions relating to the judiciary may now 
bo examined. Article 4 of the 1978 Constitution is 
similar to section 5 of the Republic Constitution 
of 1972.
1. The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist 
Republic of Sri Lanka,1978, Chapter VII.
2. Ibid., Chapter XIV.
4. The Sovereignty of the People 
shall be exercised and enjoyed 
in the following manner:
(a) the legislative pov/er of the 
People shall be exercised by 
Parliament, consisting of elected 
representatives of the People
and by the People at a Referendum;
(b) the executive power of the 
People, including the defence of 
Sri Lanka, shall be exercised by 
the President of the Republic 
elected by the People;
(c) the judicial pov/er of the 
People shall be exercised by 
Parliament through courts, tribunals 
and institutions created and 
established, or recognized, by
the Constitution, or created and 
established by law, except in 
regard to matters relating to the 
privileges, immunities and powers 
of Parliament and of its 
Members, wherein the judicial 
pov/er of the People may be 
exercised directly by Parliament 
according to lav/;
(d) _____
(e) _____
Section 5 of the 1972 Constitution declared that 
the National State Assembly exercised legislative power 
directly, and executive and judicial powers indirectly, 
v/hereas article 4 of the 1978 Constitution declares the
manner in which the Sovereignty of the People of the
Republic of Sri Lanka is to be exercised, namely
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that Parliament exercises the legislative power directly 
and the judicial pov/er indirectly while the President 
of the Republic directly exercises the executive pov/er.
It is correct to assume, following the decision of the 
Constitutional Court in the Local Authorities (Imposition 
of civic disabilities) Bill Reference, that Parliament - 
today is, as the National State Assembly was, incompetent 
to exercise directly the judicial power which is to be 
exercised only through courts and similar institutions. 
Thus, what v/e witness in the present Constitution, is a 
separation of the legislative, executive and judicial 
functions. It is interesting to note that the structure 
of section 5 of the 1972 Constitution was used in 
drafting article 4 of the present Constitution to establish 
a fundamental principle, namely,that of separation of 
powers, which is diametrically opposed to that contained 
in its model section, section 5 of the 1972 Constitution.
The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist 
Republic of Sri Lanka, 1978 established the Supreme 
Court of the Republic of Sri Lanka, and the Court of
Appeal of the Republic of Sri Lanka, each of which is a
3
superior court of record. Provision v/as made by the
2. National State Assembly Debates: Hansard.. 
Vol. 28, Ho. 15, tart"1 (1978;, col. 1655-81.
3. The Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978, article 
105 (1) and (3).
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Judicature Act, No 2 of 1978 to establish the following
courts of original jurisdiction*
(i) The High Court;
(il) District Courts;
(ill) Family Courts;
(I \ J ) Flagistrates Courts; and
(\ J ) Primary Courts*
The provisions contained in the 1978 Constitution
relating to the Judiciary, together with the Judicature
Act, No 2 of 1978, replace the system of courts
introduced by the Administration of Justice law, No 44
of 1973* Since it is not possible to examine the
present judicial structure here, our discussion must
be limited to an examination of the constitutional
provisions relating to the Judiciary, particularly to
the Supreme Court.
(i) The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court is to consist of the Chief 
Justice and of not less than six and not more than ten 
other Judges, appointed by the President.^ It must be 
noted here that all Judges of the Supreme Court and the 
High Courts established by the Administration of Justice 
law, No 44 of 1973, holding office on the day 
immediately before the commencement of the Constitution 
of 1978 ceased to hold office, by virtue of article 163 
of the Constitution. As a result of this provision a
I b i d . , a r t s *  11 9 ( I ) a n d  1 0 7 ( l ) .
number of Judges of those two courts lost their office
uhen they uere not appointed to the Supreme Court, the
5
Court of Appeal or the High Court by the President,
Every Judge of the Supreme Court holds office
during good behaviour anck is removable only by the
President upon address of Parliament on the ground of
fproved misbehaviour or incapacity*.^, Parliament shall
provide for all matters relating to the presentation
of such an address, including the procedure for the
passing of such resolution and the investigation and
7
proof of the alleged misbehaviour or incapacity.
Neither the Soulbury Constitution of Ceylon nor the 1972 
Constitution limit the power of the legislature to 
make an address to . specified grounds. The 
introduction of such a limit on the power of Parliament 
indicates how the 1978 Constitution .strives to protect 
the independende of the judiciary to a greater extent 
than before. The age of retirement of Judges of the 
Supreme Court is sixty-five years, and not sixty-three
g
as before 1978. Their salaries, determined by
g
Parliament, shall be changed on the consolidated fund,
and the salary of a Judge of the Supreme Court shall
10not be reduced after his appointment.
5. This aspect will be discussed in Part 4 of 
this Chapter.
6. The Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978, art. 107(2)
7. Ibid•, g p » 107(3)
8* I bid., ar.t • 107(5); cf sec. 122(3) of the
Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972.
9* Ibid., art. 108(1)
10. Ibid., art. 108(2)
The Supreme Court, the highest and final superior 
Court of record in Sri Lanka, exercises:
(a) jurisdiction in respect of constitutional 
matters;
(b) jurisdiction for the protection of 
funda-^rnental rights;
(c) final appellate jurisdiction;
(d) Consultative jurisdiction;
(e) jurisdiction in election petitions;
(f) jurisdiction in respect of any breach of
the privileges of Parliament; and
(g) jurisdiction in respect of sush other
matters, uhich Parliament may by lau vest or
ordain • ^ -j
(a) The Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court: The function of determing the constitutionality
of Bills referred to it is vested in the Supreme Court,
A Bill comes up before'- the Supreme Court for its 
determination as to whether the Bill or any provision 
thereof is inconsistant with the Constitution either 
when the President refers a Bill in writing addressed 
to the Chief Justice or when a citizen by petition 
alleges that a Bill is, in whole or in part, inconsistent 
with the Constitution, Uhere the constitutional 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been so invoked, 
no proceeding shall be had in Parliament in relation to 
such Bill until the determination of the Supreme Court 
has been made: such determination has to be made 
within three weeks, (The Constitutional Court under the 
Constitution of 1972 had to arrive at a decision within 
two weeks)
11, Ibid,, a r t . 118.
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Uhcrc the Supreme Court determines that a Bill
is, in uhole or in part, inconsistent uith the
Constitution, it should also inform the Speaker uhether
such Bill ought to specify that it is for the
amendment of the Constitution, or uhether such Bill
can or cannot be passed by the special majority
prescribed for constitutional amendment (tuo-thirds)
uithout being approved by the people at a referendum,
A Bill declared to be inconsistent uith the constitution
can be passed only in the manner stated in the
1 3determination of the Supreme Court, Once a Bill has
been passed by Parliament it is not competent for any
court or tribunal to pronounce upon, or call in question
1 4in any manner, the validity of such Act on any ground.
These provisions also apply, mutatis mutandis,
to an urgent Bill--a Bill bearing an endorsement to
the effect that in the vieu of the Cabinet of Ministers
it is urgent in the national interest, but the
determination of. the Supreme Court has to be made
uithin tuenty-four hours. The President may, houever
1 5extend this time-limit upto three days.
12. Ibid., art. 123(1).
13. Ibid., art. 123(4).
14. Ibid., art. 80(3).
15. Ibid., a r t . 122.
The present Constitution, like its predecessor,
then, excludes judicial review of the constitutionality
of legislation. The Supreme Court replaces the
Constitutional Cour.t, which did not strictly form part
of the judicial structure, and determines uhether a
Bill is inconsistent uith the Constitution. Article
120 of the Constitution of 1978 has the effect of
preventing the Supreme Court from deciding uhether or
not a particular Bill is inconsistent uith the
Constitution in certain specified circumstances, such
as uhen the Cabinet of Ministers has certified that a
Bill is intended to be passed with the special majority
prescribed for constitutional amendment; there the
sole determination of the Court is to be uhether the
Bill should be approved at a referendum or uhether it
should be passed as an express constitutional 
1 6amendment. For instance, uhile a Bill intituled
1 an Act to Amend the Compulsory Public Service1, No. 70
of 1961 was being examined by the Supreme Court to
determine its validity, the President of the Republic
of Sri Lanka informed the Supreme Court that the Cabinet
of Ministers had decided to pass it uith a tuo-thirds
majority. Accordingly the Court limited its inquiry only
to the question uhether a referendum was required to
validly pass that Bill which the Court answered in 
1 7the negative.
16. Ibid., art. 120 (c).
17. The decision of the Supreme Court is reported
in Hansard Vol. 4, No. 4, of February 6, 1979, col. 435-8.
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It appears that the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction, has not
been slou to declare Bills inconsistent uith the
Constitution. For instance, in the Licensing of Produce
1 8Brokers Bill Decision the Supreme Court declared that 
some. of the provisions of the Bill in question were 
inconsistent uith the Constitution.
In determing uhether a Bill contains any provision
inconsistent uith the Constitution the Supreme Court is
free to drau upon previous judicial decisions, rules and
practices, for the Supreme Court, unlike the Constitutional
Court of the 1972-1978 era, is a court of lau in the
true sense of the term. And, in the performance of this
constitutional function, the Supreme Court does not
cease to be the Supreme Court and engage in performing an
extra-judicial . advisory function.
Z*t7he jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court may be exercised in different 
matters at the same time by the 
several judges of that Court sitting 
apart.ig
The sole and exclusive jurisdiction in respect of 
the interpretation of the Constitution is another aspect 
of the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 
yArticle 135(1) of the Constitution provides that uhenever 
a question relating to the interpretation of the 
Constitution arises in any other court , tribunal or 
similar institution, such question !shall forthuith be
on
referred to the Supreme Court for determination1•
18. Hansard, Vol 3(2), No. 6, of December 20,
1978, col. 1254-8.
19. The Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978, art. 132(2).
20. Ibid. , art. 125.
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i b L  Other jurisdictions of the Supreme Court:
The Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and determine any question relating to the
infringement or imminent infringement "by executive and
administrative action of any fundamental right or
21
language right enshrined in the Constitution, its 
consultative jurisdiction is exercised when the President 
of the Republic refers to it any question of lav/ or
fact of public importance to obtain the opinion of the 
22Court thereon. In addition to the exercise of the.
jurisdiction in election petitions^ and in respect of
24
the breaches of Parliamentary privileges, the Supreme 
Court functions as the final court of civil and 
criminal appellate jurisdiction.^
(ii) Provisions Relating to the Inferior Courts and 
General Provisions
The Judges of the High Court are appointed by the 
President of the Republic and can be removed by him
t
on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission.'
The appointment, transfer, dismissal and disciplinary
control of judicial officers,(excluding the Judges
of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal and the High
Court, to each of which special provisions apply), is
27vested in the Judicial Service Commission, 1 which 
consists of the Chief Justice, who shall be the Chairman,
21, Art. 126 
23. Art. 130 
25. Art. 127
22. Art. 129.
24. Art. 131.
26. Art. 111 (2)
27. Art. 114
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and two Judges of the Supreme Court appointed by the
28President of the Republic. A Judge of the Supreme
Court appointed as a member of the Commission holds
office for a period of. five years from the date of his
29appointment and is eligible for reappointment.
The salary payable to a member of the Commission is
determined by Parliament and cannot be diminished
30during his term of office.
The provisions outlined above clearly indicate that 
the present Constitution of Sri Lanka is designed to 
confer a greater degree of independence on the judiciary 
than under the Republican Constitution of Sri Lanka,
1972. Article 113, which makes it an offence to interfere 
with the Judicial Service Commission,and article 116, 
which makes it an offence to interfere with the judiciary, 
add strength to that proposition.
It is one thing to guarantee the independence of 
the judiciary by incorporating provisions in the 
Constitution to that affect; it is quite another to say 
that in the general practice the judiciary is not 
subject to excessive or objectionable control or influence 
by the legislature as well as the executive. This is 
the aspect that we will discuss in the last part of this 
chapter. Before we embark on that discussion we will 
briefly examine the impact made by the judicial power 
cases of Ceylon on other jurisdictions.
28. Art. 112 (1). 
30. Art. 112 (7).
29. Art. 112 (4).
(3) The ’Judicial Power Cases1 of Ceylon: Their
Implications Abroad
Creative law-making by the Supreme Court of Ceylon
and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ceylon
cases, particularly the ’judicial power cases’, led to the
constitutional changes brought about in 1972 especially
in respect of the Judiciary. In the Local Authorities
(imposition of Civic Disabilities) Bill Decision, the
Constitutional Court decided, as we saw in the previous
chapter, that the legislature could not exercise judicial
power in a legislative form, thereby applying the .. . .
Liyanage Pr 1 ncipi.e to the Republican Constitution which
was designed so as ‘to make that principle inapplicable.
The present constitution, although it does not reintroduce
the power of judicial review, seeks to guarantee a greater
degree of judicial independence than that obtained under
the 1972 Constitution, further the revival of the term
1
’judicial officer’ , omitted from the 1972 Constitution, 
makes the ’judicial power cases’ of the 1948-1972 era
all the more relevant today.
The ’judicial power cases’ of Ceylon did not pass 
unnoticed in foreign jurisdictions. In fact, the Jamaican 
Gun Court case heavily relies on Liyahage.’s.: case for its 
conclusion in repect of the concept of judicial power.
1. See the Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978, art. 
114 (1): The appoinment, transfer, dismissal and
disciplinary control of Judicial officers,
.... . is vested in the /Judicial Service/ 
Comini ssion.
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The Judicial power cases of Ceylon have been
referred to in some judicial decisionsfrom Canada and
Australia and attracted academic discussion, first the
2
Jamaican Cun Court case.
3Hinds v. The Queen it was argued before the 
Privy Council that the Gun Court Act of 1974, passed by 
the Parliament of Jamaica as an ordinary Act of Parliament, 
under which each of the appellants had been convicted, 
amounted to an infingement of the provisions contained 
in the Constitution of Jamaica ..relating to the Judicature.
The Gun Court Act of 1974, the impugned statute, 
established a new court called the Gun Court with power 
to sit in three divisions: a Resident Magistrate’s
Division, a Full Court Division and a Circuit Court 
Division. Provision was made to confer an exclusive 
jurisdiction in firearm offences on the Gun Court. While 
inquiring into a firearm offence, the Gun Court could 
also try the offender for any other kind of offence he 
might be changed with. Prior to the creation of the Gun 
Court, criminal offences were triable either in a resident 
Magistrate’s court or in a circuit court of the Supreme 
Court of Jamaica.
It was held by the Privy Council that the Gun Court, 
in establishing the Resident Magistrate’s Division and 
the Circuit Court Division, merely enhanced the powers
2. /i97£? 1 All E. R. 353.
3« Ibide
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which were exercised by the resident magistrates and the 
circuit court of the Supreme Court respectively under the 
general law. The Cun Court Act, however, sought to 
create a new court when it provided for a Full Court 
Division consisting of three resident magistrates. The 
Full Court Division had a criminal jurisdiction, except 
for capital offences, and its sentencing powers for such 
offences v/ere coextensive with those of a circuit court.
It was argued that the impugned Act was unconstitutional 
to the extent that it purported to confer on a court 
consisting of persons qualified and appointed as resident 
magistrates a jurisdiction which under the Constitution 
was exercisable only by a person qualified and appointed 
as a judge of the Supreme Court.
Their Lordship observed that the constitutional 
provisions dealing with the appointment and security of 
tenure of all persons holding any salaried judicial 
office drew a distinction between
(a) a higher judiciary, consisting of the 
judges of the Supreme Court and judges
of the Court of Appeal; and
(b) a lower judiciary, consisting of 
resident magistrates etc.
Having outlined the relevant provisions , the Privy Council 
pointed out that:
the distinction between the higher 
and the lower judiciary is that 
the former are given a greater 
degree of security of tenure 
than the latter.^
4. Ibid., at p. 364.
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The difference in the degree of the security of
tenure, their Lordships thought, was attributable to the
difference of importance of the jurisdiction that higher
and lower courts exercised. Therefore, if a person is
granted a jurisdiction that is generally exercised by the
judges of the superior courts, then, such person must be
appointed in the same manner and entitled to the same
5security of tenure as a judge of a superior court.
I*1 Hinds v. The Queen the Privy Council went a step
further than deciding that judicial power should be
exercised by judicial officers: it decided that the judicial
power generally vested in a superior court cannot be
exercised by a judge of an inferior court. It is interesting
to note that in the judicial power cases of Ceylon this
issue did not come up for decision, except in Ratwatte v.
Piyasena.^ In that case the Supreme Court had to decide
whether it was constitutional to vest in election judges,
selected from judges of the Supreme Court and of certain
District Courts, election jurisdiction which was
exclusively exercised by the Supreme Court previously.
It was held that fthe Constitution does not vest the
jurisdiction to try election petitions in the Supreme 
7
Court1. As H. N. G. Pernando, S. P. J., explained:
Ibid.« at p. 365.
6. (1966) 69 N. 1. R. 49.
7. Ibid., at p. 52, per Sansoni, C. J.
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If it can properly be said that there 
has thus been an encroachment 
upon the jurisdiction previously 
enjoyed by judges of Supreme Court 
exclusively, those who thus encroach 
are themselves members of the 
judicature. There has been no 
encroachment by the legislature or 
the executive.g
Thus, while the Ceylon cases were primarily concerned 
with legislative and executive encroachments upon 
judicial power, the decision in Hinds v. The Queen seeks 
to declare it illegal to effect an encroachment by lower 
courts upon the jurisdiction of the higher courts.
In Hinds v. The Queen it was also argued that the 
power of the Gun Court to impose a mandatory sentence of 
detention at hard labour from which the detainee can only 
be discharged at the discretion of the Governor-General 
acting in accordance with the advice of the Review Board, 
a non-judicial body established by the Act, was inconsistent 
with the Constitution. The Privy Council pointed out that, 
in substance, the power to determine the length of any 
custodial sentence imposed for firearm offences was 
vested in the Board of Review: the Gun Court could only
make recommendations regarding the length of the custodial 
sentence but such recommendations did not bind the Board.
As their Lordship pointed out, although the legislature 
may impose limits on the discretion of the judge in 
imposing a sentence, it could not divest the courts of 
their sentencing power and vest it in a non-judicial body.
8. Ibid., at p. 57, per H. N. G. Pernando, S. P. J. 
This is the view entertained by the dissenting judges in 
Hind*s case.
If consistently with the 
Constitution, it is permissible 
for Parliament to confer the 
discretion to determine the 
length of custodial sentences 
for criminal offences on a 
body composed as the Review 
Board is, it would be equally 
permissible to a less well- 
intentioned Parliament to 
confer the same discretion 
on any other person or body of 
persons not qualified to 
exercise judicial powers, and in 
this way, without any amendment 
of the Constitution, to open 
the door to the exercise of 
arbitrary power by the Executive 
in the whole field of criminal 
lav/. ^
In arriving at these conclusions their lordships,
in Hinds v. The Queen, made certain general propositions.
Firstly, a Westminster Model Constitution generally
embodies the concept of separation of powers. As a
consequence of this, judicial power is exclusively vested
in the judiciary. The fact that the Constitution does
not expressly refer to separation of powers or to the
exclusive vesting of judicial power in the judiciary is
not conclusive because:
a great deal can be, and in drafting 
practice often is, left to necessary 
implication from the adoption in the 
new constitution of a governmental 
structure which makes provision for 
a legislature, an executive and a
judicature . . . A Z t  is well
established as a rule of construction
applicable to constitutional 
instruments under which this
9* Hinds v. The Queen £  1976_7 1 All E. R. 353 >
at p. 370.
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governmental structure is 
adopted, that the absence of 
express words to that effect 
does not prevent the legislative, 
the executive and the judicial 
powers of the new state being 
exercisable exclusively by the 
legislature, by the executive and 
by the judicature respectively.^
It is right to say that Hinds v. The Queen 
represents the high water mark in the judicial power 
cases of the Commonwealth. And, undoubtedly, the decision 
is based on a reformulation of the principles emerging 
from the judicial power cases of Ceylon.
With Hinds v. The Queen may be contrasted the
11Canadian decision of R v. G-anapathi. where it was held 
that the principle of separation of powers in Liyanage v.
The Queen did not invalidate a scheme empowering a 
magistrate to determine whether a traffic offence had 
occurred and then remit the case to an administrative
officer or tribunal to fix the penalty.
1 2
In R-'v. Humby the issue was whether the Matrimonial 
Causes Act of 1971 (Australia) which purported to validate 
maintenance orders made by the Master of Supreme Court,, which 
the Supreme Court of Southern Australia had held to be 
beyond his authority, was constitutional. The argument, 
based on Livanage v. The Queen, that the validation of 
orders was a usurpation of judicial power was rejected
19. Ibid ... at p. 359, 360.
11. (1973) 34 D. 1. R. (3d) 495.
12. 2 A. L. R. 297, (1973-74).
on the ground that the legislature made no determinations 
in respect of maintenance claims, but merely gave legal 
effect to determinations that had been made in the 
invalid orders. It was held that the Privy Council 
decision in Llyanage v. The Queen, which was given in a
special factual situation, had no application to the 
1 3instant case. ^
The relevance of the Liyanage Principle, namely 
that under the Soulbury Constitution of Ceylon there 
existed a separation of powers and that neither the 
legislature nor the executive could usurp the judicial 
power that exclusively belonged to the judiciary, for 
other Commonwealth countries has been the subject of 
academic discussion too.
Various similarities that existed between the 
constitutional systems of Ceylon and Australia, it has 
been pointed out, naturally makes Liyanage's case 
relevant for Australia. However, the difficulties
involved in applying that case to new factual situations 
appears to be a great obstacle to its relevance:
The decision appears to go a long 
way. However, its weight as an 
authoritative precedent is qualified 
by the Judicial Committee's 
disinclination to lay down any 
general rules about what might 
amount to usurpation or 
infringement of the judicial power.^
The relevance of Liyanage's case for Canada is not 
beyond controversy either.
13. Livanageb Case was discussed but not followed in: 
Gragnon and Valliers v. The Queen, 14 Criminal Reports,
New Series 321 Ti 971); and Taiga Ltd. v. M. B . C . 
International Ltd., and Others 50 A.L.J.(Reports) 629 (1976).
14. G-arth Nettheim, 'Legislative Interference with 
the Judiciary’, 40 A. L. J. 221 (1966).
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on the basis that the provisions contained in
the Canadian Constitution relating to the judiciary are
similar to those contained in the Soulbury Constitution
it has been suggested that Liyanage1s case is relevant
in Canada. This suggestion, however, is qualified by
the writer's doubt whether Liyanage's case is sound in
principle:
If the decision in Liyanage v.
The Queen is sound in principle, 
it points to the conclusion that 
the B. N. A. vests judicial power 
exclusively in the judiciary as a 
matter of law, so that constitutional 
amendment, not just an Act of 
Parliament or of a provincial 
legislature, would be required 
before such power could be exercised 
by the legislative or executive 
branches of government.
Disagreeing with the view expressed above, Peter
Hogg points out that unlike in Ceylon legislative and
executive interference with judicial ..process is not
16
precluded in Canada.
The judicial decisions and the legal writings that 
have been briefly examined above clearly indicate that 
the contribution made by the 'judicial power cases' of 
Ceylon to the development of the constitutional lav/ of 
the Commonwealth is not inconsiderable. Particularly, 
the decision of the Privy Council in Hinds v. The Queen 
bears ample evidence to the fact that what S. A. de 
Smith predicted has come true:
15. J. N. Lyon, 'The Central Fallacy of Canadian 
Constitutional Lav/', 22 McGill Law Journal (1976)
40, at 47.
16. P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (1977), 
at p. 200.
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/G.7iven the major premise that 
an exclusive domain is reserved 
to the judiciary by the Constitution 
tendencies to take a restrictive 
view of legislative power to vest 
judicial functions in bodies 
other than courts or judges 
will surely be reinforced. I?
The above discussion indicates that, except in 
Hinds' case, Liyanage's Principle has not been applied 
outside Sri Lanka. It is interesting to note that even 
in Hinds' case opinion was divided as to the 
constitutionality of the Jamaican Gun Court Act.
Viscount Dilhorne and Lord Fraser of Tullybelton,
disagreeing with the majority opinion delivered by Lord
Diplock, held that the impugned Act had validly conferred
on the Full Court Division of the Gun Court a jurisdiction
which had previously been exercisable by the Supreme Court
alone. In arriving at this conclusion, their Lordships
placed much emphasis on the fact that 'the creation of
the Full Court Division with its jurisdiction and powers
did not involve any transfer of judicial power to the 
18
executive'. While conceding that the Gun Court was 
vested with an exclusive jurisdiction in respect of 
firearm offences as well as any other offences committed 
by persons convicted by it of firearm offences, their 
Lordships could not find anything in the Jamaican
17. S. A. de Smith, 'The Separation of Powers in
a New Dress', 12 McGill Law Journal (1966) 491.
18- Hinds v. The Queen /19767 1 All E. R.
353, at p. 375.
Constitution which prohibited the exercise by a magistrate
or other inferior judicial officer of a jurisdiction
generally exercised by the Supreme Court of Jamaica.
Having observed that under section 97(1) of the Jamaican
Constitution Parliament could confer, by’an ordinary
statute, jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, their lordships
/
went on to say that:
/t7here is nothing in the Constitution
to indicate that it cannot by a
Bill passed in ^hat way reduce or
alter the jurisdiction and powers
(other than those given by the
Constitution) which by virture of the
Jamaica (Constitution; Order in
Council the Supreme Court had when
the Constitution came into force.
There is also nothing in the
Constitution to suggest that
unless the Constitution was
amended, the Supreme Court was to
continue to possess all the
powers and jurisdiction it had at
that tirne*^
19
This is exactly the position taken by the Supreme 
Court of Ceylon in respect of the power of Parliament to 
alter the jurisdiction of the courts of Ceylon. The 
discussion under the major sub-heading !the Conceptual 
Difference between Judicial Power and Jurisdiction* in 
chapter 8 of this thesis has revealed that the Supreme 
Court had held that Parliament could take away from the 
Courts a jurisdiction it was empowered to confer, although 
it was doubted whether certain powers which were 
inseparably connected with the Supreme Court could thus
19. Ibid., at p. 377.
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be taken away. The decision of the Supreme Court of
20
Ceylon in Ratwatte v. Iiyasena which we had occas+-ion
•to
to refer uearlier in this chapter clearly indicates that
Parliament could confer on a judicial officer other than
a judge of the Supreme Court a jurisdiction that had
previously been exercised exclusively by the Supreme Court
of Ceylon. Their Lordships in Hinds * case, thus, refused
to recognize a distinction between the jurisdiction of
the Superior and inferior courts, a distinction
significant enough to affect the constitutionality of an
Act of Parliament: their Lordships, however, appreciated
that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court could not be
taken away so as to materially affect the identity of
21
the Supreme Court as a superior court of record.
Their Lordships agreed with the majority decision
that the conferment of the power on the Board of Review
to determine the length of a mandatory custodial sentence
imposed by the Gun Court contravened the principle of
separation of powers. This principle, their Lordships
thought, had been given effect by the written terms of
the Constitution and did not arise by implication
22
as was held by the majority.
20. (1966) 69 K. L. R. 49.
21. Z19767 1 All E. R. 353, at p. 378.
22. Ibid.., at p. 380.
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It lias very correctly been pointed out by Hood
Phillips that in Britain which provided the ‘Westminster
Model* evidence of *a negation of the doctrine of the
23separation of powers in most of its meanings* is not
difficult to find. He asserts that the English principle
of the independence of the judiciary from executive
interference is not related historically to the doctrine
of the separation of powers*^
The innumerable difficulties which are encountered
in defining the concept of judicial power seem to be in
his mind when the learned writer says about the position
in England:
Our institutions may recognise 
in a general way three kinds of 
governmental powers, but no 
precise classification of their 
contents can be made; and also 
three kinds of governmental 
bodies, though it is not possible
to make a logical allotment of
powers among thein.0^
In part 1 of this chapter we have explained that 
when Independence v/as granted, colonial authorities 
abandoned the firmly held belief that the power of the
central government should be maintained against any other
institution in favour of providing checks and balances 
on the legislative and executive authorities Ceylon v/as 
to be endowed with. One must not forget that a
23e 0. Hood Phillips, 'A Constitutional Myth: 
Separation of Powers1, 93 Lav/ Quarterly Review (1977) 
11-13, at p. 12*
24. Ibid *, at p. 13 25. Ibid,
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'Y/estminster Model Constitution1, which is inevitably 
written, prescribes limits on the legislative competence 
of Parliament unknown to English constitutional 
lawyers. These observations indicate that, as Kood Phillips 
seems to believe, in determining the conceptual basis of 
a * V/estminster Model Constitution', any assistance that 
may be derived from the British constitutional experience 
.not be over-emphasized.
(4) Lions or Jackals: the Independence of Judges
.in Sri Lanka *
Judicial power, which essentially means the power 
to settle disputes between the subjects themselves or 
between the subject and the State, is generally entrusted 
io judges not just because they are legally qualified 
but because the law provides them with a degree of
1
independence which is not enjoyed by state officers. 
Therefore, if the independence of the judiciary is not
respected in a country, one cannot expect the courts to
do justice by the subject, especially when dealing with
disputes between him and the State. That is why the last
* This heading is suggested by the following article: 
1. Noble, ’Lions or Jackals: the Independence of Judges
in R. v. Hampden', 14 Stanford Review (1962) 711.
1. As Blackstone says in his Commentaries:
'In this distinct and separate existence of the judicial 
power, in a peculiar body of men, . . . consists one main 
preservative of the public liberty; which cannot subsist 
long in any state, unless the administration of common 
justice be in some degree separated both from the 
legislative and also from the executive power'. (7th ed. 
at p. 269).
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few images of this thesis must mainly be on how far
judges are immune from legislative and executive
interference,
Reference has already been made to the proceedings
before the Presidential Commission of Inquiry which
dealt with corruption and abuse of power committed
during the period 1970-1977. A  recurrent feature
of these proceedings is that high ranking officers,
including Ministers,are alleged to have interfered
2
with judges in the performance of their duties.
The Judges of the Supreme Court, established by 
the present Constitution of Sri Lanka, who exercise 
powers very much similar to those exercised by the judges 
of the Supreme Court as constituted under the former 
Constitution, are appointed by the President in keeping 
with the earlier practice. Thus the most appropriate 
course would have been to provide for the continuance 
in office of the judges of the Supreme Court, which was 
abolished by the 1978 Constitution, as judges of the 
newly constituted Supreme Court. However, the 
constitution-makers have thought fit to do otherwise: 
the judges of the abolished Supreme Court ceased to be 
judges of the Supreme Court with the commencement of the 
1978 Constitution and the President made fresh appointments 
to the newly constituted Supreme Court which resulted 
in the loss of office to certain judges of the former 
Supreme Court.
2. See surra pp. 410-11.
The practical consequence of this procedure is
that those judges who were not reappointed ceased to
hold office in a manner riot provided for in the former
Constitution under whfch they were appointed. Removal
of Judges of the Supreme Court was to he by the
President on an address by Parliament alone and this
rule continues to apply under the present Constitution
3
in a more rigid form. When the existing Constitution 
recognises, more firmly than before, that the tenure of 
judges should be guaranteed in order to ensure their 
independence, is it consonant with, the spirit of the 
Constitution that the Constitution itself should be used 
as a method of terminating the services of a judge 
otherwise than in accordance with the current
constitutional provisions relating to the removal of
judges ?
This incident is not strictly without precedent. 
Inquiring into the constitutionality of the Administration 
of Justice Bill, the Constitutional Court upheld the 
argument that the provision contained in that Bill, which 
declared that each judge who on the day preceding the 
commencing day of the Administration of Justice Law 
held office on the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court, 
unless he has reached the age of sixty-three years, would 
continue to be a judge of the newly constituted Supreme 
Court, was inconsistent with the Constitution which 
declared that the judges of the Supreme Court should be
A OK k i  U  <
This decision of the Constitutional Courtr is not 
sound in principle either; for when the impugned Bill 
provided for the continuance in office of the existing 
judges it did not appoint any judges hut merely guaranteed 
the office of existing judges who had been appointed by 
the President in accordance with the relevant 
constitutional provisions. If the decision of the 
Constitutional Court that the President should make new 
appointments because the Supreme Court to be established 
by the impugned Bill was a new court is anything to go by, 
then, the non-appointment of certain judges following 
the adoption of the present Constitution is legally 
justified. It is submitted that both these instances 
are far from being consistent with the proper degree of 
independence that judges should enjoy.
Kow the legislature has attempted to circumvent 
difficulties created by judicial decisions is relevant 
to our discussion. In 1974 the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka 
decided by a majority that an order of the Minister to 
acquire land was ineffective since he had not acted in 
good faith. Immediately after the decision was pronounced 
the National State Assembly prepared a Bill amending the 
Interpretation Ordinance on which the decision was based 
and nullifying the judgment, referred it to the 
Constitutional Court as an urgent Bill and,having obtained 
the approval of the Constitutional Court as to the Bill's 
constitutionality, proceeded to pass it with the clear
4. The decision is reported in The Decisions, of
the Constitutional Court, Vol 1 (1973), 57.
488
5
two-thirds majority the government commanded at the time.
This incident was criticised especially by the opposition
political parties as an attempt to undermine the
independence of the judiciary. Recently, while the
the decision of the High Court that the Special
Presidential Commission had no authority to inquire into
any incidents previous to the enactment of the relevant lav/
was being inquired into by the Supreme Court, the President
publicly declared that the government would respect any
decision that the Supreme Court would pronounce.0 However,
before the Supreme Court delivered its judgment an Act
was passed expressly conferring the power on the Commission
to inquire into any past events. The Act also validated
the proceedings before the Commission that had been
7
adversely affected by the High Court decision. Is this 
not a reenactment of what happened in 1974 in respect of 
the Interpretation Ordinance ?
The instances mentioned above are only a few of 
the examples which are available. One needs hardly to say 
that it is in the interest of the independence of the 
judiciary that such deeds ought to be avoided to the 
greatest possible extent.
Y/hat are the reasons for clashes between the judiciary 
and the administration? When one looks at such clashes, 
which start from the early days of colonial rule in Ceylon, 
the conclusion is irresistable that very often these
5. for a discussion of this incident see L. J. M. 
Cooray, 'The Twilight of Judicial Control of Executive 
Action in Sri Lanka’, 18 Hal ay a Lav/ Journal (1976) 230.
6. See Linanina (Sinhala daily) September 16, 1978.
7. Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry 
(Special Provisions) Act, Ho, 4 of 1978.
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are referable to a elasli of social values respected by
Ojudges and the administration.' As Griffith points out
judges are 'primarily concerned to protect and conserve
certain values and institutions'.
They ace protectors and conservators 
of v/hat has been, of the relationships 
and interests on which, in their view, 
our society is founded.Q
Therefore, particularly when a government 
is committed to radical or progressive changes in the 
social structure^there seems to be prepared ground for 
disagreement between the judges and the government 
leading to a strained relationship. Judges who are bred 
in the common law tradition upholding the rights 
and freedoms of the individual will not easily become 
adjusted to radical reforms of society. Therefore, these 
disagreements will continue until such time that there is 
a change of attitude in the mind of the judges. Such 
a change will not easily come because judges do tend 
to be very cautious in deviating from previous rules 
and practices.
When one talks about the role of the judiciary 
especially in the field of constitutional law it is 
extremely difficult to set an imaginary pattern against 
which the actual operation of courts can be tested.
The best that can be done is to r e v i e w  the past and present 
it so that we may learn from the past and build upon it,
8. See generally J. A. G. Griffith, The Politics
of the Judiciary (1977)
9- Il-ift. > at p. 52.
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